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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Thursday, August 13, 2026

Governor Signs Bill Requiring Libraries and Other Facilities to Post Suicide Hotline (9-8-8) Information


On August 7, 2026, Governor Pritzker signed Public Act 104-0808 into law, also referred to as Tammurra's Act (Act). The Act applies to various facilities and institutions, including libraries established under the Local Library Act and Public Library District Act of 1991, county shelter care homes, public institutions of higher education, and licensed day care centers. The Act takes effect on January 1, 2027.

The Act requires that contact information for the 9-8-8 National Suicide Prevention Lifeline be posted in these facilities “in a prominent location that is visible to and accessible by” patrons and users. The 9-8-8 Lifeline is a free, nationwide resource administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the federal government (SAMHSA). While the Act does not specify what contact information must be posted, the 9-8-8 Lifeline allows individuals seeking assistance to call, text, or “chat” online.

The 9-8-8 Lifeline website (linked above) has many resources readers can consult, including FAQs, a glossary of terms, and information regarding services available to individuals. Notably, the website offers free print materials that include contact information for those seeking assistance.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

City Not Liable for Damages in Failed Sale of City Land


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit claiming a city was responsible for damages relating to a failed sale of city land because of alleged verbal promises of a city employee. Arroyo et al. v. City of Chicago.

According to the lawsuit, the city economic development coordinator met with a potential purchaser of property that was owned by the city. The city entered into a right of entry agreement allowing the potential purchaser to access the properties to conduct due diligence. However, the parties did not enter into a purchase and sale agreement for the sale of the property. The potential purchaser retained consultants to conduct investigations of soil and other conditions of the property. The potential purchaser claims that the city employee assured him that the city would sell the property to him, but when he was not provided with an appraisal by the city to complete the negotiations for the purchase, he filed a lawsuit seeking $500,000 in damages from the city for the investigations. The circuit court dismissed the case, and he appealed.

The Appellate Court upheld the dismissal. First, the Court held that there could be no "implied-in-fact contract" under a promissory estoppel theory because the city could not be bound by a contract that does not comply with legal requirements for a valid contract. Here, city ordinances provided that only the city council had the authority to sell city land, so any promises made by a city employee were void and unenforceable.

Second, it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on assurances from a city employee who did not have actual authority to bind the city. 

Third, the Court noted that verbal contracts for the sale of land are unenforceable.

Finally, the Court held that the right of entry agreement that the parties did enter into did not provide for compensation to the plaintiff for his due diligence efforts, which were conducted to benefit the plaintiff, and not the city.

Tuesday, August 11, 2026

7th Circuit Addresses First Amendment Challenge to Town's Deletion of Comments on Website


In Schulte v. Leners, et al., the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to a municipal official's deletion of critical comments on the town's website, as well as the town's decision to entirely shut down future comments on its website.

A Wisconsin town maintained a website where it posted agendas and updates on pending town activities and business. The website allowed members of the public to comment on individual town posts, and many members of the public did express their opinions in the comment sections. The town did not have a policy to limit who could comment or what commenters could post. In 2022, the chairman of the town board posted on the website a notice criticizing the use of RVs in the town and advocating for greater regulations. A member of the public who owns an RV posted a comment disagreeing with the chairman's post, and other members of the public also took issue with the post. The chairman replied to one of the critical comments calling the comment disrespectful, and the commenter replied. The chairman then deleted the commenter's reply, as well as all other critical comments to the chairman's original post. A month or so later, the town board voted to end comment sections entirely on its website.

The original commenter sued, claiming the town and the town board chairman violated her First Amendment right to free speech by engaging in "viewpoint discrimination" in deleting her comments. She also claimed the town retaliated against her when it shut down all comments on the website. The chairman filed a motion to dismiss her case claiming he had qualified immunity for his actions. The district court denied the motion, rejecting the chairman's qualified immunity argument.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit agreed with the district court that the town chairman did not have qualified immunity for his actions in deleting the critical comments from his original post. The Court first determined that the comment section of the town's website was a public forum (at least during the time it was open to the public), and the town could not discriminate based on viewpoint, which the Court found the chairman did in deleting all critical comments from the original post. The Court likened the town's website that allowed comments to a social media site, noting there were numerous cases finding that public comment sections are a public forum subject to the First Amendment. The Court also rejected the town's argument that the website was "government speech," finding that the comment section of the website operated as a public forum for people to express opinions about government actions. The Court also noted that the town had no policy to control comments, which defeated any "government speech" argument. In sum, the Court found that because no reasonable official could have concluded that it was legal to selectively delete speech based on viewpoint, the chairman was not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in deleting the critical comments. 

The Court did not address the chairman's argument that he had qualified immunity for the town's decision to shut down comments entirely because it was not part of the district court's qualified-immunity analysis. So, we did not get a clear indication of how the 7th Circuit would rule on that particular issue. However, the Court did give a hint how it might analyze this issue in the following statement:

Just as the government can designate a forum on its previously nonpublic property, it reserves the right to close the forum at any time. 

This statement suggests that governments might be able to shut down comments entirely in a designated public forum like a website that allows comments or a social media page. However, because this statement was in the nature of "dicta," governments should consult with legal counsel before deciding to shut down comments entirely in a designated public forum.

Monday, August 10, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 108: Election Special!


Ancel Glink released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 108: Quorum Forum 108: Election Special!

Summer of 2026 is upon us, and election season is kicking off as spirited candidates, trusted election authorities, and municipalities across Illinois seek to address a host of complex issues. Local election officials and electoral boards have many responsibilities to make elections happen, from processing nomination papers to convening quasi-adjudicative hearings. Meanwhile, local governments must navigate the enforcement of political sign regulations, electioneering laws, and the strict rules governing the use of public funds in referenda.

To help listeners tackle these issues, Ancel Glink’s Erin Monforti and Katie Nagy revisit classic insights from equity partner Keri-Lyn Krafthefer and provide vital updates for the 2027 Consolidated Election cycle.  

In This Episode 

  • Independent vs. Nonpartisan Candidates: Understand the critical legal distinctions between these two types of candidates and how they appear on the ballot.
  • The 2027 Election Timeline: Key dates for the February 23, 2027, Consolidated Primary and the April 6, 2027, Consolidated Election, including petition circulation and filing windows.
  • Objection Procedures & "Business Days": How to calculate the five-business-day objection deadline, especially with the Thanksgiving 2026 holiday.
  • Electoral Board Mechanics: A deep dive into the "24-hour call" rule, the composition of the board, and the requirement to deliberate in open session.
  • Strategic Scheduling: Practical advice for clerks on the "strategic receipt" of objection petitions to ensure boards can meet within statutory deadlines.
  • Setting Compensation: Why local governments must set compensation for newly elected officials at least 180 days before their terms begin.
  • New Laws: Updates on Public Act 104-443 (redacting candidate addresses) and Public Act 104-438 (prohibiting meetings on election days).
  • Public Funds & Referenda: Guidelines on what constitutes "factual information" versus prohibited advocacy when units of local government are involved in public questions.
  • FOIA & Arrest Records: A review of PAC Opinion 26-006 regarding the public’s right to access arrest records involving public figures.

Friday, August 7, 2026

ISBE Has Issued 408 Pages of AI Guidance: What School Districts Need to Know


The Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) has published statewide guidance on artificial intelligence use in schools. This guidance provides schools with a toolbox of instructional use rubrics, model policies, and implementation checklists. However, what it does not provide them with is a single, uniform Illinois model policy ready to adopt. 

This guidance was developed in response to Public Act 104-0399, which in 2025 charged the ISBE with “develop[ing] statewide guidance for school districts and educators on the use of artificial intelligence in elementary and secondary education.” 


School districts are directed to model templates and policies that they can use as “starting points.” Those resources are organized into three distinct policies: a district-wide policy, an Acceptable Use Policy, and an Informed Use Policy. ISBE provides model template resources from other states and districts to support drafting, review, legal/compliance checks, and board adoption processes. 


The guidance also flags that “trust but verify” should govern all AI use where it “should not independently determine special education eligibility, student discipline outcomes, teacher evaluations, hiring decisions, or other high-stake determinations without documented human review and district accountability processes.” 


ISBE indicates it will release additional tailored guidance and no-cost professional learning during the 2026-27 school year. In the meantime, school districts with questions about implementing AI policies or evaluating their current procedures should contract their legal counsel for assistance.


Post Authored by Ronette Leal McCarthy & Betsy Lecy, Ancel Glink

Thursday, August 6, 2026

Employees First Amendment Retaliation Claims Rejected by Court


In Fox v. DuPage Township, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected former employees' First Amendment claim that they were terminated because they campaigned for an opposing candidate for election to government office. 

After an election that changed the make-up of township government, the township board voted to reorganize a senior center's leadership, resulting in the termination of two employees from their employment at the center. They sued, claiming that they were terminated in retaliation for their campaigning for the township supervisor's opponent in the election. The district court rejected their arguments and ruled in favor of the township, finding that the two former employees had failed to show that their protected First Amendment activity was a motivating factor in their termination. They appealed.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision. To make a retaliation case against the government in a First Amendment claim, the former employees were required to show that their speech was constitutionally protected, they suffered a deprivation likely to deter their speech, and their speech was "at least a motivating factor" in the government's action. Here, the Court held that the two former employees did not meet the third requirement because they provided no direct evidence that their participation in the opponent's campaign was a motivating factor in their terminations. Instead, they relied on an inference of "suspicious timing" which was not sufficient in this case because they could not show that the government knew of their protected conduct. The township also showed alternative reasons for their termination. As a result, the former employees failed to show they were retaliated against based on their First Amendment activities.




Wednesday, August 5, 2026

11th Circuit Finds City Panhandling Ordinance Unconstitutional


In Scott v. City of Daytona Beach, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals struck down several provisions of a city ordinance that restricted panhandling.

Daytona Beach, Florida, enacted Ordinance No. 19-27 in 2019. The ordinance banned “aggressive panhandling” throughout the city, banned traditional panhandling in numerous locations, and restricted certain methods of panhandling.

Four men who regularly panhandled in Daytona Beach challenged the ordinance both facially and as applied to them, arguing it violated their First Amendment free-speech rights. After conducting a lengthy standing analysis for each plaintiff and each challenged provision, the court addressed the merits of the constitutional claims.

First, relying on existing precedent, the Court reaffirmed that panhandling is protected speech under the First Amendment. The Court next determined that the challenged provisions were “content-based” rather than “content-neutral” regulations, meaning that the ordinance was subject to strict scrutiny, which is the highest standard of constitutional review, requiring a compelling government interest pursued through the least speech-restrictive means.

To satisfy strict scrutiny, the city argued that the ordinance was necessary to advance the compelling government interests of protecting public health and promoting traffic safety. While the Court acknowledged that both can be compelling government interests, it concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. The Court also noted that the city could pursue both interests through less speech-restrictive means, including the enforcement of existing laws such as disorderly conduct or trespassing.  

As a result, the Court struck down those portions of the ordinance that were found unconstitutional. The Court also upheld an award of $80,000 in damages to the plaintiffs.

Note that this decision covers the 11th Circuit and not the 7th Circuit in which Illinois is located. However, the content-based versus content-neutral analysis comes from U.S. Supreme Court precedent that applies to all states. 

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando, Ancel Glink


Tuesday, August 4, 2026

Court Upholds Disqualification of Police Officer Candidate for Past Conduct


A candidate applied for a probationary police officer position with a city police department. As part of the application process, the city conducted a background investigation that found two police reports that included allegations of assault and stalking by the candidate against two women. After investigating the incidents and interviewing the candidate, the city removed the candidate from the eligibility list for dishonesty during the interview and past criminal conduct. The candidate challenged his disqualification with the city's police board which upheld the decision. He then filed an appeal with the circuit court which also upheld the city's disqualification. 

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the candidate argued that the disqualification was "unjust" because he had never been arrested. He also claimed the allegations made by the two women were false. Finally, he claimed the city violated his due process rights. The city defended its disqualification decision, arguing that they had sufficient evidence to dispute his claims, including records of two prior arrests. 

First, the Appellate Court reviewed the bases relied upon by the city for its disqualification decision (impersonation of a police officer, conduct indicating violent tendencies, and false statements during the application process) and determined that the city had ample evidence to support its decision to disqualify the candidate from the eligibility list for the position of probationary police officer. 

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the candidate's claim that his due process rights were violated, finding that he received written notice of his disqualification, he took full advantage of the opportunity to challenge his disqualification through a written appeal to the police board, and that there is no legal requirement that disqualified applicants are entitled to an in-person hearing to confront witnesses. In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the city's decision to disqualify him from the police officer position. Navarro-Angulo v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, et al.

Monday, August 3, 2026

Court Rules Against Journalists in Lawsuit Against Police Officers for Injuries Sustained at a Protest


In Schukar, et al. v. Kenosha County, et al., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court’s decision in favor of police officers in a First and Fourth Amendment case brought by photojournalists relating to a protest incident.  

On August 25, 2020, two photojournalists were documenting a protest at the Kenosha County Courthouse. The protest was sparked by the shooting of a 29-year-old Black male by a City of Kenosha police officer. During the protest, both protestors and police officers launched objects at one another, including the officers’ launching of foam batons that hit and injured the journalists. Shortly after the incident, the journalists filed a lawsuit against two police officers who were at the protest. They claimed the officers intentionally struck them in retaliation for engaging in the First Amendment protected activity of protesting and used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled against the journalists, who appealed the district court’s ruling.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling in favor of the police officers. As to the journalists' First Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found there was no evidence that either officer intentionally targeted the journalists for engaging in their First Amendment right to protest. The Court found that the officers’ use-of-force reports (which failed to accurately state the total number of rounds deployed during the protest) were not enough to show that the officers intentionally targeted the photojournalists.

As to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found that the officers had qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit determined that it was not "clearly established" by case law whether an officer’s intentional deployment of less-than-lethal munitions that hit unintended targets during a protest constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, so the journalists could not defeat the officers' claims of qualified immunity.

Authored by Rachel Stempler, Ancel Glink

Thursday, July 30, 2026

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA for Not Responding


The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 8th binding opinion for 2026 finding a public body in violation of FOIA for not responding to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 26-008.

A requester submitted a FOIA request for copies of agendas for all meetings of the village for a 4 month period. He followed up with a second FOIA request seeking records pertaining to mold remediation at village hall and asking the village to respond to several questions. Ten days after he submitted his requests, he filed a request for review with the PAC alleging that the village failed to respond to either FOIA request. After the PAC reached out to the village for a response and did not hear from the village, it issued a binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA requests. 

Although there is nothing new in this opinion regarding a public body's obligation to respond to FOIA, the PAC did include the following footnote in its opinion noting that the village had no obligation to answer the questions posed by the requester in his second FOIA request (see below):

13. To the extent that Mr. Kilbanerei's request asked questions concerning the location of Village documents and any plans to relocate Village documents, FOIA does not require the Village to answer those questions. Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989) ("The Act does not compel the agency to provide answers to questions posed by the inquirer."). 

Wednesday, July 29, 2026

Board of Fire And Police Commission Had No Jurisdiction to Hear Disciplinary Charges


An Illinois Appellate Court held that a board of fire and police commissioners did not have jurisdiction to hear disciplinary charges against a police officer because the hearing was not held within 30 days of the filing of the charges. Harris v. City of Madison Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. 

A city police chief filed written disciplinary charges with the city's board of fire and police commission seeking a police officer's removal from the police department. The charges alleged that the officer fraudulently documented time spent patrolling. The board commenced a hearing but heard no testimony, received no evidence, did not render a decision, and instead continued the matter. The officer filed a lawsuit against the board claiming that because the board failed to conduct a hearing within the 30 day time frame required by state statute, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the pending disciplinary charges. After the circuit court denied the city's motion to dismiss because of the city's failure to conduct a hearing within the statutory timeframe, the police chief filed a second set of disciplinary charges with the board. The officer then filed a motion with the circuit court seeking an injunction to stop the board from conducting a hearing, arguing that the board had no jurisdiction because it did not conduct the original hearing within the statutory timeframe. The circuit court ruled in favor of the city, finding the second set of disciplinary charges to be a new filing that could proceed to hearing.

The officer appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed. The Appellate Court cited to section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code that requires a board of fire and police commission to conduct a hearing on written charges "within 30 days of the filing" of the charges with the board. The Appellate Court found that the original disciplinary charges were never voluntarily dismissed by the city nor was the original proceeding terminated by the board (it was continued by the board). As a result, the Court held that the second set of charges (which were identical to the first) did not "restart" the statutory 30 day period for commencing a hearing, so the board had no jurisdiction to proceed on the disciplinary charges against the officer.


Monday, July 27, 2026

Ordinance Violation Order Vacated for Failure to Properly Serve Notice of Administrative Hearing


An Illinois Appellate Court reversed a city's decision regarding an ordinance violation, finding that the city lacked jurisdiction because it failed to properly serve the homeowner under the city's hearing and notice procedures. McCain v. City of Granite City.

A city sent a homeowner letters notifying her that her property was in violation of several local property maintenance regulations. The letters gave her a few weeks to cure the violations, and when that deadline passed without a cure, the city sent notice to the homeowner by regular mail of an administrative hearing on the violations. The homeowner argued that the city's service of notice of the hearing was defective because she was not served personally as required by section 2-203 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The homeowner did not appear at the administrative hearing, and the city's administrative officer found her liable and issued a decision ordering her to pay fines in the amount of $575, plus court fees. The homeowner appealed the judgment to the circuit court, arguing that the administrative hearing officer had no jurisdiction to issue the decision because she was not properly served with the complaint.

The city argued that its notice to appear was adequate to initiate an enforcement action that doesn't involve a jail sentence, and that personal service of the complaint and a summons was not required. The circuit court agreed with the city, finding that the city properly served the homeowner with notice to appear, and that there was no violation of the homeowner's due process rights where she had notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the ruling in favor of the city. As an initial matter, the Appellate Court rejected the homeowner's argument that the Code of Civil Procedure (state statute) applied to the city's administrative hearing process, finding that the city had authority to establish its own hearing process and notice requirements for administrative hearings on ordinance violations. Nevertheless, the court did find that the city violated its own hearing procedures, which required that notice of an administrative hearing be served personally, by certified mail, or by posting notice on the property. Because the city served the notice by regular mail (which was not identified in the city's procedures), it did not comply with the city's own service requirements. The Court also noted that the city's own procedures required that certain information be included in the notice, such as the fine and any penalties for late payment or failure to attend the hearing, but that information was not included in the city's notice to the homeowner. Because the city failed to comply with its own service requirements, the Court found that the hearing body did not have jurisdiction to conduct the administrative hearing and vacated the violation order and fines.