PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Responding

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Responding

  Thursday, July 30, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 8th binding opinion for 2026 finding a public body in violation of FOIA for not responding to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 26-008.

A requester submitted a FOIA request for copies of agendas for all meetings of the village for a 4 month period. He followed up with a second FOIA request seeking records pertaining to mold remediation at village hall and asking the village to respond to several questions. Ten days after he submitted his requests, he filed a request for review with the PAC alleging that the village failed to respond to either FOIA request. After the PAC reached out to the village for a response and did not hear from the village, it issued a binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA requests. 

Although there is nothing new in this opinion regarding a public body's obligation to respond to FOIA, the PAC did include the following footnote in its opinion noting that the village had no obligation to answer the questions posed by the requester in his second FOIA request (see below):

13. To the extent that Mr. Kilbanerei's request asked questions concerning the location of Village documents and any plans to relocate Village documents, FOIA does not require the Village to answer those questions. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) ("The Act does not compel the agency to provide answers to questions posed by the inquirer."). 

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Board of Fire And Police Commission Had No Jurisdiction to Hear Disciplinary Charges

Board of Fire And Police Commission Had No Jurisdiction to Hear Disciplinary Charges

  Wednesday, July 29, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court held that a board of fire and police commissioners did not have jurisdiction to hear disciplinary charges against a police officer because the hearing was not held within 30 days of the filing of the charges. Harris v. City of Madison Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. 

A city police chief filed written disciplinary charges with the city's board of fire and police commission seeking a police officer's removal from the police department. The charges alleged that the officer fraudulently documented time spent patrolling. The board commenced a hearing but heard no testimony, received no evidence, did not render a decision, and instead continued the matter. The officer filed a lawsuit against the board claiming that because the board failed to conduct a hearing within the 30 day time frame required by state statute, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the pending disciplinary charges. After the circuit court denied the city's motion to dismiss because of the city's failure to conduct a hearing within the statutory timeframe, the police chief filed a second set of disciplinary charges with the board. The officer then filed a motion with the circuit court seeking an injunction to stop the board from conducting a hearing, arguing that the board had no jurisdiction because it did not conduct the original hearing within the statutory timeframe. The circuit court ruled in favor of the city, finding the second set of disciplinary charges to be a new filing that could proceed to hearing.

The officer appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed. The Appellate Court cited to section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code that requires a board of fire and police commission to conduct a hearing on written charges "within 30 days of the filing" of the charges with the board. The Appellate Court found that the original disciplinary charges were never voluntarily dismissed by the city nor was the original proceeding terminated by the board (it was continued by the board). As a result, the Court held that the second set of charges (which were identical to the first) did not "restart" the statutory 30 day period for commencing a hearing, so the board had no jurisdiction to proceed on the disciplinary charges against the officer.

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Ordinance Violation Order Vacated for Failure to Properly Serve Notice of Administrative Hearing

Ordinance Violation Order Vacated for Failure to Properly Serve Notice of Administrative Hearing

  Monday, July 27, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court reversed a city's decision regarding an ordinance violation, finding that the city lacked jurisdiction because it failed to properly serve the homeowner under the city's hearing and notice procedures. McCain v. City of Granite City.

A city sent a homeowner letters notifying her that her property was in violation of several local property maintenance regulations. The letters gave her a few weeks to cure the violations, and when that deadline passed without a cure, the city sent notice to the homeowner by regular mail of an administrative hearing on the violations. The homeowner argued that the city's service of notice of the hearing was defective because she was not served personally as required by section 2-203 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The homeowner did not appear at the administrative hearing, and the city's administrative officer found her liable and issued a decision ordering her to pay fines in the amount of $575, plus court fees. The homeowner appealed the judgment to the circuit court, arguing that the administrative hearing officer had no jurisdiction to issue the decision because she was not properly served with the complaint.

The city argued that its notice to appear was adequate to initiate an enforcement action that doesn't involve a jail sentence, and that personal service of the complaint and a summons was not required. The circuit court agreed with the city, finding that the city properly served the homeowner with notice to appear, and that there was no violation of the homeowner's due process rights where she had notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the ruling in favor of the city. As an initial matter, the Appellate Court rejected the homeowner's argument that the Code of Civil Procedure (state statute) applied to the city's administrative hearing process, finding that the city had authority to establish its own hearing process and notice requirements for administrative hearings on ordinance violations. Nevertheless, the court did find that the city violated its own hearing procedures, which required that notice of an administrative hearing be served personally, by certified mail, or by posting notice on the property. Because the city served the notice by regular mail (which was not identified in the city's procedures), it did not comply with the city's own service requirements. The Court also noted that the city's own procedures required that certain information be included in the notice, such as the fine and any penalties for late payment or failure to attend the hearing, but that information was not included in the city's notice to the homeowner. Because the city failed to comply with its own service requirements, the Court found that the hearing body did not have jurisdiction to conduct the administrative hearing and vacated the violation order and fines. 

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In the Zone: Court Rejects "Takings" Challenge to City's Rental Assistance Ordinance

In the Zone: Court Rejects "Takings" Challenge to City's Rental Assistance Ordinance

  Thursday, July 23, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a "takings" challenge to a city ordinance that protects tenants in residential buildings when ownership is transferred through a foreclosure action. BBLI Edison, LLC v. City of Chicago.

In 2021, the City of Chicago adopted the "Keep Chicago Renting Ordinance." That ordinance requires anyone who obtains a rental property through a foreclosure action to negotiate new leases with existing tenants in good faith and if the tenant declines to renew a lease, pay the tenant $10,600 to assist with relocation expenses. When BBLI took control of a rental property through a sheriff's deed in 2024, BBLI followed the procedures under the ordinance for negotiating new leases, but at least five tenants declined new leases and requested the relocation assistance fee. BBLI filed a lawsuit against the city claiming that the ordinance violated its civil rights because requiring payment of the fee constituted an unconstitutional "takings" under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, and BBLI appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit uphold the dismissal of the case. 

First, the Court found that the city had authority to adopt the ordinance as a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship. 

Second, the Court rejected BBLI's argument that the relocation assistance fee requirement was a "physical" taking because it transfers wealth, finding this ordinance to be similar to rent control regulations which courts have found are not "physical" takings. 

Third, the Court did not find a "regulatory" taking because, among other things, the city's ordinance did not interfere with BBLI's "investment-backed expectations" since the ordinance was already in effect when BBLI purchased the property.

Finally, the Court rejected BBLI's "unconstitutional conditions" argument because BBLI was not asking for permission to build or engage in some other lawful activity that the city was withholding or imposing conditions on the issuance. Instead, the ordinance was enacted to further the city's interest in keeping its residents housed.

In short, the Court upheld the dismissal of BBLI's "takings" challenge to the rental assistance ordinance.

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PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of OMA Because Agenda Description Was Not Sufficient

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of OMA Because Agenda Description Was Not Sufficient

  Wednesday, July 22, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In its 7th binding opinion for 2026, the Public Access Counselor for the Illinois Attorney General (PAC) found a public body in violation of the Open Meetings Act by taking final action at a board meeting without setting forth the general subject matter of the item on the meeting agenda. PAC Op. 26-007. The PAC did find the board provided an adequate public recital prior to voting on the matter, however.

A reporter filed a complaint with the PAC alleging that a public body voted on the creation of new employment positions without adequately describing the proposed action on its meeting agenda or providing a sufficient public recital prior to voting. The vote to create the new positions was taken under the agenda item "Approval of Supervisor's Report." The PAC watched the video recording of the meeting and noted that the Supervisor suggested adding five new employment positions during his Supervisor's report, and that a motion was made to approve the necessary hires, the motion seconded, and then a vote taken by the board to approve that motion. 

The board defended its actions, stating that no formal action had been taken by the board since these hires were within the Supervisor's authority, and that the board's vote was not final action but "merely a formality." The PAC rejected that argument, stating that the board's vote "resolved the question of whether the Board approved of the creation of those positions," which constituted final action under the OMA. The PAC then determined that the agenda listing did not comply with Section 2.02(c) of the OMA, which requires that a meeting agenda set forth the general subject matter of any ordinance or resolution that will be the subject of final action at a meeting. (Note that the PAC opinion does not state that the action taken by the board even involved the approval of an ordinance or resolution, and instead only references a motion being made, seconded, and voted on at the meeting). 

As for the reporter's claim that the board did not provide an adequate public recital prior to taking a vote, the PAC rejected that argument, finding that the Supervisor described each of the positions involved in the motion and detailed the justification for the proposed new hires. The PAC noted that a discussion of the financial impacts of the new hires was not required, and that the discussion prior to the actual vote complied with Section 2(e) of the OMA.

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Appeals Court Rules in Favor of City in Challenge to Firefighter's Termination for Social Media Posts

Appeals Court Rules in Favor of City in Challenge to Firefighter's Termination for Social Media Posts

  Tuesday, July 21, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A federal court of appeals upheld the termination of a city firefighter after he posted several racially charged and offensive posts on his personal Facebook account. Inendino v. Nance-Holt.

A firefighter worked for a city fire department for 16 years. Most of his work was at a station in a predominantly Black neighborhood of the city. As an EMT, he had frequent contact with the public and engaged directly with patients. He had a personal Facebook page which was publicly viewable. On his personal Facebook page, he identified himself as a city firefighter, and his profile picture depicted him on the back of a fire truck, wearing his firefighter gear. After the city received multiple complaints about content he posted on Facebook, the city conducted an investigation and prepared a report that found that a number of his Facebook posts were racist and offensive, targeted Black and Asian Americans, and showed a contempt for the residents of the community he served. The report recommended that the city terminate him. Shortly after, he was terminated for violating the city's personnel rules relating to social media and professional conduct. The firefighter filed a grievance under the city's collective bargaining agreement, but the arbitrator ruled against him, finding just cause for his termination.

The firefighter then sued the city, claiming it violated his civil rights in firing him, and challenging the city's policies as unconstitutional. The district court ruled in favor of the city, and he appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the city's termination, rejecting the firefighter's constitutional claims. The Court applied what is known as the "Pickering balancing test" which applies when a government employee challenges a negative employment action on First Amendment grounds.

First, the Seventh Circuit accepted for purposes of applying the Pickering balancing that some of his Facebook posts might address matters of public concern. However, the Court rejected the firefighter's argument that the First Amendment protected those posts, finding that (1) he identified himself as a city firefighter on his Facebook page, (2) his Facebook posts were racially offensive, (3) he targeted groups that his position required him to protect, and (4) that the city's interest in ensuring that its fire department succeed in performing its public safety mission outweighed any interest in his posting the offensive content on Facebook. 

In sum, the Court upheld the city's termination of the firefighter for his Facebook posts and comments.

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Public Comment Policy Overly Broad and Vague Under First Amendment

Public Comment Policy Overly Broad and Vague Under First Amendment

  Monday, July 20, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Merriott v. City of Bossier City, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a city's "decorum" policy for city meetings violated the First Amendment because it was overly broad as well as vague in prohibiting personal, impertinent, and slanderous remarks and "becoming boisterous" during public comment. 

An online journalist attended city council meetings where the city clerk read from the city's rules of decorum for public comment. Those rules included restrictions on cell phone usage, imposed time limits on speakers, and required the audience to maintain decorum. At one of the meetings, the city clerk read the following statement: 

Any person making personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks or who shall become boisterous while addressing the Council shall be forthwith, by the President Pro-tem, barred from further audience before the Council unless permission to continue by [sic] granted by a majority vote of the Council” (the “Policy”)....All remarks shall be addressed to the Council as a body and not to any member thereof. No questions shall be asked a [sic] Council person or the mayor except through the meeting chair. All other audience members are asked to please observe the meeting quietly. City Council appointed Sergeant at Arms have been instructed to maintain decorum and ask anyone in violation to step out of the meeting. Merriott again “criticiz[ed] the Council for failing to listen to the Mayor and the citizens. 

The journalist spoke during public comment at several meetings and criticized the city on a decision relating to term limits. He was interrupted by councilmembers reminding him of the decorum rules. After one of the meetings, the journalist wrote a letter to the city, requesting the council respect his First Amendment rights and not interrupt him during public comment. At the next meeting, he was again interrupted during public comment and threatened with removal. He then sued, alleging violations of the state's open meetings laws and his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed his case, and he appealed.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed part of the dismissal of his case, finding that the journalist had plausibly alleged in his complaint that the city's public comment policy was unconstitutional. First, the Court found that the policy's prohibition on "personal" remarks was too broad because its enforcement could capture protected free speech, such as criticism of individual councilmembers. Second, the Court found that the prohibition on "impertinent" remarks was also too broad because it allows the city council to decide which comments are permissible at its whim. Third, the Court struck down the policy's ban on "slanderous" remarks, finding that it was too broad because it placed a speaker in doubt about what he or she could say about public officials and public figures. Fourth, the Court found that the policy's ban on persons who "become boisterous" was too broad because it went beyond conduct and would also apply to speech, implicating the First Amendment. The Court also found the policy to be too vague because the terms "personal" and "impertinent" were undefined and, therefore, failed to provide speakers with a "reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited." 

In sum, the Court found that the city's public comment policy was overly broad and too vague, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. The Court upheld the district court's findings in favor of the city on the journalist's open meetings act and content-based discrimination claims, however.

Although this case is out of the Fifth Circuit (which does not cover Illinois), it is consistent with Illinois Attorney General opinions and court rulings that question public comment policies that go beyond regulating conduct.

 

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Court Sends Social Media Defamation Case Back to Trial Court to Award Compensatory Damages

Court Sends Social Media Defamation Case Back to Trial Court to Award Compensatory Damages

  Wednesday, July 15, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Although this case does not involve local governments, it is an interesting case involving social media posts and a defamation lawsuit. Sullivan v. Schiman. 

A patient posted on a local "updates and information" Facebook page about a doctor she had seen in the emergency room. Her post named the doctor and claimed that he had sexually assaulted her in giving a rectal examination. That Facebook post was then made a "featured post" by the Facebook page's administrator, which meant it was the first post on that Facebook page. When the doctor learned about the post, he filed a complaint against both the patient and the Facebook page's administrator alleging defamation "per se" among other claims. The case went to trial, and testimony by a nurse who was present during the exam contradicted the claims made by the patient in her Facebook post. At the end of the trial, the judge found in favor of the doctor on his defamation claim against both defendants, and awarded him $1.00 in nominal damages from both the poster and the page administrator.

The doctor appealed on two grounds. First, the doctor claimed the trial court erred in awarding only $1.00 in damages. Second, the doctor argued that the trial court should have imposed sanctions against the page administrator and his attorney for providing false answers in discovery.

The Appellate Court agreed with the doctor on both issues. First, the Appellate Court ruled that nominal damages were not reasonable in this case where several thousand people saw the Facebook post accusing him of a violent sexual assault, which, among other things, would support an award of compensatory damages rather than only nominal damages. Defamation "per se" occurs when a false statement is so inherently harmful that the damage to a person's reputation is obvious on its face, meaning the doctor did not need to prove actual monetary or special damages. The Appellate Court also found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying sanctions for the discovery violations. The Appellate Court  sent the case back to the trial court to enter an appropriate award of damages and to reevaluate the sanctions request. 

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Court Rejects Excessive Force Claim Against Police Officers

Court Rejects Excessive Force Claim Against Police Officers

  Tuesday, July 14, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling upholding a district court's decision in favor of city police officers in an excessive force case. Davis v. City of Elgin. 

Police were dispatched to a home after someone called to report that an individual was threatening his ex-wife and roommate with a shotgun. Police called the suspect, who threatened to harm himself with a knife. The police then surrounded the house but the suspect had already left the home and gone to his neighbors.  The suspect came outside to the porch but when he refused police orders to come out further, police fired at him with a non-lethal impact weapon. After the suspect threatened to harm the officer who shot him, officers shot him again. The suspect eventually pled guilty to disorderly conduct, and then filed a lawsuit against the city and the police officers involved in the incident claiming that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled against the suspect, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, finding that the suspect did not establish that the officers violated a clearly established right to be free from a particular use of force. The Court found that the officers had good reason not to want the suspect to go back into the house so he could potentially grab a weapon, and that the officers had knowledge of his earlier threats with a gun against his ex-wife, as well as his threat that he had a knife. In sum, the Court found that the officers had qualified immunity. The Court also held that the suspect did not meet his burden to show a theory of liability against the city itself.

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In the Zone: Court Denies Injunction Against Village's Proposed Storm Improvements

In the Zone: Court Denies Injunction Against Village's Proposed Storm Improvements

  Monday, July 13, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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To alleviate flooding, a municipality designed and planned certain modifications to its stormwater system. A quarry owner opposed the planned improvements and filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction to stop the municipality from modifying its stormwater system as planned. The trial court denied the injunction and ruled that the municipality possessed an easement across the quarry that was granted by a predecessor owner of the quarry. The owner appealed.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the ruling of the trial court. First, the Court determined that there was substantial evidence that the municipality held an easement across the quarry based on the installation of a stormwater pipe with the agreement of the predecessor quarry owner and language contained in an easement document. Next, the Court rejected the owner's argument that the municipality had abandoned its easement. Finally, the Court held that the owner had not established the elements necessary to obtain an injunction. In sum, the Court upheld the ruling in favor of the municipality. Hanson Aggregates Midwest, Inc. v. Village of La Grange.

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Seventh Circuit Upholds "Protect Illinois Communities Act" that Restricts Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines

Seventh Circuit Upholds "Protect Illinois Communities Act" that Restricts Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines

  Friday, July 10, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois General Assembly enacted the Protect Illinois Communities Act following a deadly shooting at a Chicago suburb’s Independence Day parade. That Act criminalizes the manufacture, sale, delivery, purchase, and possession of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, among other things. The Act contains a grandfather clause that allows preexisting lawful owners of the regulated items to continue possessing them. 

Shortly after the Act was adopted, several lawsuits were filed to challenge its constitutionality. The district court decisions were divided, with one court granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act and two district courts denying injunctive relief. Those appeals made their way to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which consolidated the cases and issued a ruling in 2023 that rejected preliminary relief to the challengers and sent the case back to the district courts for further proceedings.

One of the consolidated cases proceeded to a bench trial. The district court in that case held that much of the Act violated the Second Amendment and that the offending provisions were not severable, and the court enjoined enforcement of the Act in its entirety. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which recently reversed the ruling and upheld the Act, including its restrictions on AR-15s and thirty-round rifle magazines. Barnett et al., v. Raoul. 

First, the Seventh Circuit held that the challengers failed to meet their burden to show that all of the Act's regulations were facially invalid. Second, the Seventh Circuit assumed for purposes of its ruling that the regulated items constituted "arms" under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment, meaning that they were presumptively entitled to constitutional protection under the Second Amendment. Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the test established by the Supreme Court for challenges under the Second Amendment and determined that the Act was consistent with the principles that "underpin our regulatory tradition" because legislatures have long imposed restrictions on particularly dangerous weapons like those regulated by the Act. Further, the Seventh Circuit found the Act’s “burden on the right of armed self defense" to be minimal. In sum, the Seventh Circuit held that the challengers failed to meet their burden in a facial challenge to the Act's constitutionality under the Second Amendment. 

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Illinois Adopts Amendments to Child Care Licensing; Provides Direction to Newly Organized Department of Early Childhood

Illinois Adopts Amendments to Child Care Licensing; Provides Direction to Newly Organized Department of Early Childhood

  Thursday, July 09, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Two years ago, the State of Illinois began the process of consolidating the operation and management of programs previously administered by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS), Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), and the Governor’s Office of Early Childhood Development (GOECD). As of July 1, 2026, the Illinois Department of Early Childhood (IDEC) began operations to complete the transition.

Just before IDEC began operating, the Governor signed into law Public Act 104-0480 adopting comprehensive reforms in license regulations for day care centers. The new act creates three tiers of licensing and registration:  Day Care Center Providers, Recognized Alternative Providers and Exempt Providers. Most importantly for local governments, the amendments re-affirm the State’s double exemption for programs operated by local governments so long as those programs meet defined statutory parameters. Eligible programs will be exempt from regulation as a Day Care Center Provider and from registration as a Recognized Alternative Provider.

To qualify for the double exemption, a local government (or combination of local governments pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement) may demonstrate it is operating a special activities program, such as athletics, recreation, crafts instruction, music, dance, drama, sports, or similar activities offered by a unit of local government, including special activities programs offered by 2 or more units of local government pursuant to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. (There are other exemptions for school-based extracurricular activities conducted outside of the school day.)

These types of special activities programs will qualify for the double exemption if they demonstrate all the following requirements:

(A) State law authorizes the unit of local government to offer the program and an elected or appointed board of the unit of local government has adopted policies governing the operation of the program, pursuant to Section 8-10 of the Park District Code or other applicable law.

(B) The program is offered to the following categories of children and the parent or legal guardian of each child has received written acknowledgement that the program is not licensed by the Department under this Act:

(i) children at least 5 years of age for no more than 100 continuous days in any 12-month period when school is not in session;

(ii) children at least 3 years of age for no more than 3.5 continuous hours at a time; or

(iii) children under 3 years of age for no more than one hour at a time.

(C) The program does not advertise to the public as a pre-school program, licensed early care and education provider, licensed child care, or licensed day care.

(D) The program conducts the following investigations on all employees of the program no less than once every 5 years:

(i) background investigations pursuant to Section 8-23 of the Park District Code, Section 16a-5 of the Chicago Park District Act, or other applicable law;

(ii) a (free) name check against State and national sex offender registries; and

(iii) a (free) Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System (CANTS) name check through the Department at no cost to the unit of local government.

(E) The program conducts the following investigations on all volunteers of the program no less than once every 5 years:

(i) background investigations pursuant to Section 8-23 of the Park District Code, Section 16a-5 of the Chicago Park District Act, or other applicable law;

(ii) a (free) name check against State and national sex offender registries; and

(iii) a (free) Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System (CANTS) name check through the Department at no cost to the unit of local government.

(F) The unit of local government has an emergency preparedness and response plan for the location of the special activities program.

(G) The program does not participate in the Child Care Assistance Program (CCAP) or receive funding pursuant to the Early Childhood Block Grant.

If a program fails to satisfy all the requirements, it will be required to either obtain a license as a day care center or register as a recognized alternative provider.

Some local governments have recently been asked by DCFS to “apply” for exempt status. Public Act 104-0480 clarifies whether this is necessary. Section 3.01 of the Child Care Act, as amended, provides

The Department of Early Childhood shall provide written verification of exemption and description of compliance with standards for the health, safety, and development of the children who receive the services upon submission by the provider of, in addition to any other documentation required by the Department of Early Childhood, a notarized statement that the provider facility complies with: (1) the standards of the Department of Public Health or local health department, (2) the fire safety standards of the State Fire Marshal, and (3) if operated in a public school building, the health and safety standards of the State Board of Education.

The amendments related to licensing and registration requirements will become effective for all providers other than park districts on July 1, 2027, but not until July 1, 2028 for park districts.  Programs operating under a current 2-year licensing exemption shall be allowed to continue to operate under that exemption until it expires or until July 1, 2028, whichever is later.

Keep an eye open for IDEC adopting new administrative regulations implementing the revised statutory scheme. 

Post Authored by Adam Simon, Ancel Glink

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Supreme Court Invalidates Hawaii Firearm "Owner Consent" Restriction

Supreme Court Invalidates Hawaii Firearm "Owner Consent" Restriction

  Wednesday, July 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Hawaii law that prohibited firearms on private property open to the public without the express and affirmative consent of the property owner. Wolford v. Lopez.

Following the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, which ended “may-issue” concealed carry licensing schemes, Hawaii enacted HRS § 134-9.5. The law provided that a person carrying a licensed firearm could not enter or remain on private property of another person “unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property.” Such authorization could be provided through unambiguous written or verbal consent or the posting of clear and conspicuous signage at the entrance of the building or elsewhere on the premises.

The Supreme Court held that the law conflicted with the common law presumption that members of the public, including those lawfully carrying firearms, may enter private property open to the public unless expressly prohibited from doing so. As a result, the Court concluded that Hawaii’s law unconstitutionally burdened individuals seeking to exercise their Second Amendment right to carry a firearm for self-defense. In addition, the Hawaii law could not be justified by the country's historical firearm regulations.

This ruling does not raise concerns regarding the applicability of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act (430 ILCS 66/et seq.). Illinois follows a system where firearms are presumptively allowed on private property unless the owner posts statutorily prescribed signage prohibiting them. This is consistent with the common law presumption. Hawaii took the opposite approach, presumptively prohibiting firearms on private property by requiring signage indicating that carrying firearms was authorized. Illinois law requires that property owners take affirmative steps to exclude firearms, whereas Hawaii’s approach required that property owners take affirmative steps to allow them.   

This decision impacts California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey, which have laws similar to Hawaii’s.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Dan Bolin, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Police Department Violated FOIA in Withholding Investigative Records

PAC Finds Police Department Violated FOIA in Withholding Investigative Records

  Tuesday, July 07, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A news media requester submitted a FOIA request to a police department seeking records related to an investigation of an arrested individual for a domestic incident. The department entirely denied its responsive records to the request citing FOIA’s personal privacy exemption in Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. After the requester submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) challenging the denial, the PAC issued its sixth binding opinion of 2026 concluding that the department improperly withheld its responsive records. PAC Op. 26-006

The PAC first noted that previous PAC opinions were clear that there is a strong public interest in the disclosure of information concerning arrests that outweighs an arrestee's right to privacy. Also, because the requester is a news reporter seeking to report about a matter of high public interest (the arrest of a police officer), there was a heightened public interest in disclosure of information regarding this arrest. 

Because the department’s records contain information that was incidental or had no bearing on the arrest or circumstances leading to the arrest, including the names and personally identifying information (contact information, nature of relationship with arrestee) of witnesses and third parties, the PAC determined that the department was authorized to redact that personal information pursuant to Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. However, the department was required to release the remaining non-exempt parts of its responsive records to the request.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam

  Monday, July 06, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast released Episode 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam. In this episode,  the American Planning Association Chicago Metro Section recently teamed up with Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast for the 11th Annual “Bar Exam” Planning Law Session. Recorded live at Goodwin’s in Chicago, this realistic, simulated law school experience tests planners and land use professionals on the latest legal precedents in wind energy, annexation, and First Amendment protections. As is tradition, all participants passed the bar, and teams competed for the prestigious (and five-foot-tall) Ancel Glink Cup. In this episode, Ancel Glink’s Dan Bolin, Megan Mack, and Tyler Smith are joined by special guest Phil Green, a Local Gov 250 Government Champion, who undergoes a high-tech “firmware update” to become the session’s first AI-powered planning law assistant.

In This Episode

§  [00:00] The Roll Call: Host Dan Bolin calls the meeting to order with professors Megan Mack and Tyler Smith, plus local government champion Phil Green.

§  [05:00] Round 1: Democracy at the Doorstep: Phil discusses his recognition as a Local Gov 250 Champion and his work on “democracy at the doorstep” in Hoffman Estates.

§  [11:30] Case 1.1 - Wind Farm Bans: A look at Hickory Wind LLC v. Village of Cedar Point, exploring why outright bans on lawful land uses exceed non-home rule authority.

§  [19:00] Case 1.2 - Zoning Finality: In Chosen Consulting LLC v. Town Council of Highland, we learn why ADA and discrimination claims do not bypass the requirement for a final zoning decision.

§  [22:30] Case 1.3 - Cross-Examination Rights: A resort project in Galena highlights the importance of maintaining a record when residents forfeit their right to cross-examine witnesses.

§  [26:30] Round 2: The Road to Houston: Phil shares takeaways from serving as the Education Chair for NPC26 in Detroit and teases a “Moon Joy” theme for NPC27 in Houston.

§  [31:45] Case 2.1 - Forceful Annexation: We review a 4.7% perimeter gap in Husky Transportation v. Village of Barrington Hills to define the “wholly bounded” standard.

§  [35:45] Case 2.2 - First Amendment Retaliation: The saga of the Minocqua Brewing Co. demonstrates that permit denials are not retaliatory if they would have occurred regardless of protected speech.

§  [39:15] Case 2.3 - The Hamburger UFOs: A whimsical mural case from Kansas tests “intermediate scrutiny” and whether cities can prove that burger art is more distracting than flower art.

§  [42:00] The Future of Planning Law: Megan and Tyler discuss the responsible use of AI in legal practice and how municipalities are responding to data center controversies involving power and water consumption.

§  [46:15] The Reveal of A.I. CPU: Phil Green manifests as the A.I. CPU, an assistant that is 100% confident, 60% accurate, and requires massive amounts of “liquid cooling” to function.

§  [48:00] Round 3: AI-Assisted Answers: The A.I. CPU helps navigate cases on warrantless rental inspections, daily fine calculations, and why missing scaffolding is not a legal defense for safety hazards.

§  [1:02:30] Crowning the Champions: We announce the winners of the 2026 Bar Exam and award the shiny gold Ancel Glink Cup to the “Transit Masters.”

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Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA

Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA

  Thursday, July 02, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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After a police department failed to respond to a news agency's FOIA request, the requester filed a lawsuit. Although the department produced its responsive records during the litigation, the requester filed a petition for civil penalties against the department pursuant to Section 11(j) of FOIA, which states that:

If the court determines that a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith, the court shall also impose upon the public body a civil penalty of not less than $2,500 nor more than $5,000 for each occurrence. 5 ILCS 140/11(j).

After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that the department had willfully and intentionally violated FOIA because it had knowledge of FOIA’s response requirements and did not to demonstrate a good reason for non-compliance with those requirements. However, relying on prior Illinois cases that required a requester to demonstrate both (1) a willful and intentional violation of FOIA, and (2) that the FOIA violation was deliberate, by design, and done with a dishonest purpose, the circuit court ruled that the requester was not entitled to civil penalties, because the requester did not prove that the department had a dishonest purpose when violating FOIA.

After the requester appealed the circuit court’s ruling, an Illinois Appellate Court (First District) reversed the circuit court’s denial of civil penalties, and sent the case back to the circuit court to determine appropriate civil penalties. Lucy Parsons Labs v. Chicago Police Department. The Appellate Court determined that the “or otherwise acted in bad faith” language in Section 11(j) is a catch-all category of possible bad faith actions that a public body can take in violation of FOIA. In other words, the examples of bad faith conduct included in Section 11(j) of FOIA—willful and intentional noncompliance—is an illustrative example of bad faith conduct rather than an exhaustive list. The Appellate Court reasoned that interpreting Section 11(j) of FOIA to require demonstrating that a public body “willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith failed to comply with the FOIA” supplants the catchall term, and replaces it with the conjunctive “and,” which imposes a higher standard of proof to demonstrate bad faith non-compliance with FOIA, and eliminates the possibility that a “willful and intentional” violation of FOIA could, by itself, warrant civil penalties. In this case, because the circuit court found that the department intentionally and willfully violated FOIA, the Appellate Court ruled that the circuit court’s order finding that the requester had not met its burden of proof for the imposition of civil penalties against the department was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Court Rejects "Equitable Estoppel" Claim of Property Owner

In the Zone: Court Rejects "Equitable Estoppel" Claim of Property Owner

  Tuesday, June 30, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a municipality in a case brought by a property owner challenging the municipality's zoning decisions relating to the owner's commercial uses of property zoned in a Conservation zoning district. Deepe v. Village of Swansea Planning & Zoning Board.

The owner of two parcels of property applied for a zoning compliance certificate and construction permit to operate a commercial business on land zoned in the Conservation district. Over several years, the owner applied for and received permits and permission from the municipality to operate his business. After neighbors complained about the operation of the lawncare and storage businesses on the two parcels, the municipality notified the owner that his uses were nonconforming and he needed to bring his operations into compliance with the zoning regulations. The owner appealed the order to the zoning board, which ruled in favor of the municipality. He then appealed to the circuit court, which ruled in favor of the owner with respect to one of the parcels, finding that the municipality was "equitably estopped" from enforcing its regulations. However, the court found in favor of the municipality with respect to the second parcel. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's ruling in favor of the owner on his equitable estoppel claim. The Court first determined that the two parcels were zoned in the Conservation district, and the owner never applied for a rezoning to a more appropriate district. Second, the owner knew and even acknowledged that the Conservation district did not allow a storage business so he could not rely on any acquiescence by the municipality. Third, the Court acknowledged that while the municipality could have been more forceful in its enforcement, "slow enforcement" would not support an estoppel claim. In sum, the Court found in favor of the municipality, holding that the owner could not establish an "equitable estoppel" claim for its use of either parcel. 

There was a dissenting opinion that would have ruled in favor of the property owner on his equitable estoppel claims based on the actions of municipal officials and employees over the years with respect to the owner's uses. 

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Court Upholds Municipality's Administrative Adjudication Fine for Overweight Trucks

Court Upholds Municipality's Administrative Adjudication Fine for Overweight Trucks

  Monday, June 29, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Solano v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld a home rule municipality's authority to use its administrative adjudication hearing system and fine drivers of overweight trucks in an amount in excess of $250.00. First, the Court acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court in Cammacho v. City of Joliet had previously held that home rule governments could use administrative hearings to adjudicate moving offenses and reportable violations. Second, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that section 11-208.3 of the Illinois Vehicle Code restricts municipalities from imposing a fine of more than $250.00 for certain standing, parking, and other violations, finding that overweight trucks were not listed in the category of offenses identified in that section of the Code. As a result, the Court upheld the municipality's issuance of the fine against Solano.

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Abandonment Statute Does Not Require Proof of Delivery or Receipt of Notice

Abandonment Statute Does Not Require Proof of Delivery or Receipt of Notice

  Thursday, June 25, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently interpreted the abandonment procedures of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code), holding that a municipality does not have to prove actual delivery or receipt of notice to all parties with a record interest in order to obtain a judicial deed under section 11-31-1 of the Code. Village of Downers Grove v. Beckham.

A municipality filed a petition with the court under section 11-31-1 of the Code to request that the court declare a property abandoned and issue a judicial deed to the property as well as an order of demolition. The municipality argued that the property was in disrepair and unfit for occupancy, as well as dangerous and unsafe. The petition indicated that notices were sent by mail to all named defendants advising them of the court action. The owner of record executed a waiver of rights to challenge the petition. However, another defendant (Lakeview) with a security interest in the property objected to the petition based on notice deficiencies. After the municipality amended its petition and served notice by certified mail, Lakeview again objected to the petition on notice grounds. The circuit court ultimately granted the municipality's petition and issued a judicial deed for the property.

Lakeview appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in issuing the judicial deed because the municipality failed to establish that notice was actually delivered to or received by all interested parties. The municipality argued that the statute does not require proof of delivery, and the Appellate Court agreed, holding that section 11-31-1(d) of the Code does not condition the notice's effectiveness on actual delivery or receipt. Instead, the Code only requires the municipality to send the notice in the required manner - i.e., by certified or registered mail. As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's issuance of the judicial deed.

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Supreme Court Says Government Not Liable to Pay Owner Fair Market Value in Tax Foreclosure Sale

Supreme Court Says Government Not Liable to Pay Owner Fair Market Value in Tax Foreclosure Sale

  Wednesday, June 24, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In a 9-0 opinion (with a couple of concurring opinions), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a government that forecloses and sells property for delinquent property taxes is not responsible to pay the owner the difference between the sale price and the hypothetical fair market value of the property. Pung v. Isabella County. 

Three years ago, the Supreme Court held that a government that forecloses and sells property for delinquent property taxes may be liable to return to the owner any surplus proceeds from tax foreclosure sales (i.e., the difference between the sales price and the taxpayer's debt). Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U. S. 631 (2023). 

In today's case, the question before the Supreme Court went a step further -  what if the sale price falls below the property's hypothetical fair market value, would the government be responsible for paying the difference to the owner as "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause? Yesterday, the Supreme Court said no, holding that the proper baseline for determining compensation under the Takings Clause is the price obtained in the tax sale so long as the sale was fairly conducted. The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not require the government to return the difference between the sale price and fair market value of the property that was sold. In this case, the Court held that the county was obligated to pay the surplus proceeds to the owner, but was not liable to pay more than what the county sold the property for at its tax sale auction. The opinion concluded with the following:

The Pung family lost its property because it failed to pay its taxes. The Fifth Amendment protects the family’s right to surplus proceeds from the tax sale, not compensation for the property’s fair market value. The Eighth Amendment offers no greater protections. 

So, when a government forecloses and sells property for delinquent taxes, (1) it must return any surplus proceeds from the sale (the difference between the sale price and the taxpayer's debt) but (2) is not required to pay more than what the government sold the property for even if the fair market value of the property exceeds the sale price. 

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Citizen Was Not Entitled to Litigation Costs in Lawsuit Against PAC

Citizen Was Not Entitled to Litigation Costs in Lawsuit Against PAC

  Tuesday, June 23, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A citizen filed two appeals with the Public Access Counselor of the Attorney General's office (PAC) claiming a public body violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA). After the PAC had still not issued a decision two years later, the citizen sued the PAC claiming it violated the OMA by not resolving his appeals within 60 days as provided by section 3.5 of the OMA. Within a week of being served with the lawsuit, the PAC issued non-binding determinations resolving the two appeals and finding the public body in violation of OMA. The citizen filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss one of his claims seeking a court order mandating the PAPACC to respond, acknowledging that claim was now "moot." However, the citizen also filed a motion seeking litigation costs from the PAC under section 3 of the OMA. The trial court denied his request and he appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court examined the OMA and determined that the PAC was not a proper defendant to a lawsuit to enforce the OMA under section 3 of the OMA. The Court interpreted the enforcement provision to apply to public body defendants and their alleged violations of the OMA, and not to the PAC's compliance with the statutory deadlines to respond to appeals, because the PAC is not a "party" under the enforcement statute when a citizen files an appeal of a public body's decision or actions with the PAC. As a result, the Court held that the citizen was not entitled to recover his litigation costs against the PAC for its violation of the statutory deadline required by section 3.5(e) of the OMA. Pal v. Office of the Public Access Counselor.

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School Board Violated First Amendment in Restricting Critical Public Comment

School Board Violated First Amendment in Restricting Critical Public Comment

  Thursday, June 18, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Although this case was decided by a different federal circuit court of appeals than the Seventh Circuit that governs Illinois, it is illustrative of how courts view restrictions on public comment at government meetings. Boddy v. Grech (6th Cir. June 10, 2026).

A school board in Xenia, Ohio held a public meeting where public comment was permitted under its public comment policy. While one of the speakers was expressing her views regarding the school district's alleged teaching of critical race theory, the school board president threatened to turn off the speaker's microphone and then grabbed the microphone and recessed the meeting. The speaker sued, claiming the school district violated her First Amendmnet rights. The school district defended the board president's actions, stating that the reason the speaker was silenced was because she violated rules of decorum by inciting and riling up the audience, by using terms such as "cowardice" and "failing" to describe the board and the school district,and by calling people "names" and spreading "baseless accusations." 

The district court rejected the speaker's request for a preliminary injunction against the school district, finding that although the speaker's criticism of the board was subject to some First Amendment protection, some of her speech was an "ad hominem" attack that was not protected by the First Amendment. The speaker appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and ordered the district court to grant the speaker a preliminary injunction against the board.

First, the Court determined that the speaker's use of "failing" and "cowardice" did not qualify as "fighting words" under the First Amendment. Instead, the speaker was simply criticizing the board and the superintendent for their policy decisions, while maintaining a calm demeanor and tone, which is protected by the First Amendment. The Court further stated that even if her words were "offensive," the First Amendment protects that type of speech and a contrary position would allow the government to ban the express of unpopular views, which would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. The Court further noted that the [f]reedom to criticize public officials and expose their wrongdoing is at the core of First Amendment values.”

Second, the Court rejected the school district's argument that restricting the speaker's speech was necessary to maintain decorum, finding that the real justification for shutting the speaker down was because she shared viewpoints critical of the board. 

Finally, the Court agreed with the speaker that the board's actions in shutting down her speech constituted a "heckler's veto," because the board appeared to be taking action based on the crowd's reactions to the speaker's public comments - i.e., silencing the speaker in an attempt to address a disruptive or unruly crowd. 

In sum, the Sixth Circuit found that the speaker was entitled to a preliminary injunction to stop the school board from enforcing its policy against her at future meetings.

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County Not Liable for Former Coroner's Actions in Keeping Skull

County Not Liable for Former Coroner's Actions in Keeping Skull

  Tuesday, June 16, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in favor of a county in a civil rights lawsuit involving the former county coroner's keeping of a family member's skull as a trophy. Betts v. Boone County.

In 1977, a high school student was kidnapped, raped, and murdered and then dumped in a field within the county. As part of the investigation, the county coroner examined the body, and returned the remains to the family, except for the skull, which the coroner kept. 

In 2022, the current county coroner contacted the family to inform them that the former coroner had kept at least three skulls, one of which was their family member's. After the family exhumed the casket to place the skull with her remains, they filed a civil rights lawsuit against the county, arguing that the coroner's actions unconstitutionally retained their property in violation of their due process rights. The district court dismissed the case, determining that the family did not show that the former coroner's actions established an official county policy, as required to hold the county liable for its employee's actions. 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the legal standard for holding a government liable for civil rights claims for its employees' actions, which requires a person to show that the deprivation of a constitutional right was caused by a municipal policy or custom. Here, the Seventh Circuit held that because state law requires coroners to return all remains to the next of kin, the former coroner did not implement an “official policy” of the county when he kept the skull. Instead, he violated the law. Since the family members could not establish that the county was liable for its former employee's actions, the district court properly dismissed their case. 

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In the Zone: Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Lawsuit Against County Regarding Denial of Solar Facilities

In the Zone: Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Lawsuit Against County Regarding Denial of Solar Facilities

  Monday, June 15, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In January 2023, the Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 102-1123 (the Act) which, among other things, amended the Counties Code to codify new standards and procedures for the development of “commercial solar energy facilities” in counties across Illinois. Notable provisions of the Act include the following: 

• A restriction that counties may not adopt zoning regulations that “disallow, permanently ortemporarily,” commercial solar energy facilities in agricultural or industrial districts,
• Guidelines regarding maximum setbacks, fencing requirements, height, vegetative screening, etc.,
• A provision allowing counties to adopt standards for solar facilities, so long as county requirements are not “more restrictive” than those specified in the Act,
• A requirement that counties hold public hearings prior to making decisions to approve or deny solar facilities, and
• A provision stating that requests for siting approval or special use permits “shall be approved” if a request complies with the Counties Code, the local county zoning ordinance, and relevant state and federal statutes and regulations.

In 2024, two solar development companies submitted separate applications to a county seeking to develop commercial solar energy facilities within the county. Over the following several months, the developers appeared before the county zoning board of appeals and the zoning committee, which held public hearings and recommended that the county board deny the proposed project under the county’s unified development ordinance (UDO). Both projects were ultimately denied by the county board, and each developer filed a lawsuit requesting (1) a writ of mandamus to compel the county to issue their requested permits, and (2) a declaration that their project applications should be approved. The developers claimed their applications complied with the Act and all provisions of the UDO, and therefore the county was obligated to approve their application and issue all necessary permits for their projects. The county moved to dismiss both cases, arguing that the Act did not give the developers an absolute right to the permits requested.

The trial court ruled in the county's favor, dismissing both cases. The court determined that mandamus was not available because the county could not be compelled to exercise its discretionary zoning authority to issue siting approval or special use permits for the facilities. Furthermore, the court found that the developer’s claim for declaratory judgment was insufficiently plead, and gave the developers an opportunity to replead their complaint. Instead, both developers appealed the trial court’s decision, and the cases were consolidated before the Fourth District Appellate Court. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the decision of the trial court, determining that mandamus was not available given the discretion vested in the county to make local zoning decisions (particularly decisions to grant or deny applications for special use permits). Tate Road Solar 1, LLC, et al. v. County of Winnebago. The Court found the Act did not prohibit the county from exercising discretion in determining whether to issue permits. Instead, by allowing counties to regulate commercial solar energy facilities as “special uses,” the Illinois General Assembly plainly intended that counties maintain some discretion over approval and siting for these land uses. The Court also determined that counties were permitted to apply their traditional, subjective standards used when making local zoning decisions. Additionally, because the Act requires a public hearing before a permit can be issued, the Court found that the county would need to exercise discretion in accepting testimony and evidence, and then weighing various standards to determine whether a permit should be issued. While the Act codified certain limitations on local authority to regulate solar facilities, the Court determined the General Assembly did not eliminate counties’ traditional discretion to make local zoning decisions. Therefore, mandamus was not an appropriate remedy to force the county to approve the developer’s applications and issue permits for the facilities.

As to the developers’ claims for declaratory judgment, the Court found that because the developers did not have a “clear right” to the permits, there was no actual controversy the developers could plead to seek a declaration that their permits be issued. In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision dismissing the developers’ lawsuits for failing to state a proper claim for mandamus or declaratory relief.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink 

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Case Was Properly Dismissed Where Appeal Not Served on City

Case Was Properly Dismissed Where Appeal Not Served on City

  Thursday, June 11, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Crane v. City of Rockford, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of an appeal of an administrative hearing officer's issuance of fines for building code violations where the property owner did not comply with the service requirements of state law.

A municipal administrative hearing officer found a property owner in violation of various building code provisions and assessed a fine of $64,000. The property owner filed an appeal with the circuit court within the statutory 35 day period but failed to properly serve the City and other defendants as required by section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law. The City filed a motion to dismiss the case based on noncompliance with the service requirements of state law, and the circuit court and Appellate Courts ruled in favor of the City, finding that section 3-103 was mandatory, and both the filing of the appeal and "issuance of summons" on the defendants has to be accomplished within 35 days of the date the administrative decision is served. Here, although the owner had filed an affidavit with the filed complaint identifying the hearing officer and mayor as defendants to be served, he failed to pay the fee for certified mailing of the summonses, so they were not issued. As a result, his appeal of the $64,000 fine was properly dismissed.

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 106: Legislative Update

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 106: Legislative Update

  Tuesday, June 09, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink has released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 106: Legislative Update. The Illinois General Assembly recently concluded its spring legislative session and Ancel Glink’s Greg Jones and Tyler Smith join us to talk about recent legislation local governments should know, including updates on housing grants, e-bike and e-scooter regulations, hemp regulations, and more! 

In This Episode:

• [00:00] Baseball Fever: Greg and Tyler discuss their favorite all-time and underrated players, including Lou Whitaker, Barry Bonds, and Anthony Rizzo.
• [03:45] The "Build Plan" vs. The "REAL Act": We review Governor Pritzker’s Build Plan omnibus package, which sought to preempt local zoning for housing but ultimately failed to advance. We also discuss the IML’s alternative REAL Act.
• [09:00] Housing Grants: Even though the Build Plan didn't pass, the FY27 budget allocated hundreds of millions for housing, including funds for the Missing Middle program, SmartBuy, and Opening Doors.
• [10:45] E-Bikes & E-Scooters: New statewide standards for electric micromobility devices effectively preempt home rule authority for regulating these devices, starting January 1, 2027 .(SB3484)
• [14:45] The Illinois Hemp Act & Cannabis: Illinois repeals the Industrial Hemp Act to align with federal standards, effective November 12, 2026. This bill also doubles the legal possession limit for cannabis to 60 grams and extends dispensary hours to 2 a.m., subject to local zoning. (SB3222)
• [17:45] Operational Updates: Briefing on HB4541 regarding overpayments under the Unclaimed Property Act and HB1353 protecting volunteer emergency workers during training.
• [19:30] Financial Posting & Trusts: Coverage of HB2137 regarding website financial posting requirements, SB638 on OPEB trust funds, and SB2102 on electronic filing receipts.
• [22:45] Special Districts: New rules for dissolving drainage and sanitation districts in certain counties (HB5166) and disconnecting park district territory (HB5542).
• [26:15] Local Finance & IMRF: Discussing SB2769 (Business District fund transfers), SB2826 (IMRF separation benefits), and SB2836 (increased audit thresholds for FY27).
• [29:30] Fire Protection & School Transfers: Updates on HB4292 (ambulance fund transfers), HB4909 (Taft-Hartley/IMRF contributions), and HB4375 (extending school fund transfer periods).
• [33:00] School Code Changes: An update covering psychologist qualifications (HB4397, effective July 1, 2027), CPR/AED training (HB4788), staff mental health procedures (HB4862, starting 2028), and service animal handling (SB2761).
• [37:30] Rights & Protections: Details on SB2914 (expanded teacher dismissal warnings) and SB3361 (The Jett Hawkins Law regarding religious hairstyles), both effective immediately upon signing.
• [39:45] Open Meetings Act: Can you list "Personnel Issues" on a meeting agenda? We review a new binding opinion regarding employee termination and the Open Meetings Act.
• [44:15] Upcoming Events: A summary of where to catch Ancel Glink attorneys this summer and fall.

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Seventh Circuit Upholds Removal of Public Employee for Social Media Posts

Seventh Circuit Upholds Removal of Public Employee for Social Media Posts

  Monday, June 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the removal of a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary after he refused to stop posting himself in uniform and making derogatory statements on social media in Wenzler v. United States Coast Guard, et al.

Wenzler had been a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary for about 15 years when a member of the public complained about his LinkedIn posts. One of the posts accused certain Supreme Court Justices of being racist, and another made a crude remark about the Girl Scouts. The Auxiliary conducted an investigation, and a supervisor directed him to remove from social media any photograph of himself wearing his uniform and to delete any reference to the Auxiliary. He responded that he would not comply with the directive and that he would file a complaint against the supervisor for racist action against him because he was white. He continued to post about his Auxiliary position on LinkedIn and another complaint was filed by a member of the public about one of his posts. He again stated he would not comply with the Auxiliary's social media directive, and formal disciplinary proceedings were started which resulted in the Coast Guard disenrolling him. After his administrative appeals failed, he sued in federal court claiming the Coast Guard's actions against him violated his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in the Coast Guard's favor, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the standards for a First Amendment retaliation claim, which require a public employee to show that (1) their speech was constitutionally protected; (2) they suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) their speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. In analyzing the first prong (whether his speech was constitutionally protected), the Court applied the two-step Pickering test: (a) whether the speech involved a matter of public concern and (b) if so, does the speaker's interest in commenting on the matter of public concern outweigh the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

In this case, the Court accepted that Wenzler's speech touched on matters of public concern (meeting the first step of the Pickering test). However, in applying the second step (balancing interests test), the Court determined that the Coast Guard deserved deference in assessing and responding to its members' speech when those members hold themselves out as members of the organization while wearing its uniform. The Auxiliary's structure as a uniformed organization within the Coast Guard with a military-like hierarchy was also relevant to the Court in balacing its interests against Wenzler's. In short, the Court held that the Auxiliary could reasonably determine that Wenzler's speech would be detrimental to the Auxiliary and its reputation, and reasonably expect that other members of the Auxiliary would be less likely to work with him because of his derogatory comments and attacks on others. As a result, the Seventh Circuit found no First Amendment violation in the Coast Guard's removal of Wenzler. 

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Illinois General Assembly Passes Illinois Hemp Act

Illinois General Assembly Passes Illinois Hemp Act

  Wednesday, June 03, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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On the final day of its 2026 spring legislative session, the Illinois General Assembly passed Senate Bill 3222, creating the Illinois Hemp Act governing hemp-derived products in Illinois. If signed by the Governor, the Act would repeal the existing Industrial Hemp Act, effective November 12, 2026.

The federal Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 Farm Bill) created an exception to the federal definition of “marijuana” for products meeting the legal definition of “hemp.” This created a loophole under which hemp was no longer a controlled substance under the Controlled Substances Act, allowing for the proliferation of synthetic cannabis products, such as Delta-9 THC products. Recent federal changes (Pub. L. No. 119-37) to the definition of “hemp” effectively close this loophole while continuing to allow “industrial hemp” grown for non-cannabis purposes. The federal changes are scheduled to become effective November 12, 2026.

Senate Bill 3222 aligns Illinois law with the recent federal changes by adopting the federal definition of “hemp,” among other terms. The effective date of the Industrial Hemp Act repeal coincides with the effective date of the federal changes. Beyond incorporating federal definitions, SB3222 brings hemp-derived products that contain qualifying concentrations of THC-related compounds within the State’s cannabis licensing, testing, distribution, and retail framework. As a result, the sale, distribution, manufacturing, and production of covered hemp products without state authorization or licensing will be prohibited in Illinois.

Aside from hemp-related updates, the bill introduces several changes to broader cannabis laws. It doubles the threshold for a minor cannabis offense from 30 grams to 60 grams of any substance containing cannabis and raises the legal possession limits for Illinois residents age 21 or older to 60 grams of cannabis flower, 1,000 milligrams of THC in cannabis-infused products, 10 grams of cannabis concentrate. Additionally, the Act provides that a cannabis dispensary may now operate until 2 a.m. (rather than 10p.m.), subject to local zoning rules.

The bill now heads to the Governor for final consideration.

Post Authored by Adam Simon & Luigi Laudando

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