Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down

Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down

  Tuesday, September 15, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently issued a ruling regarding a school detachment/annexation petition in a lengthy opinion analyzing the requirements for a property owner to detach their property from one school district and attach it to another school district. Board of Education of Jasper County Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, et al. The case has a convoluted history with multiple motions to reconsider and changes of position of both the Regional Board and circuit court, which partially explains the long opinion.

Homeowners of property located in Jasper County (petitioners) filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees requesting that their property be detached from Jasper County School District (District 1) and annexed to Dieterich Community School District in Effingham County (District 30). Their property was located entirely within Jasper County and approximately 1.5 miles from the boundary of District 30 and did not touch any part of District 30. Owners of property located between the petitioners' property and the District 30 boundary joined the petition, asking that a 10 foot wide strip of their property be included in the detachment/annexation petition. The petition alleged that the territory to be detached and annexed was "contiguous" to District 30.

District 1 argued against the petition, saying it did not comply with section 7-4 of the School Code because the detachment, if granted, would result in districts that were not "compact and contiguous" as required by the Illinois Constitution and the School Code, and would create multiple "islands" that would destroy the compactness of both districts. The Regional Board conducted a hearing on the petition, hearing testimony from the petitioners and District 1 representatives. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Regional Board initially denied the petition, finding that the detriment to District 1 outweighed the benefit to the petitioners and District 30. The petitioners requested a rehearing, and at the conclusion of that rehearing, the Regional Board overturned its previous decision and granted the petition, allowing the detachment and annexation of the territory. 

District 1 filed an administrative review action with the circuit court to appeal the Regional Board's decision. The circuit court initially reversed the Regional Board, finding its decision to grant the detachment/annexation petition to be contrary to the Illinois Constitution and the School Code. The petitioners again filed a motion to reconsider, and a new judge assigned to the case vacated the prior judge's order and upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, that Court reviewed the administrative record of the Regional Board's multiple hearings, as well as documentary evidence, including a map showing the petitioners' property and the narrow strip that would connect the petitioners' property to District 30 if annexed to that district (see photo from opinion below), and determined that the Regional Board erred in granting the petition. The Court found that the petitioners failed to show how the proposed detachment and annexation would result in "compact and contiguous" districts as required by Illinois case law, the Illinois constitution, and Illinois statutes. In sum, the Court held that the petition should not have been granted, and it reversed the Regional Board's order and the circuit court's decision upholding the Regional Board's order. There was a dissenting opinion which would have upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

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First District Appellate Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA Differently than Second District

First District Appellate Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA Differently than Second District

  Thursday, September 10, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The First District Appellate Court overturned a trial court's denial of civil penalties in a FOIA case challenging a police department's response to a news media's FOIA requests. NBC Subsidiary v. Chicago Police Department.

NBC filed FOIA requests with a police department seeking surveillance video, incident reports, witness statements, and other records relating to a hit-and-run crash, as well as emails to and from two police officers relating to the crash. The police department responded by referring the requester to its records inquiry section for the crash reports and by denying the request for body-work camera footage. The response also denied other requested records claiming they were exempt because there was an ongoing criminal investigation. The police department sent an extension notice regarding the request for emails, but later denied that request citing to the same ongoing criminal investigation exemption. 

NBC filed a lawsuit against the police department, claiming it violated FOIA. The trial court ruled in favor of the police department relating to certain counts in the complaint, including finding that the police department completed a reasonable search and that certain responsive records had been destroyed pursuant to the department's records retention policy. However, the court ruled against the department regarding its withholding of certain records in their entirety. The court also found that the department "willfully and intentionally violated FOIA" by not producing the requested records. The department subsequently produced the requested records, and NBC then filed a motion seeking its attorneys fees and an award of civil penalties against the department. The court granted NBC's request for attorneys fees. However, the court denied NBC's request for civil penalties, applying a Second District Appellate Court ruling that would require NBC to show that the department "willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith" (emphasis added) failed to comply with FOIA. In this case, the trial court found there was no evidence that the department acted with a "dishonest purpose" by withholding the records. 

NBC appealed, arguing that FOIA does not require a showing of bad faith to justify the imposition of civil penalties if the public body is shown to have willfully and intentionally violated FOIA. The Appellate Court agreed with NBC, stating as follows:

We agree with this court’s decisions in Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that section 11(j) does not require separate showings that the public body both “willfully and intentionally” violated FOIA and did so “in bad faith,” or with a “dishonest purpose.” This analysis is true to the language of section 11(j), which allows for the imposition of civil penalties when “a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith.” 5 ILCS 140/11(j). We agree with Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that this court’s decision in Williams “failed to honor the disjunctive ‘or’” in section 11(j), and in doing so created a more demanding standard for the imposition of civil penalties than contemplated by the text of the statute. [citations omitted] Thus, we decline to follow Williams or Thomas.

Applying its interpretation of section 11(j) of FOIA, the First District Appellate Court found that the department's "deliberate and by design" conduct in denying the FOIA request was enough to justify the imposition of civil penalties. As a result, the Appellate Court sent the case back to the trial court to make a determination on an appropriate civil penalty against the police department.

This decision means that the First and Second District Appellate Courts have taken a different position on the type of conduct by a public body that justifies the imposition of civil penalties for a FOIA violation. 

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid

  Tuesday, September 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink released Episode 109 of its Quorum Forum Podcast: Quorum Forum Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid.

This year marks 100 years since the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty. In this episode, we share a recorded presentation from Ancel Glink's David Silverman, FAICP, and ZoneCo's Sean Suder, as a sneak preview of their upcoming live plenary session at the APA-IL State Conference on September 30, 2026! 

Episode Highlights

• The Public Safety Roots of Zoning: Why early 20th-century industrial chaos, street accidents involving children, noise, and pollution prompted the Supreme Court to step in

• The Dual Legacy: How the "intensity of use" rules established in 1926 successfully protected neighborhoods but fostered exclusionary development patterns

• Modern Prescriptions: A look at statewide zoning challenges, local preemption, and the "BUILD" legislative strategies impacting local authority

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Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

  Wednesday, September 02, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a village and village employees in a lawsuit filed by a firefighter claiming he was injured during a training drill.  Hidalgo v. Village of Romeoville.

A village firefighter attended an advanced technician firefighter training course. As part of that training course curriculum, participants were required to perform a “bailout drill.” During a bailout drill, participants exit out a third-story window of a hose tower, one leg at a time, and then use rappel line to descend down the side of the tower. Participants could use a Class 1 harness, Class 3 pre-sewn harness, or a Class 3 “hasty” harness during the bailout drill. Class 1 harnesses are body harnesses that go around a person’s waist, while Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses are manufactured body harnesses that go around a person’s waist and shoulders. Class 3 “hasty” harnesses are harnesses made by the participants using available webbing, which is a tubular structure that can be tied into a knot. 

The firefighter performed the bailout drill using a Class 1 harness and was injured after becoming separated from the harness and falling to the ground. He sued the village, claiming the village acted with “intentional/reckless conduct” in its instructions and usage of the harnesses during the bailout drill. He specifically claimed certain village employees involved in the training failed to provide adequate instructions on using and creating the Class 3 “hasty” harness. He also claimed the village’s omissions constituted negligence through willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court ruled against the firefighter, who then appealed. 

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the village, relying on Section 2-201 of the Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which states as follows: 

Sec. 2-201. Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.

That Act distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts made by government employees when determining whether a government employee qualifies for immunity. The Appellate Court applied the two-prong test, which requires courts to determine (1) if the employee holds a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving an exercise of discretion and (2) if the employee also engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the injury resulted. If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then the government employee will have immunity under that section of the Act. 

As to the village’s assistant training course instructors, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion as to certain aspects of the bailout drill (i.e., whether a Class 3 harness needed to be used) and (2) used their discretion to decide how to secure ropes and lines to the harnesses. The court emphasized that the assistant instructors used their own discretion, rather than adhering to a mandate requiring them to act in a prescribed manner, in making any decisions regarding the bailout drill. As to the village’s lead and supervising training course instructor, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion to decide how to conduct bailout drills based on their knowledge and experience and (2) exercised discretion in determining that Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses were appropriate for the bailout drill. The court also found that the village was entitled to immunity under the Act. As to the claims of negligence by willful and wanton conduct, the court found that Section 2-201 immunity is absolute and not subject to exceptions for willful and wanton conduct. 

Ultimately, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court ruling that both the employees and the village had immunity from the firefighter's claims relating to his injuries.

Post Authored by Rachel Stempler & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

  Tuesday, September 01, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a city seeking copies of correspondence exchanged between a city official and a representative from a private company, which the city official subsequently forwarded to a city attorney for the purpose of seeking legal guidance. The city denied the request citing to FOIA exemption under Section 7(1)(m), stating that because these documents came into possession of a city attorney from a client, they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and are exempt from disclosure. The reporter then filed an appeal with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) contesting the denial.

The PAC issued its 10^th binding opinion of the year, concluding that the city improperly withheld communications exchanged with a third party because they were not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 26-010. The PAC reasoned that at the time the records originated, they were not sent to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice or services, or sent from an attorney providing legal advice. Instead, the communications were between a city official and a third-party contractor for the city. Even though a city attorney later obtained these records from their client (city official), the PAC determined that forwarding pre-existing communications between the city and a third-party to counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice did  not transform those records into privileged attorney-client communications, because the records (1) did not originate in confidence between parties engaged in an attorney-client relationship and (2) at the time the records originated, they were not exchanged for the purpose of securing or providing legal advice.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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New Law Establishes Rules for Electric Bikes and Scooters

New Law Establishes Rules for Electric Bikes and Scooters

  Monday, August 31, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A new Illinois law governing who can use electric bikes and scooters, how fast they go, and where they can be used will go into effect next year. Last week, Illinois Governor Pritzker signed Senate Bill 3484  (now P.A. 104-0854) creating new statewide standards for “micromobility” devices that include age restrictions, speed limits, and locations where they can operate. The bill takes effect on January 1, 2027.

According to the bill, “electric micromobility devices” are a light-weight, low-speed, electric-powered device primarily used for personal transportation that operate at speeds up to 28 miles per hour. This includes electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters.

Electric and gas bicycles strong enough to exceed the state’s existing “low-speed” thresholds fall into a category of regulations called “motor driven cycles.” Electric bikes fall into this category if they either have electric motors rated between 750 and 8,000 watts or can operate at speeds greater than 28 miles per hour.

These vehicles will be regulated similarly to motorcycles if owners of these vehicles purchased new on or after January 1, 2027, will be required to have a driver’s license, insurance, an ownership title, and register the vehicle with the state. According to the bill, the Secretary of State may issue an instruction permit to a person who is 16 or 17 years old that entitles the holder to drive on the highways during daylight under direct supervision of a licensed motor driven cycle operator who is at least 21 and has a year of driving experience.  

“Motor driven cycles” can operate on any public highway, street, or roadway, but may not be used on any sidewalk, bicycle lane, bicycle path, shared-use path, off-road bicycle trail, or natural surface trail designated for bicycle use.

“Low-speed” electric bicycles are already regulated by the state, but the law creates new categories that govern how old a person must be to drive them. Drivers must be 15 years old to operate a Class 1 pedal-assist bicycle that’s limited to 20 miles per hour, and a Class 2 motor-powered bike that doesn’t have to be pedaled. However, riders must be 16 years old to operate a Class 3 pedal-assist bike that can travel up to 28 miles per hour.

All low-speed electric bicycles can be used on streets, bikes, lanes, paths, and trails, but not sidewalks.

The new regulations cap “electric micromobility devices” such as electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters at 28 miles per hour. Devices capable of exceeding that speed are barred outright from public roads, bike lanes, and bike paths, regardless of the posted speed limit. Riders may operate qualifying devices on any path, bike lane, roads with speed limits up to 35 miles per hour, or roads with higher speed limits if there is a bike lane. A person may not operate one of these devices unless they are 16 years of age or older.

Battery powered ride-on toys that are designed for children under 8-years-old would be unregulated aside from a stipulation they must stay on sidewalks and paths.

Users who violate the regulations could pay fines and have their devices confiscated and impounded by the police. They are also subject to other existing traffic laws and penalties. 

Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Storm Sewer Maps and Records

PAC Finds City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Storm Sewer Maps and Records

  Wednesday, August 26, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In its 9th binding opinion for 2026, the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) found in favor of a public body in a FOIA appeal involving a request for storm sewer infrastructure maps and records. PAC Op. 26-009. 

A requester submitted a request to a city water department asking for sewer and flood control maps, GIS mapping data, engineering schematics, and other maps detailing the exact locations of all surface water drainage infrastructure for a specified area in the city. The city denied the request, citing to section 7(1)(x) of FOIA which exempts the following from disclosure:

Maps and other records regarding the location or security of generation, transmission, distribution, storage, gathering, treatment, or switching facilities owned by a utility, by a power generator, or by the Illinois Power Agency.

The PAC agreed with the city that the FOIA exemption applied to the requested records, finding that the "plain language of section 7(1)(x) exempts, among other things, maps and other records regarding the location of gathering facilities owned by a utility." The PAC determined that the city's water department operated as a "utility" and that the infrastructure operated by the city that was the subject of the request qualified as "facilities" under the cited FOIA exemption. The PAC rejected the requester's argument that the city was required to demonstrate how release of the records would affect the security of the city's utility system, finding that records that reveal "the location" of utility facilities was enough to trigger the exemption without having to show a security concern, stating as follows:

Because section 7(1)(x) is worded disjunctively, however, it provides two independent bases for claiming the exemption: (1) the requested records regard the location of facilities owned by a utility or (2) the requested records regard the security of facilities owned by a utility. 

In sum, the PAC determined that the requested records (consisting of atlases-detailed maps showing the location of sewers, storm mains, access points, and various other details of the city's water infrastructure and GIS mapping data detailing the location of stormwater gathering facilities) fall squarely within the types of records exempt under section 7(1)(x). As a result, the city did not violate FOIA in denying the request in its entirety.

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Court Finds Appeal of Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Frivolous

Court Finds Appeal of Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Frivolous

  Tuesday, August 25, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a public body in a FOIA lawsuit, finding the appeal frivolous in Tidwell v. Illinois Department of Corrections.

A requester submitted a request to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) seeking the names of all medical personnel. IDOC denied the request, citing to a FOIA exemption that expressly exempts from release records requested by persons committed to the DOC or a county jail that include staff members' personnel files, staff rosters, or other staffing assignment information. The requester filed a lawsuit against IDOC. The circuit court dismissed his lawsuit, ruling in favor of IDOC. He then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of his lawsuit, finding that his appeal of the circuit court's decision was frivolous because he was aware of the specific exemption that prevented the disclosure of the information he requested. 

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City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Records Maintained by Another Public Body

City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Records Maintained by Another Public Body

  Monday, August 24, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request seeking a court docket for a specific case, a city responded that it did not have any responsive records in its possession or custody, and directed the requester to contact the agency most likely to have responsive records (the county court system). After the requester sued the city alleging FOIA violations, the circuit court ruled in favor of the city, finding that the city did not violate FOIA when it did not produce records that were not in its possession.

After the requester appealed, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the city. Tidwell v. City of Alton. The Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the city could obtain the sought records by downloading them (from another agency’s website) and providing them to the requester, because FOIA does not require a public body to turn over records that the public body does not have and does not normally retain. Because a public body cannot improperly withhold records that it does not maintain, the Appellate Court determined that the city did not violate FOIA in response to the request.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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No Violation of FOIA Where Records Not in Possession of Responding Public Body

No Violation of FOIA Where Records Not in Possession of Responding Public Body

  Monday, August 17, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court rejected an inmate's claims in a FOIA lawsuit against a sheriff's department in King v. Livingston County Sheriff's Office.

An inmate filed a FOIA request with a sheriff's office seeking records pertaining to racial profiling by a specific police officer. The sheriff's office responded that it had no responsive records because the officer was not employed by the sheriff's office but a city police department. The inmate sued, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the sheriff's office. On appeal, the Appellate Court also found no violation of FOIA in the sheriff's office's response, holding that the "nonexistence of requested documents is a cognizable affirmative defense" to a FOIA claim. In this case, the sheriff's office was not in possession of the requested record at the time of the request, so there was no FOIA violation in its response to the inmate's request.

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Governor Signs Bill Requiring Libraries and Other Facilities to Post Suicide Hotline (9-8-8) Information

Governor Signs Bill Requiring Libraries and Other Facilities to Post Suicide Hotline (9-8-8) Information

  Thursday, August 13, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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On August 7, 2026, Governor Pritzker signed Public Act 104-0808 into law, also referred to as Tammurra's Act (Act). The Act applies to various facilities and institutions, including libraries established under the Local Library Act and Public Library District Act of 1991, county shelter care homes, public institutions of higher education, and licensed day care centers. The Act takes effect on January 1, 2027.

The Act requires that contact information for the 9-8-8 National Suicide Prevention Lifeline be posted in these facilities “in a prominent location that is visible to and accessible by” patrons and users. The 9-8-8 Lifeline is a free, nationwide resource administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the federal government (SAMHSA). While the Act does not specify what contact information must be posted, the 9-8-8 Lifeline allows individuals seeking assistance to call, text, or “chat” online.

The 9-8-8 Lifeline website (linked above) has many resources readers can consult, including FAQs, a glossary of terms, and information regarding services available to individuals. Notably, the website offers free print materials that include contact information for those seeking assistance.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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City Not Liable for Damages in Failed Sale of City Land

City Not Liable for Damages in Failed Sale of City Land

  Wednesday, August 12, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit claiming a city was responsible for damages relating to a failed sale of city land because of alleged verbal promises of a city employee. Arroyo et al. v. City of Chicago.

According to the lawsuit, the city economic development coordinator met with a potential purchaser of property that was owned by the city. The city entered into a right of entry agreement allowing the potential purchaser to access the properties to conduct due diligence. However, the parties did not enter into a purchase and sale agreement for the sale of the property. The potential purchaser retained consultants to conduct investigations of soil and other conditions of the property. The potential purchaser claims that the city employee assured him that the city would sell the property to him, but when he was not provided with an appraisal by the city to complete the negotiations for the purchase, he filed a lawsuit seeking $500,000 in damages from the city for the investigations. The circuit court dismissed the case, and he appealed.

The Appellate Court upheld the dismissal. First, the Court held that there could be no "implied-in-fact contract" under a promissory estoppel theory because the city could not be bound by a contract that does not comply with legal requirements for a valid contract. Here, city ordinances provided that only the city council had the authority to sell city land, so any promises made by a city employee were void and unenforceable.

Second, it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on assurances from a city employee who did not have actual authority to bind the city. 

Third, the Court noted that verbal contracts for the sale of land are unenforceable.

Finally, the Court held that the right of entry agreement that the parties did enter into did not provide for compensation to the plaintiff for his due diligence efforts, which were conducted to benefit the plaintiff, and not the city.

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