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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Thursday, February 5, 2026

Clean and Reliable Grid Affordability Act’s Impact on Units of Local Government and Road Districts

  Thursday, February 05, 2026    

On January 8, 2026, Governor Pritzker signed the Clean and Reliable Grid Affordability Act (CRGA) into law. With an effective date of June 1, 2026, the Act brings several changes to state energy policy intended to develop new energy resources.

The Act amends state statute to restrict the ability of units of local government and road districts to impose fees, fines, or other payment obligations for road use agreements with a commercial wind energy facility or a commercial solar energy facility owner (including the facility developer).

Previously, Section 5-12020 of the Counties Code stated that road-related fees, permit fees, or other charges imposed under a road use agreement must be reasonably related to the administration cost of such agreement.

Under the new amendment, a road district or other unit of local government is prohibited from requiring any permit fees, fines, or other payment obligations as a condition of a road use agreement, unless the reasonable permit fee or payment obligation reflects the actual expenses incurred. These expenses must relate to the negotiation, execution, construction, or implementation of the road use agreement.

The new amendment also prohibits a road use agreement from requiring a facility owner to pay or perform any road work that is not specifically and uniquely related to the road improvements required for the facility or the restoration of roads used by the facility owner during construction-related activities. 

In effect, the Act constrains the scope of road use agreements and the ability of units of local government and road districts to impose fees related to commercial alternative energy facilities. However, Section 5-12020 of the Counties Code does not expressly provide that it is a denial and limitation on home rule powers and functions.

Authored by Luigi Laudando and Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

  

  

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Wednesday, February 4, 2026

More Bills Introduced in General Assembly to Amend FOIA

  Wednesday, February 04, 2026    

On January 20th, we reported on a number of bills introduced in the Illinois General Assembly this term that would, if approved, amend various provisions of FOIA. Since that post, the General Assembly has been quite busy and has introduced many more bills that propose to amend FOIA, many of which appear to be designed to address the recent proliferation of "mass" requests submitted by organizations that seek the same records from numerous numerous public bodies. 

HB 4597: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to authorize a public body to impose a fee on a requester for staff time incurred in redacting body camera recordings, at the lowest paid employee's pay rate. The bill has some exceptions where a fee may not be imposed, including (1) where the requester certifies that it will not use the recording for financial purposes; or (2) the requester is involved in the incident; or (3) the recording depicts an officer-involved shooting; or (4) the public body fails to provide the requester with an estimate of the applicable fees as required by the bill.

HB  4681: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to add provisions relating to "mass" requesters and "vexatious" requesters and expand the definition of "commercial" requester. The bill would also require requesters to notify the public body before filing a lawsuit against the public body for an alleged violation of FOIA. The bill would provide a process for public bodies to petition the Public Access Counselor of the Attorney Generals Office (PAC) for relief from "vexatious" requesters, and also provide additional time to respond to "mass" requesters.

HB 4682: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to provide that repeated requests for commercial purposes are deemed unduly burdensome if the reuqests are from the same person and seek similar or updated records.

HB 4683: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to add language regarding "mass" requesters and provide additional time for the public body to respond to requests from requesters that fall into that category. 

HB 4684: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to modify the definition of "commercial purpose" and add a new provision for "purposeless mass requests."

HB 4704: If approved, this bill would amend the Student Confidentiality Reporting Act and FOIA to prohibit the release of information submitted to school helplines.

SB 3218: If approved, this bill would amend FOIA to modify provisions relating to law enforcement and arrest and booking records, increase the allowable fee for copies from 15 cents to 25 cents, and modify the amount public bodies can charge for staff time in searching for and retrieving records requested for commercial purposes.

None of these bills have passed yet, but we will keep you posted if any of these move forward.


  

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Tuesday, February 3, 2026

Seventh Circuit Grants Qualified Immunity to Police Officers

  Tuesday, February 03, 2026    

In Johnson v. Edwards, an arrestee sued four police officers alleging they violated his constitutional rights after he was arrested for disorderly conduct. 

Johnson was arrested after he attempted to enter an area that had been taped off for police investigation of a crime scene. When the police officers ordered Johnson to leave the area, he became agitated and began to yell at the officers. Johnson refused to leave and the officers arrested Johnson, put him in the squad car, and drove him to the police station. Johnson had refused to wear his seatbelt on the drive there. On the way there, Johnson asked the officer to slow down. The officer quickly slowed the car down to stop at a red light which caused Johnson to lurch forward and hit his head on the divider. Two minutes later, when they arrived at the station, the officers realized Johnson had been knocked unconscious. He was taken to the hospital where he was diagnosed and treated for a cut lip.

Johnson was charged with disorderly conduct for failing to obey a police officer. After the charges were dropped, he sued the officers involved in his arrest, claiming the following constitutional violations: (1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) state-created danger in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; (3) excessive use of force for the “rough ride” to the station; (4) failure to provide adequate medical care. Johnson also brought a claim for malicious prosecution. The district court ruled in favor of the police officers, finding they were immune from Johnson’s claims based on qualified immunity. 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in favor of the officers. The Seventh Circuit found that Johnson had not established a violation of his constitutional rights because: (1) the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for engaging in disorderly conduct when he refused to leave the crime scene; (2) the officers had not placed Johnson in a position of danger, or violated an established constitutional right, by allowing him to ride to the station without a seatbelt on; (3) the facts did not support a finding that the ride to the station constituted an excessive use of force; and (4) the officers had called the paramedics as soon as they realized Johnson was hurt, so Johnson could not establish that they acted unreasonably. Because Johnson failed to establish a violation of a constitutional right, the Seventh Circuit found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.

As to Johnson’s malicious prosecution claim, the Court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Johnson for disorderly conduct and dismissed this claim.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter

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Monday, February 2, 2026

Court Finds Response to FOIA Request That Was Quarantined by Email Service Untimely

  Monday, February 02, 2026    

An Illinois Appellate Court recently issued an opinion on the timeliness of FOIA responses where a request is quarantined by a public body's email software service. Balzer v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation.

On July 31st, a requester emailed a FOIA request to the public body's FOIA officer seeking various contract records. However, the FOIA officer did not learn about the FOIA request until the next business day because the public body’s third-party email software service (Mimecast) flagged the email as suspicious and quarantined the FOIA request in its security queue. On August 1st, Mimecast sent the public body’s FOIA account a notification that the FOIA request was held in queue, and the public body’s FOIA officer received the FOIA request that day. The public body reached out to the requester on August 1st to ask the requester to narrow the request because it was unduly burdensome. The requester refused to narrow the request, and the public body formally denied the FOIA request as unduly burdensome pursuant to Section 3(g) of FOIA on August 8th, the sixth business day after the request was sent, but only the fifth business day after the FOIA officer became aware of it.

The requester sued the public body, claiming the public body’s response was untimely. The circuit court ruled in favor of the public body, finding that FOIA’s five-business-day response window only begins when the public body actually receives and acknowledges receipt, which according to the circuit court meant that the response was due on August 8th.

However, on appeal, the Appellate Court ruled in favor of the requester, finding that the public body received the request on July 31st (the day that Mimecast received the request and quarantined it), so the public body's August 8th response was untimely under FOIA. 

The Appellate Court acknowledged that FOIA does not define when a FOIA request is deemed received by a public body. However, the Court found that the request at issue was “received” by the public body when Mimecast received it on July 31st, regardless of whether Mimecast or the public body were aware of it, and regardless of whether Mimecast was operated by a third-party rather than by the public body. The Appellate Court held that FOIA does not "toll" a public body’s five-business-day response obligation because a system that the public body itself created or adopted caused an internal delay in a request reaching its FOIA officer, so the public body’s August 8th denial of the request was untimely.

The Appellate Court also held that the public body waived its ability to deny the request as unduly burdensome pursuant to Section 3(g) of FOIA because its response was untimely.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

  

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Wednesday, January 28, 2026

Ancel Glink at the IAPD/IPRA 2026 Conference

  Wednesday, January 28, 2026    

For all of our park officials and employee readers who will be in attendance at the IAPD/IPRA conference this week, we hope you can stop by one or more of the sessions at which Ancel Glink attorneys will be presenting:

Thursday, 1/29/2026

1 - 2 pm - Session 112 - Real Estate 101, Scott Puma & David Silverman (Ancel Glink)

1 - 2 pm - Session 120 - Can We and Should We Have Video Surveillance in Parks & Facilities?, Megan Mack & Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink)

1 - 2 pm - Session 126 - From Ballot To Victory: Strategies for Successful Referendums, Keri-Lyn Krafthefer (Ancel Glink), Lauren Raspanti & Paul Henley

Friday, 1/30/2026

8:30 - 9:30 am - Session 110 - Legal/Legislative I, Derke Price (Ancel Glink) & Jason Anselment

3:30 - 4:30 pm - Session 119 - Regulating Controversial Park Activities, Eugene Bolotnikov, Katie Nagy & Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink)

Saturday, 1/31/2026

10:45 - 11:45 am - Session 115 - Be Prepared for Your First Amendment Audits, Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink)

10:45 - 11:45 am - Session 118 - Park District Finance - It's Not Intuitive, Adam Simon (Ancel Glink) & Mari-Lynn Peters

12:30 - 1:30 pm - Session 116 - Understanding Social Media: Facebook? Instagram? X?, Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink)

12:30 - 1:30 pm - Session 131 - Solar and Green Energy Options, Adam Simon (Ancel Glink), Erik Brown & Shawn Ajazi

12:30 - 1:30 pm - Session 133 - Managing Teen Takeover Events: Strategies, Challenges, and Collaborative Solutions, Derke Price (Ancel Glink) & Chief Steven Schindlbeck

12:30 - 1:30 pm - Session 129 - Boardmanship Essentials Part I, Scott Puma (Ancel Glink)

2 - 3 pm - Session 130 - Boardmanship Essentials Part II, Adam Simon (Ancel Glink)

2 - 3 pm - Session 122 - You Really Should Read Your Board Policy Manual (And Keep It Updated), Scott Puma & Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink)

2 - 3 pm - Session 128 - Parks Role in Successful Planning and Economic Development, David Silverman (Ancel Glink), Dan Bolin (Ancel Glink) & Jodi Mariano

  

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Tuesday, January 27, 2026

Fourth Circuit Denies Injunctive Relief for Public Comment Interruptions

  Tuesday, January 27, 2026    

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling on public comment at meetings in Platt v. Mansfield. Although the Fourth Circuit does not cover Illinois so this ruling is not binding on Illinois government bodies, the case is interesting because it provides a different perspective from the recent Public Access Counselor ruling (PAC Op. 26-001) that we reported on recently that struck down a public comment policy that prohibited comments that attacked public employees or officials.

The case involved a school board that offered an opportunity for public comment at its school board meetings pursuant to a school board policy. That policy prohibited public comment that targets, criticizes, or attacks individual students at meetings, and stated that these type of concerns must be raised privately to the appropriate school official. A group of individuals attended a school board meeting to express their concerns about a student who had been arrested for threats to another classmate, and claimed they were interrupted or not allowed to speak after the board ended the public comment period because of the content of their speech. They filed a lawsuit against the school board claiming that the school board discriminated against their viewpoint and that the board's public comment policy was unconstitutionally vague in violation of their free speech rights under the First Amendment. The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, and they appealed.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of injunctive relief, finding that the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims to support their request for a preliminary injunction. The Court found that the public comment period of the school board meeting was a "limited public forum" and the school board had the right to establish content-neutral restrictions on the speach presented during that public comment period so long as those restrictions were not discriminatorily applied. The Court determined that the school board only interrupted speakers when they violated the school board's policy that prohibits comments that critized an individual student. The Court rejected the speakers' argument that they were discriminated against, finding that the interruptions during their comments were for violations of a facially constitutional speech policy. 





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Monday, January 26, 2026

Court Finds City Immune from Lawsuit in Case Involving Missing Person

  Monday, January 26, 2026    

An Illinois Appellate Court determined that a municipality had immunity from a lawsuit brought by a mother who claimed she suffered emotional distress caused by the municipality's failure to assist her in locating her missing daughter. Specifically, the court held that the city had immunity from liability for "failure to provide adequate police protection or service" under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act. Bailey v. City of Chicago.

A mother called 911 to report her daughter missing after she went to her daycare center and the child was missing. She also asked the police to issue an Amber Alert. No police met with her at the daycare and no Amber Alert was issued, although her daughter was found about two hours after she was reported missing. The mother filed a lawsuit against the city claiming the city breached a duty of care. After the circuit court dismissed the complaint and denied her request to amend the complaint, she appealed to the Appellate Court, which upheld the circuit court's ruling, finding that her claims were barred by the Tort Immunity Act.

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Thursday, January 22, 2026

PAC Finds OMA Violation for Restriction on Public Comment at Meeting

  Thursday, January 22, 2026    

The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's Office (PAC) issued its first binding opinion of 2026 finding a public body in violation of the Illinois Open Meetings Act (OMA) by limiting a speaker during public comment. PAC Op. 26-001. 

An individual filed a request for review with the PAC claiming that a public body violated the OMA when the mayor interrupted her during her public comment before the village board at its meeting. Specifically, she claims the mayor told her she could not say the names of village trustees, turned off the audio system and had the microphone removed, tried to cut her off before her 3 minutes were up, and asked the police chief to remove her from the meeting. 

In response, the village board defended its actions, arguing that its public comment rules and Roberts Rules of Order allowed the mayor to enforce rules of decorum to avoid disruptions and maintain order at village meetings.

The PAC acknowledged that a public body could terminate "inflammatory comments" that cause disruption in order to ensure that its meetings can be conducted in an efficient manner. However, the PAC determined that this speaker had not made inflammatory comments and that any disruption to the meeting was created by the mayor improperly interfering with the speaker's right to address the board during public comment. The PAC also noted that the village board's public comment rules did not restrict speakers from naming village officials or employees during public comment, and questioned whether this type of rule would be consistent with the OMA. The PAC also suggested this type of rule could be unconstitutional if it was intended to censor protected critical speech against a public official. Because the speaker did not disrupt the meeting, the PAC determined that the village board's restrictions on her speech violated 2.06(g) of OMA (the provision of OMA that requires public bodies to provide members of the public with an opportunity to address the public body at its meetings).

  

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Wednesday, January 21, 2026

City's Citizen Flag Pole a Public Forum, Not Government Speech

  Wednesday, January 21, 2026    

We previously reported on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that a city's policy in allowing private groups to place flags on the city's flag pole rendered the speech protected speech under the First Amendment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed a similar challenge relating to a "citizen's flag pole" outside of a city hall in New Hampshire that allowed citizens to apply to the city for permission to fly their flag. In this case, a group wanted to fly a flag that read "Save Women's Sports" on the citizen's flag pole. The city initially allowed the flag, but then revoked its permission after receiving complaints that the flag was transphobic. 

The group sued, claiming that the city's revocation of its permission violated its First Amendment free speech rights. The group argued that the city had never denied citizen flag requests prior to revoking their permission, and that the action of the city was content-based viewpoint discrimination in violation of their free speech rights. The city defended its decision by arguing that the flag pole constituted government speech, so the city could control the message on the flag pole. 

The district court found the speech to be government speech but on appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the citizen's flag pole program was not government speech based on the U.S. Supreme Court's Shurtleff v. City of Boston decision, and that the city's revocation of the flag permit was viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. Scaer v. City of Nashua

  

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Tuesday, January 20, 2026

Illinois General Assembly Introduces Bills Amending FOIA

  Tuesday, January 20, 2026    

The Illinois General Assembly was in session last week, which brings with it newly introduced legislation. Many of these bills are “shell bills” that will be amended with substantive language later in session, but a number of these introduced bills propose changes to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that would be relevant to local governments if they ultimately pass. 

A few of those bills (none of which have been voted on yet) are summarized below: 

HB 4395: If approved, this would amend various provisions of FOIA, including Section 2(a) of FOIA to add the “judicial branch and components to the judicial branch” to the definition of “public body” and Section 7 to add a new FOIA exemption for all records pertaining to the preparation of “judicial opinions and orders." Section 9.5(a) would also be amended to state that if the judicial branch and components deny a FOIA request, the requester cannot request review from the Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General (PAC). 

HB 4408: If approved, this would amend Section 7 of FOIA to add a new exemption for records created for administrative, correctional, or law enforcement purposes that include identifying or contact information of a minor who is a victim of secual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual violence.

HB 4409: If approved, this would amend the time for response to a FOIA request submitted to a law enforcement or correctional agency to 15 business days (rather than the current 5 business days). It would also allow an extension of 15 business days for requested records that require the agency to blur body camera footage or make other redactions because the records are partially exempt from disclosure.  

HB 4444: If approved, this would allow a public body to charge the actual cost for each hour spent by government personnel searching for a requested record or examining the record for redactions (current cost recovery is capped at $10). The bill would also remove the provision restricting the cost recovery provision to commercial requests only.  

HB 4445: If approved, this would add a new Section 10.5 to impose certain notice requirements on both the public body and the requester for requests for body worn camera recordings that are reasonably likely to be used for commercial purposes. These notice requirements would require notice to identifiable subjects in the recording prior to release of the records.

At this time, it is not clear how many of these bills (if any) will move forward but if they do, we will keep you posted. 

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung, Luigi Laudando & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

  

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Thursday, January 15, 2026

Supreme Court Finds Candidate Has Standing to Challenge Illinois Vote Counting Law

  Thursday, January 15, 2026    

In another U.S. Supreme Court decision this week, the Court reversed the dismissal of a case filed by three candidates for political office that challenged the State of Illinois' procedure for counting mail-in ballots received after election day. Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections. The district court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had dismissed the case, finding that the candidates did not have standing to challenge the state law. 

Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in ballots that are postmarked or certified no later than election day and received within 2 weeks of election day. Three candidates for various offices sued the Illinois State Board of Elections claiming that the statute violates federal law, specifically that it conflicts with statutes that set election day as the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the lawsuits based on lack of standing.

On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that at least one of the candidates who had filed a lawsuit challenging the statute had a "personal stake" in the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election to satisfy the requirement for standing. The Court rejected the dissenting justices' argument that the candidates should have to show actual harm (not potential harm) to have standing to sue.

Note that this decision does not address the substance of the claims made by the candidates against the Illinois law, but simply holds that the candidates have standing to have those claims heard in court.

  

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Wednesday, January 14, 2026

Supreme Court Finds No Fourth Amendment Violation in Warrantless Entry to Home

  Wednesday, January 14, 2026    

The U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion today in Case v. Montana, rejecting an argument that police officers must have "probable cause" to enter a home without a warrant when they encounter an emergency situation. The Court held that the proper test for the emergency exception to the warrant requirement is whether the officer was acting on an objective, reasonable belief that someone inside the home was seriously injured, imminently threatened with an injury, or needed emergency assistance, rather than the "probable cause" standard that applies in criminal cases. 

In this case, petitioner's ex-girlfield called police to report that petitioner had been drinking and was threatening suicide. Police officers were dispatched to do a welfare check and when they arrived, determined that the situation was serious and decided to enter the home to render emergency aid. An officer encountered the petitioner holding a black object that the officer thought was a gun, and the officer fired his own rifle. The petitioner was ultimately charged with assaulting a police officer after a handgun was found next to where petitioner stood. Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence at trial, arguing that police had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that officers were responding to an emergency (an exception to the warrant requirement). 

The case was appealed and made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the trial court's ruling. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the police officers had to show "probable cause" in order to exercise a warrantless search. Instead, officers must show that they had an "objectively reasonable basis for believing" that their intervention was necessary to prevent serious harm. Here, the officers demonstrated that they were aware of petitioner's mental health and alcohol abuse problems and that he had previously talked about committing suicide. They had statements from his ex-girlfriend that he had threatened to kill himself, and when they went to the home, he refused to respond to their knocking on his door. The Court found that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe petitioner needed emergency aid, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of his rights in the warrantless entry.

  

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