Municipal Minute

Updates on cases, laws, and other topics of interest to local governments

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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Monday, March 9, 2026

Introduction of BUILD Plan Legislation Proposes Statewide Housing Development Reform

  Monday, March 09, 2026    

In mid-February, the Governor delivered his State of the State address and budget proposal for the 2027 State Fiscal Year. During his presentation, Governor Pritzker shared his concerns about the availability and cost of housing across Illinois, noting that “local regulations have made it too difficult and costly to build new housing” and citing “bureaucratic red tape” as an impediment to residential development activity. To combat these issues, the Governor announced the Building Up Illinois Development (BUILD Plan), an initiative to lower housing costs by making it more efficient and cost effect to build housing in Illinois. This initiative includes several legislative proposals that have since been introduced in the Illinois General Assembly.

House Bill 5626: Housing Omnibus

HB 5626 is a 40-page omnibus bill that includes a host of amendments to the Illinois Municipal Code and Illinois Counties Code addressing issues including impact fees, “middle housing” development, accessory dwelling units (ADUs), single-stair regulations, among others. In addition to HB 5626, several bills have been introduced in the Illinois Senate which propose the same substantive changes at an issue-by-issue level.

Senate Bill 4060: Middle Housing & Statewide Standards

SB 4060 proposes several changes to the Illinois Municipal Code with the express purpose of expanding housing choice and increasing the supply of “middle housing,” which includes duplexes, triplexes, fourplexes, cottage clusters, townhomes, attached courtyard housing, detached courtyard housing, and stacked flat-plexes. If enacted, SB 4060 would limit the imposition of local standards (including bulk, lot area, setbacks, and other restrictions) that are not “clear and objective” as defined in the Bill. The Bill also proposes to prohibit municipalities from enforcing standards that impose requirements on middle housing that are more stringent than those applicable to detached single-family units and restricts the use of “discretionary review,” such as special use permitting and variations for middle housing unless the same process is required for single-family homes.

Senate Bill 4061: Single-Stair Reform

SB 4061 provides that, beginning January 1, 2027, no building code adopted by a municipality may prohibit a residential building from having a single stairway serving as an exit for all units if the building exhibits certain features (limited height, sufficient automatic sprinkler installation, and ample emergency escape and rescue openings for residents).

Senate Bill 4062: Statewide Impact Fee Calculation

SB 4062 proposes a plan to implement statewide municipal impact fee calculations. The Bill, if approved, would authorize and direct the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (IDCEO) to issue mandatory statewide formulas, multipliers, and other tools for calculating and imposing impact fees at the local level. The Bill sets forth several deadlines for compliance with its provisions, including an overall 30-month timeframe for municipalities to being calculating impact fees in accordance with the formulas and guidance materials to be published by the IDCEO.

Senate Bill 4063: Third-Party Plan Review

SB 4063 provides uniform deadlines for municipal building permit review and inspections, proposing the following deadlines:

o   Plan Review:

§  A municipality must complete its initial plan review (undefined term) within 15 business days after receipt of an application for a 1-family or 2-family residential project.

§  A municipality must complete its initial plan review (undefined term) within 30 business days after receipt of an application for a multifamily, mixed-use, or commercial project.

§  Any subsequent reviews must be completed within 10 business days of the revisions being submitted.

o   Inspections: a municipality must conduct any required inspection within 2 business days of receiving a request.

Under SB 4063, if a municipality failed to comply with the plan review and inspection deadlines, an applicant would be able to retain a qualified third-party professional to conduct the review or inspection. These professionals must be licensed architects or engineers and be certified under one of several national building code standards. Upon submission of third-party plan reviews and inspection reports, municipalities would be limited in their ability to audit the reviews and impose additional standards for projects

Senate Bill 4064: Parking Reform

SB 4064 proposes to limit municipal parking requirements starting January 1, 2027. Specifically municipalities would be prohibited from requiring more than 0.5 parking space per multifamily dwelling, or more than 1 parking space per single-family home. Municipalities would also be restricted from establishing parking minimums for certain uses including affordable housing projects, dwellings smaller than 1,500 square feet, and others.

Senate Bill 4071: Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs)

SB 4071 provides that every municipality must permit ADUs in all zoning districts allowing single-family dwellings without additional requirements related to lot size, setbacks, aesthetic standards, design review, frontage, space limitations, or controls beyond those imposed for single-family homes. The Bill also limits other ADU regulations, including by prohibiting municipalities from requiring a familial relationship between occupants of an ADU and the principal structure on a lot.

Again, the proposals in Senate Bills 4060–4064 and Senate Bill 4071 have also been introduced in the Illinois House through House Bill 5626. All of the legislative initiatives summarized above also include express language preempting home rule units from regulating in a manner more restrictive to the various housing initiatives than provided in the bills. Readers should note that these bills were only recently introduced, and some (or all) may be subject to amendments, debate, and delays as they make their way through the General Assembly. We will be tracking this legislation to provide key updates as the spring legislative session gets underway.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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Thursday, March 5, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 102: Web Accessibility

  Thursday, March 05, 2026    

Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast just released Episode 102: Web Accessibility. 

In this episode, Jamie Wilkey, a Partner at Lauterbach & Amen, joins Ancel Glink’s Katie Nagy to discuss the Department of Justice’s final rule on web accessibility under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). They explore the new requirements for state and local governments to ensure their web content and mobile applications are accessible to individuals with disabilities, and offer practical advice on implementation, technical standards, and compliance deadlines (starting on April 24, 2026 for some larger governments). 

Highlights:

  1. The Technical Standard: An overview of WCAG 2.1 Level AA, the benchmark for digital accessibility compliance.
  1. Defining Web Content: Understanding how the rule applies to websites, mobile apps, social media, online payment portals, and digital documents like meeting minutes and agendas.
  1. Compliance Deadlines: Key dates for local governments (April 24, 2026 for populations over 50,000; April 26, 2027 for smaller entities and special districts).
  1. Practical Implementation: Steps for success, including identifying an internal team, conducting an inventory of digital assets, and prioritizing remediation.
  1. Exceptions and Limitations: A breakdown of what content is exempt, such as archived web content, pre-existing conventional documents, and certain third-party content.
  1. Risk Management: Analyzing the legal, financial, and reputational risks of non-compliance.
  1. Public Comment: A discussion on the Seventh Circuit's decision in O’Donnell v. City of Chicago regarding vehicle forfeiture programs and unconstitutional takings.

Resources:

  1. Fact Sheet: New Rule on the Accessibility of Web Content and Mobile Apps Provided by State and Local Governments
  1. DOJ Guidance: First Steps Toward Complying with the ADA Title II Web and Mobile Application Accessibility Rule
  1. Municipal Minute: City's Vehicle Forfeiture Program Not an Unconstitutional Taking

  

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Tuesday, March 3, 2026

Court Finds FOIA Search Reasonable But Sends Request for Civil Penalties for Late Response Back to Circuit Court

  Tuesday, March 03, 2026    

An Illinois Appellate Court recently found a public body's search for records in response to a FOIA request to be reasonable and adequate in Tobias v. City of Chicago's Office of Mayor.

An independent journalist submitted a FOIA request to the Office of Mayor for text messages between the Mayor and the President of the Chicago Teachers Union for the period from the date the Mayor took office to the date the FOIA was processed and all text messages sent or received by the Mayor's Chief of Staff for two specified dates. 

A City FOIA officer extended the time for response and initiated a search of texts but the City did not respond by the extended due date. Shortly thereafter, the journalist filed a lawsuit against the City claiming it violated FOIA by not responding to the FOIA request. The City produced four pages of text messages as part of its response to the lawsuit, arguing that the case was now moot, and that it could not have produced the records by the original deadline because it did not possess them at that time. The circuit court ruled in the City's favor, finding that the City did not have the records in its possession at the time the FOIA response was due since the records had not been turned over to the City until after the deadline.

On appeal, the journalist argued that the City improperly narrowed its search for records, both in scope and time-frame. The Appellate Court disagreed, finding that the City's search was both reasonable and adequate in scope and time and there was no statutory requirement that records existing after the date of the City's search be provided. However, the Court determined that the circuit court needed to reconsider the journalist's request for civil penalties against the City for failing to respond to the FOIA request in a timely matter and remanded the case back for further proceedings. 


  

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Monday, March 2, 2026

Court Rules in Favor of Public Body in FOIA Case

  Monday, March 02, 2026    

In 2023, a FOIA requester mailed over 40 letters to the Illinois Secretary of State (ILSOS) seeking copies of various records. After ILSOS did not respond to his requests, the requester sued ILSOS alleging various FOIA violations. ILSOS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, supported by the affidavit of its FOIA Officer, because (1) the requester failed to comply with ILSOS’s FOIA regulations, because the requests were improperly addressed—not directed to the designated address for ILSOS’s FOIA officer as identified on its forms, and (2) because ILSOS never received the FOIA requests, it did not violate FOIA. The circuit court ruled in favor of ILSOS, and the requester appealed. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of ILSOS. Lenard v. Office of the Illinois Secretary of State.

The appellate court determined that Section 3(h) of FOIA expressly authorizes public bodies to establish FOIA regulations governing the time, place, and person from whom records may be requested. In this case, because the requester failed to comply with ILSOS’s FOIA regulations for submitting FOIA requests by sending his requests to the wrong address rather than the address prescribed by ILSOS in its forms, the appellate court determined that ILSOS never received his requests within the meaning of FOIA, and ILSOS’s duty to respond was never triggered. Furthermore, because the requester’s FOIA requests were improperly submitted to ILSOS, the requester was never denied access to public records, and ILSOS did not improperly deny the requester access to records in violation of FOIA. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

  

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Monday, February 23, 2026

Appellate Court Sends FOIA Challenge Back to Circuit Court

  Monday, February 23, 2026    

In 2022, a requester sued a county board, a county sheriff, and a county’s state’s attorney’s office (defendants) for several alleged FOIA violations. During the litigation, defendants requested the circuit court to: (1) allow defendants to designate one of the requester’s FOIA requests as unduly burdensome because defendants identified over 69,000 pages of responsive records to the request, or (2) in the alternative, to perform an in camera review of defendants responsive records to assess whether FOIA exemptions applied to the records. The circuit court appointed a special master to review defendants’ 69,000 pages of records to determine which parts of the records qualified for exemptions, and ordered the requester to pay the special master’s retainer prior to the start of their services. The requester did not make the court-ordered retainer payment, which led the circuit court to rule in favor of defendants, finding that the requester’s FOIA request was unduly burdensome, and that the requester failed to comply with the court’s prior order requiring pre-payment of the special master’s fees for review services.

After the requester appealed the circuit court’s ruling, an Illinois Appellate Court: (1) held that the circuit court erred when it appointed a special master and required the requester to pay the special master’s review services fees, and (2) ordered the circuit court to re-instate the requester’s FOIA lawsuit and conduct that proceeding in accordance with FOIA. Dorman v. Madison County.

The Appellate Court reasoned that FOIA places the burden of justifying nondisclosure squarely on public bodies, and that FOIA contemplates that the court itself will resolve disputes concerning exemptions and disclosure. The Appellate Court determined that the circuit court’s inherent authority to control their proceedings may not be exercised in a way that conflicts with, or expands beyond, a legislatively prescribed statutory scheme. Here, the Appellate Court determined that the FOIA statute does not permit courts to (i) delegate their express statutory in camera review responsibilities to third parties, (ii) impose compliance or review-related costs on a requester, or (iii) condition the continuation of a requester’s FOIA action on their payment for special master services.

Post Authored by Eugene Boltnikov, Ancel Glink

  

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Thursday, February 19, 2026

In the Zone: Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Village in TIF Dispute with Schools

  Thursday, February 19, 2026    

In 2004, a village in Illinois established a tax-increment financing district (TIF #1) to revitalize its town center. In 2021 (6 years before the expiration of TIF #1), the village passed several ordinances to create a new TIF district comprised entirely of parcels of land that were previously included in the original TIF district’s redevelopment area (TIF #2). The majority of the parcels in TIF #2 are owned by a local hospital network, which entered into a redevelopment agreement with the village to increase parking for its facilities and facilitate the development of a mixed-use commercial building. Due to delays in the approval processes, the redevelopment of the hospital site began prior to adoption of the ordinance establishing TIF #2.

Two local school districts filed a lawsuit against the village, claiming that the newly established TIF #2 was invalid because it did not satisfy the statutory requirements for a “conservation area” subject to TIF treatment. The school districts claimed that the ongoing redevelopment activity by the hospital (prior to establishment of TIF #2) showed there was no need for tax-increment financing to spur development. Additionally, the school districts claimed that the process of removing parcels from TIF #1 only to include those same parcels in TIF #2 was an unlawful attempt to extend the 23-year lifespan imposed for TIF districts under the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (Act).

The trial court ruled in favor of the village, finding it adequately established that the area comprising TIF #2 met the minimum criteria to be deemed a “conservation area” eligible for tax-increment financing. More specifically, the trial court determined that the village had shown there was (1) a lack of community planning, (2) a lagging equalized assessed value (EAV) in the proposed TIF #2 area compared with the rest of the village, and (3) deterioration of parcels within the TIF #2 area. The trial court also determined that the de-TIF/re-TIF process of removing parcels from one TIF district to enroll them in another was not prohibited by the Act.

The school districts appealed the trial court’s decision, and the Appellate Court upheld the ruling in favor of the village. On the issue of TIF #2’s designation as a conservation area, the Appellate Court first determined that the village had not erred in finding that the designated area would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without implementation of TIF #2 and the associated redevelopment plan. While the hospital campus was being actively redeveloped when TIF #2 was established, the Court determined that this activity was clearly supported by the promise of tax-increment financing—in other words, the redevelopment activity and establishment of TIF #2 worked in tandem to stimulate revitalization of the site. The Court further affirmed that the village properly established the 3 eligibility criteria (lack of planning, lagging EAV, and deterioration) to designate TIF #2 as a conservation area.

The Appellate Court also determined that the de-TIF/re-TIF process for the parcels removed from TIF #1 and enrolled in TIF #2 was valid. The Court acknowledged that, to extend the life of a TIF district, municipalities must seek approval from the Illinois General Assembly. However, the Court found TIF #2 was sufficiently distinct from TIF #1, and therefore the de-TIF/re-TIF was not an invalid extension without legislature approval. The Appellate Court observed that nothing prohibits a parcel of land from being placed in a new TIF district after removal from another. Furthermore, the Court noted that the base EAV values had been reset upon the village’s creation of TIF #2, which effectively allowed the other local taxing bodies to receive tax revenue based on EAVs calculated in 2021 rather than 2004. Therefore, the facts and circumstances underlying the creation of TIF #2 did not suggest an unlawful extension of the original TIF #1.

Board of Education of Winfield S.D. 34, et al. v. Village of Winfield

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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Wednesday, February 18, 2026

Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Government in Malicious Prosecution Case

  Wednesday, February 18, 2026    

In Hill v. Cook County, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld a circuit court’s ruling in favor of government defendants in a malicious prosecution claim.

An arrestee sued the county, the county sheriff, and a municipality and various police officers for claims arising from an arrest in connection with an alleged armed robbery. The arrestee claimed that upon his arrest, he entered into an agreement with police that he would not be rearrested or charged in connection with the incident if he passed a polygraph test.

At his criminal trial, the court found the agreement unenforceable because a prosecutor was not involved in the agreement. Subsequently, the arrestee was sentenced to lengthy prison sentences for murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery convictions.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the court erred in finding his arrest agreement with police invalid. While his appeal was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Stapinski, holding that prosecutors could be bound by agreements made by police officers, and his agreement with police was later found valid and his conviction was vacated.

After his conviction was vacated, he filed an action for malicious prosecution against the government defendants. Because the vacation of his conviction was based on contract law and due process principles, and not the probability of his innocence, the Appellate Court held that the government defendants could not be held liable for malicious prosecution, and the trial court's ruling in favor of the government defendants was proper. 

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink


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Tuesday, February 17, 2026

Appellate Court Addresses Claims Against Municipality by Tree Vendor

  Tuesday, February 17, 2026    

An Illinois Appellate Court dismissed most of the claims in a lawsuit filed by a vendor against a municipality, although it allowed an unjust enrichment claim and a fradulent misrepresentation claim to move forward in the circuit court. Johns Pro-Tree Service v. Village of Dolton.

A mayor and two village public works employees reached out to the president of a tree service company for emergency tree trimming and removal service related to a storm in June 2023. After the parties agreed to a price, the tree company completed the work. Subsequently, the parties agreed to continue the services to the village, and the village paid the full invoice amount. On September 25th, the company submitted another invoice for their work, but was told that none of the village’s vendors would be paid for their recent work due to budget restrictions. The company filed a lawsuit against the village claiming breach of contract, a violation of the Local Government Prompt Payment Act, fraudulent misrepresentation, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The circuit court dismissed the case in its entirety, finding that the village was immune from liability and the alleged contract was not enforceable because it had not been approved or ratified by the village's board of trustees.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of the breach of contract, Prompt Payment Act, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel claims. 

On the breach of contract claim, the Appellate Court held that the complaint did not show that the contract was approved by the board of trustees or that the board had delegated contracting authority to the mayor or other officials or otherwise authorized the contract with the tree service contract. As a result, the tree service company's claim that the village had breached a contract with the company was properly dismissed by the circuit court. 

The Appellate Court also held that because the breach of contract claim was properly dismissed, the Local Government Payment Act claim was also properly dismissed.

On the company's quantum meruit claim, the Appellate Court found that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to show that the board of trustees authorized the proper officials to accept or approve the terms of the transaction with the tree service company.

The Appellate Court also upheld the dismissal of the company's promissory estoppel claim finding that the company did not establish that the representatives of the village involved with the tree company had authority to make any representations or promises to the company.

However, the Appellate Court disagreed with the circuit court on the dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, finding that the village did not meet the burden of proof by showing they were immune under the Tort Immunity Act. 

The Court also disagreed with the dismissal of the tree company's unjust enrichment claim, finding that this claim was adequately pled in the complaint to survive a dismissal.

As a result, the Court sent the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings on the company's fraudulent mispresentation and unjust enrichment claims.

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

  

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Thursday, February 12, 2026

Appellate Court Upholds Demolition Order But Limits Municipal Fines

  Thursday, February 12, 2026    

In County of DuPage v. Arjmand, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld a demolition order issued by a circuit court in favor of a county, but reversed portions of the circuit court's order imposing fines on the property owner.

A property owner owned a partially constructed and vacant property. According to the county, the property contained numerous unsafe and hazardous conditions, including broken windows, graffiti, mold, and structural issues, and became a site for trespassing and other illicit activities. After the owner failed to address all of the code issues, the county filed a complaint against the owner alleging that the residence was an unsafe structure, public nuisance, lacked a valid building permit, and violated various provisions of the International Property Maintenance Code.

The circuit court ruled in favor of the county on all counts in 2021 and issued a demolition order for 2022. The court also imposed fines, fees, and costs against the property owner. The owner appealed, raising four issues on appeal: (1) the validity of demolition order, (2) the grant of summary judgment in favor of the county, (3) the validity of the imposed fines, and (4) the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself.

The Appellate Court upheld the demolition order in favor of the county, finding that despite the owner taking some remedial measures, the property remained dangerous and unsafe, and the owner had more than reasonable time to repair the property. 

As to the owner's appeal of the fines imposed by the court, the Appellate Court determined that fines for ordinance violations must be calculated for violations up to the date of the court order, not after the order is issued. The court also rejected the issuance of prejudgment fines on certain of the counts and sent the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

The Appellate Court also rejected the property owner's claim that the judge should have recused himself.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

  

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Wednesday, February 11, 2026

PAC Finds FOIA Violation in Response to Request for Termination Letter

  Wednesday, February 11, 2026    

A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a State's Attorney's Office (SAO) seeking records about a former SAO employee who was terminated and criminally charged for alleged misconduct while working at the SAO. The SAO withheld a responsive termination letter on the basis that the letter, if disclosed, would interfere with a pending criminal prosecution and picking of a jury.

After the requester submitted a request for review with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), the PAC issued its second binding opinion of 2026 concluding that the SAO improperly withheld the termination letter. PAC Op. 26-002.

First, the PAC determined that FOIA’s investigatory exemptions in Section 7(1)(d) only apply to records either (1) created in the course of administrative enforcement proceedings, or (2) if the record is maintained by a correctional or law enforcement agency for law enforcement purposes. In this case, the PAC determined that the termination letter was not created during the course in the course of an administrative enforcement proceeding. The PAC also determined that the letter was not a record maintained by the SAO "for law enforcement purposes,” because the letter was a personnel record created by the SAO to document a former employee’s termination. Because the withheld letter was not a record maintained by the SAO "for law enforcement purposes,” the PAC determined that FOIA’s investigatory exemptions in Sections 7(1)(d)(i) and 7(1)(d)(iii) did not apply to allow the SAO to withhold the record.

Second, the PAC determined that the SAO did not demonstrate that disclosing the letter would interfere with law enforcement proceedings or create a substantial likelihood that a person would be deprived of a fair trial or impartial hearing. Although the SAO argued that the court had not yet ruled on the admissibility of information in the letter, the PAC reasoned that FOIA does not provide a blanket exemption for records that may contain information that may be inadmissible in court. The PAC found that the SAO did not illustrate that revealing previously undisclosed information in the letter is likely to garner intense pre-trial publicity that could taint the pool of potential jurors in the county. Even if some potential jurors were exposed to the letter, the PAC argued that the SAO could use judicial safeguards, like voir dire, to identify and exclude potential jurors whose knowledge of relevant information may taint their impartiality. While the letter contains allegations that have not been publicly disseminated or reported on, the PAC reasoned that disclosing the letter would not interfere with the prosecution of the former SAO employee, because it does not contain highly specific details (e.g., identities of witnesses, sensitive details that would materially impact witness testimony, or evidentiary proof or sources of evidence) that would interfere with a law enforcement proceeding.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

  

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Tuesday, February 10, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 101 - Navigating AI's Impact on the Modern Workplace

  Tuesday, February 10, 2026    

Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast just released Episode 101 featuring Mysi Hall's recent ILCMA presentation, “Digital Decisions: Navigating AI’s Impact on the Modern Workplace.” In this podcast, Mysi examines the current legal landscape surrounding the use of artificial intelligence in labor relations and employment practices.

Highlights:

  • The Legal Landscape: Overview of federal and state regulations, including EEOC guidelines on Title VII and the ADA.
  • Illinois Specifics: A look at the AI Video Interview Act (AIVIA) and the 2026 amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act.
  • Bias and Mitigation: Understanding automation bias, selective adherence, and real-world examples of algorithmic discrimination.
  • Labor Relations: How major unions (ILA, SAG-AFTRA, AFL-CIO) are negotiating AI safeguards and transparency.
  • Best Practices: Practical steps for employers, including the NIST Risk Management Framework and the importance of human oversight.

  

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Thursday, February 5, 2026

Clean and Reliable Grid Affordability Act’s Impact on Units of Local Government and Road Districts

  Thursday, February 05, 2026    

On January 8, 2026, Governor Pritzker signed the Clean and Reliable Grid Affordability Act (CRGA) into law. With an effective date of June 1, 2026, the Act brings several changes to state energy policy intended to develop new energy resources.

The Act amends state statute to restrict the ability of units of local government and road districts to impose fees, fines, or other payment obligations for road use agreements with a commercial wind energy facility or a commercial solar energy facility owner (including the facility developer).

Previously, Section 5-12020 of the Counties Code stated that road-related fees, permit fees, or other charges imposed under a road use agreement must be reasonably related to the administration cost of such agreement.

Under the new amendment, a road district or other unit of local government is prohibited from requiring any permit fees, fines, or other payment obligations as a condition of a road use agreement, unless the reasonable permit fee or payment obligation reflects the actual expenses incurred. These expenses must relate to the negotiation, execution, construction, or implementation of the road use agreement.

The new amendment also prohibits a road use agreement from requiring a facility owner to pay or perform any road work that is not specifically and uniquely related to the road improvements required for the facility or the restoration of roads used by the facility owner during construction-related activities. 

In effect, the Act constrains the scope of road use agreements and the ability of units of local government and road districts to impose fees related to commercial alternative energy facilities. However, Section 5-12020 of the Counties Code does not expressly provide that it is a denial and limitation on home rule powers and functions.

Authored by Luigi Laudando and Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

  

  

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Wednesday, February 4, 2026

More Bills Introduced in General Assembly to Amend FOIA

  Wednesday, February 04, 2026    

On January 20th, we reported on a number of bills introduced in the Illinois General Assembly this term that would, if approved, amend various provisions of FOIA. Since that post, the General Assembly has been quite busy and has introduced many more bills that propose to amend FOIA, many of which appear to be designed to address the recent proliferation of "mass" requests submitted by organizations that seek the same records from numerous numerous public bodies. 

HB 4597: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to authorize a public body to impose a fee on a requester for staff time incurred in redacting body camera recordings, at the lowest paid employee's pay rate. The bill has some exceptions where a fee may not be imposed, including (1) where the requester certifies that it will not use the recording for financial purposes; or (2) the requester is involved in the incident; or (3) the recording depicts an officer-involved shooting; or (4) the public body fails to provide the requester with an estimate of the applicable fees as required by the bill.

HB  4681: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to add provisions relating to "mass" requesters and "vexatious" requesters and expand the definition of "commercial" requester. The bill would also require requesters to notify the public body before filing a lawsuit against the public body for an alleged violation of FOIA. The bill would provide a process for public bodies to petition the Public Access Counselor of the Attorney Generals Office (PAC) for relief from "vexatious" requesters, and also provide additional time to respond to "mass" requesters.

HB 4682: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to provide that repeated requests for commercial purposes are deemed unduly burdensome if the reuqests are from the same person and seek similar or updated records.

HB 4683: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to add language regarding "mass" requesters and provide additional time for the public body to respond to requests from requesters that fall into that category. 

HB 4684: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to modify the definition of "commercial purpose" and add a new provision for "purposeless mass requests."

HB 4704: If approved, this bill would amend the Student Confidentiality Reporting Act and FOIA to prohibit the release of information submitted to school helplines.

SB 3218: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to modify provisions relating to law enforcement and arrest and booking records, increase the allowable fee for copies from 15 cents to 25 cents, and modify the amount public bodies can charge for staff time in searching for and retrieving records requested for commercial purposes.

None of these bills have passed yet, but we will keep you posted if any of these move forward.


  

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Tuesday, February 3, 2026

Seventh Circuit Grants Qualified Immunity to Police Officers

  Tuesday, February 03, 2026    

In Johnson v. Edwards, an arrestee sued four police officers alleging they violated his constitutional rights after he was arrested for disorderly conduct. 

Johnson was arrested after he attempted to enter an area that had been taped off for police investigation of a crime scene. When the police officers ordered Johnson to leave the area, he became agitated and began to yell at the officers. Johnson refused to leave and the officers arrested Johnson, put him in the squad car, and drove him to the police station. Johnson had refused to wear his seatbelt on the drive there. On the way there, Johnson asked the officer to slow down. The officer quickly slowed the car down to stop at a red light which caused Johnson to lurch forward and hit his head on the divider. Two minutes later, when they arrived at the station, the officers realized Johnson had been knocked unconscious. He was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed and treated for a cut lip.

Johnson was charged with disorderly conduct for failing to obey a police officer. After the charges were dropped, he sued the officers involved in his arrest, claiming the following constitutional violations: (1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) state-created danger in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; (3) excessive use of force for the “rough ride” to the station; (4) failure to provide adequate medical care. Johnson also brought a claim for malicious prosecution. The district court ruled in favor of the police officers, finding they were immune from Johnson’s claims based on qualified immunity. 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in favor of the officers. The Seventh Circuit found that Johnson had not established a violation of his constitutional rights because: (1) the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for engaging in disorderly conduct when he refused to leave the crime scene; (2) the officers had not placed Johnson in a position of danger, or violated an established constitutional right, by allowing him to ride to the station without a seatbelt on; (3) the facts did not support a finding that the ride to the station constituted an excessive use of force; and (4) the officers had called the paramedics as soon as they realized Johnson was hurt, so Johnson could not establish that they acted unreasonably. Because Johnson failed to establish a violation of a constitutional right, the Seventh Circuit found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.

As to Johnson’s malicious prosecution claim, the Court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for disorderly conduct and dismissed this claim.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter

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Monday, February 2, 2026

Court Finds Response to FOIA Request That Was Quarantined by Email Service Untimely

  Monday, February 02, 2026    

An Illinois Appellate Court recently issued an opinion on the timeliness of FOIA responses where a request is quarantined by a public body's email software service. Balzer v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation.

On July 31st, a requester emailed a FOIA request to the public body's FOIA officer seeking various contract records. However, the FOIA officer did not learn about the FOIA request until the next business day because the public body’s third-party email software service (Mimecast) flagged the email as suspicious and quarantined the FOIA request in its security queue. On August 1st, Mimecast sent the public body’s FOIA account a notification that the FOIA request was held in queue, and the public body’s FOIA officer received the FOIA request that day. The public body reached out to the requester on August 1st to ask the requester to narrow the request because it was unduly burdensome. The requester refused to narrow the request, and the public body formally denied the FOIA request as unduly burdensome pursuant to Section 3(g) of FOIA on August 8th, the sixth business day after the request was sent, but only the fifth business day after the FOIA officer became aware of it.

The requester sued the public body, claiming the public body’s response was untimely. The circuit court ruled in favor of the public body, finding that FOIA’s five-business-day response window only begins when the public body actually receives and acknowledges receipt, which according to the circuit court meant that the response was due on August 8th.

However, on appeal, the Appellate Court ruled in favor of the requester, finding that the public body received the request on July 31st (the day that Mimecast received the request and quarantined it), so the public body's August 8th response was untimely under FOIA. 

The Appellate Court acknowledged that FOIA does not define when a FOIA request is deemed received by a public body. However, the Court found that the request at issue was “received” by the public body when Mimecast received it on July 31st, regardless of whether Mimecast or the public body were aware of it, and regardless of whether Mimecast was operated by a third-party rather than by the public body. The Appellate Court held that FOIA does not "toll" a public body’s five-business-day response obligation because a system that the public body itself created or adopted caused an internal delay in a request reaching its FOIA officer, so the public body’s August 8th denial of the request was untimely.

The Appellate Court also held that the public body waived its ability to deny the request as unduly burdensome pursuant to Section 3(g) of FOIA because its response was untimely.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

  

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Wednesday, January 28, 2026

Ancel Glink at the IAPD/IPRA 2026 Conference

  Wednesday, January 28, 2026    

For all of our park officials and employee readers who will be in attendance at the IAPD/IPRA conference this week, we hope you can stop by one or more of the sessions at which Ancel Glink attorneys will be presenting:

Thursday, 1/29/2026

1 - 2 pm - Session 112 - Real Estate 101, Scott Puma & David Silverman (Ancel Glink)

1 - 2 pm - Session 120 - Can We and Should We Have Video Surveillance in Parks & Facilities?, Megan Mack & Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink)

1 - 2 pm - Session 126 - From Ballot To Victory: Strategies for Successful Referendums, Keri-Lyn Krafthefer (Ancel Glink), Lauren Raspanti & Paul Henley

Friday, 1/30/2026

8:30 - 9:30 am - Session 110 - Legal/Legislative I, Derke Price (Ancel Glink) & Jason Anselment

3:30 - 4:30 pm - Session 119 - Regulating Controversial Park Activities, Eugene Bolotnikov, Katie Nagy & Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink)

Saturday, 1/31/2026

10:45 - 11:45 am - Session 115 - Be Prepared for Your First Amendment Audits, Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink)

10:45 - 11:45 am - Session 118 - Park District Finance - It's Not Intuitive, Adam Simon (Ancel Glink) & Mari-Lynn Peters

12:30 - 1:30 pm - Session 116 - Understanding Social Media: Facebook? Instagram? X?, Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink)

12:30 - 1:30 pm - Session 131 - Solar and Green Energy Options, Adam Simon (Ancel Glink), Erik Brown & Shawn Ajazi

12:30 - 1:30 pm - Session 133 - Managing Teen Takeover Events: Strategies, Challenges, and Collaborative Solutions, Derke Price (Ancel Glink) & Chief Steven Schindlbeck

12:30 - 1:30 pm - Session 129 - Boardmanship Essentials Part I, Scott Puma (Ancel Glink)

2 - 3 pm - Session 130 - Boardmanship Essentials Part II, Adam Simon (Ancel Glink)

2 - 3 pm - Session 122 - You Really Should Read Your Board Policy Manual (And Keep It Updated), Scott Puma & Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink)

2 - 3 pm - Session 128 - Parks Role in Successful Planning and Economic Development, David Silverman (Ancel Glink), Dan Bolin (Ancel Glink) & Jodi Mariano

  

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Tuesday, January 27, 2026

Fourth Circuit Denies Injunctive Relief for Public Comment Interruptions

  Tuesday, January 27, 2026    

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling on public comment at meetings in Platt v. Mansfield. Although the Fourth Circuit does not cover Illinois so this ruling is not binding on Illinois government bodies, the case is interesting because it provides a different perspective from the recent Public Access Counselor ruling (PAC Op. 26-001) that we reported on recently that struck down a public comment policy that prohibited comments that attacked public employees or officials.

The case involved a school board that offered an opportunity for public comment at its school board meetings pursuant to a school board policy. That policy prohibited public comment that targets, criticizes, or attacks individual students at meetings, and stated that these type of concerns must be raised privately to the appropriate school official. A group of individuals attended a school board meeting to express their concerns about a student who had been arrested for threats to another classmate, and claimed they were interrupted or not allowed to speak after the board ended the public comment period because of the content of their speech. They filed a lawsuit against the school board claiming that the school board discriminated against their viewpoint and that the board's public comment policy was unconstitutionally vague in violation of their free speech rights under the First Amendment. The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, and they appealed.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of injunctive relief, finding that the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims to support their request for a preliminary injunction. The Court found that the public comment period of the school board meeting was a "limited public forum" and the school board had the right to establish content-neutral restrictions on the speach presented during that public comment period so long as those restrictions were not discriminatorily applied. The Court determined that the school board only interrupted speakers when they violated the school board's policy that prohibits comments that critized an individual student. The Court rejected the speakers' argument that they were discriminated against, finding that the interruptions during their comments were for violations of a facially constitutional speech policy. 





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Monday, January 26, 2026

Court Finds City Immune from Lawsuit in Case Involving Missing Person

  Monday, January 26, 2026    

An Illinois Appellate Court determined that a municipality had immunity from a lawsuit brought by a mother who claimed she suffered emotional distress caused by the municipality's failure to assist her in locating her missing daughter. Specifically, the court held that the city had immunity from liability for "failure to provide adequate police protection or service" under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act. Bailey v. City of Chicago.

A mother called 911 to report her daughter missing after she went to her daycare center and the child was missing. She also asked the police to issue an Amber Alert. No police met with her at the daycare and no Amber Alert was issued, although her daughter was found about two hours after she was reported missing. The mother filed a lawsuit against the city claiming the city breached a duty of care. After the circuit court dismissed the complaint and denied her request to amend the complaint, she appealed to the Appellate Court, which upheld the circuit court's ruling, finding that her claims were barred by the Tort Immunity Act.

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Thursday, January 22, 2026

PAC Finds OMA Violation for Restriction on Public Comment at Meeting

  Thursday, January 22, 2026    

The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's Office (PAC) issued its first binding opinion of 2026 finding a public body in violation of the Illinois Open Meetings Act (OMA) by limiting a speaker during public comment. PAC Op. 26-001. 

An individual filed a request for review with the PAC claiming that a public body violated the OMA when the mayor interrupted her during her public comment before the village board at its meeting. Specifically, she claims the mayor told her she could not say the names of village trustees, turned off the audio system and had the microphone removed, tried to cut her off before her 3 minutes were up, and asked the police chief to remove her from the meeting. 

In response, the village board defended its actions, arguing that its public comment rules and Roberts Rules of Order allowed the mayor to enforce rules of decorum to avoid disruptions and maintain order at village meetings.

The PAC acknowledged that a public body could terminate "inflammatory comments" that cause disruption in order to ensure that its meetings can be conducted in an efficient manner. However, the PAC determined that this speaker had not made inflammatory comments and that any disruption to the meeting was created by the mayor improperly interfering with the speaker's right to address the board during public comment. The PAC also noted that the village board's public comment rules did not restrict speakers from naming village officials or employees during public comment, and questioned whether this type of rule would be consistent with the OMA. The PAC also suggested this type of rule could be unconstitutional if it was intended to censor protected critical speech against a public official. Because the speaker did not disrupt the meeting, the PAC determined that the village board's restrictions on her speech violated 2.06(g) of OMA (the provision of OMA that requires public bodies to provide members of the public with an opportunity to address the public body at its meetings).

  

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Wednesday, January 21, 2026

City's Citizen Flag Pole a Public Forum, Not Government Speech

  Wednesday, January 21, 2026    

We previously reported on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that a city's policy in allowing private groups to place flags on the city's flag pole rendered the speech protected speech under the First Amendment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed a similar challenge relating to a "citizen's flag pole" outside of a city hall in New Hampshire that allowed citizens to apply to the city for permission to fly their flag. In this case, a group wanted to fly a flag that read "Save Women's Sports" on the citizen's flag pole. The city initially allowed the flag, but then revoked its permission after receiving complaints that the flag was transphobic. 

The group sued, claiming that the city's revocation of its permission violated its First Amendment free speech rights. The group argued that the city had never denied citizen flag requests prior to revoking their permission, and that the action of the city was content-based viewpoint discrimination in violation of their free speech rights. The city defended its decision by arguing that the flag pole constituted government speech, so the city could control the message on the flag pole. 

The district court found the speech to be government speech but on appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the citizen's flag pole program was not government speech based on the U.S. Supreme Court's Shurtleff v. City of Boston decision, and that the city's revocation of the flag permit was viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. Scaer v. City of Nashua

  

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Tuesday, January 20, 2026

Illinois General Assembly Introduces Bills Amending FOIA

  Tuesday, January 20, 2026    

The Illinois General Assembly was in session last week, which brings with it newly introduced legislation. Many of these bills are “shell bills” that will be amended with substantive language later in session, but a number of these introduced bills propose changes to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that would be relevant to local governments if they ultimately pass. 

A few of those bills (none of which have been voted on yet) are summarized below: 

HB 4395: If approved, this would amend various provisions of FOIA, including Section 2(a) of FOIA to add the “judicial branch and components to the judicial branch” to the definition of “public body” and Section 7 to add a new FOIA exemption for all records pertaining to the preparation of “judicial opinions and orders." Section 9.5(a) would also be amended to state that if the judicial branch and components deny a FOIA request, the requester cannot request review from the Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General (PAC). 

HB 4408: If approved, this would amend Section 7 of FOIA to add a new exemption for records created for administrative, correctional, or law enforcement purposes that include identifying or contact information of a minor who is a victim of secual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual violence.

HB 4409: If approved, this would amend the time for response to a FOIA request submitted to a law enforcement or correctional agency to 15 business days (rather than the current 5 business days). It would also allow an extension of 15 business days for requested records that require the agency to blur body camera footage or make other redactions because the records are partially exempt from disclosure.  

HB 4444: If approved, this would allow a public body to charge the actual cost for each hour spent by government personnel searching for a requested record or examining the record for redactions (current cost recovery is capped at $10). The bill would also remove the provision restricting the cost recovery provision to commercial requests only.  

HB 4445: If approved, this would add a new Section 10.5 to impose certain notice requirements on both the public body and the requester for requests for body worn camera recordings that are reasonably likely to be used for commercial purposes. These notice requirements would require notice to identifiable subjects in the recording prior to release of the records.

At this time, it is not clear how many of these bills (if any) will move forward but if they do, we will keep you posted. 

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung, Luigi Laudando & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

  

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Thursday, January 15, 2026

Supreme Court Finds Candidate Has Standing to Challenge Illinois Vote Counting Law

  Thursday, January 15, 2026    

In another U.S. Supreme Court decision this week, the Court reversed the dismissal of a case filed by three candidates for political office that challenged the State of Illinois' procedure for counting mail-in ballots received after election day. Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections. The district court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had dismissed the case, finding that the candidates did not have standing to challenge the state law. 

Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in ballots that are postmarked or certified no later than election day and received within 2 weeks of election day. Three candidates for various offices sued the Illinois State Board of Elections claiming that the statute violates federal law, specifically that it conflicts with statutes that set election day as the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the lawsuits based on lack of standing.

On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that at least one of the candidates who had filed a lawsuit challenging the statute had a "personal stake" in the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election to satisfy the requirement for standing. The Court rejected the dissenting justices' argument that the candidates should have to show actual harm (not potential harm) to have standing to sue.

Note that this decision does not address the substance of the claims made by the candidates against the Illinois law, but simply holds that the candidates have standing to have those claims heard in court.

  

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Wednesday, January 14, 2026

Supreme Court Finds No Fourth Amendment Violation in Warrantless Entry to Home

  Wednesday, January 14, 2026    

The U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion today in Case v. Montana, rejecting an argument that police officers must have "probable cause" to enter a home without a warrant when they encounter an emergency situation. The Court held that the proper test for the emergency exception to the warrant requirement is whether the officer was acting on an objective, reasonable belief that someone inside the home was seriously injured, imminently threatened with an injury, or needed emergency assistance, rather than the "probable cause" standard that applies in criminal cases. 

In this case, petitioner's ex-girlfield called police to report that petitioner had been drinking and was threatening suicide. Police officers were dispatched to do a welfare check and when they arrived, determined that the situation was serious and decided to enter the home to render emergency aid. An officer encountered the petitioner holding a black object that the officer thought was a gun, and the officer fired his own rifle. The petitioner was ultimately charged with assaulting a police officer after a handgun was found next to where petitioner stood. Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence at trial, arguing that police had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that officers were responding to an emergency (an exception to the warrant requirement). 

The case was appealed and made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the trial court's ruling. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the police officers had to show "probable cause" in order to exercise a warrantless search. Instead, officers must show that they had an "objectively reasonable basis for believing" that their intervention was necessary to prevent serious harm. Here, the officers demonstrated that they were aware of petitioner's mental health and alcohol abuse problems and that he had previously talked about committing suicide. They had statements from his ex-girlfriend that he had threatened to kill himself, and when they went to the home, he refused to respond to their knocking on his door. The Court found that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe petitioner needed emergency aid, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of his rights in the warrantless entry.

  

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Monday, January 12, 2026

Seventh Circuit Finds in Favor of City in Warrantless Entry and False Arrest Case

  Monday, January 12, 2026    

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit against a City and several police officers, finding that the officers had probable cause to support the arrest and warrantless entry into the arrestee's home. Cannon v. Filip.

Plaintiff sued the City and several police officers claiming they violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his home without a warrant and arrested him for domestic battery. The police officers were acting on a 911 call that claimed the plaintiff was abusing a woman, and entered the home based on their belief that there was exigent circumstances since there was no answer at the home. After questioning both individuals in the home, the officers arrested plaintiff and charged him with domestic battery. Those charges were later dropped and he sued the City and officers. The district court ruled in favor of the City and officers and he appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the police officers had an objective reasonable basis to believe that someone in the home needed immediate aid and there was a compelling need to enter without a warrant. The basis for the officers' belief was the 911 call that there was a domestic violence situation at the home. The Court also rejected plainitff's false arrest claim, finding that there was sufficient probable cause for the arrest based on statements by the woman at the home.



  

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Friday, January 9, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 100 - Lessons from a Local Government Law Career

  Friday, January 09, 2026    

We have a quorum! In this special 100th episode of Quorum Forum, we celebrate a major milestone by hosting a special live recording from Ancel Glink’s Chicago headquarters. Our featured guest is our friend and colleague, Julie Tappendorf, who joins us on the eve of her retirement to reflect on her career in local government law. In this career retrospective, Julie shares the professional lessons she learned along her journey—from her early days in military intelligence to becoming a local government lawyer.

Episode Highlights

• From Cryptology to Codes: Julie reflects on her eight years as a Korean cryptologic-linguist in the U.S. Army and how the discipline of military intelligence prepared her for legal practice.

• The Land Use Landscape: We review the evolution of development and annexation agreements. Julie explains how these contracts reduce adversarial friction and why formal agreements are critical for risk management.

• Municipal Minute: Julie shares the origin story of her award-winning blog, Municipal Minute, which has registered over 3.3 million visits. She discusses her foresight in identifying social media as a legal issue for local governments as early as 2011.

• Social Media After Lindke: What the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lindke v. Freed means for local officials. Julie provides essential advice on maintaining separate personal and official accounts and navigating the "actual authority" test.

• The Future of the Field: A candid discussion on the next "tweeting into trouble" moment—Artificial Intelligence. Julie warns about the risks of AI "hallucinations" and the importance of verifying legal output.

• Public Comment Segment: Ancel Glink attorneys share the most impactful lessons they have learned from Julie over the years, ranging from effective meeting procedures to the "gold standard" of responsiveness.

  

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Thursday, January 8, 2026

City's Vehicle Forfeiture Program Not an Unconstitutional Taking

  Thursday, January 08, 2026    

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that an Illinois municipality's vehicle forfeiture program was not an unconstitutional "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. O'Donnell v. City of Chicago.

The City adopted an ordinance authorizing it to immobilize, tow, impound, and ultimately dispose of vehicles in enforcing its traffic code. After the City exercised its authority and disposed of two vehicles, the vehicle owners sued the City claiming that its forfeiture scheme was an unconstitutional taking under both the U.S. and Illinois constitutions. The district court dismissed the claims, which was appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal, finding that the City's forfeiture program (which included provisions for notice and a hearing and included graduated penalties for multiple violations of the traffic code) was an exercise of the City's police power to enforce its traffic code, a punitive remedy that does not constitute a taking.

  

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Wednesday, January 7, 2026

Grand Jury Subpoena in Possession of School District Not Exempt From FOIA

  Wednesday, January 07, 2026    

A requester sued a school district claiming it violated FOIA by improperly redacting certain names and other information in a federal grand jury subpoena received by the district. As part of its defense of the lawsuit, the school district submitted an affidavit signed by the school board president stating that the district relied on an opinion by the U.S Attorney’s Office stating that the grand jury subpoena was exempt from disclosure under several exemptions in the federal FOIA statute, and that disclosure of the subpoena would violate federal law and interfere with a criminal investigation. The circuit court ruled in favor of the school district, finding that it did not violate FOIA, but ordered the school district to disclose a copy of the subpoena with certain information unredacted.

On appeal, the Appellate Court ruled that the circuit court erred in determining that the school district properly redacted recipient names and other information contained in the subpoena in Edgar County Watchdogs v. Paris Union School District No. 95.

First, the Appellate Court held that the school district’s reliance on an opinion by the U.S. Attorney’s Office was misplaced, because the request was submitted to an Illinois public body under the Illinois FOIA statute, so federal FOIA’s statutory exemptions were inapplicable to this request.

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the school district’s argument that names in the subpoena were exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, because the school district did not demonstrate that any federal law or statute specifically prohibited disclosing those names.

Third, the Appellate Court determined that names of school district officials and employees in the subpoena "bear on" the duties of public employees, so disclosure would not cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.

Next, the Appellate Court held that because the school district is not a law enforcement or correctional agency, had no investigatory role in the federal grand jury proceedings, and was not conducting an ongoing criminal investigation, and the school district did not demonstrate that the U.S. Attorney’s Office had a substantial interest in protecting names in the subpoena, the subpoena was not exempt under the law enforcement exemptions cited by the district.

Finally, because the school district’s asserted exemptions were not applicable, and the circuit court previously ordered the school district to release certain information that was originally redacted in its response to the FOIA request, the Appellate Court determined that the requester was a “prevailing” party in the FOIA lawsuit and could file a petition requesting the recovery of attorneys fees and costs as the prevailing party.  

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

  

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Tuesday, January 6, 2026

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Disclosing Termination Letter

  Tuesday, January 06, 2026    

The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's Office (PAC) issued a late binding opinion that did not make our year-end review of 2025 binding opinions, which we have summarized below.

In response to a FOIA request seeking a termination letter issued to former village clerk, a village entirely withheld the letter from disclosure pursuant to various exemptions under FOIA. Specifically, the village argued that several provisions of the Personnel Record Review Act (Act) prohibited the village from disclosing the letter in response to the FOIA request.

In its 16th binding opinion of 2025, the PAC concluded that the village improperly withheld the termination letter in response to the FOIA request. PAC Op. 25-016.

Although the Act permits an employee or their designated representative to review certain personnel records, the PAC determined that this right has no bearing on the availability of personnel records to third parties pursuant to FOIA. Even if the termination letter at issue was a record of disciplinary action taken against the former village clerk, the PAC determined that the Act did not require the Village to obtain the former village clerk’s consent before disclosing that letter to the FOIA requester. Instead, the Act merely required the village to give the former clerk notice of the FOIA request on or before the day that Village disclosed the letter in response to the FOIA request. The PAC also determined that the Act’s notice requirement to employees did not toll the village’s deadline to timely respond to the FOIA request. Therefore, the PAC concluded that the village did not demonstrate that the letter was exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA.

Because the termination letter at issue did not contain any personal information which, if disclosed, would cause the former clerk a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and the letter itself directly bears on the public duties of the former village clerk, the PAC concluded that the letter was not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA.

Although the village argued that the termination letter included its decision-making rationale for terminating the former clerk, the PAC determined that the village never conducted an adjudicatory proceeding pertaining to the former clerk’s dismissal, so the Village did not demonstrate that the letter was exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

  

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Monday, January 5, 2026

Top 10 Posts of 2025

  Monday, January 05, 2026    

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Friday, January 2, 2026

Social Media & Local Government Book Recently Published by ABA

  Friday, January 02, 2026    

It's a new year and time for a new book for those who advise and work with local governments on social media legal issues. The ABA recently published my book "Social Media & Local Governments: Navigating the New Public Square," which is intended to be a practical and legal resource for local government lawyers, officials, and employees on the various legal issues that arise in local government use and regulation of social media. 

You can find the book here.

  

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