Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

  Wednesday, September 02, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a village and village employees in a lawsuit filed by a firefighter claiming he was injured during a training drill.  Hidalgo v. Village of Romeoville.

A village firefighter attended an advanced technician firefighter training course. As part of that training course curriculum, participants were required to perform a “bailout drill.” During a bailout drill, participants exit out a third-story window of a hose tower, one leg at a time, and then use rappel line to descend down the side of the tower. Participants could use a Class 1 harness, Class 3 pre-sewn harness, or a Class 3 “hasty” harness during the bailout drill. Class 1 harnesses are body harnesses that go around a person’s waist, while Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses are manufactured body harnesses that go around a person’s waist and shoulders. Class 3 “hasty” harnesses are harnesses made by the participants using available webbing, which is a tubular structure that can be tied into a knot. 

The firefighter performed the bailout drill using a Class 1 harness and was injured after becoming separated from the harness and falling to the ground. He sued the village, claiming the village acted with “intentional/reckless conduct” in its instructions and usage of the harnesses during the bailout drill. He specifically claimed certain village employees involved in the training failed to provide adequate instructions on using and creating the Class 3 “hasty” harness. He also claimed the village’s omissions constituted negligence through willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court ruled against the firefighter, who then appealed. 

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the village, relying on Section 2-201 of the Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which states as follows: 

Sec. 2-201. Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.

That Act distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts made by government employees when determining whether a government employee qualifies for immunity. The Appellate Court applied the two-prong test, which requires courts to determine (1) if the employee holds a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving an exercise of discretion and (2) if the employee also engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the injury resulted. If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then the government employee will have immunity under that section of the Act. 

As to the village’s assistant training course instructors, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion as to certain aspects of the bailout drill (i.e., whether a Class 3 harness needed to be used) and (2) used their discretion to decide how to secure ropes and lines to the harnesses. The court emphasized that the assistant instructors used their own discretion, rather than adhering to a mandate requiring them to act in a prescribed manner, in making any decisions regarding the bailout drill. As to the village’s lead and supervising training course instructor, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion to decide how to conduct bailout drills based on their knowledge and experience and (2) exercised discretion in determining that Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses were appropriate for the bailout drill. The court also found that the village was entitled to immunity under the Act. As to the claims of negligence by willful and wanton conduct, the court found that Section 2-201 immunity is absolute and not subject to exceptions for willful and wanton conduct. 

Ultimately, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court ruling that both the employees and the village had immunity from the firefighter's claims relating to his injuries.

Post Authored by Rachel Stempler & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Employees First Amendment Retaliation Claims Rejected by Court

Employees First Amendment Retaliation Claims Rejected by Court

  Thursday, August 06, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Fox v. DuPage Township, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected former employees' First Amendment claim that they were terminated because they campaigned for an opposing candidate for election to government office. 

After an election that changed the make-up of township government, the township board voted to reorganize a senior center's leadership, resulting in the termination of two employees from their employment at the center. They sued, claiming that they were terminated in retaliation for their campaigning for the township supervisor's opponent in the election. The district court rejected their arguments and ruled in favor of the township, finding that the two former employees had failed to show that their protected First Amendment activity was a motivating factor in their termination. They appealed.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision. To make a retaliation case against the government in a First Amendment claim, the former employees were required to show that their speech was constitutionally protected, they suffered a deprivation likely to deter their speech, and their speech was "at least a motivating factor" in the government's action. Here, the Court held that the two former employees did not meet the third requirement because they provided no direct evidence that their participation in the opponent's campaign was a motivating factor in their terminations. Instead, they relied on an inference of "suspicious timing" which was not sufficient in this case because they could not show that the government knew of their protected conduct. The township also showed alternative reasons for their termination. As a result, the former employees failed to show they were retaliated against based on their First Amendment activities.

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Court Upholds Disqualification of Police Officer Candidate for Past Conduct

Court Upholds Disqualification of Police Officer Candidate for Past Conduct

  Tuesday, August 04, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A candidate applied for a probationary police officer position with a city police department. As part of the application process, the city conducted a background investigation that found two police reports that included allegations of assault and stalking by the candidate against two women. After investigating the incidents and interviewing the candidate, the city removed the candidate from the eligibility list for dishonesty during the interview and past criminal conduct. The candidate challenged his disqualification with the city's police board which upheld the decision. He then filed an appeal with the circuit court which also upheld the city's disqualification. 

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the candidate argued that the disqualification was "unjust" because he had never been arrested. He also claimed the allegations made by the two women were false. Finally, he claimed the city violated his due process rights. The city defended its disqualification decision, arguing that they had sufficient evidence to dispute his claims, including records of two prior arrests. 

First, the Appellate Court reviewed the bases relied upon by the city for its disqualification decision (impersonation of a police officer, conduct indicating violent tendencies, and false statements during the application process) and determined that the city had ample evidence to support its decision to disqualify the candidate from the eligibility list for the position of probationary police officer. 

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the candidate's claim that his due process rights were violated, finding that he received written notice of his disqualification, he took full advantage of the opportunity to challenge his disqualification through a written appeal to the police board, and that there is no legal requirement that disqualified applicants are entitled to an in-person hearing to confront witnesses. In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the city's decision to disqualify him from the police officer position. Navarro-Angulo v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, et al.

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Board of Fire And Police Commission Had No Jurisdiction to Hear Disciplinary Charges

Board of Fire And Police Commission Had No Jurisdiction to Hear Disciplinary Charges

  Wednesday, July 29, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court held that a board of fire and police commissioners did not have jurisdiction to hear disciplinary charges against a police officer because the hearing was not held within 30 days of the filing of the charges. Harris v. City of Madison Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. 

A city police chief filed written disciplinary charges with the city's board of fire and police commission seeking a police officer's removal from the police department. The charges alleged that the officer fraudulently documented time spent patrolling. The board commenced a hearing but heard no testimony, received no evidence, did not render a decision, and instead continued the matter. The officer filed a lawsuit against the board claiming that because the board failed to conduct a hearing within the 30 day time frame required by state statute, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the pending disciplinary charges. After the circuit court denied the city's motion to dismiss because of the city's failure to conduct a hearing within the statutory timeframe, the police chief filed a second set of disciplinary charges with the board. The officer then filed a motion with the circuit court seeking an injunction to stop the board from conducting a hearing, arguing that the board had no jurisdiction because it did not conduct the original hearing within the statutory timeframe. The circuit court ruled in favor of the city, finding the second set of disciplinary charges to be a new filing that could proceed to hearing.

The officer appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed. The Appellate Court cited to section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code that requires a board of fire and police commission to conduct a hearing on written charges "within 30 days of the filing" of the charges with the board. The Appellate Court found that the original disciplinary charges were never voluntarily dismissed by the city nor was the original proceeding terminated by the board (it was continued by the board). As a result, the Court held that the second set of charges (which were identical to the first) did not "restart" the statutory 30 day period for commencing a hearing, so the board had no jurisdiction to proceed on the disciplinary charges against the officer.

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Appeals Court Rules in Favor of City in Challenge to Firefighter's Termination for Social Media Posts

Appeals Court Rules in Favor of City in Challenge to Firefighter's Termination for Social Media Posts

  Tuesday, July 21, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A federal court of appeals upheld the termination of a city firefighter after he posted several racially charged and offensive posts on his personal Facebook account. Inendino v. Nance-Holt.

A firefighter worked for a city fire department for 16 years. Most of his work was at a station in a predominantly Black neighborhood of the city. As an EMT, he had frequent contact with the public and engaged directly with patients. He had a personal Facebook page which was publicly viewable. On his personal Facebook page, he identified himself as a city firefighter, and his profile picture depicted him on the back of a fire truck, wearing his firefighter gear. After the city received multiple complaints about content he posted on Facebook, the city conducted an investigation and prepared a report that found that a number of his Facebook posts were racist and offensive, targeted Black and Asian Americans, and showed a contempt for the residents of the community he served. The report recommended that the city terminate him. Shortly after, he was terminated for violating the city's personnel rules relating to social media and professional conduct. The firefighter filed a grievance under the city's collective bargaining agreement, but the arbitrator ruled against him, finding just cause for his termination.

The firefighter then sued the city, claiming it violated his civil rights in firing him, and challenging the city's policies as unconstitutional. The district court ruled in favor of the city, and he appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the city's termination, rejecting the firefighter's constitutional claims. The Court applied what is known as the "Pickering balancing test" which applies when a government employee challenges a negative employment action on First Amendment grounds.

First, the Seventh Circuit accepted for purposes of applying the Pickering balancing that some of his Facebook posts might address matters of public concern. However, the Court rejected the firefighter's argument that the First Amendment protected those posts, finding that (1) he identified himself as a city firefighter on his Facebook page, (2) his Facebook posts were racially offensive, (3) he targeted groups that his position required him to protect, and (4) that the city's interest in ensuring that its fire department succeed in performing its public safety mission outweighed any interest in his posting the offensive content on Facebook. 

In sum, the Court upheld the city's termination of the firefighter for his Facebook posts and comments.

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Court Rejects Excessive Force Claim Against Police Officers

Court Rejects Excessive Force Claim Against Police Officers

  Tuesday, July 14, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling upholding a district court's decision in favor of city police officers in an excessive force case. Davis v. City of Elgin. 

Police were dispatched to a home after someone called to report that an individual was threatening his ex-wife and roommate with a shotgun. Police called the suspect, who threatened to harm himself with a knife. The police then surrounded the house but the suspect had already left the home and gone to his neighbors.  The suspect came outside to the porch but when he refused police orders to come out further, police fired at him with a non-lethal impact weapon. After the suspect threatened to harm the officer who shot him, officers shot him again. The suspect eventually pled guilty to disorderly conduct, and then filed a lawsuit against the city and the police officers involved in the incident claiming that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled against the suspect, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, finding that the suspect did not establish that the officers violated a clearly established right to be free from a particular use of force. The Court found that the officers had good reason not to want the suspect to go back into the house so he could potentially grab a weapon, and that the officers had knowledge of his earlier threats with a gun against his ex-wife, as well as his threat that he had a knife. In sum, the Court found that the officers had qualified immunity. The Court also held that the suspect did not meet his burden to show a theory of liability against the city itself.

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Seventh Circuit Upholds Removal of Public Employee for Social Media Posts

Seventh Circuit Upholds Removal of Public Employee for Social Media Posts

  Monday, June 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the removal of a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary after he refused to stop posting himself in uniform and making derogatory statements on social media in Wenzler v. United States Coast Guard, et al.

Wenzler had been a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary for about 15 years when a member of the public complained about his LinkedIn posts. One of the posts accused certain Supreme Court Justices of being racist, and another made a crude remark about the Girl Scouts. The Auxiliary conducted an investigation, and a supervisor directed him to remove from social media any photograph of himself wearing his uniform and to delete any reference to the Auxiliary. He responded that he would not comply with the directive and that he would file a complaint against the supervisor for racist action against him because he was white. He continued to post about his Auxiliary position on LinkedIn and another complaint was filed by a member of the public about one of his posts. He again stated he would not comply with the Auxiliary's social media directive, and formal disciplinary proceedings were started which resulted in the Coast Guard disenrolling him. After his administrative appeals failed, he sued in federal court claiming the Coast Guard's actions against him violated his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in the Coast Guard's favor, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the standards for a First Amendment retaliation claim, which require a public employee to show that (1) their speech was constitutionally protected; (2) they suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) their speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. In analyzing the first prong (whether his speech was constitutionally protected), the Court applied the two-step Pickering test: (a) whether the speech involved a matter of public concern and (b) if so, does the speaker's interest in commenting on the matter of public concern outweigh the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

In this case, the Court accepted that Wenzler's speech touched on matters of public concern (meeting the first step of the Pickering test). However, in applying the second step (balancing interests test), the Court determined that the Coast Guard deserved deference in assessing and responding to its members' speech when those members hold themselves out as members of the organization while wearing its uniform. The Auxiliary's structure as a uniformed organization within the Coast Guard with a military-like hierarchy was also relevant to the Court in balacing its interests against Wenzler's. In short, the Court held that the Auxiliary could reasonably determine that Wenzler's speech would be detrimental to the Auxiliary and its reputation, and reasonably expect that other members of the Auxiliary would be less likely to work with him because of his derogatory comments and attacks on others. As a result, the Seventh Circuit found no First Amendment violation in the Coast Guard's removal of Wenzler. 

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Seventh Circuit Rejects Discrimination Claim by Candidate for Deputy Sheriff Position

Seventh Circuit Rejects Discrimination Claim by Candidate for Deputy Sheriff Position

  Wednesday, May 27, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a county sheriff office's decision not to hire a candidate for a deputy sheriff position, rejecting the candidate's racial discrimination claim in Burton v. Will County Sheriff's Merit Commission.

A candidate applied for a deputy sheriff position with a county sheriff's department. As part of the background check process, the county contacted the candidate's current employer, who stated that he was not a dependable employee, did not work well with others, and that the employer would not rehire him. Based on that information, the county sheriff's commission removed the candidate from the hiring certification process. He sued, claiming that the county discriminated against him because of his race.

The district court ruled in favor of the county, finding no evidence that the decision to remove the candidate from the hiring certification process was related to his race. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, finding no evidence that race played a role in the sheriff's merit commission's decision, rejecting the candidate's argument that the negative background check was a pretext to remove him from consideration. Instead, the Court found that the county had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to remove him - the negative employment reference from his current employer.

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Court Upholds Pension Board Decision to Award Non-Duty Disability Pension

Court Upholds Pension Board Decision to Award Non-Duty Disability Pension

  Tuesday, May 26, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a pension board's award of a non-duty disability rather than a line-of-duty disability in Hull v. Village of Wheeling Police Pension Fund. 

A probationary police officer applied for a line-of-duty disability, claiming that a motor vehicle accident while on duty caused disabilities preventing him from returning to work. The pension board conducted a hearing, at which the officer presented evidence in favor of a line-of-duty pension and the village (as intervenor) presented evidence opposing the application, arguing that he was able to work and had, in fact, been employed in various jobs since the accident. The opinions of multiple medical professionals was also presented at the hearing, including evidence that the officer did suffer from depression that prevented him from continuing to work in his police officer position. At the conclusion of the hearing, the pension board voted to grant a non-duty disability pension to the former officer (who had since been terminated by the village), finding that he was disabled but not due to the motor vehicle accident.

The former officer appealed, and both the trial court and the Appellate Court upheld the pension board's decision that he was entitled to a non-duty disability pension, but not a line-of-duty pension. Both courts determined that the pension board relied on the opinions of multiple medical professionals that while his condition was disabling, it was not caused by the motor vehicle accident. 

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Prosser Rule Applied to City Council's Appointment of Clerk

Prosser Rule Applied to City Council's Appointment of Clerk

  Thursday, May 14, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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It isn't often that the Illinois courts apply the "Prosser Rule" to the vote of a city council, but an Illinois Appellate Court did just that recently in Christian v. Buscher. 

In 2025, a city council held a special meeting to vote on the appointment of a person to fill a vacant city clerk position. The city council (made up of 10 elected aldermen and the mayor) voted five "yea," three "nay," and two "present" on the motion to approve an ordinance to appoint a sitting alderman to fill the clerk position. The mayor (who did not vote) announced that the measure passed. The alderman who was being appointed voted in favor of his appointment.

A citizen filed a lawsuit to challenge the vote on the appointment, arguing that the measure did not receive the necessary six votes to approve an ordinance. Specifically, the citizen argued that the two "present" votes should not have been counted towards the majority who did vote in favor of the measure. The citizen also argued that the favorable vote of the alderman who was being appointed should not have been counted. The circuit court dismissed the case and it was appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court first analyzed the Illinois Supreme Court's Prosser v. Village of Fox Lake case where the Supreme Court held that an ordinance was validly approved even though a member of the board was present but did not vote, finding that the non-vote counted towards the majority of "yea" votes. The Court explained that if a measure requires an "affirmative" vote of the majority, then "voting to 'abstain,' or to 'pass,' or voting 'present' or of refusing to vote when present at a meeting" counts as a "nay" vote. However, if a measure requires a "concurrence" vote of the majority, a vote of pass, present, abstain, or a failure to vote counts as an acquiescence or concurrence with the majority, based on the "general rule" that those members present at a meeting "must vote against a proposal in order to defeat it." 

Because the city ordinances required a "concurrence of a majority" to pass an ordinance, the Court found that the ordinance being challenged was validly approved because the two "present" votes were properly counted with the "yea" votes based on the Prosser Rule. The Court also rejected the argument that the vote of the alderman being appointed should not have been counted, finding that even without his vote, the measure passed. As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the case challenging the appointment.

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Court Finds Health Reimbursement Benefits Not Covered by PSEBA

Court Finds Health Reimbursement Benefits Not Covered by PSEBA

  Monday, May 04, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In a recent decision, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld a fire protection district's (District) denial of certain supplemental benefits to a disabled firefighter who was receiving benefits under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (PSEBA). Carter v. Fox Lake Fire Protection District.

A firefighter was injured in the line of duty and applied for and received a duty disability pension. The firefighter was also eligible for, and received, benefits under PSEBA, which provides health insurance benefits to public safety officers who suffer a catastrophic injury in the line of duty. For six years, the District provided the disabled firefighter with the PSEBA health benefits, and also covered the firefighter under the District's vision, dental, and life insurance plans as well as the District's health reimbursement benefits that provided reimbursement for certain deductibles. In 2023, however, the District notified the firefighter that PSEBA does not include the vision, dental, and life insurance benefits or the health reimbursement benefits and stopped coverage for those benefits. The firefighter sued, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the District. The firefighter appealed the denial of the health reimbursement benefits to the Appellate Court (he did not challenge the denial of vision, dental, and life insurance benefits).

The Appellate Court examined the language of PSEBA and determined that the statute was clear that PSEBA benefits cover the premium for the health insurance plan, but expressly excludes "supplemental benefits that are not part of the basic group health insurance plan." The Court determined that the health reimbursement benefits were supplemental and not part of the District's health insurance plan, so they were not covered under PSEBA.

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Supreme Court Finds Qualified Immunity for Police Officer Sued for Excessive Force by Protester

Supreme Court Finds Qualified Immunity for Police Officer Sued for Excessive Force by Protester

  Wednesday, April 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Supreme Court recently weighed in on the issue of qualified immunity for a police officer who was sued under the civil rights statute for allegedly using excessive force in removing a person from a protest. Zorn v. Linton. 

Protestors staged a sit-in at the state capitol on the day of the Vermont Governor's inauguration. When the capitol closed for the day, police officers informed the protesters that they needed to leave or would be arrested for trespassing. When they refused to leave, officers removed them one-by-one. When one of the protesters refused to stand up, a police officer took her arm, put it behind her back, placed pressure on her wrist, and lifted her to her feet. The protester sued the police officer for using excessive force, claiming the use of a "rear wristlock" during the arrest injured her arm and caused psychological disorders. The district court held in favor of the officer, finding he had qualified immunity for his actions. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the "gratuitous" use of a rear wristlock on a protester who was passively resisting arrest constituted excessive force, so the police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The officer appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court

The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and held that the police officer did have qualified immunity. The Court noted that government officials have qualified immunity from suit under the civil rights statute (1983) unless their conduct violates clearly established law. Because the court of appeals failed to identify any case in the circuit where an officer taking similar action (rear wristlock) in a similar circumstance (removing a protester for trespass after repeated warnings), the Supreme Court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

Three Justices filed a dissenting opinion, finding that the officer should not be entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim because prior case law had established that using a rear wristlock as a "pain compliance technique" against a nonviolent protester would violate the protester's constitutional rights.

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Appellate Court Addresses Claims Against Municipality by Tree Vendor

Appellate Court Addresses Claims Against Municipality by Tree Vendor

  Tuesday, February 17, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court dismissed most of the claims in a lawsuit filed by a vendor against a municipality, although it allowed an unjust enrichment claim and a fradulent misrepresentation claim to move forward in the circuit court. Johns Pro-Tree Service v. Village of Dolton.

A mayor and two village public works employees reached out to the president of a tree service company for emergency tree trimming and removal service related to a storm in June 2023. After the parties agreed to a price, the tree company completed the work. Subsequently, the parties agreed to continue the services to the village, and the village paid the full invoice amount. On September 25th, the company submitted another invoice for their work, but was told that none of the village’s vendors would be paid for their recent work due to budget restrictions. The company filed a lawsuit against the village claiming breach of contract, a violation of the Local Government Prompt Payment Act, fraudulent misrepresentation, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The circuit court dismissed the case in its entirety, finding that the village was immune from liability and the alleged contract was not enforceable because it had not been approved or ratified by the village's board of trustees.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of the breach of contract, Prompt Payment Act, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel claims. 

On the breach of contract claim, the Appellate Court held that the complaint did not show that the contract was approved by the board of trustees or that the board had delegated contracting authority to the mayor or other officials or otherwise authorized the contract with the tree service contract. As a result, the tree service company's claim that the village had breached a contract with the company was properly dismissed by the circuit court. 

The Appellate Court also held that because the breach of contract claim was properly dismissed, the Local Government Payment Act claim was also properly dismissed.

On the company's quantum meruit claim, the Appellate Court found that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to show that the board of trustees authorized the proper officials to accept or approve the terms of the transaction with the tree service company.

The Appellate Court also upheld the dismissal of the company's promissory estoppel claim finding that the company did not establish that the representatives of the village involved with the tree company had authority to make any representations or promises to the company.

However, the Appellate Court disagreed with the circuit court on the dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, finding that the village did not meet the burden of proof by showing they were immune under the Tort Immunity Act. 

The Court also disagreed with the dismissal of the tree company's unjust enrichment claim, finding that this claim was adequately pled in the complaint to survive a dismissal.

As a result, the Court sent the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings on the company's fraudulent mispresentation and unjust enrichment claims.

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 101 - Navigating AI's Impact on the Modern Workplace

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 101 - Navigating AI's Impact on the Modern Workplace

  Tuesday, February 10, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast just released Episode 101 featuring Mysi Hall's recent ILCMA presentation, “Digital Decisions: Navigating AI’s Impact on the Modern Workplace.” In this podcast, Mysi examines the current legal landscape surrounding the use of artificial intelligence in labor relations and employment practices.

Highlights:

• The Legal Landscape: Overview of federal and state regulations, including EEOC guidelines on Title VII and the ADA.
• Illinois Specifics: A look at the AI Video Interview Act (AIVIA) and the 2026 amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act.
• Bias and Mitigation: Understanding automation bias, selective adherence, and real-world examples of algorithmic discrimination.
• Labor Relations: How major unions (ILA, SAG-AFTRA, AFL-CIO) are negotiating AI safeguards and transparency.
• Best Practices: Practical steps for employers, including the NIST Risk Management Framework and the importance of human oversight.

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Seventh Circuit Grants Qualified Immunity to Police Officers

Seventh Circuit Grants Qualified Immunity to Police Officers

  Tuesday, February 03, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Johnson v. Edwards, an arrestee sued four police officers alleging they violated his constitutional rights after he was arrested for disorderly conduct. 

Johnson was arrested after he attempted to enter an area that had been taped off for police investigation of a crime scene. When the police officers ordered Johnson to leave the area, he became agitated and began to yell at the officers. Johnson refused to leave and the officers arrested Johnson, put him in the squad car, and drove him to the police station. Johnson had refused to wear his seatbelt on the drive there. On the way there, Johnson asked the officer to slow down. The officer quickly slowed the car down to stop at a red light which caused Johnson to lurch forward and hit his head on the divider. Two minutes later, when they arrived at the station, the officers realized Johnson had been knocked unconscious. He was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed and treated for a cut lip.

Johnson was charged with disorderly conduct for failing to obey a police officer. After the charges were dropped, he sued the officers involved in his arrest, claiming the following constitutional violations: (1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) state-created danger in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; (3) excessive use of force for the “rough ride” to the station; (4) failure to provide adequate medical care. Johnson also brought a claim for malicious prosecution. The district court ruled in favor of the police officers, finding they were immune from Johnson’s claims based on qualified immunity. 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in favor of the officers. The Seventh Circuit found that Johnson had not established a violation of his constitutional rights because: (1) the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for engaging in disorderly conduct when he refused to leave the crime scene; (2) the officers had not placed Johnson in a position of danger, or violated an established constitutional right, by allowing him to ride to the station without a seatbelt on; (3) the facts did not support a finding that the ride to the station constituted an excessive use of force; and (4) the officers had called the paramedics as soon as they realized Johnson was hurt, so Johnson could not establish that they acted unreasonably. Because Johnson failed to establish a violation of a constitutional right, the Seventh Circuit found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.

As to Johnson’s malicious prosecution claim, the Court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for disorderly conduct and dismissed this claim.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter

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Seventh Circuit Finds No Fourth Amendment Violation in Police Pursuit Case

Seventh Circuit Finds No Fourth Amendment Violation in Police Pursuit Case

  Friday, December 26, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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City police officers responded to a report of gunshots in Chicago’s Austin neighborhood. While investigating the report, the officers approached Juan Mendez on the front porch of his home. Mendez initially did not respond to the officers questions and suddenly fled. A brief foot chase ensued during which Mendez jumped a fence and ran down an alley. According to body-worn camera footage of the incident, Mendez held an unidentified object in his right hand as he was running from the officers. The officers shouted warnings at Mendez and then fired three shots. Mendez fell to the ground and a gun landed nearby.

Mendez sued the City of Chicago and the responding officers alleging excessive use of force, battery, and an indemnification claim against the City for the actions of the officers. The district court reviewed the body-camera footage of the event and concluded that a reasonable officer would have had probable cause to belief that Mendez threatened the safety of the officers.

Mendez appealed, and the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling in favor of the City in Mendez v. City of Chicago. First, the Court considered whether the officers had probable cause to believe that the suspect posed a threat of serious harm to the officers or the public. If the officers had probable cause, it would be constitutionally reasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Like the district court, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the video footage and determined that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to believe that Mendez posed a threat to the safety of others.

The Court also resolved Mendez’s claims for battery and indemnification. The Court held that because the officers had a reasonable belief as to the threat of danger posed by Mendez, their conduct did not rise to the level of willful and wanton, and, as a result, the officers were granted immunity under the Tort Immunity Act. Because the individual officers were not liable, Mendez’s claim that the City had a duty to indemnify the actions of the officers also failed.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter, Ancel Glink

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The New Year Countdown – Amendments Relating to Public Safety

The New Year Countdown – Amendments Relating to Public Safety

  Wednesday, December 17, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2026. Three "public safety" related Acts are summarized below:

Public Act 104-0158 amends the Illinois Police Training Act to require applicants for law enforcement positions at law enforcement agencies to direct all previous employers to produce employment records including performance history, investigations, examinations, and civil and criminal background investigation materials. Previous employers receiving a request for an applicant’s records must furnish a complete file of these records and, with limited exceptions for financial and personal identifying information, cannot make redactions.

Any previous employer that receives a request for these records must produce the records within 14 days of the request. If additional time is required, a 14-day extension may be requested. The Act provides a sample form for the consent and release for background investigation.

Public Act 104-0097 amends the Illinois Municipal Code and Counties Code to authorize municipalities and counties to use utility poles or public rights-of-way for public safety purposes, including, but not limited to, the placement of public safety equipment. This equipment cannot be located on or interfere with electric distribution systems, worker safety zones, or electric supply zones. All use of public safety equipment in these areas must comply with applicable codes or regulations that concern public safety.

Under this Act, a state agency or unit of local government may, by rule, ordinance, or resolution, create a permitting process to allow a utility pole or right-of-way to be used. However, any fee charged by the owner of the pole or right-of-way must be at the lowest rate charged and cannot exceed the owner’s costs. 

Public Act 104-0364 amends the Interstate Mutual Emergency Aid Act. The Interstate Mutual Emergency Aid Act helps to extend a jurisdiction’s emergency response capabilities by allowing local government bodies to enter into a mutual aid agreement with units of government from another state. In this new amendment, any public safety agency, including fire departments, municipal police departments, and emergency medical response services, or public contractors of any such agency, may provide assistance to any other public safety agency in the state or in a bordering state at the time of a natural disaster.

Post authored by Alexis Carter, Ancel Glink

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Appeal of Pension Board Decision Dismissed for Violation of Court Rules in Use of AI

Appeal of Pension Board Decision Dismissed for Violation of Court Rules in Use of AI

  Tuesday, November 25, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently dismissed the appeal by a former police officer of a pension board's denial of pension benefits because he violated Illinois Supreme Court Rules when he filed an appellate brief almost wholly created with the aid of artificial intelligence (AI). Pletcher v. Village of Libertyville Police Pension Board.

The plaintiff was hired as a police officer in 2003, and filed an application for a non-duty disability pension in 2020. He subsequently withdrew his application, and returned to full duty. In 2022, he was placed on a performance improvement plan for certain violations of department orders and policies. Shortly thereafter, he filed a second application for a non-duty disability pension. The pension board held a hearing on the application and ultimately denied his application, finding that the officer's condition could have been remedied with medication, which the pension board found the officer refused to regularly to take.

The officer filed a complaint for administrative review with the trial court to appeal the pension board's decision, along with a brief supporting his complaint. In his brief, he cited to several cases that did not exist. At the hearing, the officer also attempted to introduce new evidence and exhibits that were not part of the original hearing. The pension board brought the nonexistent cases to the attention of the trial court and objected to the introduction of new evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court upheld the pension board's denial of his pension application.

The officer then appealed to the Appellate Court. After he filed his brief with the Appellate Court, the pension board filed a response and a motion for sanctions alleging that the officer violated Illinois Supreme Court Rules for fictitious citations to the administrative record, citations to nonexistent cases, and fictitious holdings from actual cases. The Appellate Court noted that all parties in litigation (even pro se litigants) are obligated to comply with court rules and procedures. The Court also noted that the officer had cited five cases in his appellate brief that did not exist, and that the some of the actual cases cited in his brief did not stand for the propositions stated in his brief. The Court stated that the officer's status as a "pro se" party does not excuse his careless reliance on AI, and that he was aware of the risks of using AI-generated research when this same issue was raised at the trial court and yet he still chose to use AI in this manner in his appellate brief. After holding oral argument on the motion to dismiss the appeal, the Appellate Court granted the pension board's motion and the officer's appeal was dismissed.

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Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund

Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund

  Tuesday, November 18, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a pension board's decision to deny an application for pension membership in Kooistra v. Board of Trustees of Sycamore Police Pension Fund.

A deputy chief in a municipal police department retired from that department and began receiving a retirement pension. Subsequently, he was hired as a patrol officer in a second municipal police department and submitted an application for membership in the second municipality's pension fund. His application was denied by the police pension board based on section 3-124.1(b) of the Police Pension Code, which states as follows: 

(b) If a police officer who first becomes a member on or after January 1, 2019 is receiving pension payments (other than as provided in Section 3-109.3) and re-enters active service with any municipality that has established a pension fund under this Article, that police officer may continue to receive pension payments while he or she is in active service, but shall only participate in a defined contribution plan established by the municipality pursuant to Section 3-109.4 and may not establish creditable service in the pension fund established by that municipality or have his or her pension recomputed.” 40 ILCS 5/3-124.1(b)

The pension board determined that this statute precluded the officer from membership in the second municipality's pension fund because he was already receiving pension payments from the first municipality's pension fund; however, he could participate in a defined contribution plan. The officer appealed the pension board's decision to the circuit court which upheld the pension board's decision, and that ruling was then appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court analyzed the language in Section 3-124.1(b) and determined that it applied to the officer who was drawing a pension from his former employer. The Court rejected the officer's argument that the statutory provision did not apply to him because he became a "member" of the first municipality's pension fund before January 1, 2019. Instead, the Court agreed with the pension board's interpretation of the statute that it applies to the officer because he became a member of the second municipality's police department after the statutory cutoff date. In the Court's view, that was the most logical interpretation because the officer "first" becomes a member of the second municipality's police department upon reentry into active service, which would allow him to continue to receive pension payments from the first municipality but preclude him from participating in the second municipality's pension fund. The Court noted that this interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent of this section which was to prevent "double dipping" in two pension funds. 

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Both Houses Pass the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act

Both Houses Pass the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act

  Tuesday, November 04, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois General Assembly passed a number of bills in the veto session that may be of interest to local governments, including HB 576 which creates the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act. While HB 576 was designed to protect certain state legislative and executive officials, and certain county officials (and not local government officials), the bill's ban on "government agencies" displaying or posting personal information about public officials who make a request that this information not be publicly disclosed expressly applies to units of local government and school districts. The bill has been sent to the Governor for signature.

If signed by the Governor, the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act would prohibit government agencies (including units of local government) from displaying, posting, or disclosing a public official's personal information if the government agency has received a written request from the public official to refrain from disclosing that personal information. It would also require government agencies to remove that content within five business days of a written request under the new Act. The Act also prohibits persons, businesses, and associations from publicly posting or displaying a public official's personal information online when the public official has made a written request that this information not be disclosed. 

"Personal information" is defined in the bill as follows:

"Personal information" means a home address, home telephone number, mobile telephone number, pager number, personal email address, social security number, federal tax identification number, checking and savings account numbers, credit card numbers, marital status, and identity of children under the age of 18.

"Public official" is defined in the bill as follows:

"Public official" includes 

(1) members or former members of the Illinois General Assembly;

(2) constitutional officers or former constitutional officers; 

(3) elected or appointed State's Attorneys

(4) appointed Public Defenders; and

(5) county clerks and members of the Board of Election Commissioners whose responsibilities include administering and overseeing elections.

The bill would also make it unlawful for anyone to knowingly publicly post on the Internet the personal information of a public official or his or her immediate family of the person knows or reasonably should know that publicly posting that information poses an imminent and serious threat to the health and safety of the public official or the public official's immediate family and if the violation is a proximate cause of bodily injury or death of the public official or family member. Violation of this provision would be a Class 3 felony. 

The bill would also amend FOIA to expressly exempt the personal information of public officials from disclosure. 

The would also make several other changes to various statutes, including the Election Code. First, the bill would amend a provision limiting expenditures by a political committee so that it does not apply to expenses relating to personal security services or cybersecurity measures for public officials. It also requires the State Board of Elections to redact the home addresses of public officials and current and past officers of political committees upon written request, and home addresses of candidates for public office upon expiration of the objection filing period, upon request. The bill would also amend the Vehicle Code and FOID card statute to allow public officials to use their work addresses rather than home addresses on their ID cards and vehicle registration applications.

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