Federal District Court Allows Public Employee’s First Amendment Claim to Proceed to Trial

Federal District Court Allows Public Employee’s First Amendment Claim to Proceed to Trial

  Thursday, April 24, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Recently, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (District Court) issued an opinion allowing a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed to trial. Caparelli-Ruff v. Bd. of Educ. of East Aurora Sch. Dist. 131.

The Executive Director of Student Services (Director) of a school district (School District) was employed by the School District under a one-year contract for the 2021-2022 school year. In the spring of 2022, the Director began her campaign for County Regional Superintendent of Schools—a position unrelated to her employment with the School District.

To raise campaign contributions, the Director held a gun raffle, which she advertised on her personal Facebook page. Within weeks of posting the advertisement, the Director was placed on paid administrative leave for the remaining term of her employment contract with the School District. The Director filed a lawsuit against the School District, claiming she was terminated (and her contract was not renewed) in retaliation for her post about the gun raffle. The Director argued that the School District’s actions violated her First Amendment right to free speech and constituted a breach of her employment contract. The School District defended its decision to place the Director on leave and not rehire her for the following school year because of her poor performance (and not her speech activity). 

The District Court ruled in favor of the School District on the breach of contract claims, finding that the Director’s contract did not entitle her to automatic renewal of her employment for the following school year. Because the Director could not establish that her employment contract was breached, or that the School District had agreed to retain her for the following school year, her contract claims were dismissed. 

On the Director’s First Amendment retaliation claim, however, the District Court denied the School District's motion for summary judgment and allowed that claim to move forward to trial. The Court undertook a balancing test to evaluate whether the Director’s interest in speaking as a private citizen outweighed the School District’s interest in maintaining orderly operations. 

First, the Court found that the raffle advertisement was clearly posted in the Director’s personal capacity, since it related to her campaign for public office that was separate from her employment.

Second, in evaluating whether the Director’s post interfered with the School District’s operations, the District Court considered the actual impact of her post on the school community based on several factors, including (1) whether the post disrupted harmony among co-workers, (2) whether the post interfered with the Director’s job duties, and (3) the context of the post, among others.

The School District argued that the advertisement was very disruptive, since it was posted around the same time of the school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, in May 2022 and staff had raised concerns about the Director’s judgment in advertising a gun raffle at that time. The Director argued that the School District had taken the post out of context: the post was made to her personal Facebook page, and she had not discussed the raffle while at work. Furthermore, her campaign did not impact her ability to do her job as Director. Taking all of these factors into consideration, the District Court found that the School District was unable to demonstrate that the post unduly interfered with its operations or the Director’s performance of her duties. Because the School District had not shown that its interests outweighed those of the Director in speaking freely, it did not meet its burden for summary judgment.

For these reasons, the District Court determined that the Director’s First Amendment retaliation claim could move forward to trial.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Appellate Court Overturns ZBA’s Decision Concerning Special Use Permit for Clinic

In the Zone: Appellate Court Overturns ZBA’s Decision Concerning Special Use Permit for Clinic

  Tuesday, April 22, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently overturned a municipality's zoning determination that a property owner complied with the terms of a preexisting special use permit for the property. Rylatt v. Christensen

A doctor purchased a home that was subject to a preexisting special use permit (SUP) to allow a medical clinic (chiropractor) to operate as a home occupation, which included a variance to permit one nonresident of the home to work in the clinic. The doctor who purchased the property planned to operate a family planning clinic on the property. Initially, the city zoning official determined that the proposed business did not comply with the SUP because no employee would reside at the home so it could not qualify as a home occupation. After several discussions, the doctor stated that one of the clinic employees would reside at the property, and the City found the proposed use would comply with the SUP’s requirements.

A group of plaintiffs appealed the zoning official’s determination, arguing the proposed clinic would negatively impact neighboring properties, and the City's ZBA held a hearing on that appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ZBA upheld the determination that the clinic conformed with the SUP and found that none of plaintiffs had standing to challenge the determination.

Plaintiffs then filed a lawsuit to challenge the ZBA's rulings. The trial court dismissed the case and upheld the ZBA's decision that plaintiffs had no standing and dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining claim that the ZBA violated state law. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court found that the plaintiffs who resided within 550 feet of the clinic raised sufficient arguments about the potential impact of the clinic on his home to have standing to challenge the City's determination before the ZBA. However, the Appellate Court upheld the ZBA's finding that the other plaintiffs had no standing.  The Appellate Court provided a detailed discussion of the factors used in determining standing in these type of cases, with a thorough analysis of the standing cases.

The Appellate Court also held that the ZBA erred in affirming the zoning determination that the clinic was consistent with the SUP’s terms. The Court expressed concerns that the original SUP was never produced, making it difficult to justify the City's detemination that its terms were complied with. Also, the Court determined that there was no evidence the doctor would work or live on property, unlike the previous property owner. The Court noted that there was a lot of information lacking with regard to the SUP and the proposed use, and the Court was skeptical about the City official's testimony about his interpretation of the City's code in making the determination.

As a result, the Appellate Court overturned the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal of the ZBA's determination and sent the case back to the trial court.

Post Authored by Dan Lev & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Court Interprets Procedural Requirements in Civil Forfeiture Statute

Court Interprets Procedural Requirements in Civil Forfeiture Statute

  Thursday, April 17, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Last January, police arrested a driver for driving under the influence. The driver was charged with aggravated DUI because he was driving with a suspended license from a prior DUI offense, and his truck was not insured at the time of the arrest. The police also seized the truck the Defendant was driving pursuant to state civil forfeiture of vehicle laws. 720 ILCS 5/36-1.5(a)

A month after the arrest, the State filed notice and a petition for preliminary determination of probable cause at the court’s next available hearing, which was 18 days after police seized the driver's truck. State law required the State to “seek” a preliminary determination over whether the police had probable cause to seize property within 14 days of taking it. 

At the hearing, the driver asked the court to dismiss the action, arguing that because more than 14 days had passed since police seized his truck, it did not comply with state law. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the petition was filed on time, and that probable cause existed for the police to seize the vehicle. 

On appeal, the main question was whether the State was required to obtain a preliminary determination of probable cause within 14 days of seizing the truck, or if requesting a hearing within that time frame was enough to satisfy the statutory requirement. This question turned on the meaning of the word “seek” in the statute. The driver argued that “seek” meant the State had to obtain a court ruling on probable cause to satisfy the requirement. However, the Appellate Court determined that the word “seek” only required the State to “request or try to acquire” a preliminary determination on probable cause within the 14-day time frame. As a result, the Appellate Court held that the State satisfied the statutory requirement by requesting a hearing within the 14-day period. Illinois v. 2008 Ford F-250 Super Duty, 2025 IL App 3d 240194.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Illinois Supreme Court Dismisses Redistricting Challenge to State Legislative Maps

Illinois Supreme Court Dismisses Redistricting Challenge to State Legislative Maps

  Friday, April 11, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Supreme Court issued a ruling addressing time requirements for bringing constitutional challenges to a legislative redistricting plan adopted by the Illinois General Assembly. McCombie v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections.

Following the 2020 decennial census, the Illinois General Assembly adopted a redistricting plan (2021 Map) drawing new legislative districts to elect state representatives and state senators beginning at the 2022 general election. Plaintiffs challenged the 2021 Map arguing it was unconstitutional as the new legislative districts were not compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population as required under the Illinois Constitution. Additionally, Plaintiffs argued the 2021 Map was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander that denied voters and Republican candidates for the General Assembly a fair election.

The Illinois Speaker of the House and Illinois Senate President intervened in the case arguing the Plaintiff’s lawsuit was not timely filed and was barred under a latches defense because they had filed their  lawsuit more than three years since the 2021 Map was first adopted and two elections for General Assembly members had occurred based on the 2021 Map. The intervenors argued the lawsuit should be dismissed under their laches defense because Plaintiffs lacked due diligence in bringing their lawsuit and the opposing party experienced prejudice due to the delay.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled against Plaintiffs and dismissed the lawsuit based on a laches defense. The Court noted Plaintiffs could have challenged the 2021 Map when it was first adopted and that waiting multiple election cycles to reveal the effects of the redistricting was unpersuasive. According to the Court, allowing Plaintiffs to challenge the 2021 Map now “would be prejudicial and create uncertainty for voters and officeholders alike, now and in the future, as to whether any redistricting plan in Illinois is ever final.”

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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Quorum Forum Podcast: Episode 92: Not in my Park!

Quorum Forum Podcast: Episode 92: Not in my Park!

  Monday, April 07, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast just released Episode 92: Not in My Park! Regulating Controversial Park Activities

Park agencies manage many acres of public space where sometimes controversial activities take place. What authority does your organization have to address E-Scooters & E-Bikes, First Amendment activities, public camping and more? Find out as Ancel Glink attorneys Megan Mack, Erin Monforti, and Tyler Smith join Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast to present “Not in my Park!” at the 2025 IAPD/IPRA Soaring to New Heights Conference! 

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Court Dismisses Candidate's Appeal of Electoral Board Decision for Late Filing and Failure to Serve

Court Dismisses Candidate's Appeal of Electoral Board Decision for Late Filing and Failure to Serve

  Thursday, April 03, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A candidate (Candidate) filed nomination papers to run for the office of Township Supervisor. An objection to the Candidate’s nomination was filed, based on a violation of section 10-4 of the Election Code (regarding form of petitions for nomination). The Electoral Board sustained the objection, finding that the Candidate’s nomination papers were invalid.

The Candidate, with legal representation, appealed the Electoral Board’s decision, but the appeal was not timely filed as it was filed more than five days after the decision and he included no proof of service in the filing. The Candidate then filed a series of motions pro se (without legal representation), including a motion to amend his appeal, claiming his lawyer was responsible for the delay in filing and seeking to delete all references to the lawyer. The Candidate also filed “proof of delivery” with the motions, but that proof did not indicate that the parties were actually served in compliance with the statutory requirements.

The Electoral Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to review its decision because the Candidate failed to file his petition in time and to properly serve the parties. In response, the Candidate did not dispute that he filed the petition late, but argued his attorney’s misconduct caused the delay, so he should not be penalized. The trial court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Electoral Board that it did not have jurisdiction to review the matter.

The Candidate appealed that decision. The Candidate argued that the trial court failed to consider the impact of his attorney’s conduct, and asked that the dismissal of his appeal be overturned. He cited several cases to support his argument that the filing requirement should have been relaxed due to his attorney’s actions. However, the Appellate Court found that the cases he cited did not exist, except for a U.S. Supreme Court case that dealt with federal law rather than Illinois law. Because the Candidate filed his appeal of the Electoral Board’s decision late, and because he never properly served the parties by registered or certified mail, the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the Candidate's appeal. Moore v. Thornton Township Electoral Board, 2025 IL App (1st) 250349-U

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Police Department in Violation of FOIA in Withholding Resignation and Termination Records

PAC Finds Police Department in Violation of FOIA in Withholding Resignation and Termination Records

  Wednesday, April 02, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request seeking copies of resignation/termination records and payroll records for city law enforcement officers, a city police department (Department) disclosed the payroll records, but withheld resignation/termination records citing various exemptions under FOIA. After the requestor appealed to the Public Access Counselor of the Attorney General's Office (PAC), the PAC issued binding opinion PAC Op. 25-002 finding that the Department improperly withheld its responsive termination/resignation records.

First, the PAC determined that the Department did not provide detailed factual basis demonstrating how and why disclosing its withheld termination/resignation records would interfere with either (1) a pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceeding or (2) an active administrative enforcement proceeding. Even if the Department had established the existence of an active administrative enforcement proceeding, the PAC opined that the Department improperly withheld its records under a cited exemption because they were not created in the course of that proceeding.

The PAC also rejected the Department’s argument that disclosing the withheld records would create a substantial likelihood of depriving people of a fair trial or an impartial hearing, because the Department did not demonstrate that (1) a trial or adjudication was pending or imminent, and (2) that is was more probable than not that disclosing the records would interfere with a fair trial of impartial hearing. Notably, the PAC stated that the existence of a pending investigation/proceeding or the possibility of criminal charges being filed is not sufficient to establish that a trial is “pending or imminent” for purposes of Section 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA.

The PAC also rejected the Department’s argument that the resignation/termination records were confidential and not subject to disclosure under Section 7(1)(d-6) of FOIA, which exempts:

Records contained in the Officer Professional Conduct Database (Database) under Section 9.2 of the Illinois Police Training Act (Act), except to the extent authorized under Section 9.2 of the Act.

Although Section 9.2(c) of the Act generally requires the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board (Board) to maintain the confidentiality of certain local law enforcement records that are obtained by or disclosed to the Board, these confidentiality restrictions prohibit the Board, not local law enforcement entities, from disclosing public records shared with the Board. Because the Act expressly states that local law enforcement agencies are not exempt from disclosing public records subject to FOIA, the PAC reasoned that the Department was authorized to disclose its responsive termination/resignation records, even if those records had been shared with the Board. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Appellate Court Decides Damages Claims in Development Agreement Dispute

In the Zone: Appellate Court Decides Damages Claims in Development Agreement Dispute

  Tuesday, April 01, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A developer entered into a 2012 development agreement with a Village to, among other things, purchase property and grade it for the Village’s later use. The agreement required the developer to transfer the property to the Village within three years. This development agreement resulted in years of litigation between the parties, which recently resulted in an Appellate Court decision on the issue of damages for the breach of contract claims. PML Development, LLC v. Village of Hawthorn Woods.

In 2015, the developer filed a lawsuit against the Village claiming that while it was working on the property, the Village issued restricting permits and stop-work orders while it developed a plan for its use of the property, which it claims interfered with the work on the property and caused it to incur additional costs. The Village filed a counterclaim against the developer, alleging that the developer failed to repair the road leading to the property, failed to pay taxes on the property, and the failure to fund the project draw-down account.

In 2020, the trial court found both parties in material breach of the agreement and both parties appealed. In a previous ruling, the Appellate Court agreed that both parties were in breach but held that neither was entitled to damages. The case made its way to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that both parties alleged viable breach of contract claims and remanded the case back to the trial court to hear and decide the parties' damages claims. We reported on the previous Appellate Court decision here and the Illinois Supreme Court's decision here. 

On remand from the Illinois Supreme Court, the trial court awarded $5,349,677.70 to the developer for costs incurred as a result of the Village’s interference with the development, and $408,000.00 to the Village for the developer’s failure to fund the draw-down account and the failure to repair the road. The developer was awarded attorneys fees for the initial proceedings, but the court denied the request for additional fees. Both parties appealed.

On appeal, the Village contends the developer was not entitled to any damages because it did not establish damages to a reasonable degree of certainty because it had no history of profits. The Appellate Court reviewed the developer’s expert witness testimony and held that the damages were not based entirely on speculation and the calculations were credible. The Village also argued that the trial court erred because it did not award damages for the developer’s failure to convey the property. The Appellate Court held that the Village was not entitled to these damages because it did not pursue monetary damages on this issue until the final appeal.

The developer argued it was improperly denied damages related to overhead costs because of the Village’s delay. However, at trial, multiple witnesses recognized that even if everything had gone according to the plan the project would not have been completed by December 31, 2015. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision because the damages the developer sought were not reasonably certain.

Finally, both parties challenged the award of attorney fees. The trial court had ruled that the developer was the prevailing party at the first trial, but neither of the parties were prevailing at the following hearings. The Appellate Court did not agree with the trial court's ruling and held that the developer was the prevailing party entitled to all reasonable costs associated with all of the stages of this case.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Court Dismisses Electoral Board Appeal for Improper Service

Court Dismisses Electoral Board Appeal for Improper Service

  Monday, March 31, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In November 2024, a candidate for the position of School Board Member (Candidate) filed a statement of candidacy which affirmed that her residence was within the School District. A resident of the School District (Objector) objected to the Candidate’s nominating papers, alleging that her address was incorrect and that she resided outside of the District, making her ineligible for a School Board Member position.

The Objector requested that the Electoral Board find that the Candidate was ineligible to appear on the April 2025 ballot. At the Electoral Board hearing, the Candidate moved to dismiss the objection claiming the objection failed to state an “interest” as required by the relevant statute. In response, the Objector argued that being a resident of the School District was enough of an interest to satisfy the requirement. Because the statute required a statement of interest, and the objection failed to state an interest, the Electoral Board granted the Candidate’s motion, dismissing the objection.

The Objector appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that the objection included the Objector's status as a resident of the School District, so no further information was required. The trial court ruled in favor of the Candidate, finding it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Objector failed to send certified copies of the petition to the parties as required by statute. The trial court also addressed the merits of the appeal, affirming the Electoral Board’s decision dismissing the objection as not “clearly erroneous.”

The Objector appealed that decision, and the Appellate Court also held that the court had no jurisdiction over the appeal because the Objector failed to comply with the service requirements of state law. Although the Objector stated in the petition for review that he served the parties by registered or certified mail, the evidence showed he only sent it by regular mail, which was not sufficient under the statute. As a result, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, vacated the portion of the opinion that addressed the merits of the appeal, and affirmed the Electoral Board’s decision dismissing the objection. Mosley v. Holbrook, 2025 IL App (5th) 250096-U

Note that the Petitioner also filed identical objections against two other School Board Member Candidates for living outside the School District. The trial court in all three cases reached the same result – dismissing the objections because the Petitioner failed to state an “interest” on his objection. It was also the same result on appeal in all three cases – dismissal for improper service after the Petitioner sent his petitions for review by regular mail rather than certified mail. Mosley v. Holbrook, 2025 IL App (5th) 250097-U; Mosley v. Holbrook, 2025 IL App (5th) 250098-U.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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City's Designation of Historic District Upheld by Appellate Court

City's Designation of Historic District Upheld by Appellate Court

  Tuesday, March 25, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In 2007, the Chicago City Council adopted an ordinance designating an area of the City as the Arlington-Deming Historic District. That ordinance was challenged in court on various grounds, including that it violated a property owner's due process and equal protection rights and that it was arbitrary and capricious and did not meet the "rational basis" test for legislative decision. Litigation continued for almost 20 years, resulting in numerous trial court and appellate court rulings on various claims in the lawsuit. The last of the remaining claims in the lawsuit were the subject of a trial court ruling that upheld the City's designation of the historic district, and that decision was recently the subject of a decision by the Illinois Appellate Court. Robinson v. City of Chicago, 2025 IL App (1st) 232174.

On March 24, 2025, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of the City, upholding the ordinance designating the historic district. First, the Court held that the City has a legitimate government interest in preserving historic properties and areas and that the City's decision to designate this area as an historic district "bears a rational relationship" to that purpose. As a result, the Court held that the City's designation ordinance satisfied the "rational basis" test for a legislative decision. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the ordinance should be invalidated because the City allegedly failed to follow its own standards in designating the district, holding that an ordinance of a home rule municipality is not invalid for failure to follow self-imposed standards. The Court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the LaSalle factors test (which applies to challenges to zoning decisions) should have been used in this case, finding that the LaSalle factors did not apply to this challenge of historic district designation.

In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City on all remaining claims in this lawsuit, upholding the designation of this historic district.

Disclaimer: Ancel Glink represented the City at the summary judgment phase at the trial court in this case.

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Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Tax Misallocation Dispute

Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Tax Misallocation Dispute

  Thursday, March 20, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Last year we reported on an Illinois Appellate Court decision in a tax allocation dispute between two municipalities where sales tax revenues generated from a restaurant located in the Village of Arlington Heights (Village) were mistakenly paid to the City of Rolling Meadows (City) for almost a decade. In January of last year, the Appellate Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the case because the trial court did have jurisdiction to hear and decide this dispute.  

That ruling was subsequently appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which issued a decision this week reversing the Appellate Court and upholding the trial court's previous dismissal of the Village's lawsuit against the City. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the Illinois Department of Revenue has exclusive jurisdiction over tax matters, including misallocation disputes, so the trial court's dismissal of the Village's case against the City for lack of jurisdiction was proper. Village of Arlington Heights v. City of Rolling Meadows.

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Illinois Appellate Court Upholds Push Tax Ordinance

Illinois Appellate Court Upholds Push Tax Ordinance

  Monday, March 17, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In Illinois Gaming Machine Operators v. The City of Waukegan, the Illinois Gaming Machine Operators Association (IGMOA) and a group of plaintiffs sued the City to challenge an ordinance that imposed a one cent tax per push (push tax) on players of video game terminals. The City’s push tax ordinance required every terminal operator (a company that leases video gaming machines to bars or restaurants) to register as a tax collector and imposed a duty to secure the tax from their customers. The trial court upheld the ordinance and ruled that it was a permissible use of municipal authority. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the City's ordinance, rejecting the terminal operators' challenge.

First, the Appellate Court ruled that the push tax ordinance did not impose an unconstitutional occupation tax because the tax burden rested solely on the player and could not be transferred to the terminal operator.

Second, the Court ruled the push tax ordinance was not a license for revenue because enforcement provisions only imposed penalties and merely ensured compliance.

Third, the Court ruled that the ordinance did not contradict the uniformity clause of the Illinois constitution that requires taxes to be uniformly imposed across classes of goods. The terminal operators had argued that because the ordinance only imposed taxes on push machines, and not on automatic machines, the ordinance violated this clause. The court rejected that argument, finding that the City had provided sufficient justification for the ordinance and imposition of the push tax.

Finally, the Court ruled that the tax collection mechanism did not exceed the City’s home-rule authority. The terminal operators had argued the funds inserted into the gaming machines were outside of the City’s grasp because they did not pertain to the City’s government and affairs. The Court discussed the different ways the tax could be collected and ultimately ruled that there are permissible mechanisms for the City to collect the tax funds.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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