Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 110: Statement of Economic Interests

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 110: Statement of Economic Interests

  Monday, October 05, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 110: Statement of Economic Interests.

Back by listener request, the podcast is taking a brief recess to revisit one of its classic episodes on Statements of Economic Interests (SOEI) for local government officials and candidates. Ancel Glink’s Daniel J. Bolin and Keri-Lyn J. Krafthefer break down the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act reporting questions, clear up common misconceptions about disclosable assets and debts, and offer practical guidance for local officials and employees.

Candidates running in the 2027 consolidated elections must file an SOEI and submit their receipt alongside nomination papers during the candidate petition filing period. While incumbent officials may have filed an annual statement earlier this year in relation to their current office, many choose or are advised to file an additional statement explicitly in relation to their candidacy.

Inflation-Adjusted Thresholds: On this year’s form, disclosable dollar thresholds have been updated for Question 1 (Single Assets:  $11,600), Question 2 (Outside Income/Capital Gains;  $8,700), Question 3 (Single Non-Public Debts:  $11,600), and Question 6 (Gifts/Honoraria :  $600).

Episode Breakdown:

Who Must File:  Understanding filing obligations for elected/appointed local officials versus designated public employees and candidates.

Question 1 (Assets):  Distinguishing disclosable single assets (stocks, bonds, investment real estate) from explicitly excluded personal items like primary residences, personal vehicles, savings/checking accounts, retirement funds, and pensions.

Question 2 (Income; Capital Gains): How to simplify your disclosure by relying directly on your federal income tax return (W-2s, 1099s, capital gains) while excluding compensation from your filing position.

Question 3 (Debts):  How standard consumer debts (mortgages, credit cards, auto loans from financial institutions) are excluded from reporting.

Question 4 (Government Employment; Contracts):  Disclosing other units of government where you or your spouse serve as an employee, officeholder, or contractor.

Question 5 (Lobbyist Relationships):  Identifying disclosable business relationships or family members known to be registered lobbyists.

Question 6 (Gifts; Honoraria):  Reporting disclosable sources of gifts or honoraria.

Question 7 (Public Utilities): Disclosing family members employed by non-governmental public utilities.

Practical Tips:  Safe harbor protections for good-faith filings, relying on Illinois Secretary of State guidance, and handling county clerk online portals

 Resources: Secretary of State Guidance

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Court Says Pension Should Have Been Calculated Based on Promotion Rank

Court Says Pension Should Have Been Calculated Based on Promotion Rank

  Wednesday, September 30, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court held that a pension board erred in awarding a line-of-duty disability pension based on a firefighter's salary rather than a lieutenant's salary in Schneider v. Elgin Firefighters' Pension Fund.

A firefighter employed by a city's fire department injured his back while responding to a call. He was unable to return to duty and applied for a disability pension. During the time between his injury and the pension board hearing, the city had promoted him from the rank of firefighter to lieutenant. The pension board awarded him a pension based on a firefighter's salary and he appealed to the circuit court, arguing that his pension should have been based on a lieutenant's salary. The circuit court upheld the pension board's decision. He then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the pension board argued that it determined the pension award based on the firefighter having been injured while serving as a firefighter, having received workers' compensation benefits based on his firefighter salary, having never worked or qualified for work as a lieutenant, and having never contributed to the pension fund at the lieutenant rank. As a result, the board had concluded that the firefighter rank was the rank "held" at the time he was removed from payroll for purposes of determining his pensionable salary.

The firefighter argued that section 4-110 of the Pension Coe requires a line-of-duty disability pension to be calculated based on the "monthly salary attached to the rank held...at the date [the firefighter] is removed from the municipality's fire department payroll" and that since he was a sworn lieutenant at the time he was removed from the fire department's payroll, his pension should be based on that rank.

The Appellate Court agreed with the firefighter, finding that he had been promoted to lieutenant before he was removed from the fire department's payroll and, as a result, he should have been awarded a line-of-duty disability pension based on the lieutenant salary since that is the rank he held on the payroll-removal date.

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Dual Circulation Prohibition Not Apply to Nonpartisan School Board Candidates

Dual Circulation Prohibition Not Apply to Nonpartisan School Board Candidates

  Tuesday, September 29, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a decision by a board of election commissioners that school board candidates did not violate the Election Code's prohibition on dual circulation in collecting signatures for an election involving non-partisan candidates. Sanchez v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.

Objections were filed to the nominating petitions submitted by certain candidates running for elected school board positions in the upcoming November 2026 election. The objections claimed that the candidates had violated the "dual circulation" prohibition of the Election Code because circulators who collected signatures for the candidates had also circulated petitions for partisan candidates in the primary election in March of 2026. The objection was heard by the board of election commissioners which denied the objections. The objectors appealed to the circuit court which upheld the board's decision and the case made its way to the Illinois Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court first examined the relevant statute, which states as follows:

[N]o person shall circulate or certify petitions for candidates of more than one political party, or for an independent candidate or candidates in addition to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or for such candidates and parties with respect to the same political subdivision at the next consolidated election. 10 ILCS 5/10- 4. 

The candidates argued that the dual circulation prohibition of this statute applies only to candidates of political parties and independents, but does not apply to nonpartisan candidates. Because the school board candidates were nonpartisan candidates, the candidates argued that the statute did not bar circulators who had previously circulated petitions for partisan candidates in the primary election. The Appellate Court agreed, finding that the clear language of the statute only applied to partisan and independent elections and the school board election was, by statute, nonpartisan. As a result, the petitions circulated by the challenged circulators were proper and the candidates were not barred from running for office.

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Court Finds in Favor of School District in Wrongful Death Lawsuit Involving Student-Athlete

Court Finds in Favor of School District in Wrongful Death Lawsuit Involving Student-Athlete

  Monday, September 28, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a ruling in favor of a school district in a lawsuit relating to a student-athlete’s death, holding that government tort immunity barred the family’s claims because the family could not show the district’s inaction caused the student’s death. (Falconer v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 (5th Dist.).

A student and football player collapsed during a preseason conditioning program in the school’s weight room. One of the coaches immediately called 911, and another coach checked his vital signs and found a “radial pulse.” Medical assistants from the school’s on-site health clinic and responding paramedics all confirmed that the student had a detectable pulse and respiration. Because he had a pulse and was breathing, no one administered a shock or performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The student was transported to the hospital, where he lost his pulse; CPR there was unsuccessful, and he died. An autopsy later revealed an undiagnosed heart condition. 

The student’s mother sued the East St. Louis School District for negligence and willful and wanton conduct, arguing that school staff should have used the automated external defibrillator device in the weight room and performed CPR regardless of the pulse readings. She also argued that the school district violated Illinois’s AED Act and Physical Fitness Facility Medical Emergency Preparedness Act by failing to properly staff and prepare for a medical emergency. 

The circuit court ruled in favor of the school district, finding that the district had immunity under the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court agreed. The court found the district could not be held liable because its staff’s actions were not the actual or legal cause of the student's death; he was breathing and had a pulse throughout the time he was in the district’s care, and only stopped breathing and lost his pulse after he arrived at the hospital, under EMT and hospital staff supervision. The court also rejected the argument that the more specific AED Act and Facility Preparedness Act should override the Tort Immunity Act’s protections. Finally, the court held that several sections of the Tort Immunity Act independently shielded the district from liability, since staffing and the decisions in response to the emergency were purely discretionary in nature rather than mandated duties. 

Post Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Lawsuit Challenging Village's Tow of Vehicle Was Properly Dismissed

Lawsuit Challenging Village's Tow of Vehicle Was Properly Dismissed

  Wednesday, September 23, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A village police officer towed a vehicle that had five parking citations. The following day, an individual went to the police department and offered to pay $22 to the village, which he claimed satisfied the debt, and demanded the car be returned. The village refused to release the vehicle. Subsequently, the individual filed a lawsuit against the village alleging unjust enrichment on the village's part in keeping the vehicle, among other claims. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the individual had no standing to sue the village because he was not the owner of the vehicle and had no legal interest to sue the village for its return.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that he had no standing to sue the village. The individual had conceded he was not the owner of the vehicle, and the court found that his voluntary $22 payment towards the debt of another did not establish sufficient a "legal interest" to satisfy the standing requirements for his lawsuit. Bey v. Village of Midlothian, et al.

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Court Upholds City's Revocation of Liquor Licenses

Court Upholds City's Revocation of Liquor Licenses

  Tuesday, September 22, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a local liquor commissioner's revocation of liquor licenses for two establishments in Raven Place v. City of Blue Island.

A licensee was issued liquor licenses for two establishments in a city. In 2021, 23 gunshots were fired towards one of the licensed establishments and the establishment's security personnel returned fire. The mayor (who also serves as the local liquor commissioner) issued an emergency seven day closure of that establishment. Later that month, the city entered into an agreement with the licensee that established certain conditions and restrictions to the continued operation of both licensed establishments in the city. Under the agreement, the licensee agreed to use ID scanners, impose age restrictions and restricted hours of operation, to pay a $7,500 fine, among other restrictions. A year later while the agreement was in effect, there was another shooting at one of the establishments and the mayor issued a second seven day emergency closure order, and subsequently conducted hearings and issued two orders determining that the businesses were a "nuisance" and that the licensee had failed to comply with the agreement with the city. The mayor revoked both liquor licenses. The licensee appealed the revocation orders to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, which upheld the city's decision to revoke both licenses. The licensee then filed an administrative review action with the circuit court challenging both revocation orders, which court ruled against the licensee finding that one of the appeals was untimely and the other appeal was unfounded.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the licensee argued that the circuit court should have decided both appeals, that the businesses did not constitute a nuisance, and that the licensee's due process rights had been violated. The Appellate Court agreed with the circuit court that the licensee's appeal of the first revocation order was not timely and that it was improper for the licensee to combine both appeals into one administrative review action. Second, the court determined that both revocation orders were proper and upheld the city's decisions to revoke the liquor licenses for both establishments. 

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Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down

Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down

  Tuesday, September 15, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently issued a ruling regarding a school detachment/annexation petition in a lengthy opinion analyzing the requirements for a property owner to detach their property from one school district and attach it to another school district. Board of Education of Jasper County Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, et al. The case has a convoluted history with multiple motions to reconsider and changes of position of both the Regional Board and circuit court, which partially explains the long opinion.

Homeowners of property located in Jasper County (petitioners) filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees requesting that their property be detached from Jasper County School District (District 1) and annexed to Dieterich Community School District in Effingham County (District 30). Their property was located entirely within Jasper County and approximately 1.5 miles from the boundary of District 30 and did not touch any part of District 30. Owners of property located between the petitioners' property and the District 30 boundary joined the petition, asking that a 10 foot wide strip of their property be included in the detachment/annexation petition. The petition alleged that the territory to be detached and annexed was "contiguous" to District 30.

District 1 argued against the petition, saying it did not comply with section 7-4 of the School Code because the detachment, if granted, would result in districts that were not "compact and contiguous" as required by the Illinois Constitution and the School Code, and would create multiple "islands" that would destroy the compactness of both districts. The Regional Board conducted a hearing on the petition, hearing testimony from the petitioners and District 1 representatives. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Regional Board initially denied the petition, finding that the detriment to District 1 outweighed the benefit to the petitioners and District 30. The petitioners requested a rehearing, and at the conclusion of that rehearing, the Regional Board overturned its previous decision and granted the petition, allowing the detachment and annexation of the territory. 

District 1 filed an administrative review action with the circuit court to appeal the Regional Board's decision. The circuit court initially reversed the Regional Board, finding its decision to grant the detachment/annexation petition to be contrary to the Illinois Constitution and the School Code. The petitioners again filed a motion to reconsider, and a new judge assigned to the case vacated the prior judge's order and upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, that Court reviewed the administrative record of the Regional Board's multiple hearings, as well as documentary evidence, including a map showing the petitioners' property and the narrow strip that would connect the petitioners' property to District 30 if annexed to that district (see photo from opinion below), and determined that the Regional Board erred in granting the petition. The Court found that the petitioners failed to show how the proposed detachment and annexation would result in "compact and contiguous" districts as required by Illinois case law, the Illinois constitution, and Illinois statutes. In sum, the Court held that the petition should not have been granted, and it reversed the Regional Board's order and the circuit court's decision upholding the Regional Board's order. There was a dissenting opinion which would have upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

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First District Appellate Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA Differently than Second District

First District Appellate Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA Differently than Second District

  Thursday, September 10, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The First District Appellate Court overturned a trial court's denial of civil penalties in a FOIA case challenging a police department's response to a news media's FOIA requests. NBC Subsidiary v. Chicago Police Department.

NBC filed FOIA requests with a police department seeking surveillance video, incident reports, witness statements, and other records relating to a hit-and-run crash, as well as emails to and from two police officers relating to the crash. The police department responded by referring the requester to its records inquiry section for the crash reports and by denying the request for body-work camera footage. The response also denied other requested records claiming they were exempt because there was an ongoing criminal investigation. The police department sent an extension notice regarding the request for emails, but later denied that request citing to the same ongoing criminal investigation exemption. 

NBC filed a lawsuit against the police department, claiming it violated FOIA. The trial court ruled in favor of the police department relating to certain counts in the complaint, including finding that the police department completed a reasonable search and that certain responsive records had been destroyed pursuant to the department's records retention policy. However, the court ruled against the department regarding its withholding of certain records in their entirety. The court also found that the department "willfully and intentionally violated FOIA" by not producing the requested records. The department subsequently produced the requested records, and NBC then filed a motion seeking its attorneys fees and an award of civil penalties against the department. The court granted NBC's request for attorneys fees. However, the court denied NBC's request for civil penalties, applying a Second District Appellate Court ruling that would require NBC to show that the department "willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith" (emphasis added) failed to comply with FOIA. In this case, the trial court found there was no evidence that the department acted with a "dishonest purpose" by withholding the records. 

NBC appealed, arguing that FOIA does not require a showing of bad faith to justify the imposition of civil penalties if the public body is shown to have willfully and intentionally violated FOIA. The Appellate Court agreed with NBC, stating as follows:

We agree with this court’s decisions in Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that section 11(j) does not require separate showings that the public body both “willfully and intentionally” violated FOIA and did so “in bad faith,” or with a “dishonest purpose.” This analysis is true to the language of section 11(j), which allows for the imposition of civil penalties when “a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith.” 5 ILCS 140/11(j). We agree with Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that this court’s decision in Williams “failed to honor the disjunctive ‘or’” in section 11(j), and in doing so created a more demanding standard for the imposition of civil penalties than contemplated by the text of the statute. [citations omitted] Thus, we decline to follow Williams or Thomas.

Applying its interpretation of section 11(j) of FOIA, the First District Appellate Court found that the department's "deliberate and by design" conduct in denying the FOIA request was enough to justify the imposition of civil penalties. As a result, the Appellate Court sent the case back to the trial court to make a determination on an appropriate civil penalty against the police department.

This decision means that the First and Second District Appellate Courts have taken a different position on the type of conduct by a public body that justifies the imposition of civil penalties for a FOIA violation. 

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid

  Tuesday, September 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink released Episode 109 of its Quorum Forum Podcast: Quorum Forum Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid.

This year marks 100 years since the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty. In this episode, we share a recorded presentation from Ancel Glink's David Silverman, FAICP, and ZoneCo's Sean Suder, as a sneak preview of their upcoming live plenary session at the APA-IL State Conference on September 30, 2026! 

Episode Highlights

• The Public Safety Roots of Zoning: Why early 20th-century industrial chaos, street accidents involving children, noise, and pollution prompted the Supreme Court to step in

• The Dual Legacy: How the "intensity of use" rules established in 1926 successfully protected neighborhoods but fostered exclusionary development patterns

• Modern Prescriptions: A look at statewide zoning challenges, local preemption, and the "BUILD" legislative strategies impacting local authority

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Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

  Wednesday, September 02, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a village and village employees in a lawsuit filed by a firefighter claiming he was injured during a training drill.  Hidalgo v. Village of Romeoville.

A village firefighter attended an advanced technician firefighter training course. As part of that training course curriculum, participants were required to perform a “bailout drill.” During a bailout drill, participants exit out a third-story window of a hose tower, one leg at a time, and then use rappel line to descend down the side of the tower. Participants could use a Class 1 harness, Class 3 pre-sewn harness, or a Class 3 “hasty” harness during the bailout drill. Class 1 harnesses are body harnesses that go around a person’s waist, while Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses are manufactured body harnesses that go around a person’s waist and shoulders. Class 3 “hasty” harnesses are harnesses made by the participants using available webbing, which is a tubular structure that can be tied into a knot. 

The firefighter performed the bailout drill using a Class 1 harness and was injured after becoming separated from the harness and falling to the ground. He sued the village, claiming the village acted with “intentional/reckless conduct” in its instructions and usage of the harnesses during the bailout drill. He specifically claimed certain village employees involved in the training failed to provide adequate instructions on using and creating the Class 3 “hasty” harness. He also claimed the village’s omissions constituted negligence through willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court ruled against the firefighter, who then appealed. 

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the village, relying on Section 2-201 of the Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which states as follows: 

Sec. 2-201. Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.

That Act distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts made by government employees when determining whether a government employee qualifies for immunity. The Appellate Court applied the two-prong test, which requires courts to determine (1) if the employee holds a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving an exercise of discretion and (2) if the employee also engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the injury resulted. If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then the government employee will have immunity under that section of the Act. 

As to the village’s assistant training course instructors, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion as to certain aspects of the bailout drill (i.e., whether a Class 3 harness needed to be used) and (2) used their discretion to decide how to secure ropes and lines to the harnesses. The court emphasized that the assistant instructors used their own discretion, rather than adhering to a mandate requiring them to act in a prescribed manner, in making any decisions regarding the bailout drill. As to the village’s lead and supervising training course instructor, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion to decide how to conduct bailout drills based on their knowledge and experience and (2) exercised discretion in determining that Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses were appropriate for the bailout drill. The court also found that the village was entitled to immunity under the Act. As to the claims of negligence by willful and wanton conduct, the court found that Section 2-201 immunity is absolute and not subject to exceptions for willful and wanton conduct. 

Ultimately, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court ruling that both the employees and the village had immunity from the firefighter's claims relating to his injuries.

Post Authored by Rachel Stempler & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

  Tuesday, September 01, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a city seeking copies of correspondence exchanged between a city official and a representative from a private company, which the city official subsequently forwarded to a city attorney for the purpose of seeking legal guidance. The city denied the request citing to FOIA exemption under Section 7(1)(m), stating that because these documents came into possession of a city attorney from a client, they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and are exempt from disclosure. The reporter then filed an appeal with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) contesting the denial.

The PAC issued its 10^th binding opinion of the year, concluding that the city improperly withheld communications exchanged with a third party because they were not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 26-010. The PAC reasoned that at the time the records originated, they were not sent to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice or services, or sent from an attorney providing legal advice. Instead, the communications were between a city official and a third-party contractor for the city. Even though a city attorney later obtained these records from their client (city official), the PAC determined that forwarding pre-existing communications between the city and a third-party to counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice did  not transform those records into privileged attorney-client communications, because the records (1) did not originate in confidence between parties engaged in an attorney-client relationship and (2) at the time the records originated, they were not exchanged for the purpose of securing or providing legal advice.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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New Law Establishes Rules for Electric Bikes and Scooters

New Law Establishes Rules for Electric Bikes and Scooters

  Monday, August 31, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A new Illinois law governing who can use electric bikes and scooters, how fast they go, and where they can be used will go into effect next year. Last week, Illinois Governor Pritzker signed Senate Bill 3484  (now P.A. 104-0854) creating new statewide standards for “micromobility” devices that include age restrictions, speed limits, and locations where they can operate. The bill takes effect on January 1, 2027.

According to the bill, “electric micromobility devices” are a light-weight, low-speed, electric-powered device primarily used for personal transportation that operate at speeds up to 28 miles per hour. This includes electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters.

Electric and gas bicycles strong enough to exceed the state’s existing “low-speed” thresholds fall into a category of regulations called “motor driven cycles.” Electric bikes fall into this category if they either have electric motors rated between 750 and 8,000 watts or can operate at speeds greater than 28 miles per hour.

These vehicles will be regulated similarly to motorcycles if owners of these vehicles purchased new on or after January 1, 2027, will be required to have a driver’s license, insurance, an ownership title, and register the vehicle with the state. According to the bill, the Secretary of State may issue an instruction permit to a person who is 16 or 17 years old that entitles the holder to drive on the highways during daylight under direct supervision of a licensed motor driven cycle operator who is at least 21 and has a year of driving experience.  

“Motor driven cycles” can operate on any public highway, street, or roadway, but may not be used on any sidewalk, bicycle lane, bicycle path, shared-use path, off-road bicycle trail, or natural surface trail designated for bicycle use.

“Low-speed” electric bicycles are already regulated by the state, but the law creates new categories that govern how old a person must be to drive them. Drivers must be 15 years old to operate a Class 1 pedal-assist bicycle that’s limited to 20 miles per hour, and a Class 2 motor-powered bike that doesn’t have to be pedaled. However, riders must be 16 years old to operate a Class 3 pedal-assist bike that can travel up to 28 miles per hour.

All low-speed electric bicycles can be used on streets, bikes, lanes, paths, and trails, but not sidewalks.

The new regulations cap “electric micromobility devices” such as electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters at 28 miles per hour. Devices capable of exceeding that speed are barred outright from public roads, bike lanes, and bike paths, regardless of the posted speed limit. Riders may operate qualifying devices on any path, bike lane, roads with speed limits up to 35 miles per hour, or roads with higher speed limits if there is a bike lane. A person may not operate one of these devices unless they are 16 years of age or older.

Battery powered ride-on toys that are designed for children under 8-years-old would be unregulated aside from a stipulation they must stay on sidewalks and paths.

Users who violate the regulations could pay fines and have their devices confiscated and impounded by the police. They are also subject to other existing traffic laws and penalties. 

Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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