Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

  Wednesday, September 02, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a village and village employees in a lawsuit filed by a firefighter claiming he was injured during a training drill.  Hidalgo v. Village of Romeoville.

A village firefighter attended an advanced technician firefighter training course. As part of that training course curriculum, participants were required to perform a “bailout drill.” During a bailout drill, participants exit out a third-story window of a hose tower, one leg at a time, and then use rappel line to descend down the side of the tower. Participants could use a Class 1 harness, Class 3 pre-sewn harness, or a Class 3 “hasty” harness during the bailout drill. Class 1 harnesses are body harnesses that go around a person’s waist, while Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses are manufactured body harnesses that go around a person’s waist and shoulders. Class 3 “hasty” harnesses are harnesses made by the participants using available webbing, which is a tubular structure that can be tied into a knot. 

The firefighter performed the bailout drill using a Class 1 harness and was injured after becoming separated from the harness and falling to the ground. He sued the village, claiming the village acted with “intentional/reckless conduct” in its instructions and usage of the harnesses during the bailout drill. He specifically claimed certain village employees involved in the training failed to provide adequate instructions on using and creating the Class 3 “hasty” harness. He also claimed the village’s omissions constituted negligence through willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court ruled against the firefighter, who then appealed. 

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the village, relying on Section 2-201 of the Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which states as follows: 

Sec. 2-201. Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.

That Act distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts made by government employees when determining whether a government employee qualifies for immunity. The Appellate Court applied the two-prong test, which requires courts to determine (1) if the employee holds a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving an exercise of discretion and (2) if the employee also engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the injury resulted. If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then the government employee will have immunity under that section of the Act. 

As to the village’s assistant training course instructors, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion as to certain aspects of the bailout drill (i.e., whether a Class 3 harness needed to be used) and (2) used their discretion to decide how to secure ropes and lines to the harnesses. The court emphasized that the assistant instructors used their own discretion, rather than adhering to a mandate requiring them to act in a prescribed manner, in making any decisions regarding the bailout drill. As to the village’s lead and supervising training course instructor, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion to decide how to conduct bailout drills based on their knowledge and experience and (2) exercised discretion in determining that Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses were appropriate for the bailout drill. The court also found that the village was entitled to immunity under the Act. As to the claims of negligence by willful and wanton conduct, the court found that Section 2-201 immunity is absolute and not subject to exceptions for willful and wanton conduct. 

Ultimately, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court ruling that both the employees and the village had immunity from the firefighter's claims relating to his injuries.

Post Authored by Rachel Stempler & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

  Tuesday, September 01, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a city seeking copies of correspondence exchanged between a city official and a representative from a private company, which the city official subsequently forwarded to a city attorney for the purpose of seeking legal guidance. The city denied the request citing to FOIA exemption under Section 7(1)(m), stating that because these documents came into possession of a city attorney from a client, they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and are exempt from disclosure. The reporter then filed an appeal with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) contesting the denial.

The PAC issued its 10^th binding opinion of the year, concluding that the city improperly withheld communications exchanged with a third party because they were not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 26-010. The PAC reasoned that at the time the records originated, they were not sent to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice or services, or sent from an attorney providing legal advice. Instead, the communications were between a city official and a third-party contractor for the city. Even though a city attorney later obtained these records from their client (city official), the PAC determined that forwarding pre-existing communications between the city and a third-party to counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice did  not transform those records into privileged attorney-client communications, because the records (1) did not originate in confidence between parties engaged in an attorney-client relationship and (2) at the time the records originated, they were not exchanged for the purpose of securing or providing legal advice.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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New Law Establishes Rules for Electric Bikes and Scooters

New Law Establishes Rules for Electric Bikes and Scooters

  Monday, August 31, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A new Illinois law governing who can use electric bikes and scooters, how fast they go, and where they can be used will go into effect next year. Last week, Illinois Governor Pritzker signed Senate Bill 3484  (now P.A. 104-0854) creating new statewide standards for “micromobility” devices that include age restrictions, speed limits, and locations where they can operate. The bill takes effect on January 1, 2027.

According to the bill, “electric micromobility devices” are a light-weight, low-speed, electric-powered device primarily used for personal transportation that operate at speeds up to 28 miles per hour. This includes electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters.

Electric and gas bicycles strong enough to exceed the state’s existing “low-speed” thresholds fall into a category of regulations called “motor driven cycles.” Electric bikes fall into this category if they either have electric motors rated between 750 and 8,000 watts or can operate at speeds greater than 28 miles per hour.

These vehicles will be regulated similarly to motorcycles if owners of these vehicles purchased new on or after January 1, 2027, will be required to have a driver’s license, insurance, an ownership title, and register the vehicle with the state. According to the bill, the Secretary of State may issue an instruction permit to a person who is 16 or 17 years old that entitles the holder to drive on the highways during daylight under direct supervision of a licensed motor driven cycle operator who is at least 21 and has a year of driving experience.  

“Motor driven cycles” can operate on any public highway, street, or roadway, but may not be used on any sidewalk, bicycle lane, bicycle path, shared-use path, off-road bicycle trail, or natural surface trail designated for bicycle use.

“Low-speed” electric bicycles are already regulated by the state, but the law creates new categories that govern how old a person must be to drive them. Drivers must be 15 years old to operate a Class 1 pedal-assist bicycle that’s limited to 20 miles per hour, and a Class 2 motor-powered bike that doesn’t have to be pedaled. However, riders must be 16 years old to operate a Class 3 pedal-assist bike that can travel up to 28 miles per hour.

All low-speed electric bicycles can be used on streets, bikes, lanes, paths, and trails, but not sidewalks.

The new regulations cap “electric micromobility devices” such as electric skateboards, electric unicycles, low-speed electric scooters, and high-speed scooters at 28 miles per hour. Devices capable of exceeding that speed are barred outright from public roads, bike lanes, and bike paths, regardless of the posted speed limit. Riders may operate qualifying devices on any path, bike lane, roads with speed limits up to 35 miles per hour, or roads with higher speed limits if there is a bike lane. A person may not operate one of these devices unless they are 16 years of age or older.

Battery powered ride-on toys that are designed for children under 8-years-old would be unregulated aside from a stipulation they must stay on sidewalks and paths.

Users who violate the regulations could pay fines and have their devices confiscated and impounded by the police. They are also subject to other existing traffic laws and penalties. 

Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Storm Sewer Maps and Records

PAC Finds City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Storm Sewer Maps and Records

  Wednesday, August 26, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In its 9th binding opinion for 2026, the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) found in favor of a public body in a FOIA appeal involving a request for storm sewer infrastructure maps and records. PAC Op. 26-009. 

A requester submitted a request to a city water department asking for sewer and flood control maps, GIS mapping data, engineering schematics, and other maps detailing the exact locations of all surface water drainage infrastructure for a specified area in the city. The city denied the request, citing to section 7(1)(x) of FOIA which exempts the following from disclosure:

Maps and other records regarding the location or security of generation, transmission, distribution, storage, gathering, treatment, or switching facilities owned by a utility, by a power generator, or by the Illinois Power Agency.

The PAC agreed with the city that the FOIA exemption applied to the requested records, finding that the "plain language of section 7(1)(x) exempts, among other things, maps and other records regarding the location of gathering facilities owned by a utility." The PAC determined that the city's water department operated as a "utility" and that the infrastructure operated by the city that was the subject of the request qualified as "facilities" under the cited FOIA exemption. The PAC rejected the requester's argument that the city was required to demonstrate how release of the records would affect the security of the city's utility system, finding that records that reveal "the location" of utility facilities was enough to trigger the exemption without having to show a security concern, stating as follows:

Because section 7(1)(x) is worded disjunctively, however, it provides two independent bases for claiming the exemption: (1) the requested records regard the location of facilities owned by a utility or (2) the requested records regard the security of facilities owned by a utility. 

In sum, the PAC determined that the requested records (consisting of atlases-detailed maps showing the location of sewers, storm mains, access points, and various other details of the city's water infrastructure and GIS mapping data detailing the location of stormwater gathering facilities) fall squarely within the types of records exempt under section 7(1)(x). As a result, the city did not violate FOIA in denying the request in its entirety.

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Court Finds Appeal of Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Frivolous

Court Finds Appeal of Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Frivolous

  Tuesday, August 25, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a public body in a FOIA lawsuit, finding the appeal frivolous in Tidwell v. Illinois Department of Corrections.

A requester submitted a request to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) seeking the names of all medical personnel. IDOC denied the request, citing to a FOIA exemption that expressly exempts from release records requested by persons committed to the DOC or a county jail that include staff members' personnel files, staff rosters, or other staffing assignment information. The requester filed a lawsuit against IDOC. The circuit court dismissed his lawsuit, ruling in favor of IDOC. He then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of his lawsuit, finding that his appeal of the circuit court's decision was frivolous because he was aware of the specific exemption that prevented the disclosure of the information he requested. 

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City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Records Maintained by Another Public Body

City Did Not Violate FOIA in Denying Request for Records Maintained by Another Public Body

  Monday, August 24, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request seeking a court docket for a specific case, a city responded that it did not have any responsive records in its possession or custody, and directed the requester to contact the agency most likely to have responsive records (the county court system). After the requester sued the city alleging FOIA violations, the circuit court ruled in favor of the city, finding that the city did not violate FOIA when it did not produce records that were not in its possession.

After the requester appealed, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the city. Tidwell v. City of Alton. The Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the city could obtain the sought records by downloading them (from another agency’s website) and providing them to the requester, because FOIA does not require a public body to turn over records that the public body does not have and does not normally retain. Because a public body cannot improperly withhold records that it does not maintain, the Appellate Court determined that the city did not violate FOIA in response to the request.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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No Violation of FOIA Where Records Not in Possession of Responding Public Body

No Violation of FOIA Where Records Not in Possession of Responding Public Body

  Monday, August 17, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court rejected an inmate's claims in a FOIA lawsuit against a sheriff's department in King v. Livingston County Sheriff's Office.

An inmate filed a FOIA request with a sheriff's office seeking records pertaining to racial profiling by a specific police officer. The sheriff's office responded that it had no responsive records because the officer was not employed by the sheriff's office but a city police department. The inmate sued, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the sheriff's office. On appeal, the Appellate Court also found no violation of FOIA in the sheriff's office's response, holding that the "nonexistence of requested documents is a cognizable affirmative defense" to a FOIA claim. In this case, the sheriff's office was not in possession of the requested record at the time of the request, so there was no FOIA violation in its response to the inmate's request.

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Governor Signs Bill Requiring Libraries and Other Facilities to Post Suicide Hotline (9-8-8) Information

Governor Signs Bill Requiring Libraries and Other Facilities to Post Suicide Hotline (9-8-8) Information

  Thursday, August 13, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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On August 7, 2026, Governor Pritzker signed Public Act 104-0808 into law, also referred to as Tammurra's Act (Act). The Act applies to various facilities and institutions, including libraries established under the Local Library Act and Public Library District Act of 1991, county shelter care homes, public institutions of higher education, and licensed day care centers. The Act takes effect on January 1, 2027.

The Act requires that contact information for the 9-8-8 National Suicide Prevention Lifeline be posted in these facilities “in a prominent location that is visible to and accessible by” patrons and users. The 9-8-8 Lifeline is a free, nationwide resource administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the federal government (SAMHSA). While the Act does not specify what contact information must be posted, the 9-8-8 Lifeline allows individuals seeking assistance to call, text, or “chat” online.

The 9-8-8 Lifeline website (linked above) has many resources readers can consult, including FAQs, a glossary of terms, and information regarding services available to individuals. Notably, the website offers free print materials that include contact information for those seeking assistance.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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City Not Liable for Damages in Failed Sale of City Land

City Not Liable for Damages in Failed Sale of City Land

  Wednesday, August 12, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit claiming a city was responsible for damages relating to a failed sale of city land because of alleged verbal promises of a city employee. Arroyo et al. v. City of Chicago.

According to the lawsuit, the city economic development coordinator met with a potential purchaser of property that was owned by the city. The city entered into a right of entry agreement allowing the potential purchaser to access the properties to conduct due diligence. However, the parties did not enter into a purchase and sale agreement for the sale of the property. The potential purchaser retained consultants to conduct investigations of soil and other conditions of the property. The potential purchaser claims that the city employee assured him that the city would sell the property to him, but when he was not provided with an appraisal by the city to complete the negotiations for the purchase, he filed a lawsuit seeking $500,000 in damages from the city for the investigations. The circuit court dismissed the case, and he appealed.

The Appellate Court upheld the dismissal. First, the Court held that there could be no "implied-in-fact contract" under a promissory estoppel theory because the city could not be bound by a contract that does not comply with legal requirements for a valid contract. Here, city ordinances provided that only the city council had the authority to sell city land, so any promises made by a city employee were void and unenforceable.

Second, it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on assurances from a city employee who did not have actual authority to bind the city. 

Third, the Court noted that verbal contracts for the sale of land are unenforceable.

Finally, the Court held that the right of entry agreement that the parties did enter into did not provide for compensation to the plaintiff for his due diligence efforts, which were conducted to benefit the plaintiff, and not the city.

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7th Circuit Addresses First Amendment Challenge to Town's Deletion of Comments on Website

7th Circuit Addresses First Amendment Challenge to Town's Deletion of Comments on Website

  Tuesday, August 11, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Schulte v. Leners, et al., the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to a municipal official's deletion of critical comments on the town's website, as well as the town's decision to entirely shut down future comments on its website.

A Wisconsin town maintained a website where it posted agendas and updates on pending town activities and business. The website allowed members of the public to comment on individual town posts, and many members of the public did express their opinions in the comment sections. The town did not have a policy to limit who could comment or what commenters could post. In 2022, the chairman of the town board posted on the website a notice criticizing the use of RVs in the town and advocating for greater regulations. A member of the public who owns an RV posted a comment disagreeing with the chairman's post, and other members of the public also took issue with the post. The chairman replied to one of the critical comments calling the comment disrespectful, and the commenter replied. The chairman then deleted the commenter's reply, as well as all other critical comments to the chairman's original post. A month or so later, the town board voted to end comment sections entirely on its website.

The original commenter sued, claiming the town and the town board chairman violated her First Amendment right to free speech by engaging in "viewpoint discrimination" in deleting her comments. She also claimed the town retaliated against her when it shut down all comments on the website. The chairman filed a motion to dismiss her case claiming he had qualified immunity for his actions. The district court denied the motion, rejecting the chairman's qualified immunity argument.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit agreed with the district court that the town chairman did not have qualified immunity for his actions in deleting the critical comments from his original post. The Court first determined that the comment section of the town's website was a public forum (at least during the time it was open to the public), and the town could not discriminate based on viewpoint, which the Court found the chairman did in deleting all critical comments from the original post. The Court likened the town's website that allowed comments to a social media site, noting there were numerous cases finding that public comment sections are a public forum subject to the First Amendment. The Court also rejected the town's argument that the website was "government speech," finding that the comment section of the website operated as a public forum for people to express opinions about government actions. The Court also noted that the town had no policy to control comments, which defeated any "government speech" argument. In sum, the Court found that because no reasonable official could have concluded that it was legal to selectively delete speech based on viewpoint, the chairman was not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in deleting the critical comments. 

The Court did not address the chairman's argument that he had qualified immunity for the town's decision to shut down comments entirely because it was not part of the district court's qualified-immunity analysis. So, we did not get a clear indication of how the 7th Circuit would rule on that particular issue. However, the Court did give a hint how it might analyze this issue in the following statement:

Just as the government can designate a forum on its previously nonpublic property, it reserves the right to close the forum at any time. 

This statement suggests that governments might be able to shut down comments entirely in a designated public forum like a website that allows comments or a social media page. However, because this statement was in the nature of "dicta," governments should consult with legal counsel before deciding to shut down comments entirely in a designated public forum.

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 108: Election Special!

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 108: Election Special!

  Monday, August 10, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 108: Quorum Forum 108: Election Special!

Summer of 2026 is upon us, and election season is kicking off as spirited candidates, trusted election authorities, and municipalities across Illinois seek to address a host of complex issues. Local election officials and electoral boards have many responsibilities to make elections happen, from processing nomination papers to convening quasi-adjudicative hearings. Meanwhile, local governments must navigate the enforcement of political sign regulations, electioneering laws, and the strict rules governing the use of public funds in referenda.

To help listeners tackle these issues, Ancel Glink’s Erin Monforti and Katie Nagy revisit classic insights from equity partner Keri-Lyn Krafthefer and provide vital updates for the 2027 Consolidated Election cycle.  

In This Episode 

• Independent vs. Nonpartisan Candidates: Understand the critical legal distinctions between these two types of candidates and how they appear on the ballot.
• The 2027 Election Timeline: Key dates for the February 23, 2027, Consolidated Primary and the April 6, 2027, Consolidated Election, including petition circulation and filing windows.
• Objection Procedures & "Business Days": How to calculate the five-business-day objection deadline, especially with the Thanksgiving 2026 holiday.
• Electoral Board Mechanics: A deep dive into the "24-hour call" rule, the composition of the board, and the requirement to deliberate in open session.
• Strategic Scheduling: Practical advice for clerks on the "strategic receipt" of objection petitions to ensure boards can meet within statutory deadlines.
• Setting Compensation: Why local governments must set compensation for newly elected officials at least 180 days before their terms begin.
• New Laws: Updates on Public Act 104-443 (redacting candidate addresses) and Public Act 104-438 (prohibiting meetings on election days).
• Public Funds & Referenda: Guidelines on what constitutes "factual information" versus prohibited advocacy when units of local government are involved in public questions.
• FOIA & Arrest Records: A review of PAC Opinion 26-006 regarding the public’s right to access arrest records involving public figures.

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ISBE Has Issued 408 Pages of AI Guidance: What School Districts Need to Know

ISBE Has Issued 408 Pages of AI Guidance: What School Districts Need to Know

  Friday, August 07, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) has published statewide guidance on artificial intelligence use in schools. This guidance provides schools with a toolbox of instructional use rubrics, model policies, and implementation checklists. However, what it does not provide them with is a single, uniform Illinois model policy ready to adopt. 

This guidance was developed in response to Public Act 104-0399, which in 2025 charged the ISBE with “develop[ing] statewide guidance for school districts and educators on the use of artificial intelligence in elementary and secondary education.” 

School districts are directed to model templates and policies that they can use as “starting points.” Those resources are organized into three distinct policies: a district-wide policy, an Acceptable Use Policy, and an Informed Use Policy. ISBE provides model template resources from other states and districts to support drafting, review, legal/compliance checks, and board adoption processes. 

The guidance also flags that “trust but verify” should govern all AI use where it “should not independently determine special education eligibility, student discipline outcomes, teacher evaluations, hiring decisions, or other high-stake determinations without documented human review and district accountability processes.” 

ISBE indicates it will release additional tailored guidance and no-cost professional learning during the 2026-27 school year. In the meantime, school districts with questions about implementing AI policies or evaluating their current procedures should contract their legal counsel for assistance.

Post Authored by Ronette Leal McCarthy & Betsy Lecy, Ancel Glink

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