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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Firefighter's Termination Upheld


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a city's decision to terminate a city firefighter from the fire department for using his late father's electrician's license to obtain electrical permits for his second job. Chicago Firefighters Union v. City of Chicago, et al. 

A city firefighter had a second job working with an electrical contracting business with his father. His father held a city supervising electrician license. After his father died, the firefighter continued to renew and use his father's electrician's license to obtain electrical permits. After a city investigation, he was terminated for violating the fire department code of professional conduct, various city ordinances, the state's identity theft statute, and city personnel rules. He appealed his termination which went to arbitration, and the arbitrator found that he had violated several city ordinances and state law and that the city's termination was justified. He then filed a lawsuit in the circuit court which also upheld his termination.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the firefighter argued that the arbitrator's decision was in error because, among other things, the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in making a determination as to whether the firefighter violated city ordinances and state law. The Appellate Court disagreed, finding that the arbitrator did have that authority. The Court also rejected the firefighter's argument that a lesser discipline should have been imposed, finding that the CBA authorized termination where just cause exists.




Monday, October 19, 2026

Court Finds in Favor of Public Body in FOIA Case


An individual sued a Sheriff’s Office alleging that the Sheriff’s Office violated FOIA (1) by not producing requested records (jail handbook, medical records, and federal detention standards) in response to his FOIA requests, (2) by improperly charging him fees for certain requested records, and (3) seeking civil penalties against the Sheriff’s Office because their alleged violations were willful and intentional, or otherwise in bad faith.

The trial court dismissed the case finding that: (1) the Sheriff’s Office was authorized to charge fees for requested documents exceeding 50 pages, (2) the non-existence of certain records in the Sheriff’s Office possession or custody was an affirmative defense to his complaint, (3) his prior receipt of requested records from the Sheriff’s Office made that part of his requests moot, and (4) the Sheriff’s Office response to his requests did not justify imposition of civil penalties.

On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the case in Walters v. Ogle County Sheriff’s Office.

First, because the individual had previously acknowledged that he received his requested medical records and jail handbook from the Sheriff’s Office, the Appellate Court found that claim "moot" because the court could not grant him relief by directing the Sheriff’s Office to produce documents he already had.

Second, the Appellate Court held that the Sheriff’s Office cannot violate FOIA by failing to produce records that do not exist in its possession or custody.

Finally, the Appellate Court held that the Sheriff’s Office did not willfully or intentionally, or otherwise in bad faith, violate FOIA by charging plaintiff fees for copies of records after providing 50 pages at no cost. The Court determined that, as a single requester, he was entitled to 50 free pages total, and the Sheriff’s Office was free to charge him for pages after 50 regardless of how many requests he had submitted. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Thursday, October 15, 2026

City Has Private Right of Action to Recover PEDA Benefits from Employee


An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a city in a lawsuit filed by the city to recover payments made to an employee under the Public Employees' Disability Act (PEDA). City of Monmouth v. Thomas.

A city employee received disability benefits from a city under PEDA. The city filed a lawsuit against the employee claiming he forfeited those benefits when he engaged in secondary employment, and that the city was entitled to a return of $55,370.66 in benefits. The circuit court held that PEDA does not provide a right of action to the city to recover benefits even where those benefits were forfeited under the statute, and that the city had an adequate remedy in its secondary "unjust enrichment" claim. 

The city appealed, arguing that PEDA creates an implied right of action to recover payments made to an employee that the employee statutorily forfeits under the statute. The Appellate Court acknowledged that PEDA does not include express language authorizing a private right of action to recover benefits but noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had established four factors to consider in deciding whether a right might exist by implication. In applying those four factors, the Appellate Court held as follows:

Based on the foregoing application of the Fisher factors, we find it reasonable to conclude the Act implies a private right of action for public employers who suffer monetary injury resulting from disability payments made to public employees who are secondarily employed while receiving benefits under the Act. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the City could not pursue an action under the Act was in error.

The Appellate Court sent the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. 


Wednesday, October 14, 2026

Court Upholds Electoral Board Decision Rejecting Objection to Referendum Petition


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a decision by a municipal electoral board that denied an objection to a petition for a referendum question in Peres v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board.

Village residents circulated a petition to submit a referendum question to village voters on the November 3rd ballot that stated the following: "Should the State of Illinois repeal laws that ban state investment in businesses that boycott the State of Israel?” The petition included 3,504 signatures, and on each page of the petition, the circulator certified that the signers were qualified electors and registered village voters. An objection was filed to the petition to challenge its validity and seeking to have the question not appear on the ballot. The objectors argued that the petition was invalid because it did not specifically attest that the signatures were "genuine." The village's electoral board held a hearing on the objection and voted to reject the objection, finding that the petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Election Code. The circuit court upheld the electoral board's decision, and the objectors appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court agreed with the electoral board that the petition substantially complied with the Election Code. The Court held that the omission of a statement that the signatures "are genuine" was a technical violation of the Election Code but not one that would "impair election integrity," particularly where the objectors provided no evidence that any of the 3,504 signatures were inauthentic and there was other language in the petition that demonstrated substantial compliance with the Election Code. As a result, the Court found the referendum petition to be valid. 



Tuesday, October 13, 2026

Lawsuit Against Village Relating to Property Development Was Properly Dismissed


A property owner reached out to village officials about the procedures for building a structure on property in the village. He claims that a village trustee told him that he couldn't find any regulations that would deny or allow the project, and that he shouldn't worry about permits because the village wasn't issuing them and there was no current village employee to conduct inspections. Based on these conversations, the owner claimed the village approved his project and he began building the structure. He spent approximately $110,000 on materials and labor before he received a cease and desist letter from the village president. He was also served with a notice of fines owed to the village in the amount of $10,200 for violating the village's zoning ordinance. The owner filed a lawsuit against the village, arguing that the village was "equitably estopped" from enforcing its zoning ordinance based on the village trustee's assurances to him that the project could proceed (Count 1), and seeking money damages for the work he performed on the structure (Count 2). The circuit court dismissed the case, finding that the village had immunity from the claims in the lawsuit. He appealed.

The Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit against the village, although on different grounds. First, the Court held that the Tort Immunity Act did not apply to Count 1 requesting injunctive relief based on an "equitable estoppel" argument and only applied to Count 2 requesting money damages. However, the Court determined that Count 1 was, nevertheless, properly dismissed because the complaint did not include any allegations that the village trustee who communicated with the owner had express authority to act on behalf of the village, a required element for an equitable estoppel claim. As a result, the lawsuit was properly dismissed. Baum v. Village of Viola.


Wednesday, October 7, 2026

Court Upholds Termination of Hospital Pharmacist Who Refused Vaccine


The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a county's termination of a county employee after she refused to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine as required by the county's pandemic policy in Mason v. Cook County.

In August of 2021, the county adopted a policy mandating that county hospital staff members receive the COVID-19 vaccine. A hospital pharmacist applied for an exemption from the vaccine mandate based on her Christian faith. The county denied her request, stating that doing so would compromise workplace safety and pose an undue hardship on the county. The county gave her 90 days to comply. When she refused to do so, she was fired, and she filed a lawsuit against the county claiming that the county violated her civil rights in not accommodating her religious beliefs. The district court ruled in favor of the county, finding that allowing the employee to work unvaccinated during a public health crisis would have jeopardized the health of county staff and patients, causing undue hardship on the county.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the county had sufficiently shown an undue hardship that justified denial of the religious accommodation. The Court noted that the employee worked as a pharmacist in a hospital setting and worked in the same room with other pharmacist, and regularly interacted with patients where the risks and consequences of spreading the COVID-19 virus were high, and that masking and social distancing alone did not adequately reduce those risks.  



Tuesday, October 6, 2026

PAC Says Incident Reports Should Have Been Released


The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's office (PAC) issued its 11th binding opinion for 2026 finding a public body in violation of FOIA when it denied a request for jail incident reports where those records could have been redacted and released. PAC Op. 26-011.

A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a sheriff's office seeking incident reports at a county jail relating to the use of restraint chairs. The sheriff's office denied the request in its entirety, citing to the personal privacy and private information exemptions of FOIA. The reporter filed an appeal with the PAC arguing that the sheriff's office had previously provided the same types of records with identifying information of the detainees redacted and that the sheriff's office should have released redacted records in response to this request. 

The PAC analyzed the "invasion of personal privacy" claim of the sheriff's office based on the following four factors:

(l) the requester's interest in disclosure, 

(2) the public interest in disclosure, 

(3) the degree of invasion of personal privacy, and 

(4) the availability of alternative means of obtaining the requested information.

The PAC applied the four factors and determined that the public's and requester's interest in the disclosure of records that shed light on law enforcement officials performing their official duties outweighed any privacy interests since the names of the detainees could have been redacted to protect the detainees' identities before the records were released. As a result, the PAC determined that the records should have been released with all identifying information of the detainees redacted.

Monday, October 5, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 110: Statement of Economic Interests


Ancel Glink released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 110: Statement of Economic Interests.

Back by listener request, the podcast is taking a brief recess to revisit one of its classic episodes on Statements of Economic Interests (SOEI) for local government officials and candidates. Ancel Glink’s Daniel J. Bolin and Keri-Lyn J. Krafthefer break down the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act reporting questions, clear up common misconceptions about disclosable assets and debts, and offer practical guidance for local officials and employees.

Candidates running in the 2027 consolidated elections must file an SOEI and submit their receipt alongside nomination papers during the candidate petition filing period. While incumbent officials may have filed an annual statement earlier this year in relation to their current office, many choose or are advised to file an additional statement explicitly in relation to their candidacy.

Inflation-Adjusted Thresholds: On this year’s form, disclosable dollar thresholds have been updated for Question 1 (Single Assets:  $11,600), Question 2 (Outside Income/Capital Gains;  $8,700), Question 3 (Single Non-Public Debts:  $11,600), and Question 6 (Gifts/Honoraria :  $600).

Episode Breakdown:

Who Must File:  Understanding filing obligations for elected/appointed local officials versus designated public employees and candidates.

Question 1 (Assets):  Distinguishing disclosable single assets (stocks, bonds, investment real estate) from explicitly excluded personal items like primary residences, personal vehicles, savings/checking accounts, retirement funds, and pensions.

Question 2 (Income; Capital Gains): How to simplify your disclosure by relying directly on your federal income tax return (W-2s, 1099s, capital gains) while excluding compensation from your filing position.

Question 3 (Debts):  How standard consumer debts (mortgages, credit cards, auto loans from financial institutions) are excluded from reporting.

Question 4 (Government Employment; Contracts):  Disclosing other units of government where you or your spouse serve as an employee, officeholder, or contractor.

Question 5 (Lobbyist Relationships):  Identifying disclosable business relationships or family members known to be registered lobbyists.

Question 6 (Gifts; Honoraria):  Reporting disclosable sources of gifts or honoraria.

Question 7 (Public Utilities): Disclosing family members employed by non-governmental public utilities.

Practical Tips:  Safe harbor protections for good-faith filings, relying on Illinois Secretary of State guidance, and handling county clerk online portals

 Resources: Secretary of State Guidance

Wednesday, September 30, 2026

Court Says Pension Should Have Been Calculated Based on Promotion Rank


An Illinois Appellate Court held that a pension board erred in awarding a line-of-duty disability pension based on a firefighter's salary rather than a lieutenant's salary in Schneider v. Elgin Firefighters' Pension Fund.

A firefighter employed by a city's fire department injured his back while responding to a call. He was unable to return to duty and applied for a disability pension. During the time between his injury and the pension board hearing, the city had promoted him from the rank of firefighter to lieutenant. The pension board awarded him a pension based on a firefighter's salary and he appealed to the circuit court, arguing that his pension should have been based on a lieutenant's salary. The circuit court upheld the pension board's decision. He then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the pension board argued that it determined the pension award based on the firefighter having been injured while serving as a firefighter, having received workers' compensation benefits based on his firefighter salary, having never worked or qualified for work as a lieutenant, and having never contributed to the pension fund at the lieutenant rank. As a result, the board had concluded that the firefighter rank was the rank "held" at the time he was removed from payroll for purposes of determining his pensionable salary.

The firefighter argued that section 4-110 of the Pension Coe requires a line-of-duty disability pension to be calculated based on the "monthly salary attached to the rank held...at the date [the firefighter] is removed from the municipality's fire department payroll" and that since he was a sworn lieutenant at the time he was removed from the fire department's payroll, his pension should be based on that rank.

The Appellate Court agreed with the firefighter, finding that he had been promoted to lieutenant before he was removed from the fire department's payroll and, as a result, he should have been awarded a line-of-duty disability pension based on the lieutenant salary since that is the rank he held on the payroll-removal date.

Tuesday, September 29, 2026

Dual Circulation Prohibition Not Apply to Nonpartisan School Board Candidates


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a decision by a board of election commissioners that school board candidates did not violate the Election Code's prohibition on dual circulation in collecting signatures for an election involving non-partisan candidates. Sanchez v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.

Objections were filed to the nominating petitions submitted by certain candidates running for elected school board positions in the upcoming November 2026 election. The objections claimed that the candidates had violated the "dual circulation" prohibition of the Election Code because circulators who collected signatures for the candidates had also circulated petitions for partisan candidates in the primary election in March of 2026. The objection was heard by the board of election commissioners which denied the objections. The objectors appealed to the circuit court which upheld the board's decision and the case made its way to the Illinois Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court first examined the relevant statute, which states as follows:
[N]o person shall circulate or certify petitions for candidates of more than one political party, or for an independent candidate or candidates in addition to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or for such candidates and parties with respect to the same political subdivision at the next consolidated election. 10 ILCS 5/10- 4. 
The candidates argued that the dual circulation prohibition of this statute applies only to candidates of political parties and independents, but does not apply to nonpartisan candidates. Because the school board candidates were nonpartisan candidates, the candidates argued that the statute did not bar circulators who had previously circulated petitions for partisan candidates in the primary election. The Appellate Court agreed, finding that the clear language of the statute only applied to partisan and independent elections and the school board election was, by statute, nonpartisan. As a result, the petitions circulated by the challenged circulators were proper and the candidates were not barred from running for office.

Monday, September 28, 2026

Court Finds in Favor of School District in Wrongful Death Lawsuit Involving Student-Athlete


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a ruling in favor of a school district in a lawsuit relating to a student-athlete’s death, holding that government tort immunity barred the family’s claims because the family could not show the district’s inaction caused the student’s death. (Falconer v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 (5th Dist.).

A student and football player collapsed during a preseason conditioning program in the school’s weight room. One of the coaches immediately called 911, and another coach checked his vital signs and found a “radial pulse.” Medical assistants from the school’s on-site health clinic and responding paramedics all confirmed that the student had a detectable pulse and respiration. Because he had a pulse and was breathing, no one administered a shock or performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The student was transported to the hospital, where he lost his pulse; CPR there was unsuccessful, and he died. An autopsy later revealed an undiagnosed heart condition. 

The student’s mother sued the East St. Louis School District for negligence and willful and wanton conduct, arguing that school staff should have used the automated external defibrillator device in the weight room and performed CPR regardless of the pulse readings. She also argued that the school district violated Illinois’s AED Act and Physical Fitness Facility Medical Emergency Preparedness Act by failing to properly staff and prepare for a medical emergency. 


The circuit court ruled in favor of the school district, finding that the district had immunity under the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court agreed. The court found the district could not be held liable because its staff’s actions were not the actual or legal cause of the student's death; he was breathing and had a pulse throughout the time he was in the district’s care, and only stopped breathing and lost his pulse after he arrived at the hospital, under EMT and hospital staff supervision. The court also rejected the argument that the more specific AED Act and Facility Preparedness Act should override the Tort Immunity Act’s protections. Finally, the court held that several sections of the Tort Immunity Act independently shielded the district from liability, since staffing and the decisions in response to the emergency were purely discretionary in nature rather than mandated duties. 


Post Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink



Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Lawsuit Challenging Village's Tow of Vehicle Was Properly Dismissed


A village police officer towed a vehicle that had five parking citations. The following day, an individual went to the police department and offered to pay $22 to the village, which he claimed satisfied the debt, and demanded the car be returned. The village refused to release the vehicle. Subsequently, the individual filed a lawsuit against the village alleging unjust enrichment on the village's part in keeping the vehicle, among other claims. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the individual had no standing to sue the village because he was not the owner of the vehicle and had no legal interest to sue the village for its return.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that he had no standing to sue the village. The individual had conceded he was not the owner of the vehicle, and the court found that his voluntary $22 payment towards the debt of another did not establish sufficient a "legal interest" to satisfy the standing requirements for his lawsuit. Bey v. Village of Midlothian, et al.

Tuesday, September 22, 2026

Court Upholds City's Revocation of Liquor Licenses


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a local liquor commissioner's revocation of liquor licenses for two establishments in Raven Place v. City of Blue Island.

A licensee was issued liquor licenses for two establishments in a city. In 2021, 23 gunshots were fired towards one of the licensed establishments and the establishment's security personnel returned fire. The mayor (who also serves as the local liquor commissioner) issued an emergency seven day closure of that establishment. Later that month, the city entered into an agreement with the licensee that established certain conditions and restrictions to the continued operation of both licensed establishments in the city. Under the agreement, the licensee agreed to use ID scanners, impose age restrictions and restricted hours of operation, to pay a $7,500 fine, among other restrictions. A year later while the agreement was in effect, there was another shooting at one of the establishments and the mayor issued a second seven day emergency closure order, and subsequently conducted hearings and issued two orders determining that the businesses were a "nuisance" and that the licensee had failed to comply with the agreement with the city. The mayor revoked both liquor licenses. The licensee appealed the revocation orders to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, which upheld the city's decision to revoke both licenses. The licensee then filed an administrative review action with the circuit court challenging both revocation orders, which court ruled against the licensee finding that one of the appeals was untimely and the other appeal was unfounded.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the licensee argued that the circuit court should have decided both appeals, that the businesses did not constitute a nuisance, and that the licensee's due process rights had been violated. The Appellate Court agreed with the circuit court that the licensee's appeal of the first revocation order was not timely and that it was improper for the licensee to combine both appeals into one administrative review action. Second, the court determined that both revocation orders were proper and upheld the city's decisions to revoke the liquor licenses for both establishments. 



Tuesday, September 15, 2026

Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down


An Illinois Appellate Court recently issued a ruling regarding a school detachment/annexation petition in a lengthy opinion analyzing the requirements for a property owner to detach their property from one school district and attach it to another school district. Board of Education of Jasper County Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, et al. The case has a convoluted history with multiple motions to reconsider and changes of position of both the Regional Board and circuit court, which partially explains the long opinion.

Homeowners of property located in Jasper County (petitioners) filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees requesting that their property be detached from Jasper County School District (District 1) and annexed to Dieterich Community School District in Effingham County (District 30). Their property was located entirely within Jasper County and approximately 1.5 miles from the boundary of District 30 and did not touch any part of District 30. Owners of property located between the petitioners' property and the District 30 boundary joined the petition, asking that a 10 foot wide strip of their property be included in the detachment/annexation petition. The petition alleged that the territory to be detached and annexed was "contiguous" to District 30.

District 1 argued against the petition, saying it did not comply with section 7-4 of the School Code because the detachment, if granted, would result in districts that were not "compact and contiguous" as required by the Illinois Constitution and the School Code, and would create multiple "islands" that would destroy the compactness of both districts. The Regional Board conducted a hearing on the petition, hearing testimony from the petitioners and District 1 representatives. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Regional Board initially denied the petition, finding that the detriment to District 1 outweighed the benefit to the petitioners and District 30. The petitioners requested a rehearing, and at the conclusion of that rehearing, the Regional Board overturned its previous decision and granted the petition, allowing the detachment and annexation of the territory. 

District 1 filed an administrative review action with the circuit court to appeal the Regional Board's decision. The circuit court initially reversed the Regional Board, finding its decision to grant the detachment/annexation petition to be contrary to the Illinois Constitution and the School Code. The petitioners again filed a motion to reconsider, and a new judge assigned to the case vacated the prior judge's order and upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, that Court reviewed the administrative record of the Regional Board's multiple hearings, as well as documentary evidence, including a map showing the petitioners' property and the narrow strip that would connect the petitioners' property to District 30 if annexed to that district (see photo from opinion below), and determined that the Regional Board erred in granting the petition. The Court found that the petitioners failed to show how the proposed detachment and annexation would result in "compact and contiguous" districts as required by Illinois case law, the Illinois constitution, and Illinois statutes. In sum, the Court held that the petition should not have been granted, and it reversed the Regional Board's order and the circuit court's decision upholding the Regional Board's order. There was a dissenting opinion which would have upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.



Thursday, September 10, 2026

First District Appellate Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA Differently than Second District


The First District Appellate Court overturned a trial court's denial of civil penalties in a FOIA case challenging a police department's response to a news media's FOIA requests. NBC Subsidiary v. Chicago Police Department.

NBC filed FOIA requests with a police department seeking surveillance video, incident reports, witness statements, and other records relating to a hit-and-run crash, as well as emails to and from two police officers relating to the crash. The police department responded by referring the requester to its records inquiry section for the crash reports and by denying the request for body-work camera footage. The response also denied other requested records claiming they were exempt because there was an ongoing criminal investigation. The police department sent an extension notice regarding the request for emails, but later denied that request citing to the same ongoing criminal investigation exemption. 

NBC filed a lawsuit against the police department, claiming it violated FOIA. The trial court ruled in favor of the police department relating to certain counts in the complaint, including finding that the police department completed a reasonable search and that certain responsive records had been destroyed pursuant to the department's records retention policy. However, the court ruled against the department regarding its withholding of certain records in their entirety. The court also found that the department "willfully and intentionally violated FOIA" by not producing the requested records. The department subsequently produced the requested records, and NBC then filed a motion seeking its attorneys fees and an award of civil penalties against the department. The court granted NBC's request for attorneys fees. However, the court denied NBC's request for civil penalties, applying a Second District Appellate Court ruling that would require NBC to show that the department "willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith" (emphasis added) failed to comply with FOIA. In this case, the trial court found there was no evidence that the department acted with a "dishonest purpose" by withholding the records. 

NBC appealed, arguing that FOIA does not require a showing of bad faith to justify the imposition of civil penalties if the public body is shown to have willfully and intentionally violated FOIA. The Appellate Court agreed with NBC, stating as follows:

We agree with this court’s decisions in Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that section 11(j) does not require separate showings that the public body both “willfully and intentionally” violated FOIA and did so “in bad faith,” or with a “dishonest purpose.” This analysis is true to the language of section 11(j), which allows for the imposition of civil penalties when “a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith.” 5 ILCS 140/11(j). We agree with Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that this court’s decision in Williams “failed to honor the disjunctive ‘or’” in section 11(j), and in doing so created a more demanding standard for the imposition of civil penalties than contemplated by the text of the statute. [citations omitted] Thus, we decline to follow Williams or Thomas.

Applying its interpretation of section 11(j) of FOIA, the First District Appellate Court found that the department's "deliberate and by design" conduct in denying the FOIA request was enough to justify the imposition of civil penalties. As a result, the Appellate Court sent the case back to the trial court to make a determination on an appropriate civil penalty against the police department.

This decision means that the First and Second District Appellate Courts have taken a different position on the type of conduct by a public body that justifies the imposition of civil penalties for a FOIA violation. 



Tuesday, September 8, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid


Ancel Glink released Episode 109 of its Quorum Forum Podcast: Quorum Forum Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid.

This year marks 100 years since the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty. In this episode, we share a recorded presentation from Ancel Glink's David Silverman, FAICP, and ZoneCo's Sean Suder, as a sneak preview of their upcoming live plenary session at the APA-IL State Conference on September 30, 2026! 

Episode Highlights

  • The Public Safety Roots of Zoning: Why early 20th-century industrial chaos, street accidents involving children, noise, and pollution prompted the Supreme Court to step in
  • The Dual Legacy: How the "intensity of use" rules established in 1926 successfully protected neighborhoods but fostered exclusionary development patterns
  • Modern Prescriptions: A look at statewide zoning challenges, local preemption, and the "BUILD" legislative strategies impacting local authority

Wednesday, September 2, 2026

Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill


An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a village and village employees in a lawsuit filed by a firefighter claiming he was injured during a training drill.  Hidalgo v. Village of Romeoville.

A village firefighter attended an advanced technician firefighter training course. As part of that training course curriculum, participants were required to perform a “bailout drill.” During a bailout drill, participants exit out a third-story window of a hose tower, one leg at a time, and then use rappel line to descend down the side of the tower. Participants could use a Class 1 harness, Class 3 pre-sewn harness, or a Class 3 “hasty” harness during the bailout drill. Class 1 harnesses are body harnesses that go around a person’s waist, while Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses are manufactured body harnesses that go around a person’s waist and shoulders. Class 3 “hasty” harnesses are harnesses made by the participants using available webbing, which is a tubular structure that can be tied into a knot. 

The firefighter performed the bailout drill using a Class 1 harness and was injured after becoming separated from the harness and falling to the ground. He sued the village, claiming the village acted with “intentional/reckless conduct” in its instructions and usage of the harnesses during the bailout drill. He specifically claimed certain village employees involved in the training failed to provide adequate instructions on using and creating the Class 3 “hasty” harness. He also claimed the village’s omissions constituted negligence through willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court ruled against the firefighter, who then appealed. 

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the village, relying on Section 2-201 of the Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which states as follows: 

Sec. 2-201. Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.

That Act distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts made by government employees when determining whether a government employee qualifies for immunity. The Appellate Court applied the two-prong test, which requires courts to determine (1) if the employee holds a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving an exercise of discretion and (2) if the employee also engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the injury resulted. If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then the government employee will have immunity under that section of the Act. 

As to the village’s assistant training course instructors, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion as to certain aspects of the bailout drill (i.e., whether a Class 3 harness needed to be used) and (2) used their discretion to decide how to secure ropes and lines to the harnesses. The court emphasized that the assistant instructors used their own discretion, rather than adhering to a mandate requiring them to act in a prescribed manner, in making any decisions regarding the bailout drill. As to the village’s lead and supervising training course instructor, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion to decide how to conduct bailout drills based on their knowledge and experience and (2) exercised discretion in determining that Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses were appropriate for the bailout drill. The court also found that the village was entitled to immunity under the Act. As to the claims of negligence by willful and wanton conduct, the court found that Section 2-201 immunity is absolute and not subject to exceptions for willful and wanton conduct. 

Ultimately, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court ruling that both the employees and the village had immunity from the firefighter's claims relating to his injuries.

Post Authored by Rachel Stempler & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, September 1, 2026

PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA


A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a city seeking copies of correspondence exchanged between a city official and a representative from a private company, which the city official subsequently forwarded to a city attorney for the purpose of seeking legal guidance. The city denied the request citing to FOIA exemption under Section 7(1)(m), stating that because these documents came into possession of a city attorney from a client, they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and are exempt from disclosure. The reporter then filed an appeal with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) contesting the denial.

The PAC issued its 10th binding opinion of the year, concluding that the city improperly withheld communications exchanged with a third party because they were not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 26-010. The PAC reasoned that at the time the records originated, they were not sent to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice or services, or sent from an attorney providing legal advice. Instead, the communications were between a city official and a third-party contractor for the city. Even though a city attorney later obtained these records from their client (city official), the PAC determined that forwarding pre-existing communications between the city and a third-party to counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice did  not transform those records into privileged attorney-client communications, because the records (1) did not originate in confidence between parties engaged in an attorney-client relationship and (2) at the time the records originated, they were not exchanged for the purpose of securing or providing legal advice.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Monday, August 31, 2026

New Law Establishes Rules for Electric Bikes and Scooters


A new Illinois law governing who can use electric bikes and scooters, how fast they go, and where they can be used will go into effect next year. Last week, Illinois Governor Pritzker signed Senate Bill 3484  (now P.A. 104-0854) creating new statewide standards for “micromobility” devices that include age restrictions, speed limits, and locations where they can operate. The bill takes effect on January 1, 2027.

According to the bill, “electric micromobility devices” are a light-weight, low-speed, electric-powered device primarily used for personal transportation that operate at speeds up to 28 miles per hour. This includes electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters.

Electric and gas bicycles strong enough to exceed the state’s existing “low-speed” thresholds fall into a category of regulations called “motor driven cycles.” Electric bikes fall into this category if they either have electric motors rated between 750 and 8,000 watts or can operate at speeds greater than 28 miles per hour.

These vehicles will be regulated similarly to motorcycles if owners of these vehicles purchased new on or after January 1, 2027, will be required to have a driver’s license, insurance, an ownership title, and register the vehicle with the state. According to the bill, the Secretary of State may issue an instruction permit to a person who is 16 or 17 years old that entitles the holder to drive on the highways during daylight under direct supervision of a licensed motor driven cycle operator who is at least 21 and has a year of driving experience.  

“Motor driven cycles” can operate on any public highway, street, or roadway, but may not be used on any sidewalk, bicycle lane, bicycle path, shared-use path, off-road bicycle trail, or natural surface trail designated for bicycle use.

“Low-speed” electric bicycles are already regulated by the state, but the law creates new categories that govern how old a person must be to drive them. Drivers must be 15 years old to operate a Class 1 pedal-assist bicycle that’s limited to 20 miles per hour, and a Class 2 motor-powered bike that doesn’t have to be pedaled. However, riders must be 16 years old to operate a Class 3 pedal-assist bike that can travel up to 28 miles per hour.

All low-speed electric bicycles can be used on streets, bikes, lanes, paths, and trails, but not sidewalks.

The new regulations cap “electric micromobility devices” such as electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters at 28 miles per hour. Devices capable of exceeding that speed are barred outright from public roads, bike lanes, and bike paths, regardless of the posted speed limit. Riders may operate qualifying devices on any path, bike lane, roads with speed limits up to 35 miles per hour, or roads with higher speed limits if there is a bike lane. A person may not operate one of these devices unless they are 16 years of age or older.

Battery powered ride-on toys that are designed for children under 8-years-old would be unregulated aside from a stipulation they must stay on sidewalks and paths.

Users who violate the regulations could pay fines and have their devices confiscated and impounded by the police. They are also subject to other existing traffic laws and penalties. 

Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink



Wednesday, August 26, 2026

PAC Finds City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Storm Sewer Maps and Records


In its 9th binding opinion for 2026, the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) found in favor of a public body in a FOIA appeal involving a request for storm sewer infrastructure maps and records. PAC Op. 26-009. 

A requester submitted a request to a city water department asking for sewer and flood control maps, GIS mapping data, engineering schematics, and other maps detailing the exact locations of all surface water drainage infrastructure for a specified area in the city. The city denied the request, citing to section 7(1)(x) of FOIA which exempts the following from disclosure:

Maps and other records regarding the location or security of generation, transmission, distribution, storage, gathering, treatment, or switching facilities owned by a utility, by a power generator, or by the Illinois Power Agency.

The PAC agreed with the city that the FOIA exemption applied to the requested records, finding that the "plain language of section 7(1)(x) exempts, among other things, maps and other records regarding the location of gathering facilities owned by a utility." The PAC determined that the city's water department operated as a "utility" and that the infrastructure operated by the city that was the subject of the request qualified as "facilities" under the cited FOIA exemption. The PAC rejected the requester's argument that the city was required to demonstrate how release of the records would affect the security of the city's utility system, finding that records that reveal "the location" of utility facilities was enough to trigger the exemption without having to show a security concern, stating as follows:

Because section 7(1)(x) is worded disjunctively, however, it provides two independent bases for claiming the exemption: (1) the requested records regard the location of facilities owned by a utility or (2) the requested records regard the security of facilities owned by a utility. 

In sum, the PAC determined that the requested records (consisting of atlases-detailed maps showing the location of sewers, storm mains, access points, and various other details of the city's water infrastructure and GIS mapping data detailing the location of stormwater gathering facilities) fall squarely within the types of records exempt under section 7(1)(x). As a result, the city did not violate FOIA in denying the request in its entirety.

Tuesday, August 25, 2026

Court Finds Appeal of Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Frivolous


An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a public body in a FOIA lawsuit, finding the appeal frivolous in Tidwell v. Illinois Department of Corrections.

A requester submitted a request to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) seeking the names of all medical personnel. IDOC denied the request, citing to a FOIA exemption that expressly exempts from release records requested by persons committed to the DOC or a county jail that include staff members' personnel files, staff rosters, or other staffing assignment information. The requester filed a lawsuit against IDOC. The circuit court dismissed his lawsuit, ruling in favor of IDOC. He then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of his lawsuit, finding that his appeal of the circuit court's decision was frivolous because he was aware of the specific exemption that prevented the disclosure of the information he requested. 




Monday, August 24, 2026

City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Records Maintained by Another Public Body


In response to a FOIA request seeking a court docket for a specific case, a city responded that it did not have any responsive records in its possession or custody, and directed the requester to contact the agency most likely to have responsive records (the county court system). After the requester sued the city alleging FOIA violations, the circuit court ruled in favor of the city, finding that the city did not violate FOIA when it did not produce records that were not in its possession.

After the requester appealed, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the city. Tidwell v. City of Alton. The Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the city could obtain the sought records by downloading them (from another agency’s website) and providing them to the requester, because FOIA does not require a public body to turn over records that the public body does not have and does not normally retain. Because a public body cannot improperly withhold records that it does not maintain, the Appellate Court determined that the city did not violate FOIA in response to the request.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Monday, August 17, 2026

No Violation of FOIA Where Records Not in Possession of Responding Public Body


An Illinois Appellate Court rejected an inmate's claims in a FOIA lawsuit against a sheriff's department in King v. Livingston County Sheriff's Office.

An inmate filed a FOIA request with a sheriff's office seeking records pertaining to racial profiling by a specific police officer. The sheriff's office responded that it had no responsive records because the officer was not employed by the sheriff's office but a city police department. The inmate sued, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the sheriff's office. On appeal, the Appellate Court also found no violation of FOIA in the sheriff's office's response, holding that the "nonexistence of requested documents is a cognizable affirmative defense" to a FOIA claim. In this case, the sheriff's office was not in possession of the requested record at the time of the request, so there was no FOIA violation in its response to the inmate's request.

Thursday, August 13, 2026

Governor Signs Bill Requiring Libraries and Other Facilities to Post Suicide Hotline (9-8-8) Information


On August 7, 2026, Governor Pritzker signed Public Act 104-0808 into law, also referred to as Tammurra's Act (Act). The Act applies to various facilities and institutions, including libraries established under the Local Library Act and Public Library District Act of 1991, county shelter care homes, public institutions of higher education, and licensed day care centers. The Act takes effect on January 1, 2027.

The Act requires that contact information for the 9-8-8 National Suicide Prevention Lifeline be posted in these facilities “in a prominent location that is visible to and accessible by” patrons and users. The 9-8-8 Lifeline is a free, nationwide resource administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the federal government (SAMHSA). While the Act does not specify what contact information must be posted, the 9-8-8 Lifeline allows individuals seeking assistance to call, text, or “chat” online.

The 9-8-8 Lifeline website (linked above) has many resources readers can consult, including FAQs, a glossary of terms, and information regarding services available to individuals. Notably, the website offers free print materials that include contact information for those seeking assistance.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

City Not Liable for Damages in Failed Sale of City Land


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit claiming a city was responsible for damages relating to a failed sale of city land because of alleged verbal promises of a city employee. Arroyo et al. v. City of Chicago.

According to the lawsuit, the city economic development coordinator met with a potential purchaser of property that was owned by the city. The city entered into a right of entry agreement allowing the potential purchaser to access the properties to conduct due diligence. However, the parties did not enter into a purchase and sale agreement for the sale of the property. The potential purchaser retained consultants to conduct investigations of soil and other conditions of the property. The potential purchaser claims that the city employee assured him that the city would sell the property to him, but when he was not provided with an appraisal by the city to complete the negotiations for the purchase, he filed a lawsuit seeking $500,000 in damages from the city for the investigations. The circuit court dismissed the case, and he appealed.

The Appellate Court upheld the dismissal. First, the Court held that there could be no "implied-in-fact contract" under a promissory estoppel theory because the city could not be bound by a contract that does not comply with legal requirements for a valid contract. Here, city ordinances provided that only the city council had the authority to sell city land, so any promises made by a city employee were void and unenforceable.

Second, it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on assurances from a city employee who did not have actual authority to bind the city. 

Third, the Court noted that verbal contracts for the sale of land are unenforceable.

Finally, the Court held that the right of entry agreement that the parties did enter into did not provide for compensation to the plaintiff for his due diligence efforts, which were conducted to benefit the plaintiff, and not the city.

Tuesday, August 11, 2026

7th Circuit Addresses First Amendment Challenge to Town's Deletion of Comments on Website


In Schulte v. Leners, et al., the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to a municipal official's deletion of critical comments on the town's website, as well as the town's decision to entirely shut down future comments on its website.

A Wisconsin town maintained a website where it posted agendas and updates on pending town activities and business. The website allowed members of the public to comment on individual town posts, and many members of the public did express their opinions in the comment sections. The town did not have a policy to limit who could comment or what commenters could post. In 2022, the chairman of the town board posted on the website a notice criticizing the use of RVs in the town and advocating for greater regulations. A member of the public who owns an RV posted a comment disagreeing with the chairman's post, and other members of the public also took issue with the post. The chairman replied to one of the critical comments calling the comment disrespectful, and the commenter replied. The chairman then deleted the commenter's reply, as well as all other critical comments to the chairman's original post. A month or so later, the town board voted to end comment sections entirely on its website.

The original commenter sued, claiming the town and the town board chairman violated her First Amendment right to free speech by engaging in "viewpoint discrimination" in deleting her comments. She also claimed the town retaliated against her when it shut down all comments on the website. The chairman filed a motion to dismiss her case claiming he had qualified immunity for his actions. The district court denied the motion, rejecting the chairman's qualified immunity argument.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit agreed with the district court that the town chairman did not have qualified immunity for his actions in deleting the critical comments from his original post. The Court first determined that the comment section of the town's website was a public forum (at least during the time it was open to the public), and the town could not discriminate based on viewpoint, which the Court found the chairman did in deleting all critical comments from the original post. The Court likened the town's website that allowed comments to a social media site, noting there were numerous cases finding that public comment sections are a public forum subject to the First Amendment. The Court also rejected the town's argument that the website was "government speech," finding that the comment section of the website operated as a public forum for people to express opinions about government actions. The Court also noted that the town had no policy to control comments, which defeated any "government speech" argument. In sum, the Court found that because no reasonable official could have concluded that it was legal to selectively delete speech based on viewpoint, the chairman was not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in deleting the critical comments. 

The Court did not address the chairman's argument that he had qualified immunity for the town's decision to shut down comments entirely because it was not part of the district court's qualified-immunity analysis. So, we did not get a clear indication of how the 7th Circuit would rule on that particular issue. However, the Court did give a hint how it might analyze this issue in the following statement:

Just as the government can designate a forum on its previously nonpublic property, it reserves the right to close the forum at any time. 

This statement suggests that governments might be able to shut down comments entirely in a designated public forum like a website that allows comments or a social media page. However, because this statement was in the nature of "dicta," governments should consult with legal counsel before deciding to shut down comments entirely in a designated public forum.

Monday, August 10, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 108: Election Special!


Ancel Glink released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 108: Quorum Forum 108: Election Special!

Summer of 2026 is upon us, and election season is kicking off as spirited candidates, trusted election authorities, and municipalities across Illinois seek to address a host of complex issues. Local election officials and electoral boards have many responsibilities to make elections happen, from processing nomination papers to convening quasi-adjudicative hearings. Meanwhile, local governments must navigate the enforcement of political sign regulations, electioneering laws, and the strict rules governing the use of public funds in referenda.

To help listeners tackle these issues, Ancel Glink’s Erin Monforti and Katie Nagy revisit classic insights from equity partner Keri-Lyn Krafthefer and provide vital updates for the 2027 Consolidated Election cycle.  

In This Episode 

  • Independent vs. Nonpartisan Candidates: Understand the critical legal distinctions between these two types of candidates and how they appear on the ballot.
  • The 2027 Election Timeline: Key dates for the February 23, 2027, Consolidated Primary and the April 6, 2027, Consolidated Election, including petition circulation and filing windows.
  • Objection Procedures & "Business Days": How to calculate the five-business-day objection deadline, especially with the Thanksgiving 2026 holiday.
  • Electoral Board Mechanics: A deep dive into the "24-hour call" rule, the composition of the board, and the requirement to deliberate in open session.
  • Strategic Scheduling: Practical advice for clerks on the "strategic receipt" of objection petitions to ensure boards can meet within statutory deadlines.
  • Setting Compensation: Why local governments must set compensation for newly elected officials at least 180 days before their terms begin.
  • New Laws: Updates on Public Act 104-443 (redacting candidate addresses) and Public Act 104-438 (prohibiting meetings on election days).
  • Public Funds & Referenda: Guidelines on what constitutes "factual information" versus prohibited advocacy when units of local government are involved in public questions.
  • FOIA & Arrest Records: A review of PAC Opinion 26-006 regarding the public’s right to access arrest records involving public figures.

Friday, August 7, 2026

ISBE Has Issued 408 Pages of AI Guidance: What School Districts Need to Know


The Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) has published statewide guidance on artificial intelligence use in schools. This guidance provides schools with a toolbox of instructional use rubrics, model policies, and implementation checklists. However, what it does not provide them with is a single, uniform Illinois model policy ready to adopt. 

This guidance was developed in response to Public Act 104-0399, which in 2025 charged the ISBE with “develop[ing] statewide guidance for school districts and educators on the use of artificial intelligence in elementary and secondary education.” 


School districts are directed to model templates and policies that they can use as “starting points.” Those resources are organized into three distinct policies: a district-wide policy, an Acceptable Use Policy, and an Informed Use Policy. ISBE provides model template resources from other states and districts to support drafting, review, legal/compliance checks, and board adoption processes. 


The guidance also flags that “trust but verify” should govern all AI use where it “should not independently determine special education eligibility, student discipline outcomes, teacher evaluations, hiring decisions, or other high-stake determinations without documented human review and district accountability processes.” 


ISBE indicates it will release additional tailored guidance and no-cost professional learning during the 2026-27 school year. In the meantime, school districts with questions about implementing AI policies or evaluating their current procedures should contract their legal counsel for assistance.


Post Authored by Ronette Leal McCarthy & Betsy Lecy, Ancel Glink