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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Thursday, June 18, 2026

School Board Violated First Amendment in Restricting Critical Public Comment

  Thursday, June 18, 2026    

Although this case was decided by a different federal circuit court of appeals than the Seventh Circuit that governs Illinois, it is illustrative of how courts view restrictions on public comment at government meetings. Boddy v. Grech (6th Cir. June 10, 2026).

A school board in Xenia, Ohio held a public meeting where public comment was permitted under its public comment policy. While one of the speakers was expressing her views regarding the school district's alleged teaching of critical race theory, the school board president threatened to turn off the speaker's microphone and then grabbed the microphone and recessed the meeting. The speaker sued, claiming the school district violated her First Amendmnet rights. The school district defended the board president's actions, stating that the reason the speaker was silenced was because she violated rules of decorum by inciting and riling up the audience, by using terms such as "cowardice" and "failing" to describe the board and the school district,and by calling people "names" and spreading "baseless accusations." 

The district court rejected the speaker's request for a preliminary injunction against the school district, finding that although the speaker's criticism of the board was subject to some First Amendment protection, some of her speech was an "ad hominem" attack that was not protected by the First Amendment. The speaker appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and ordered the district court to grant the speaker a preliminary injunction against the board.

First, the Court determined that the speaker's use of "failing" and "cowardice" did not qualify as "fighting words" under the First Amendment. Instead, the speaker was simply criticizing the board and the superintendent for their policy decisions, while maintaining a calm demeanor and tone, which is protected by the First Amendment. The Court further stated that even if her words were "offensive," the First Amendment protects that type of speech and a contrary position would allow the government to ban the express of unpopular views, which would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. The Court further noted that the [f]reedom to criticize public officials and expose their wrongdoing is at the core of First Amendment values.”

Second, the Court rejected the school district's argument that restricting the speaker's speech was necessary to maintain decorum, finding that the real justification for shutting the speaker down was because she shared viewpoints critical of the board. 

Finally, the Court agreed with the speaker that the board's actions in shutting down her speech constituted a "heckler's veto," because the board appeared to be taking action based on the crowd's reactions to the speaker's public comments - i.e., silencing the speaker in an attempt to address a disruptive or unruly crowd. 

In sum, the Sixth Circuit found that the speaker was entitled to a preliminary injunction to stop the school board from enforcing its policy against her at future meetings.

  

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Tuesday, June 16, 2026

County Not Liable for Former Coroner's Actions in Keeping Skull

  Tuesday, June 16, 2026    

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in favor of a county in a civil rights lawsuit involving the former county coroner's keeping of a family member's skull as a trophy. Betts v. Boone County.

In 1977, a high school student was kidnapped, raped, and murdered and then dumped in a field within the county. As part of the investigation, the county coroner examined the body, and returned the remains to the family, except for the skull, which the coroner kept. 

In 2022, the current county coroner contacted the family to inform them that the former coroner had kept at least three skulls, one of which was their family member's. After the family exhumed the casket to place the skull with her remains, they filed a civil rights lawsuit against the county, arguing that the coroner's actions unconstitutionally retained their property in violation of their due process rights. The district court dismissed the case, determining that the family did not show that the former coroner's actions established an official county policy, as required to hold the county liable for its employee's actions. 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the legal standard for holding a government liable for civil rights claims for its employees' actions, which requires a person to show that the deprivation of a constitutional right was caused by a municipal policy or custom. Here, the Seventh Circuit held that because state law requires coroners to return all remains to the next of kin, the former coroner did not implement an “official policy” of the county when he kept the skull. Instead, he violated the law. Since the family members could not establish that the county was liable for its former employee's actions, the district court properly dismissed their case. 

  

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Monday, June 15, 2026

In the Zone: Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Lawsuit Against County Regarding Denial of Solar Facilities

  Monday, June 15, 2026    

In January 2023, the Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 102-1123 (the Act) which, among other things, amended the Counties Code to codify new standards and procedures for the development of “commercial solar energy facilities” in counties across Illinois. Notable provisions of the Act include the following: 

  • A restriction that counties may not adopt zoning regulations that “disallow, permanently ortemporarily,” commercial solar energy facilities in agricultural or industrial districts,
  • Guidelines regarding maximum setbacks, fencing requirements, height, vegetative screening, etc.,
  • A provision allowing counties to adopt standards for solar facilities, so long as county requirements are not “more restrictive” than those specified in the Act,
  • A requirement that counties hold public hearings prior to making decisions to approve or deny solar facilities, and
  • A provision stating that requests for siting approval or special use permits “shall be approved” if a request complies with the Counties Code, the local county zoning ordinance, and relevant state and federal statutes and regulations.

In 2024, two solar development companies submitted separate applications to a county seeking to develop commercial solar energy facilities within the county. Over the following several months, the developers appeared before the county zoning board of appeals and the zoning committee, which held public hearings and recommended that the county board deny the proposed project under the county’s unified development ordinance (UDO). Both projects were ultimately denied by the county board, and each developer filed a lawsuit requesting (1) a writ of mandamus to compel the county to issue their requested permits, and (2) a declaration that their project applications should be approved. The developers claimed their applications complied with the Act and all provisions of the UDO, and therefore the county was obligated to approve their application and issue all necessary permits for their projects. The county moved to dismiss both cases, arguing that the Act did not give the developers an absolute right to the permits requested.

The trial court ruled in the county's favor, dismissing both cases. The court determined that mandamus was not available because the county could not be compelled to exercise its discretionary zoning authority to issue siting approval or special use permits for the facilities. Furthermore, the court found that the developer’s claim for declaratory judgment was insufficiently plead, and gave the developers an opportunity to replead their complaint. Instead, both developers appealed the trial court’s decision, and the cases were consolidated before the Fourth District Appellate Court. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the decision of the trial court, determining that mandamus was not available given the discretion vested in the county to make local zoning decisions (particularly decisions to grant or deny applications for special use permits). Tate Road Solar 1, LLC, et al. v. County of Winnebago. The Court found the Act did not prohibit the county from exercising discretion in determining whether to issue permits. Instead, by allowing counties to regulate commercial solar energy facilities as “special uses,” the Illinois General Assembly plainly intended that counties maintain some discretion over approval and siting for these land uses. The Court also determined that counties were permitted to apply their traditional, subjective standards used when making local zoning decisions. Additionally, because the Act requires a public hearing before a permit can be issued, the Court found that the county would need to exercise discretion in accepting testimony and evidence, and then weighing various standards to determine whether a permit should be issued. While the Act codified certain limitations on local authority to regulate solar facilities, the Court determined the General Assembly did not eliminate counties’ traditional discretion to make local zoning decisions. Therefore, mandamus was not an appropriate remedy to force the county to approve the developer’s applications and issue permits for the facilities.

As to the developers’ claims for declaratory judgment, the Court found that because the developers did not have a “clear right” to the permits, there was no actual controversy the developers could plead to seek a declaration that their permits be issued. In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision dismissing the developers’ lawsuits for failing to state a proper claim for mandamus or declaratory relief.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink 

  

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Thursday, June 11, 2026

Case Was Properly Dismissed Where Appeal Not Served on City

  Thursday, June 11, 2026    

In Crane v. City of Rockford, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of an appeal of an administrative hearing officer's issuance of fines for building code violations where the property owner did not comply with the service requirements of state law.

A municipal administrative hearing officer found a property owner in violation of various building code provisions and assessed a fine of $64,000. The property owner filed an appeal with the circuit court within the statutory 35 day period but failed to properly serve the City and other defendants as required by section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law. The City filed a motion to dismiss the case based on noncompliance with the service requirements of state law, and the circuit court and Appellate Courts ruled in favor of the City, finding that section 3-103 was mandatory, and both the filing of the appeal and "issuance of summons" on the defendants has to be accomplished within 35 days of the date the administrative decision is served. Here, although the owner had filed an affidavit with the filed complaint identifying the hearing officer and mayor as defendants to be served, he failed to pay the fee for certified mailing of the summonses, so they were not issued. As a result, his appeal of the $64,000 fine was properly dismissed.

  

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Tuesday, June 9, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 106: Legislative Update

  Tuesday, June 09, 2026    

Ancel Glink has released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 106: Legislative Update. The Illinois General Assembly recently concluded its spring legislative session and Ancel Glink’s Greg Jones and Tyler Smith join us to talk about recent legislation local governments should know, including updates on housing grants, e-bike and e-scooter regulations, hemp regulations, and more! 

In This Episode:

  • [00:00] Baseball Fever: Greg and Tyler discuss their favorite all-time and underrated players, including Lou Whitaker, Barry Bonds, and Anthony Rizzo.
  • [03:45] The "Build Plan" vs. The "REAL Act": We review Governor Pritzker’s Build Plan omnibus package, which sought to preempt local zoning for housing but ultimately failed to advance. We also discuss the IML’s alternative REAL Act.
  • [09:00] Housing Grants: Even though the Build Plan didn't pass, the FY27 budget allocated hundreds of millions for housing, including funds for the Missing Middle program, SmartBuy, and Opening Doors.
  • [10:45] E-Bikes & E-Scooters: New statewide standards for electric micromobility devices effectively preempt home rule authority for regulating these devices, starting January 1, 2027 .(SB3484)
  • [14:45] The Illinois Hemp Act & Cannabis: Illinois repeals the Industrial Hemp Act to align with federal standards, effective November 12, 2026. This bill also doubles the legal possession limit for cannabis to 60 grams and extends dispensary hours to 2 a.m., subject to local zoning. (SB3222)
  • [17:45] Operational Updates: Briefing on HB4541 regarding overpayments under the Unclaimed Property Act and HB1353 protecting volunteer emergency workers during training.
  • [19:30] Financial Posting & Trusts: Coverage of HB2137 regarding website financial posting requirements, SB638 on OPEB trust funds, and SB2102 on electronic filing receipts.
  • [22:45] Special Districts: New rules for dissolving drainage and sanitation districts in certain counties (HB5166) and disconnecting park district territory (HB5542).
  • [26:15] Local Finance & IMRF: Discussing SB2769 (Business District fund transfers), SB2826 (IMRF separation benefits), and SB2836 (increased audit thresholds for FY27).
  • [29:30] Fire Protection & School Transfers: Updates on HB4292 (ambulance fund transfers), HB4909 (Taft-Hartley/IMRF contributions), and HB4375 (extending school fund transfer periods).
  • [33:00] School Code Changes: An update covering psychologist qualifications (HB4397, effective July 1, 2027), CPR/AED training (HB4788), staff mental health procedures (HB4862, starting 2028), and service animal handling (SB2761).
  • [37:30] Rights & Protections: Details on SB2914 (expanded teacher dismissal warnings) and SB3361 (The Jett Hawkins Law regarding religious hairstyles), both effective immediately upon signing.
  • [39:45] Open Meetings Act: Can you list "Personnel Issues" on a meeting agenda? We review a new binding opinion regarding employee termination and the Open Meetings Act.
  • [44:15] Upcoming Events: A summary of where to catch Ancel Glink attorneys this summer and fall.


  

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Monday, June 8, 2026

Seventh Circuit Upholds Removal of Public Employee for Social Media Posts

  Monday, June 08, 2026    

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the removal of a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary after he refused to stop posting himself in uniform and making derogatory statements on social media in Wenzler v. United States Coast Guard, et al.

Wenzler had been a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary for about 15 years when a member of the public complained about his LinkedIn posts. One of the posts accused certain Supreme Court Justices of being racist, and another made a crude remark about the Girl Scouts. The Auxiliary conducted an investigation, and a supervisor directed him to remove from social media any photograph of himself wearing his uniform and to delete any reference to the Auxiliary. He responded that he would not comply with the directive and that he would file a complaint against the supervisor for racist action against him because he was white. He continued to post about his Auxiliary position on LinkedIn and another complaint was filed by a member of the public about one of his posts. He again stated he would not comply with the Auxiliary's social media directive, and formal disciplinary proceedings were started which resulted in the Coast Guard disenrolling him. After his administrative appeals failed, he sued in federal court claiming the Coast Guard's actions against him violated his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in the Coast Guard's favor, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the standards for a First Amendment retaliation claim, which require a public employee to show that (1) their speech was constitutionally protected; (2) they suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) their speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. In analyzing the first prong (whether his speech was constitutionally protected), the Court applied the two-step Pickering test: (a) whether the speech involved a matter of public concern and (b) if so, does the speaker's interest in commenting on the matter of public concern outweigh the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

In this case, the Court accepted that Wenzler's speech touched on matters of public concern (meeting the first step of the Pickering test). However, in applying the second step (balancing interests test), the Court determined that the Coast Guard deserved deference in assessing and responding to its members' speech when those members hold themselves out as members of the organization while wearing its uniform. The Auxiliary's structure as a uniformed organization within the Coast Guard with a military-like hierarchy was also relevant to the Court in balacing its interests against Wenzler's. In short, the Court held that the Auxiliary could reasonably determine that Wenzler's speech would be detrimental to the Auxiliary and its reputation, and reasonably expect that other members of the Auxiliary would be less likely to work with him because of his derogatory comments and attacks on others. As a result, the Seventh Circuit found no First Amendment violation in the Coast Guard's removal of Wenzler. 

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Wednesday, June 3, 2026

Illinois General Assembly Passes Illinois Hemp Act

  Wednesday, June 03, 2026    

On the final day of its 2026 spring legislative session, the Illinois General Assembly passed Senate Bill 3222, creating the Illinois Hemp Act governing hemp-derived products in Illinois. If signed by the Governor, the Act would repeal the existing Industrial Hemp Act, effective November 12, 2026.

The federal Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 Farm Bill) created an exception to the federal definition of “marijuana” for products meeting the legal definition of “hemp.” This created a loophole under which hemp was no longer a controlled substance under the Controlled Substances Act, allowing for the proliferation of synthetic cannabis products, such as Delta-9 THC products. Recent federal changes (Pub. L. No. 119-37) to the definition of “hemp” effectively close this loophole while continuing to allow “industrial hemp” grown for non-cannabis purposes. The federal changes are scheduled to become effective November 12, 2026.

Senate Bill 3222 aligns Illinois law with the recent federal changes by adopting the federal definition of “hemp,” among other terms. The effective date of the Industrial Hemp Act repeal coincides with the effective date of the federal changes. Beyond incorporating federal definitions, SB3222 brings hemp-derived products that contain qualifying concentrations of THC-related compounds within the State’s cannabis licensing, testing, distribution, and retail framework. As a result, the sale, distribution, manufacturing, and production of covered hemp products without state authorization or licensing will be prohibited in Illinois.

Aside from hemp-related updates, the bill introduces several changes to broader cannabis laws. It doubles the threshold for a minor cannabis offense from 30 grams to 60 grams of any substance containing cannabis and raises the legal possession limits for Illinois residents age 21 or older to 60 grams of cannabis flower, 1,000 milligrams of THC in cannabis-infused products, 10 grams of cannabis concentrate. Additionally, the Act provides that a cannabis dispensary may now operate until 2 a.m. (rather than 10p.m.), subject to local zoning rules.

The bill now heads to the Governor for final consideration.

Post Authored by Adam Simon & Luigi Laudando

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Tuesday, June 2, 2026

Seventh Circuit Sanctions Attorney for Filing Brief with AI Hallucinations

  Tuesday, June 02, 2026    

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sanctioned a lawyer for AI-generated hallucinations and other inaccuracies and errors in a brief filed with the Court in an immigration appeal. Perez-Castillo v. Todd Blanche.

An attorney filed an opening appellate brief with the Seventh Circuit on behalf of his client, who was appealing an immigration removal order. The Court denied the appeal on its merits in the opinion, and also addressed certain problems and irregularities the Court discovered in the appellate brief. The Court noted that about half of the cases cited in the court filing either did not exist or were falsely labeled as Seventh Circuit cases. The Court also noted that nearly every quotation in the filing could not be traced to a real case, a known hallmark of AI hallucinations. The Court also discovered false representations of the record in the filing, including statements about testimony and findings of the Immigration Judge. On order of the Court, the attorney responded that generative AI was used for the brief but he attributed that to another attorney (who had not filed an appearance in the case). The attorney admitted that he did not review the brief before filing it with the Court

The Court sanctioned the attorney who signed and filed the brief. The sanction (in the amount of $5,000) was based on a violation of the attorney rules of professional conduct rule 46, which authorizes a court to "suspend, disbar, or discipline a member of our bar ‘for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.’” While the Court did not sanction the attorney who wrote the brief, it did admonish her that she must be cautious in ensuring any use of generative AI is in compliance with the attorney rules of professional conduct. The Court also referred the matter to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC).

The Court ended its opinion with the following cautionary note to litigants and attorneys:

There is “little doubt that litigants and courts” will develop “sound and workable practices” governing AI usage in due time, but that point has not yet arrived. [citation omitted]. Briefs like those petitioner’s counsel submitted in this case are unacceptable and “result in confusion and time wasted” for this court. [citation omitted]. Members of this court’s bar must be exceedingly careful about outsourcing their work product. At all times, attorneys must follow both the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and this court’s Rules of Professional Conduct. If not, sanctions may follow.

  

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Monday, June 1, 2026

School District Administrator Had Qualified Immunity in First Amendment Challenge

  Monday, June 01, 2026    

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a school district chief talent officer had qualified immunity in a First Amendment case brought by a school district employee who had been terminated for her social media posts in Hayes v. Board of Education.

A college administrator responsible for staffing student teachers in a school district was terminated by the school district for making disparaging comments on social media about the district. The comments included criticisms of the school district and its CEO, including circulating a petition calling for the district to investigate and report on racial inequities in the district. After her termination, she filed a lawsuit against the district's chief talent officer and against the board of education, claiming she was unlawfully retaliated against in violation of her First Amendment rights. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity among other defenses, but the district court denied the motion. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit determined that the chief talent officer was entitled to qualified immunity against the First Amendment retaliation claim brought by the former employee. Specifically, the Court held that there was no prior caselaw that would put the chief talent officer on notice that his conduct in this case would violate the former employee's constitutional rights, one of the steps in a qualified immunity analysis. As a result, the former employee could not meet her burden to overcome the chief talent officer's qualified immunity defense.

Although the Seventh Circuit found that the chief talent officer had qualified immunity in the case, it allowed the former employee's First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed against the district.

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Friday, May 29, 2026

Illinois General Assembly Spring 2026 End of Session Tracking

  Friday, May 29, 2026    

As the Illinois General Assembly draws closer to concluding its 2026 spring legislative session, there are a number of outstanding bills likely to be considered that would have a significant impact on local governments throughout Illinois. The General Assembly has been busy so far in the 2026 spring session passing a number of bills that will affect local government operations as well as a bill on regulating electric mobility devices. With three days left until the General Assembly recesses on May 31st, the Governor’s BUILD Plan legislation, and other bills impacting local governments, may still be considered.

Below is a list of bills we’re tracking with updates on the bill’s status through May 28th. 

Housing Legislation 

House Bill 5626: BUILD Plan Housing Omnibus Bill (First Reading; referred to House Rules Committee) 

Senate Bill 4060: Middle Housing & Statewide Standards (First Reading; referred to Senate Assignments Committee) 

Senate Bill 4061: Single-Stair Reform (First Reading; referred to Senate Assignments Committee) 

Senate Bill 4062: Statewide Impact Fee Calculation (First Reading; referred to Senate Assignments Committee)

 Senate Bill 4063: Third-Party Plan Review (First Reading; referred to Senate Assignments Committee) 

Senate Bill 4064: Parking Reform (First Reading; referred to Senate Assignments Committee) 

Senate Bill 4071: Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) (First Reading; referred to Senate Assignments Committee) 

Senate Bill 0331: Restock the Block Act (Second Reading; Senate Floor Amendment No. 1 introduced on May 21st and recommended for adoption by the Senate Executive Committee) 

Senate Bill 0608: Federally Assisted Tenant Protection Act (Second Reading; Senate Floor Amendment No. 1 recommended for adoption by the Senate Executive Committee) 

Senate Bill 635: Faith-Based Housing and Mixed-Use By-Right Act (Second Reading; Senate Floor Amendment No.1 recommended for adoption by the Senate Executive Committee) 

House Bill 5765 / Senate Bill 4200: REAL Housing Act (Frist Reading; referred to House Rules Committee and Senate Assignments Committee) 

Other Legislation Affecting Local Governments 

House Bill 1429: Amendments to IL Homeless Bill of Rights (Second Reading; House Floor Amendment No. 1; House Floor Amendment No. 2 recommended for adoption by House Housing Committee; House Floor Amendment No. 3 recommended for approval by House Housing Committee; Bill and all House floor amendments re-referred to House Rules Committee)

House Bill 5513 / Senate Bill 4016: Power Act (First Reading; Bill re-referred to House Rules Committee and Senate Assignments Committee) 

House Bill 5326: Digital Library Protection Act (Passed House; House Floor Amendment No.1 and House Floor Amendment No. 2 adopted; First Reading in Senate; referred to Senate Assignments Committee) 

House Bill 4712: Amendments to Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (First Reading; Bill re-referred to House Rules Committee) 

Senate Bill 1796: Body Worn Camera FOIA Requests (Senate Committee Amendment No. 2 adopted; Passed Senate; Second Reading in House) 

Senate Bill 2715: OMA and FOIA Amendments: (Passed Senate; Second Reading in House; House Committee Amendment No. 1 adopted by House Executive Committee; House Floor Amendments No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, No. 5, No. 6, No. 7 recommended for adoption by House Executive Committee) 

House Bill 5784 / Senate Bill 20: Joint Omnibus CBD and Cannabis Regulatory Reform (First Reading in House and referred to House Rules Committee; First Reading in Senate; Senate Floor Amendment No. 1 referred to Senate Assignments Committee) 

Legislation Passed By Both Chambers 

Senate Bill 3336: Electric Mobility Devices (Passed both houses as of May 27, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 2836: Government Account Audits (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 2826: IMRF Pension Benefits (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 2769: Transfer of Funds Among Municipal Business District Tax Allocation Funds (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 2102: Taxing District Budget and Appropriations Ordinance Filing (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 638: Municipal Postemployment Benefit Trusts (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 2761: Service Animals and In-Service ADA Trainings (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 2913: Teacher Evaluation Plans (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 2914: Procedure for Removing/Dismissing Teachers (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Senate Bill 3361: Religious Hairstyles in Schools (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 4375: School District Interfund Transfers (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 5542: Park District Disconnection Petitions (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 5166: Dissolution of Special Districts (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 5167: Township Weed Cutting (Passed both houses as of May 21, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 4788: Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Training Curriculum (Passed both houses as of May 20, 2026; awaiting signature from Governor) 

House Bill 4862: School Staff Mental Health Policies (Passed both houses as of May 20, 2026; awaiting signature from Governor) 

House Bill 4491: Amendment to Public Employee Disability Act (Passed both houses as of May 20, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 2137: Amendment to Governmental Account Audit Act (Passed both houses as of May 20, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 4397: School Psychologist Qualifications (Passed both houses as of May 19, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 3743: School District Handbook Railroad Safety Messaging (Passed both houses as of May 19, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 4137: Amendment to Education for Homeless Children Act (Passed both houses as of May 19, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 4361: Building Inspector Certifications (Passed both houses as of May 19, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 1353: Amendment to Volunteer Emergency Worker Job Protection Act (Passed both houses as of May 19, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

House Bill 4541: Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (Passed both houses as of May 14, 2026; awaiting signature by Governor) 

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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Thursday, May 28, 2026

Police Search of Backpack During Arrest Was Lawful

  Thursday, May 28, 2026    

Federal appeals court rules against arrestee in challenge to police officer's seizure of backpack during arrest in U.S. v. Fillyaw. 

Local police officers executed a search warrant and arrested an individual in connection with an arson investigation. During the arrest (which took place in an apartment parking lot), police seized the arrestee's backpack and searched the contents, finding a loaded handgun and drugs. The arrestee filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the backpack, arguing that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the police, holding that police have the right to take custody of an arrestee's property and take inventory of that property when the arrest takes place in a public place.

  

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Wednesday, May 27, 2026

Seventh Circuit Rejects Discrimination Claim by Candidate for Deputy Sheriff Position

  Wednesday, May 27, 2026    

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a county sheriff office's decision not to hire a candidate for a deputy sheriff position, rejecting the candidate's racial discrimination claim in Burton v. Will County Sheriff's Merit Commission.

A candidate applied for a deputy sheriff position with a county sheriff's department. As part of the background check process, the county contacted the candidate's current employer, who stated that he was not a dependable employee, did not work well with others, and that the employer would not rehire him. Based on that information, the county sheriff's commission removed the candidate from the hiring certification process. He sued, claiming that the county discriminated against him because of his race.

The district court ruled in favor of the county, finding no evidence that the decision to remove the candidate from the hiring certification process was related to his race. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, finding no evidence that race played a role in the sheriff's merit commission's decision, rejecting the candidate's argument that the negative background check was a pretext to remove him from consideration. Instead, the Court found that the county had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to remove him - the negative employment reference from his current employer.

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Tuesday, May 26, 2026

Court Upholds Pension Board Decision to Award Non-Duty Disability Pension

  Tuesday, May 26, 2026    

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a pension board's award of a non-duty disability rather than a line-of-duty disability in Hull v. Village of Wheeling Police Pension Fund. 

A probationary police officer applied for a line-of-duty disability, claiming that a motor vehicle accident while on duty caused disabilities preventing him from returning to work. The pension board conducted a hearing, at which the officer presented evidence in favor of a line-of-duty pension and the village (as intervenor) presented evidence opposing the application, arguing that he was able to work and had, in fact, been employed in various jobs since the accident. The opinions of multiple medical professionals was also presented at the hearing, including evidence that the officer did suffer from depression that prevented him from continuing to work in his police officer position. At the conclusion of the hearing, the pension board voted to grant a non-duty disability pension to the former officer (who had since been terminated by the village), finding that he was disabled but not due to the motor vehicle accident.

The former officer appealed, and both the trial court and the Appellate Court upheld the pension board's decision that he was entitled to a non-duty disability pension, but not a line-of-duty pension. Both courts determined that the pension board relied on the opinions of multiple medical professionals that while his condition was disabling, it was not caused by the motor vehicle accident. 

  

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Thursday, May 21, 2026

Updates on Senate Bill 3336 (E-Bikes, etc)

  Thursday, May 21, 2026    

We previously reported about Illinois Senate Bill 3336, which if passed by both houses of the Illinois General Assembly and signed by the Governor, would make comprehensive changes to the authority of local governments to regulate several devices and vehicles, including electric mobility devices (EMDs), motor driven cycles, low-speed electric bicycles, and low-speed gas bicycles. We wanted to share a couple of updates to the bill, including House Floor Amendments No. 2 and No. 3.

House Floor Amendment No. 2 was introduced on May 11, 2026, and subsequently recommended for adoption by the House Transportation: Vehicles and Safety Committee. This amendment would make several additional noteworthy changes to Senate Bill 3336, some of which are summarized below.

If passed, the amendment would authorize park districts, forest preserve districts, conservation districts, and transit districts, by ordinance or resolution, to regulate the use of EMDs, low-speed gas bicycles, and low-speed electric bicycles on bicycle paths in their respective jurisdictions. This proposed change is important, because Senate Bill 3336 otherwise expressly preempts local governments (including home rule units) from regulating EMDs, motor driven cycles, low-speed gas bicycles, and low-speed electric bicycles.

If passed, the amendment would also prohibit persons younger than 18 years old from operating low-speed electric bicycles and low-speed electric scooters manufactured to accommodate passengers, unless the passenger is a sibling, stepsibling, child, or stepchild of the operator. The amendment would also authorize operating low-speed gas bicycles on any highway, street, roadway, or bicycle lane authorized for use by regular bicycles.

The amendment also makes several important additions regarding mobility devices. Specifically, the amendment clarifies that nothing in the Illinois Vehicle Code prohibits the use of or reasonable accommodation for personal mobility devices when operated by persons with disabilities. The amendment also clarifies that the Vehicle Code’s rules for regular bicycles also apply to “adaptive electric bicycles,” which are defined to mean an electric bicycle with 2 or more wheels that is designed for and used by a person with a mobility disability.

House Floor Amendment No. 3 was introduced on May 21, 2026. If passed, it would add language exempting low-speed electric bicycles and low-speed gas bicycles from the driving while under the influence prohibitions unless the bicycle is capable of and operating in excess of 28 miles per hour. 

Stay tuned for more updates as this bill and any future amendments to it proceeds through the Illinois General Assembly.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

    


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Tuesday, May 19, 2026

Village Board Violated OMA by Not Including "General Subject Matter" of Action Item on Agenda

  Tuesday, May 19, 2026    

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) found a public body in violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) in its fifth binding opinion of 2026 for an inadequate agenda. PAC Op. 26-005.

A citizen filed a request for review with the PAC office claiming that a village board violated the OMA at a meeting where it voted on the termination of a village employee. Specifically, the citizen claimed that the agenda only listed "Personnel issues" under a "POLICE & LIQUOR" heading on the agenda, which he claimed was not sufficient to inform the public of the matter on which the village board was intending to take final action. The PAC agreed that the agenda description "Personnel issues" did not provide advance notice of the "general subject matter" of the action that was taken, and that the phrase "Personnel issues" was too broad as it could involve any number of other types of personnel actions, and not just termination of a village employee.

In its opinion, the PAC cited to section 2.02 of OMA that provides that "[a]ny agenda required under this Section shall set forth the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance that will be the subject of final action at the meeting." As discussed in the past, the PAC appears to take a very expansive view of section 2.02 that would include actions taken by public bodies beyond votes on resolutions or ordinances (which section 2.02 seems to apply to). The PAC has applied section 2.02 to any type of action taken by a public body at a meeting, to include motions that do not involve an ordinance or resolution, even though the language of 2.02 expressly states that it applies to "the general subject matter of any resolution or ordinance..." (emphasis added). While unclear from the PAC opinion, it is possible that the village board may have acted on the termination via a resolution or ordinance, which would then clearly fall under section 2.02. In any event, it is advisable that an agenda of a meeting of a public body be sufficiently descriptive to inform the public of items that will be voted on at the meeting, whether those actions fall under 2.02 or otherwise. 

  

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Monday, May 18, 2026

PAC Finds City Council in Violation of OMA for Closed Session Discussions

  Monday, May 18, 2026    

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 4th binding opinion of 2026 finding a public body in violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by discussing matters in closed session that were not outside the scope of a closed session exemption. PAC Op. 26-004.

A citizen filed an OMA complaint with the PAC claiming that a city council improperly held closed sessions to discuss the potential renovation of city hall and plans for a new city hall. In response to the complaint, the city argued that the city council discussed whether or not the city needed to look at purchasing land to build a new city hall, including discussing several properties that were listed for sale or that could be purchased. The city argued these discussions were proper under section 2(c)(5) of the OMA.

After listening to the verbatim tapes of the closed sessions, the PAC determined that part of the city council's discussions went beyond the scope of the OMA because they focused on the condition of the city hall property and financial matters, which the PAC determined were not proper under 2(c)(5) of the OMA. As a result, the PAC ordered the city to release that part of the verbatim recordings that exceeded the scope of the OMA but determined that the city council's discussions relating to purchase of property for a new city hall could be withheld as those discussions were within the scope of 2(c)(5) of the OMA.

  

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Thursday, May 14, 2026

Prosser Rule Applied to City Council's Appointment of Clerk

  Thursday, May 14, 2026    

It isn't often that the Illinois courts apply the "Prosser Rule" to the vote of a city council, but an Illinois Appellate Court did just that recently in Christian v. Buscher. 

In 2025, a city council held a special meeting to vote on the appointment of a person to fill a vacant city clerk position. The city council (made up of 10 elected aldermen and the mayor) voted five "yea," three "nay," and two "present" on the motion to approve an ordinance to appoint a sitting alderman to fill the clerk position. The mayor (who did not vote) announced that the measure passed. The alderman who was being appointed voted in favor of his appointment.

A citizen filed a lawsuit to challenge the vote on the appointment, arguing that the measure did not receive the necessary six votes to approve an ordinance. Specifically, the citizen argued that the two "present" votes should not have been counted towards the majority who did vote in favor of the measure. The citizen also argued that the favorable vote of the alderman who was being appointed should not have been counted. The circuit court dismissed the case and it was appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court first analyzed the Illinois Supreme Court's Prosser v. Village of Fox Lake case where the Supreme Court held that an ordinance was validly approved even though a member of the board was present but did not vote, finding that the non-vote counted towards the majority of "yea" votes. The Court explained that if a measure requires an "affirmative" vote of the majority, then "voting to 'abstain,' or to 'pass,' or voting 'present' or of refusing to vote when present at a meeting" counts as a "nay" vote. However, if a measure requires a "concurrence" vote of the majority, a vote of pass, present, abstain, or a failure to vote counts as an acquiescence or concurrence with the majority, based on the "general rule" that those members present at a meeting "must vote against a proposal in order to defeat it." 

Because the city ordinances required a "concurrence of a majority" to pass an ordinance, the Court found that the ordinance being challenged was validly approved because the two "present" votes were properly counted with the "yea" votes based on the Prosser Rule. The Court also rejected the argument that the vote of the alderman being appointed should not have been counted, finding that even without his vote, the measure passed. As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the case challenging the appointment.



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Wednesday, May 13, 2026

Removal of Tow Company from County Tow List Not a Due Process Violation

  Wednesday, May 13, 2026    

In Tire Town Auto, LLC v. Wood County, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found no due process violation when a county removed a tow company from the county's tow list. 

A Wisconsin county maintained a list of towing businesses that were available on a rotating basis to recover vehicles on public roads. After receiving complaints about one of the tow companies, the county removed it from the list and the company sued, claiming the county violated its procedural due process rights in removing it from from the tow list. The county asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing there is no protected property interest in being listed on the county's tow list. The district court agreed and dismissed the case, and the company appealed.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, finding that the tow company did not allege or identify any written or other source that would support a property interest, including a statute, regulation, or ordinance that would guarantee a business a spot on the county's tow list. As a result, the case was properly dismissed.

  

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Friday, May 8, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 105: Anatomy of a Redevelopment Agreement (Part 2)

  Friday, May 08, 2026    

Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast has released a new episode, Episode 105: Anatomy of a Redevelopment Agreement (Part 2). 

In this episode, we return to the Southland Development Authority’s “TIF Talk” training series for a deep dive into the financial and practical implementation of economic development deals. Hosted by the Village of Hazel Crest, this session features Ancel Glink’s David Silverman, Michio Murakishi (Meech Group), and Terri Cox (Matanky Realty Group).

Building on the structural overview provided in Quorum Forum 97:  Anatomy of a Redevelopment Agreement, the panel explores how municipalities can use RDAs to bridge financial gaps and ensure projects are feasible for developers while protecting the public interest.

Highlights:

  • The Math of Incentives: Understanding Internal Rate of Return (IRR), yield on cost, and how consultants use gap analysis to size incentives.
  • The “But For” Test:  A look at the legal and financial necessity of incentives, and the idea that a project would not happen “but for” the public assistance.
  • Net Public Benefit:  How to measure the “dividend” of a public investment through tax base growth, job creation, and revitalized storefronts.
  • Case Studies from the Trenches:  Terri Cox shares lessons from the Bishop Classic project in Chicago and a $5 million car wash development on Dixie Highway in Harvey.
  • Performance-Based Protections:  The importance of clawback provisions, reimbursement schedules, and why the public sector should generally avoid being a landlord.


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Monday, May 4, 2026

Court Finds Health Reimbursement Benefits Not Covered by PSEBA

  Monday, May 04, 2026    

In a recent decision, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld a fire protection district's (District) denial of certain supplemental benefits to a disabled firefighter who was receiving benefits under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (PSEBA). Carter v. Fox Lake Fire Protection District.

A firefighter was injured in the line of duty and applied for and received a duty disability pension. The firefighter was also eligible for, and received, benefits under PSEBA, which provides health insurance benefits to public safety officers who suffer a catastrophic injury in the line of duty. For six years, the District provided the disabled firefighter with the PSEBA health benefits, and also covered the firefighter under the District's vision, dental, and life insurance plans as well as the District's health reimbursement benefits that provided reimbursement for certain deductibles. In 2023, however, the District notified the firefighter that PSEBA does not include the vision, dental, and life insurance benefits or the health reimbursement benefits and stopped coverage for those benefits. The firefighter sued, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the District. The firefighter appealed the denial of the health reimbursement benefits to the Appellate Court (he did not challenge the denial of vision, dental, and life insurance benefits).

The Appellate Court examined the language of PSEBA and determined that the statute was clear that PSEBA benefits cover the premium for the health insurance plan, but expressly excludes "supplemental benefits that are not part of the basic group health insurance plan." The Court determined that the health reimbursement benefits were supplemental and not part of the District's health insurance plan, so they were not covered under PSEBA.

  

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Monday, April 27, 2026

Status of the Digital Library Protection Act

  Monday, April 27, 2026    

As many of our library readers already know, the Illinois House has passed House Bill 5236, the Digital Library Protection Act. If approved by the Illinois Senate, and signed by the Governor, this new law would prevent Illinois libraries (and any library consortium acting on behalf of a library) from entering into contracts with publishers regarding "electronic literary materials" (defined as e-books and digital audio books) that would:

  1. restrict a library from licensing literary materials from publishers; 
  2. restrict a library from employing technological protection measures necessary to loan e-books and digital audiobooks; 
  3. restrict a library from making preservation copies of e-books and digital audiobooks; 
  4. restrict a library from loaning e-books and digital audiobooks through interlibrary loans; 
  5. restrict a library from loaning e-books and digital audiobooks to borrowers; 
  6. restrict a library from determining loan periods for licensed e-books and digital audiobooks; 
  7. require a library to obtain a license for e-books and digital audiobooks at a price greater than what is charged to the public for the same item;
  8. restrict the number of licenses for e-books and digital audiobooks that the library can acquire after the item is available to the public;
  9. require the library to pay a cost-per-circulation fee for loan e-books and digital audiobooks, unless the fee is substantially lower in aggregate to the cost of purchasing the item outright; 
  10. restrict the number of times the library can loan an e-book or digital audiobook over the course of the contract if the contract imposes a time-based limitation on the duration of the license; 
  11. restrict or limit the library's ability to virtually recite text or display artwork to library patrons that would be more restrictive than what is recited or displayed at the library facility;
  12. restrict the library from disclosing the terms of the contract to any other Illinois library; and
  13. require, coerce, or enable the library to violate the Library Records Confidentiality Act.

If passed, the bill would also prohibit any provision in a contract that would require a different state law to be applied in any dispute. Note that the bill would not apply to any existing contracts with publishers.

The bill has been sent to the Illinois Senate for its consideration.

  

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Thursday, April 23, 2026

PAC Finds Village Board's Closed Session Violated OMA

  Thursday, April 23, 2026    

The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its third binding opinion for 2026 finding a village board in violation of the Open Meetings Act relating to a closed session. PAC Op. 26-003.

A sitting trustee on a village board submitted a complaint to the PAC claiming that the village board went into closed session to discuss "personnel issues" but instead discussed outstanding TIF loans. The village filed a response arguing that the board's closed session discussion fell under the "litigation exception" to the OMA, and that the mayor had mispoke in citing the personnel exception. 

The PAC reviewed the village's response, the meeting minutes, and the recording of the closed session. First, the PAC noted that the closed session discussion did not pertain to personnel issues. Further, the PAC stated that even if the board had discussed personnel issues in closed session, a generic reference to "personnel" is not adequate to identify a specific OMA exception. The PAC also found that the board failed to record the board's public vote on the motion in the meeting minutes. As a result, the PAC determined that the village board violated the OMA by not publicly disclosing and recording into the minutes the specific exception authorizing the closed session.

The PAC also rejected the village's argument that the litigation exception applied because litigation was an option for the village in dealing with the oustanding TIF loans. First, the PAC found that the board did not cite to that exception in open session or make the necessary finding in closed session as to why litigation was probable or imminent. Second, the PAC noted that litigation was "merely a distant possibility," which was not sufficient to fall under the probable or imminent litigation exception to the OMA.

The PAC ordered the village board to publicly release its verbatim recording of the meeting as a remedy to the OMA violation.


  

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Wednesday, April 22, 2026

Illinois Bill Proposes Regulations for E-Bikes, E-Scooters, and Similar Devices

  Wednesday, April 22, 2026    

UPDATED 5/11/2026

After Public Act 103-899 was signed into law in August 2024 (regulating low-speed electric bikes), some Illinois local governments adopted a patchwork of regulations governing the operation of low-speed electric bicycles and low-speed electric scooters in their communities. In an effort to promote statewide uniformity, the Illinois General Assembly is considering Senate Bill 3336, which, if passed in both houses, would enact sweeping changes to the authority and scope of local government regulations for these and other devices and vehicles. 

This post analyzes some of the most important changes proposed by the bill.

Electric Micromobility Devices (EMDs)

First, SB 3336 would repeal Section 11-1518 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code), and replace it with a new section regulating “electric micromobility devices.” The bill broadly defines an electric micromobility device (EMD) to mean a light-weight, low-speed, electric-powered device primarily used for personal transportation and operated at speeds up to 28 miles per hour (including low and high-speed electric scooters, electric skateboards, and electric unicycles). 

If passed, SB 3336 would generally permit people at least 16 years of age to operate an EMD on any highway, roadway, or bicycle lane/path in Illinois in a manner that does not impede vehicular traffic—but would prohibit their operation on sidewalks, interstate highways, or on highways with a posted speed limit exceeding 35 mph (unless it has a designated bike lane). For EMD’s operating in excess of 28 miles per hour, SB 3336 would prohibit their operation on any public highway, bike path, or bike lane, regardless of speed limit. The bill expressly exempts operators of EMD’s from obtaining a drivers license (or permit), registration, certificate of title, or liability insurance. SB 3336 would also authorize local law enforcement agencies to confiscate and impound an EMD operated in violation of the Code, and release the EMD upon payment of a reasonable administrative fee related to its confiscation and impoundment. If passed, SB 3336 would expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating EMDs in a manner inconsistent with the Code.

Motor Driven Cycles

Second, SB 3336 creates a new section regulating the operation of “motor driven cycles,” which are broadly defined to include (1) every motorcycle, moped, and every motor scooter with an internal combustion engine of less than 150 cubic centimeter piston displacement, (2) an electric motor with a nominal power rating of greater than 750 watts but less than or equal to 8,000 watts, (3) or motorized pedalcycles and every electric bicycle or gas-powered bicycle that is not a low-speed electric bicycle or low-speed gas bicycle. 

If passed, SB 3336 would generally allow people possessing a drivers license (or an instruction permit in certain circumstances) to operate a motor driven cycle on public highways, streets, and roadways—but would prohibit their operation on sidewalks, bike paths, bike lanes, shared-use paths, off-road bike trails, natural surface trails designated for bike use, or any other bike-specific facility established by State or local law. In contrast to EMD’s, operators of motor driven cycles must have a drivers license (or permit), liability insurance, and must generally acquire a certificate of title. Similar to EMD restrictions, SB 3336 also authorizes local law enforcement agencies to confiscate and impound motor driven cycles operated in violation of the Code, and release them upon payment of a reasonable administrative fee related to its confiscation and impounding. If passed, SB 3336 would expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating motor driven cycles in a manner inconsistent with the Code. 

Low-Speed Electric Bicycles (E-Bikes and Gas-Bikes)

SB 3336 also proposes various changes to the Code provisions regarding low-speed electric bicycle (e-bikes) and low-speed gas bicycle regulations (gas-bikes). Currently, the Code has no minimum age requirement to operate Class 1 and 2 e-bikes. SB 3336, if passed, would require operators of Class 1 and 2 e-bikes to be at least 15 years old. Currently, the Code authorizes local governments to prohibit the operation of e-bikes on designated bike paths. SB 3336, if passed, would take that power away from local governments, and instead authorize the operation of e-bikes on any bike path unless “the State agency with jurisdiction” prohibits using e-bikes, or a specific class of e-bike, on designated bike paths. SB 3336, if passed, would also expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating e-bikes or gas bikes in a manner inconsistent with the Code.

Toy Vehicles

SB 3336 also proposes a new definition for “toy vehicle,” which includes any battery powered ride-on toy that (i) is designed to not exceed 10 miles per hour, (ii) includes any number of wheels or handlebars or a steering wheel, and a seat or platform, and (iii) is designed for children under 8 years of age, including products like "Razor," "Power Wheels," and similar products. 

If passed, SB 3336 would authorize the operation of toy vehicles on local government property, unless the local government adopts an ordinance or resolution specifically prohibiting their use. Toy vehicles would also be restricted to operating on sidewalks and paths designated for bicycles. The bill, if passed, would preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating toy vehicles in a manner less restrictive than the Code. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Tuesday, April 21, 2026

DOJ Extends Title II ADA Web Content Accessibility Compliance Deadlines

  Tuesday, April 21, 2026    

On April 20, 2026, the DOJ published an interim final rule (link here) to extend the compliance deadlines under the new Title II Americans with Disabilities Act Rule that set technical standards requiring state and local government web content and mobile apps to meet the technical standards of Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Version 2.1, Level AA.

The Rule previously required state and local governments with a population of 50,000 or more to comply with the accessibility guidelines by April 24, 2026. State and local governments with a population of less than 50,000, and any special district governments, were required to comply by April 26, 2027.

The DOJ’s new interim final rule extends the deadline for state and local governments to comply with the new Rule by at least a year, as follows:

State and Local Government Size

New Compliance Date

0 to 49,999 persons

April 26, 2028

Special district governments

April 26, 2028

50,000 or more persons

April 26, 2027

Post Authored by Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

  

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Monday, April 20, 2026

Supreme Court Declines to Hear AI Copyright Case

  Monday, April 20, 2026    

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal in an Artificial Intelligence (AI)/copyright case. Thaler v. Perlmutter. You can read the court of appeals decision here.

A Missouri artist had applied for a copyright registration for visual art he created through the use of AI technology. The U.S. Copyright Office rejected his application because the work was not created by "human authorship" as required to register a copyright. He sued, and both the district court and court of appeals upheld the Copyright Office's denial of his application. He then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to hear his appeal, meaning that the Copyright Office's rejection of his application for a copyright for the AI work stands.

This wasn't the first time the Copyright Office rejected registration applications by artists for work generated by AI based on the lack of "human authorship" in the work. This case had been followed by artists, musicians, photographers, and other creators who have used AI in their creative works and were hoping for a different outcome in court. For now, at least, work created by AI is not copyright eligible.

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Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Federal Appeals Court Upholds Injunction Preventing Enforcement of Law That Limits “Drag Story Hour” and Similar Events

  Wednesday, April 15, 2026    

In 2023, the Montana state legislature passed a bill (Bill) prohibiting any school or library that receives state funding from allowing any “sexually oriented performance or drag story hour” on their property. The Bill includes significant criminal and civil penalties for both performers and institutions hosting these events. Just months after the Bill passed, a group of individuals, organizations, and businesses (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit claiming the Bill violates the First Amendment by restricting protected speech based on content. The federal district court issued a preliminary injunction limiting the state's enforcement of the Bill during the lawsuit. The state appealed the court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Imperial Sovereign Court of the State of Montana, et al. v. Knudsen, et al.

After determining that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Bill, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the constitutional claims raised in the case. In order to determine the proper framework to evaluate the First Amendment claims, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Bill “regulates purely expressive activity or expressive conduct,” and whether the regulations are content-based or content-neutral.

To start, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Bill was not passed to regulate “obscenity,” which is a narrow category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the Bill was purportedly enacted to limit children’s exposure to “indecent speech.” The Ninth Circuit noted that state legislative authority to regulate for the protection of minors must be considered against the long history of the First Amendment, which applies to protect “sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene.” 

Drag Story Hour 

The Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs were likely to establish that the Bill’s restriction on drag storytelling events is subject to strict scrutiny, because the restriction impacts purely expressive activity and regulates based on content. First, the Court noted that these performances (involving reading out loud while performing a drag persona) constitute expressive activity, likening drag story hours to theatrical plays. Second, the Court asserted three reasons to support their determination that the restriction was content-based: the Bill’s restriction (1) applies only to people reading a particular type of content, (2) prohibits only certain speakers from reading the book out loud or conveying a message, and (3) draws a line between prohibited and permitted speakers based on the content of their expression. The Court determined that these elements of the Bill were a content-based restriction on speech subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.  

Using the strict scrutiny framework, the Court next determined that the restriction on drag story hour events was not narrowly tailored to address the State’s expressed interest in preventing the exposure of minors to “indecent speech.” The Court found that the plain language of the Bill would impact speech activity widely accepted as appropriate under historic and contemporary standards. The Court noted that the Bill’s definition of “drag queen” and “drag king,” which includes the adoption of a “flamboyant or parodic male and female personas” using costumes and makeup, could be applied to include popular, well-received characters from G-rated children’s movies. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that the Bill was not tailored to limit children’s exposure to sexualized content and was overinclusive in the content it purports to regulate. The Court also determined that the provision was not narrowly tailored because it disregards minors’ own speech rights and completely overrides parental authority to determine appropriate content for their children. Thus, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction award, finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the restriction on drag story hours violated the First Amendment.  

Sexually Oriented Performances 

In addressing the Bill’s prohibition on “sexually oriented performances” in schools and libraries, the Ninth Circuit again evaluated whether the restriction limits purely expressive activity based on content. The Court found that the performances are purely expressive and, when viewed as a whole, constitute protected speech. The Court noted that, in the case of the statutory restriction on “sexually oriented performances,” the legislature limited speech based on its effect on young viewers. The Court characterized this limitation as “the essence of a content-based speech restriction.”  

After determining that the restriction on sexually oriented performances was content-based, the Ninth Circuit found that it was not narrowly tailored to meet the State’s interest in protecting minors. The Court noted that the legislature’s use of the phrase "sexually oriented” was vague and ambiguous, leaving schools and libraries to guess which performances and events would be subject to the Bill’s prohibitions. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the restriction on speech was not plausibly linked to its impact on children, given that several of the Bill’s restrictions would apply to limit performances in schools and libraries even when children are not present. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction that limited state enforcement of the Bill while the case proceeded in court.

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung and Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink 

  

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