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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Federal Appeals Court Upholds Injunction Preventing Enforcement of Law That Limits “Drag Story Hour” and Similar Events


In 2023, the Montana state legislature passed a bill (Bill) prohibiting any school or library that receives state funding from allowing any “sexually oriented performance or drag story hour” on their property. The Bill includes significant criminal and civil penalties for both performers and institutions hosting these events. Just months after the Bill passed, a group of individuals, organizations, and businesses (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit claiming the Bill violates the First Amendment by restricting protected speech based on content. The federal district court issued a preliminary injunction limiting the state's enforcement of the Bill during the lawsuit. The state appealed the court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Imperial Sovereign Court of the State of Montana, et al. v. Knudsen, et al.

After determining that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Bill, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the constitutional claims raised in the case. In order to determine the proper framework to evaluate the First Amendment claims, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Bill “regulates purely expressive activity or expressive conduct,” and whether the regulations are content-based or content-neutral.

To start, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Bill was not passed to regulate “obscenity,” which is a narrow category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the Bill was purportedly enacted to limit children’s exposure to “indecent speech.” The Ninth Circuit noted that state legislative authority to regulate for the protection of minors must be considered against the long history of the First Amendment, which applies to protect “sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene.” 

Drag Story Hour 

The Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs were likely to establish that the Bill’s restriction on drag storytelling events is subject to strict scrutiny, because the restriction impacts purely expressive activity and regulates based on content. First, the Court noted that these performances (involving reading out loud while performing a drag persona) constitute expressive activity, likening drag story hours to theatrical plays. Second, the Court asserted three reasons to support their determination that the restriction was content-based: the Bill’s restriction (1) applies only to people reading a particular type of content, (2) prohibits only certain speakers from reading the book out loud or conveying a message, and (3) draws a line between prohibited and permitted speakers based on the content of their expression. The Court determined that these elements of the Bill were a content-based restriction on speech subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.  

Using the strict scrutiny framework, the Court next determined that the restriction on drag story hour events was not narrowly tailored to address the State’s expressed interest in preventing the exposure of minors to “indecent speech.” The Court found that the plain language of the Bill would impact speech activity widely accepted as appropriate under historic and contemporary standards. The Court noted that the Bill’s definition of “drag queen” and “drag king,” which includes the adoption of a “flamboyant or parodic male and female personas” using costumes and makeup, could be applied to include popular, well-received characters from G-rated children’s movies. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that the Bill was not tailored to limit children’s exposure to sexualized content and was overinclusive in the content it purports to regulate. The Court also determined that the provision was not narrowly tailored because it disregards minors’ own speech rights and completely overrides parental authority to determine appropriate content for their children. Thus, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction award, finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the restriction on drag story hours violated the First Amendment.  

Sexually Oriented Performances 

In addressing the Bill’s prohibition on “sexually oriented performances” in schools and libraries, the Ninth Circuit again evaluated whether the restriction limits purely expressive activity based on content. The Court found that the performances are purely expressive and, when viewed as a whole, constitute protected speech. The Court noted that, in the case of the statutory restriction on “sexually oriented performances,” the legislature limited speech based on its effect on young viewers. The Court characterized this limitation as “the essence of a content-based speech restriction.”  

After determining that the restriction on sexually oriented performances was content-based, the Ninth Circuit found that it was not narrowly tailored to meet the State’s interest in protecting minors. The Court noted that the legislature’s use of the phrase "sexually oriented” was vague and ambiguous, leaving schools and libraries to guess which performances and events would be subject to the Bill’s prohibitions. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the restriction on speech was not plausibly linked to its impact on children, given that several of the Bill’s restrictions would apply to limit performances in schools and libraries even when children are not present. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction that limited state enforcement of the Bill while the case proceeded in court.

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung and Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink 

Tuesday, April 14, 2026

Appellate Court Upholds Conviction of Disorderly Conduct Ordinance Violation


A parent was arrested for violation of a disorderly conduct ordinance, and was later convicted at trial. According to the court opinion, the arrest related to conduct of the parent towards a teacher at his child's school where he clenched his fists and cursed. He appealed his conviction on several grounds, including that his First Amendment rights were violated, that the city violated court discovery rules, and that the sentence was outside the city's authority.

The Appellate Court upheld his conviction in City of Naperville v. Penick. First, the Court rejected his First Amendment argument, finding that he engaged in more than speech during the incident. Second, the Court found his sentence (supervision and no contact/no entry order) to be within a home rule municipality's authority to set an appropriate penalty for violation of a disorderly conduct ordinance. Third, the Court rejected his argument that the city engaged in discovery violations, finding that a defendant is required to (but did not, in this case) obtain leave of court to engage in discovery in an ordinance violation proceeding. In short, the Court upheld his conviction.

Monday, April 13, 2026

Tree Trimming Incident Leads to Multiple Lawsuits


An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a county in a lawsuit involving the county's actions in regards to a tree trimming incident involving neighbors in Lugo v. Woodford County

Two neighboring property owners had ongoing issues with each other which were serious enough to cause one neighbor to seek a no-stalking, no contact order from the other neighbor. While his petition for a protective order was pending, the petitioning neighbor hired a tree trimmer to trim branches of a tree on his neighbor's property that were overhanging onto his property. Because of the ongoing neighbor problems, the tree trimmer called the county sheriff to have a deputy present while the work was being done. The deputy informed the tree-owning neighbor that he could view and film the work from his own property, but could not trespass onto the petitioning neighbor's property or stage himself in front of the property while the work was proceeding. 

The tree-owning neighbor filed a lawsuit in federal court claiming the deputy and county violated his civil rights in restricting his activities and location while the tree was being trimmed. The district court ruled in favor of the county, and the court of appeals upheld that ruling. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to take on his appeal. 

After he lost his federal lawsuit, he filed a lawsuit in state court raising many of the same claims, as well as arguing that the county was continuing to violate constitutional rights based on race and ethnicity. The circuit court dismissed his case, finding that it was barred by "res judicata" which prohibits someone from filing a second lawsuit about issues that were already litigated in court. He appealed.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that the tree-owning neighbor's state court case was barred because of the final ruling in the federal court. At the end of the opinion, the Appellate Court provides its opinion on the neighbor's multiple lawsuits and appeals regarding a tree-trimming incident, as follows:

During his address at the Virginia Bar Association’s Law Day celebration in 1962, then-attorney general Robert F. Kennedy said, “The glory of justice and the majesty of law are created not just by the Constitution—nor by the courts—nor by the officers of the law—nor by the lawyers—but by the men and women who constitute our society—who are the protectors of the law as they are themselves protected by the law.” A civil suit in federal district court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. A civil suit in the state circuit court, this appeal to the Fourth District, and probably further. All because some tree branches needed trimming. It is doubtful this is what Kennedy had in mind. 

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

Supreme Court Finds Qualified Immunity for Police Officer Sued for Excessive Force by Protester


The Supreme Court recently weighed in on the issue of qualified immunity for a police officer who was sued under the civil rights statute for allegedly using excessive force in removing a person from a protest. Zorn v. Linton

Protestors staged a sit-in at the state capitol on the day of the Vermont Governor's inauguration. When the capitol closed for the day, police officers informed the protesters that they needed to leave or would be arrested for trespassing. When they refused to leave, officers removed them one-by-one. When one of the protesters refused to stand up, a police officer took her arm, put it behind her back, placed pressure on her wrist, and lifted her to her feet. The protester sued the police officer for using excessive force, claiming the use of a "rear wristlock" during the arrest injured her arm and caused psychological disorders. The district court held in favor of the officer, finding he had qualified immunity for his actions. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the "gratuitous" use of a rear wristlock on a protester who was passively resisting arrest constituted excessive force, so the police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The officer appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court

The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and held that the police officer did have qualified immunity. The Court noted that government officials have qualified immunity from suit under the civil rights statute (1983) unless their conduct violates clearly established law. Because the court of appeals failed to identify any case in the circuit where an officer taking similar action (rear wristlock) in a similar circumstance (removing a protester for trespass after repeated warnings), the Supreme Court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

Three Justices filed a dissenting opinion, finding that the officer should not be entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim because prior case law had established that using a rear wristlock as a "pain compliance technique" against a nonviolent protester would violate the protester's constitutional rights.

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

Supreme Court Allows Civil Rights Challenge to City's Protest Ordinance to Move Forward


Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion relating to a challenge to a City ordinance that required individuals participating in protests to stay within a "designated protest area" in Olivier v. City of Brandon.

Olivier was a street preacher in Mississippi who often shared his religious views on City sidewalks. In 2019, the City adopted an ordinance requiring anyone participating in protests or demonstrations to stay within a designated protest area. Olivier was arrested for violating the ordinance and pled no contest and was fined, given one year of probation, and a suspended 10 day prison sentence that would be served only if he violated the ordinance during his probation period. Although he did not appeal the fine or sentence, he did file a section 1983 civil rights lawsuit against the City to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. Specifically, he argued that the ordinance violated the First Amendment's free speech clause because it confined speakers to a designated protest area, and he sought an injunction prohibiting the City from enforcing the ordinance against him in the future. The district court and court of appeals dismissed his case based on an earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision that prohibits the use of the section 1983 to challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence. 

The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, and reversed their decision, allowing Olivier's lawsuit to move forward. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that Olivier was not challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence. Instead, he was seeking relief from future prosecutions for violations of the ordinance, so its prior decision barring 1983 relief did not apply. The Court did not weigh in on the question of whether the ordinance was constitutional or not, remanding it back to the district court to make that determination.


Monday, April 6, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 104: Not in My Park!


In Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 104: Not in My Park! Regulating Controversial Park Activities, Ancel Glink’s Tyler Smith, Eugene Bolotnikov, and Katie Nagy take the stage at the 2026 IAPD/IPRA Soaring to New Heights Conference. The Ancel Glink "Not In My Park" team discusses the legal complexities of managing potentially controversial activities in public spaces, ranging from the rapid rise of e-bikes and e-scooters to the evolving landscape of public camping regulations and the "noise" issues surrounding pickleball courts. This episode features live audio from their conference session, providing practical strategies for park districts and municipalities to regulate these activities while balancing individual rights and public safety.

Tuesday, March 31, 2026

Another AI Hallucination Case


Although today's case summary isn't related to local government issues, it is an important reminder to be careful in relying on AI (artificial intelligence) for legal work, particularly in filings with the court.

In Dec v. Markwayne Mullin, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a challenge by a Polish citizen who was denied a waiver of the waiting period for a family-based visa that requires a person to leave the country and remain abroad for ten years. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denied her waiver request and she sued. The district court dismissed her lawsuit, holding that the applicable federal law precludes judicial review of agency decisions on waiver requests. She then appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the dismissal of her case.

In addition to upholding the dismissal of her case, the Seventh Circuit also addressed deficiencies in the appellate brief filed on her behalf by her attorney. The Court noted that her brief cited two cases that do not exist and included an imaginary quotation, which the Court noted had "tell-tale signs of AI hallucinations" (although the plaintiff's attorney argued she did not use AI in her brief). The Court acknowledged that courts have been grappling with the use of generative AI in briefs filed with the court, particularly when it produces AI hallucinations and non-existent case citations. The Court expressed its concerns, particularly that trained lawyers are failing to check the accuracy of legal citations and quotations in their filings with the court. The Court was not only concerned about the plaintiffs' counsel inclusion of these hallucinated cases, but also the fact that opposing counsel in the case (DHS attorneys) failed to catch these errors and bring them to the attention of the court. 

The Court's discussion is a reminder to all lawyers and parties to litigation that they exercise caution in their use of AI in drafting briefs filed with the court and to double-check their legal arguments and any supporting citations. That cautionary reminder is not restricted to the attorneys filing with the court, but also to opposing counsel who fail to catch these errors.

Thursday, March 26, 2026

Reminder of Updated Web Accessibility Requirements


In April 2024, the Department of Justice issued a final rule updating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) regulations to ensure that state and local governments’ web content is accessible to persons with disabilities.

Under the new rule, local governments must ensure their websites and mobile applications meet the technical standards of the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1, Level AA. An ADA fact sheet on the rule is available here.

The deadline to comply with the rule depends on the population reported for the local government in the 2020 U.S. Census Bureau data:

State and local government size

Compliance date

0 to 49,999 persons

April 26, 2027

Special district governments

April 26, 2027

50,000 or more persons

April 24, 2026

Local governments should reach out to their legal counsel if they have questions about compliance with these new regulations.

Post Authored by Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, March 25, 2026

GSMCON Conference Schedule Released


For all my government communicator/social media coordinator readers, the Government Social Media Conference (GSMCON) has released its full schedule for this year's annual conference which will take place May 4 - 7, 2026 in New Orleans and will offer both in-person and virtual attendance options. You can find the full schedule hereNote that if you are planning to register for in-person attendance, there are a limited number of those tickets remaining.

If you are going to be at this year's conference, don't miss the two sessions Julie Tappendorf will be presenting (info below):

Thursday, May 7th - 9:00 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.

What Counts as Protected Speech on Social Media?

Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, PC

We’ll cover what types of comments have First Amendment protection and how those protections apply to your agency’s social media pages. This Speed Session focuses on the core constitutional principles that guide everyday moderation decisions, helping you understand how protected speech plays out in common social-media scenarios.

Thursday, May 7th - 10:15 a,m. – 10:45 a.m.

AI-Generated Content Risks

Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink, PC

This Speed Session highlights the emerging legal risks of artificial intelligence in government social media workflows. We’ll look at how AI may raise questions related to copyright protections for creative content and the considerations social media content creators and moderators should keep in mind. You’ll leave with a clearer understanding of key legal issues to be aware of when using AI tools.

Monday, March 23, 2026

In the Zone: Appellate Court Addresses Annexation Challenge in Solar Farm Case


A company leased property in unincorporated Kane County intending to develop a solar farm. After the company applied for a special use permit from the county, the city council approved a resolution protesting the application and representatives of the city, as well as others, objected to the application at the county ZBA hearing on the application. Ultimately, the county board approved the special use permit, and shortly thereafter, the city adopted an ordinance to forcibly annex the subject property and adjacent parcels. The annexation ordinance stated that the property was "wholly bounded" by the city based on a previous voluntary annexation of railroad property.

The company filed a lawsuit against the City (in quo warranto) claiming that the annexations did not satisfy certain statutory requirements. First, the company argued that the annexation territory was not "wholly bounded" as required by section 7-1-13 of the Illinois Municipal Code because the adjacent ComEd property did not qualify as a "public utility right of way" to satisfy the contiguity exception under the annexation statute. Second, the company argued that the voluntary annexation of the railroad property was a "sham transaction" solely intended to meet the "wholly bounded" requirement of the annexation statute.

The circuit court dismissed the case, finding no deficiencies in either the forcible annexation of the annexation property or the previous voluntary annexation of the railroad property.

The company appealed, and the Appellate Court issued a ruling in RPIL Solar 10, LLC v. City of Aurora, agreeing with the circuit court that the challenge to the voluntary annexation of the railroad property as a "sham" was properly dismissed. However, the Appellate Court overturned the circuit court's dismissal of the company's challenge to the forcible annexation. The Court noted that in order for a municipality to forcibly annex property under section 7-1-13, the property must be "wholly bounded" by one or more municipalities and/or a forest preserve district. The Court acknowledged there were certain exceptions in the statute, including  property that is separated from a city by a public utility right of way, which is what the city relied on in annexing the annexation property. The company responded that because ComEd owned the disputed property in "fee simple," it did not qualify as a public "right of way" under the limited exception. The Appellate Court agreed, finding that a fee simple interest is not the same as a right of way interest under the annexation statute. As a result, the Court held that the company did adequately allege a quo warranto claim to challenge the forcible annexation, and that claim should not have been dismissed by the circuit court. The case was sent back to the circuit court for further proceedings.


Tuesday, March 17, 2026

In the Zone: Court Rejects Challenge to Zoning Approval for Dispensary


Update: This ruling was originally issued as an unpublished opinion but later published and the link has been updated.

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a neighbor objector lawsuit challenging a city's zoning approval of a marijuana dispensary. Neighbors Against a Marijuana Dispensary v. Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals, et al.

MariGrow applied for a special use permit from a city zoning board of appeals to establish an adult use cannabis dispensary in the city. A sign was posted on the property indicating the application had been filed, and notice of a community meeting was published in the newspaper. The applicant also mailed notice of the community meeting to property owners within 250 feet of the property, and the alderman for the ward in which the property was located sent an e-newsletter to all ward residents informing them of the community meeting. More than a hundred people attended the community meeting.

Two months after the community meeting, the ZBA held a public hearing on the special use application. A representative for an objector group requested a 60 day continuance of the hearing to prepare a formal case against the application, which was denied by the ZBA chair. At the hearing, both the applicant and representatives of the objector group testified about the application for a special use permit. After the application was approved by the ZBA, the objector group filed an administrative review action against the ZBA and applicant, arguing that its due process rights had been violated when the ZBA denied its request for a continuance and granted the special use permit. The circuit court ruled in favor of the ZBA, finding that the objector group was not denied due process and had not established that it had standing to pursue the administrative review action.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the ruling in favor of the ZBA. 

First, the Appellate Court held that the objector group failed to identify any members owning property within 250 feet of the proposed dispensary, either at the zoning hearing or in its complaint, and its general assertion in the complaint that the group had members who owned property within 250 feet was insufficient to demonstrate standing under section 11-13-7 of the Zoning Enabling Act.

As to the due process claim, the Court found that notice of the zoning hearing complied with all statutory requirements and that the objector group did, in fact, have (and exercised) its right to be heard at the hearing. The Court rejected the objector group's argument that the ZBA should have granted its request for a continuance to give it more time to prepare its objections, finding that representatives of the objector group had been involved in the previous community meeting two months before the hearing, and that any failure to adequately prepare was not due to lack of notice or insufficient time.

In short, the Appellate Court determined that the ZBA did not violate the objector group's rights when it approved the special use application.



Thursday, March 12, 2026

Appellate Court Sends FOIA Case Back to Circuit Court


In Dorman v. Madison County Board, an Illinois Appellate Court determined that the circuit court made an error in dismissing a FOIA challenge and sent the case back for further proceedings. 

An individual filed two separate FOIA requests for various records, including records relating to allegations of employee misconduct and communications regarding an election. The individual subsequently filed a lawsuit against the public bodies involved, claiming they violated FOIA regarding both requests. The public bodies responded that they had provided records in response to most of the requests but regarding records not produced, the public bodies asked the circuit court to allow them to rely on the unduly burdensome provision of FOIA as the responsive records exceeded 69,000 records (the public bodies did not assert that provision in their initial response to the FOIA request). The circuit court initially denied that request and appointed a special master to review the responsive records, but later issued a ruling dismissing the case, finding that the request was unduly burdensome under 3(g) of FOIA.

The requester appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed the dismissal of the case. First, the Appellate Court determined that FOIA does not authorize a circuit court to appoint a special master to review records or to require a requester plaintiff to pay the costs of the special master. Second, the Court held that although the public bodies can rely on the "unduly burdensome" provision of FOIA to defend against a FOIA lawsuit, they must first give the requester an opportunity to narrow the request.