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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Friday, July 10, 2026

Seventh Circuit Upholds "Protect Illinois Communities Act" that Restricts Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines


The Illinois General Assembly enacted the Protect Illinois Communities Act following a deadly shooting at a Chicago suburb’s Independence Day parade. That Act criminalizes the manufacture, sale, delivery, purchase, and possession of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, among other things. The Act contains a grandfather clause that allows preexisting lawful owners of the regulated items to continue possessing them. 

Shortly after the Act was adopted, several lawsuits were filed to challenge its constitutionality. The district court decisions were divided, with one court granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act and two district courts denying injunctive relief. Those appeals made their way to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which consolidated the cases and issued a ruling in 2023 that rejected preliminary relief to the challengers and sent the case back to the district courts for further proceedings.

One of the consolidated cases proceeded to a bench trial. The district court in that case held that much of the Act violated the Second Amendment and that the offending provisions were not severable, and the court enjoined enforcement of the Act in its entirety. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which recently reversed the ruling and upheld the Act, including its restrictions on AR-15s and thirty-round rifle magazines. Barnett et al., v. Raoul. 

First, the Seventh Circuit held that the challengers failed to meet their burden to show that all of the Act's regulations were facially invalid. Second, the Seventh Circuit assumed for purposes of its ruling that the regulated items constituted "arms" under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment, meaning that they were presumptively entitled to constitutional protection under the Second Amendment. Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the test established by the Supreme Court for challenges under the Second Amendment and determined that the Act was consistent with the principles that "underpin our regulatory tradition" because legislatures have long imposed restrictions on particularly dangerous weapons like those regulated by the Act. Further, the Seventh Circuit found the Act’s “burden on the right of armed self defense" to be minimal. In sum, the Seventh Circuit held that the challengers failed to meet their burden in a facial challenge to the Act's constitutionality under the Second Amendment. 

Thursday, July 9, 2026

Illinois Adopts Amendments to Child Care Licensing; Provides Direction to Newly Organized Department of Early Childhood


Two years ago, the State of Illinois began the process of consolidating the operation and management of programs previously administered by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS), Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), and the Governor’s Office of Early Childhood Development (GOECD). As of July 1, 2026, the Illinois Department of Early Childhood (IDEC) began operations to complete the transition.

Just before IDEC began operating, the Governor signed into law Public Act 104-0480 adopting comprehensive reforms in license regulations for day care centers. The new act creates three tiers of licensing and registration:  Day Care Center Providers, Recognized Alternative Providers and Exempt Providers. Most importantly for local governments, the amendments re-affirm the State’s double exemption for programs operated by local governments so long as those programs meet defined statutory parameters. Eligible programs will be exempt from regulation as a Day Care Center Provider and from registration as a Recognized Alternative Provider.

To qualify for the double exemption, a local government (or combination of local governments pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement) may demonstrate it is operating a special activities program, such as athletics, recreation, crafts instruction, music, dance, drama, sports, or similar activities offered by a unit of local government, including special activities programs offered by 2 or more units of local government pursuant to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. (There are other exemptions for school-based extracurricular activities conducted outside of the school day.)

These types of special activities programs will qualify for the double exemption if they demonstrate all the following requirements:

(A) State law authorizes the unit of local government to offer the program and an elected or appointed board of the unit of local government has adopted policies governing the operation of the program, pursuant to Section 8-10 of the Park District Code or other applicable law.

(B) The program is offered to the following categories of children and the parent or legal guardian of each child has received written acknowledgement that the program is not licensed by the Department under this Act:

(i) children at least 5 years of age for no more than 100 continuous days in any 12-month period when school is not in session;

(ii) children at least 3 years of age for no more than 3.5 continuous hours at a time; or

(iii) children under 3 years of age for no more than one hour at a time.

(C) The program does not advertise to the public as a pre-school program, licensed early care and education provider, licensed child care, or licensed day care.

(D) The program conducts the following investigations on all employees of the program no less than once every 5 years:

(i) background investigations pursuant to Section 8-23 of the Park District Code, Section 16a-5 of the Chicago Park District Act, or other applicable law;

(ii) a (free) name check against State and national sex offender registries; and

(iii) a (free) Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System (CANTS) name check through the Department at no cost to the unit of local government.

(E) The program conducts the following investigations on all volunteers of the program no less than once every 5 years:

(i) background investigations pursuant to Section 8-23 of the Park District Code, Section 16a-5 of the Chicago Park District Act, or other applicable law;

(ii) a (free) name check against State and national sex offender registries; and

(iii) a (free) Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System (CANTS) name check through the Department at no cost to the unit of local government.

(F) The unit of local government has an emergency preparedness and response plan for the location of the special activities program.

(G) The program does not participate in the Child Care Assistance Program (CCAP) or receive funding pursuant to the Early Childhood Block Grant.

If a program fails to satisfy all the requirements, it will be required to either obtain a license as a day care center or register as a recognized alternative provider.

Some local governments have recently been asked by DCFS to “apply” for exempt status. Public Act 104-0480 clarifies whether this is necessary. Section 3.01 of the Child Care Act, as amended, provides

The Department of Early Childhood shall provide written verification of exemption and description of compliance with standards for the health, safety, and development of the children who receive the services upon submission by the provider of, in addition to any other documentation required by the Department of Early Childhood, a notarized statement that the provider facility complies with: (1) the standards of the Department of Public Health or local health department, (2) the fire safety standards of the State Fire Marshal, and (3) if operated in a public school building, the health and safety standards of the State Board of Education.

The amendments related to licensing and registration requirements will become effective for all providers other than park districts on July 1, 2027, but not until July 1, 2028 for park districts.  Programs operating under a current 2-year licensing exemption shall be allowed to continue to operate under that exemption until it expires or until July 1, 2028, whichever is later.

Keep an eye open for IDEC adopting new administrative regulations implementing the revised statutory scheme. 

Post Authored by Adam Simon, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, July 8, 2026

Supreme Court Invalidates Hawaii Firearm "Owner Consent" Restriction


In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Hawaii law that prohibited firearms on private property open to the public without the express and affirmative consent of the property owner. Wolford v. Lopez.

Following the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, which ended “may-issue” concealed carry licensing schemes, Hawaii enacted HRS § 134-9.5. The law provided that a person carrying a licensed firearm could not enter or remain on private property of another person “unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property.” Such authorization could be provided through unambiguous written or verbal consent or the posting of clear and conspicuous signage at the entrance of the building or elsewhere on the premises.

The Supreme Court held that the law conflicted with the common law presumption that members of the public, including those lawfully carrying firearms, may enter private property open to the public unless expressly prohibited from doing so. As a result, the Court concluded that Hawaii’s law unconstitutionally burdened individuals seeking to exercise their Second Amendment right to carry a firearm for self-defense. In addition, the Hawaii law could not be justified by the country's historical firearm regulations.

This ruling does not raise concerns regarding the applicability of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act (430 ILCS 66/et seq.). Illinois follows a system where firearms are presumptively allowed on private property unless the owner posts statutorily prescribed signage prohibiting them. This is consistent with the common law presumption. Hawaii took the opposite approach, presumptively prohibiting firearms on private property by requiring signage indicating that carrying firearms was authorized. Illinois law requires that property owners take affirmative steps to exclude firearms, whereas Hawaii’s approach required that property owners take affirmative steps to allow them.   

This decision impacts California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey, which have laws similar to Hawaii’s.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Dan Bolin, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, July 7, 2026

PAC Finds Police Department Violated FOIA in Withholding Investigative Records


A news media requester submitted a FOIA request to a police department seeking records related to an investigation of an arrested individual for a domestic incident. The department entirely denied its responsive records to the request citing FOIA’s personal privacy exemption in Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. After the requester submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) challenging the denial, the PAC issued its sixth binding opinion of 2026 concluding that the department improperly withheld its responsive records. PAC Op. 26-006

The PAC first noted that previous PAC opinions were clear that there is a strong public interest in the disclosure of information concerning arrests that outweighs an arrestee's right to privacy. Also, because the requester is a news reporter seeking to report about a matter of high public interest (the arrest of a police officer), there was a heightened public interest in disclosure of information regarding this arrest. 

Because the department’s records contain information that was incidental or had no bearing on the arrest or circumstances leading to the arrest, including the names and personally identifying information (contact information, nature of relationship with arrestee) of witnesses and third parties, the PAC determined that the department was authorized to redact that personal information pursuant to Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. However, the department was required to release the remaining non-exempt parts of its responsive records to the request.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Monday, July 6, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam


Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast released Episode 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam. In this episode,  the American Planning Association Chicago Metro Section recently teamed up with Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast for the 11th Annual “Bar Exam” Planning Law Session. Recorded live at Goodwin’s in Chicago, this realistic, simulated law school experience tests planners and land use professionals on the latest legal precedents in wind energy, annexation, and First Amendment protections. As is tradition, all participants passed the bar, and teams competed for the prestigious (and five-foot-tall) Ancel Glink Cup. In this episode, Ancel Glink’s Dan Bolin, Megan Mack, and Tyler Smith are joined by special guest Phil Green, a Local Gov 250 Government Champion, who undergoes a high-tech “firmware update” to become the session’s first AI-powered planning law assistant.

In This Episode

§  [00:00] The Roll Call: Host Dan Bolin calls the meeting to order with professors Megan Mack and Tyler Smith, plus local government champion Phil Green.

§  [05:00] Round 1: Democracy at the Doorstep: Phil discusses his recognition as a Local Gov 250 Champion and his work on “democracy at the doorstep” in Hoffman Estates.

§  [11:30] Case 1.1 - Wind Farm Bans: A look at Hickory Wind LLC v. Village of Cedar Point, exploring why outright bans on lawful land uses exceed non-home rule authority.

§  [19:00] Case 1.2 - Zoning Finality: In Chosen Consulting LLC v. Town Council of Highland, we learn why ADA and discrimination claims do not bypass the requirement for a final zoning decision.

§  [22:30] Case 1.3 - Cross-Examination Rights: A resort project in Galena highlights the importance of maintaining a record when residents forfeit their right to cross-examine witnesses.

§  [26:30] Round 2: The Road to Houston: Phil shares takeaways from serving as the Education Chair for NPC26 in Detroit and teases a “Moon Joy” theme for NPC27 in Houston.

§  [31:45] Case 2.1 - Forceful Annexation: We review a 4.7% perimeter gap in Husky Transportation v. Village of Barrington Hills to define the “wholly bounded” standard.

§  [35:45] Case 2.2 - First Amendment Retaliation: The saga of the Minocqua Brewing Co. demonstrates that permit denials are not retaliatory if they would have occurred regardless of protected speech.

§  [39:15] Case 2.3 - The Hamburger UFOs: A whimsical mural case from Kansas tests “intermediate scrutiny” and whether cities can prove that burger art is more distracting than flower art.

§  [42:00] The Future of Planning Law: Megan and Tyler discuss the responsible use of AI in legal practice and how municipalities are responding to data center controversies involving power and water consumption.

§  [46:15] The Reveal of A.I. CPU: Phil Green manifests as the A.I. CPU, an assistant that is 100% confident, 60% accurate, and requires massive amounts of “liquid cooling” to function.

§  [48:00] Round 3: AI-Assisted Answers: The A.I. CPU helps navigate cases on warrantless rental inspections, daily fine calculations, and why missing scaffolding is not a legal defense for safety hazards.

§  [1:02:30] Crowning the Champions: We announce the winners of the 2026 Bar Exam and award the shiny gold Ancel Glink Cup to the “Transit Masters.”


Thursday, July 2, 2026

Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA


After a police department failed to respond to a news agency's FOIA request, the requester filed a lawsuit. Although the department produced its responsive records during the litigation, the requester filed a petition for civil penalties against the department pursuant to Section 11(j) of FOIA, which states that:

If the court determines that a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith, the court shall also impose upon the public body a civil penalty of not less than $2,500 nor more than $5,000 for each occurrence. 5 ILCS 140/11(j).

After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that the department had willfully and intentionally violated FOIA because it had knowledge of FOIA’s response requirements and did not to demonstrate a good reason for non-compliance with those requirements. However, relying on prior Illinois cases that required a requester to demonstrate both (1) a willful and intentional violation of FOIA, and (2) that the FOIA violation was deliberate, by design, and done with a dishonest purpose, the circuit court ruled that the requester was not entitled to civil penalties, because the requester did not prove that the department had a dishonest purpose when violating FOIA.

After the requester appealed the circuit court’s ruling, an Illinois Appellate Court (First District) reversed the circuit court’s denial of civil penalties, and sent the case back to the circuit court to determine appropriate civil penalties. Lucy Parsons Labs v. Chicago Police Department. The Appellate Court determined that the “or otherwise acted in bad faith” language in Section 11(j) is a catch-all category of possible bad faith actions that a public body can take in violation of FOIA. In other words, the examples of bad faith conduct included in Section 11(j) of FOIA—willful and intentional noncompliance—is an illustrative example of bad faith conduct rather than an exhaustive list. The Appellate Court reasoned that interpreting Section 11(j) of FOIA to require demonstrating that a public body “willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith failed to comply with the FOIA” supplants the catchall term, and replaces it with the conjunctive “and,” which imposes a higher standard of proof to demonstrate bad faith non-compliance with FOIA, and eliminates the possibility that a “willful and intentional” violation of FOIA could, by itself, warrant civil penalties. In this case, because the circuit court found that the department intentionally and willfully violated FOIA, the Appellate Court ruled that the circuit court’s order finding that the requester had not met its burden of proof for the imposition of civil penalties against the department was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

In the Zone: Court Rejects "Equitable Estoppel" Claim of Property Owner


An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a municipality in a case brought by a property owner challenging the municipality's zoning decisions relating to the owner's commercial uses of property zoned in a Conservation zoning district. Deepe v. Village of Swansea Planning & Zoning Board.

The owner of two parcels of property applied for a zoning compliance certificate and construction permit to operate a commercial business on land zoned in the Conservation district. Over several years, the owner applied for and received permits and permission from the municipality to operate his business. After neighbors complained about the operation of the lawncare and storage businesses on the two parcels, the municipality notified the owner that his uses were nonconforming and he needed to bring his operations into compliance with the zoning regulations. The owner appealed the order to the zoning board, which ruled in favor of the municipality. He then appealed to the circuit court, which ruled in favor of the owner with respect to one of the parcels, finding that the municipality was "equitably estopped" from enforcing its regulations. However, the court found in favor of the municipality with respect to the second parcel. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's ruling in favor of the owner on his equitable estoppel claim. The Court first determined that the two parcels were zoned in the Conservation district, and the owner never applied for a rezoning to a more appropriate district. Second, the owner knew and even acknowledged that the Conservation district did not allow a storage business so he could not rely on any acquiescence by the municipality. Third, the Court acknowledged that while the municipality could have been more forceful in its enforcement, "slow enforcement" would not support an estoppel claim. In sum, the Court found in favor of the municipality, holding that the owner could not establish an "equitable estoppel" claim for its use of either parcel. 

There was a dissenting opinion that would have ruled in favor of the property owner on his equitable estoppel claims based on the actions of municipal officials and employees over the years with respect to the owner's uses. 

Monday, June 29, 2026

Court Upholds Municipality's Administrative Adjudication Fine for Overweight Trucks


In Solano v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld a home rule municipality's authority to use its administrative adjudication hearing system and fine drivers of overweight trucks in an amount in excess of $250.00. First, the Court acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court in Cammacho v. City of Joliet had previously held that home rule governments could use administrative hearings to adjudicate moving offenses and reportable violations. Second, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that section 11-208.3 of the Illinois Vehicle Code restricts municipalities from imposing a fine of more than $250.00 for certain standing, parking, and other violations, finding that overweight trucks were not listed in the category of offenses identified in that section of the Code. As a result, the Court upheld the municipality's issuance of the fine against Solano.

Thursday, June 25, 2026

Abandonment Statute Does Not Require Proof of Delivery or Receipt of Notice


An Illinois Appellate Court recently interpreted the abandonment procedures of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code), holding that a municipality does not have to prove actual delivery or receipt of notice to all parties with a record interest in order to obtain a judicial deed under section 11-31-1 of the Code. Village of Downers Grove v. Beckham.

A municipality filed a petition with the court under section 11-31-1 of the Code to request that the court declare a property abandoned and issue a judicial deed to the property as well as an order of demolition. The municipality argued that the property was in disrepair and unfit for occupancy, as well as dangerous and unsafe. The petition indicated that notices were sent by mail to all named defendants advising them of the court action. The owner of record executed a waiver of rights to challenge the petition. However, another defendant (Lakeview) with a security interest in the property objected to the petition based on notice deficiencies. After the municipality amended its petition and served notice by certified mail, Lakeview again objected to the petition on notice grounds. The circuit court ultimately granted the municipality's petition and issued a judicial deed for the property.

Lakeview appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in issuing the judicial deed because the municipality failed to establish that notice was actually delivered to or received by all interested parties. The municipality argued that the statute does not require proof of delivery, and the Appellate Court agreed, holding that section 11-31-1(d) of the Code does not condition the notice's effectiveness on actual delivery or receipt. Instead, the Code only requires the municipality to send the notice in the required manner - i.e., by certified or registered mail. As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's issuance of the judicial deed.


Wednesday, June 24, 2026

Supreme Court Says Government Not Liable to Pay Owner Fair Market Value in Tax Foreclosure Sale


In a 9-0 opinion (with a couple of concurring opinions), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a government that forecloses and sells property for delinquent property taxes is not responsible to pay the owner the difference between the sale price and the hypothetical fair market value of the property. Pung v. Isabella County

Three years ago, the Supreme Court held that a government that forecloses and sells property for delinquent property taxes may be liable to return to the owner any surplus proceeds from tax foreclosure sales (i.e., the difference between the sales price and the taxpayer's debt). Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U. S. 631 (2023)

In today's case, the question before the Supreme Court went a step further -  what if the sale price falls below the property's hypothetical fair market value, would the government be responsible for paying the difference to the owner as "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause? Yesterday, the Supreme Court said no, holding that the proper baseline for determining compensation under the Takings Clause is the price obtained in the tax sale so long as the sale was fairly conducted. The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not require the government to return the difference between the sale price and fair market value of the property that was sold. In this case, the Court held that the county was obligated to pay the surplus proceeds to the owner, but was not liable to pay more than what the county sold the property for at its tax sale auction. The opinion concluded with the following:

The Pung family lost its property because it failed to pay its taxes. The Fifth Amendment protects the family’s right to surplus proceeds from the tax sale, not compensation for the property’s fair market value. The Eighth Amendment offers no greater protections. 

So, when a government forecloses and sells property for delinquent taxes, (1) it must return any surplus proceeds from the sale (the difference between the sale price and the taxpayer's debt) but (2) is not required to pay more than what the government sold the property for even if the fair market value of the property exceeds the sale price. 


Tuesday, June 23, 2026

Citizen Was Not Entitled to Litigation Costs in Lawsuit Against PAC


A citizen filed two appeals with the Public Access Counselor of the Attorney General's office (PAC) claiming a public body violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA). After the PAC had still not issued a decision two years later, the citizen sued the PAC claiming it violated the OMA by not resolving his appeals within 60 days as provided by section 3.5 of the OMA. Within a week of being served with the lawsuit, the PAC issued non-binding determinations resolving the two appeals and finding the public body in violation of OMA. The citizen filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss one of his claims seeking a court order mandating the PAPACC to respond, acknowledging that claim was now "moot." However, the citizen also filed a motion seeking litigation costs from the PAC under section 3 of the OMA. The trial court denied his request and he appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court examined the OMA and determined that the PAC was not a proper defendant to a lawsuit to enforce the OMA under section 3 of the OMA. The Court interpreted the enforcement provision to apply to public body defendants and their alleged violations of the OMA, and not to the PAC's compliance with the statutory deadlines to respond to appeals, because the PAC is not a "party" under the enforcement statute when a citizen files an appeal of a public body's decision or actions with the PAC. As a result, the Court held that the citizen was not entitled to recover his litigation costs against the PAC for its violation of the statutory deadline required by section 3.5(e) of the OMA. Pal v. Office of the Public Access Counselor.

Thursday, June 18, 2026

School Board Violated First Amendment in Restricting Critical Public Comment


Although this case was decided by a different federal circuit court of appeals than the Seventh Circuit that governs Illinois, it is illustrative of how courts view restrictions on public comment at government meetings. Boddy v. Grech (6th Cir. June 10, 2026).

A school board in Xenia, Ohio held a public meeting where public comment was permitted under its public comment policy. While one of the speakers was expressing her views regarding the school district's alleged teaching of critical race theory, the school board president threatened to turn off the speaker's microphone and then grabbed the microphone and recessed the meeting. The speaker sued, claiming the school district violated her First Amendmnet rights. The school district defended the board president's actions, stating that the reason the speaker was silenced was because she violated rules of decorum by inciting and riling up the audience, by using terms such as "cowardice" and "failing" to describe the board and the school district,and by calling people "names" and spreading "baseless accusations." 

The district court rejected the speaker's request for a preliminary injunction against the school district, finding that although the speaker's criticism of the board was subject to some First Amendment protection, some of her speech was an "ad hominem" attack that was not protected by the First Amendment. The speaker appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and ordered the district court to grant the speaker a preliminary injunction against the board.

First, the Court determined that the speaker's use of "failing" and "cowardice" did not qualify as "fighting words" under the First Amendment. Instead, the speaker was simply criticizing the board and the superintendent for their policy decisions, while maintaining a calm demeanor and tone, which is protected by the First Amendment. The Court further stated that even if her words were "offensive," the First Amendment protects that type of speech and a contrary position would allow the government to ban the express of unpopular views, which would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. The Court further noted that the [f]reedom to criticize public officials and expose their wrongdoing is at the core of First Amendment values.”

Second, the Court rejected the school district's argument that restricting the speaker's speech was necessary to maintain decorum, finding that the real justification for shutting the speaker down was because she shared viewpoints critical of the board. 

Finally, the Court agreed with the speaker that the board's actions in shutting down her speech constituted a "heckler's veto," because the board appeared to be taking action based on the crowd's reactions to the speaker's public comments - i.e., silencing the speaker in an attempt to address a disruptive or unruly crowd. 

In sum, the Sixth Circuit found that the speaker was entitled to a preliminary injunction to stop the school board from enforcing its policy against her at future meetings.