Seventh Circuit Dismisses Challenge to State's Mail-In Ballot Procedure

Seventh Circuit Dismisses Challenge to State's Mail-In Ballot Procedure

  Wednesday, September 11, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Last month, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to Illinois election laws that allow election officials to receive and count mail-in ballots for up to two weeks after the date of the election so long as the ballots are either (1) postmarked on or before the day of the election or, (2) if there is no postmark, the voter signs a certification that accompanies the ballot. Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections, et al.

A group of Illinois voters and political candidates filed a lawsuit against the State Board of Elections to challenge Illinois' mail-in vote procedure, arguing that it unlawfully expanded the time in which residents can vote. The district court dismissed the claims, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue and, even if they did, the challenge had no merits. 

Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the dismissal on standing grounds. The Seventh Circuit first rejected the voters-plaintiffs' argument that the plaintiffs votes will be "diluted" if mail-in ballots are counted after election day, finding that claim to be too generalized and not the type of particularized injury to support standing. Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected the candidate-plaintiffs' argument that they had to expend additional resources after election day to contest any objectionable ballots, finding that this future claim of harm was neither actual or imminent to support standing. The Court also rejected the candidates-plaintiffs' argument that they have an interest in ensuring that only legally valid votes are counted, finding that argument to be purely speculative. In sum, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit based on lack of standing.

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Village Owed No Duty of Care to Bicyclist Injured on Sidewalk

Village Owed No Duty of Care to Bicyclist Injured on Sidewalk

  Tuesday, September 10, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a Village in a bike injury case in Johnson v. Village of Palatine.

In June 2020, a cyclist was riding his bicycle on a sidewalk adjacent to a high-traffic street. While riding his bike, the cyclist struck an uneven section of the sidewalk, and fell and was injured. He sued the Village, claiming the Village owed him a duty of care to maintain or repair the sidewalk, which he claimed the Village negligently failed to do, leaving it dangerous and unsafe for use.

The Village asserted the following defenses against the lawsuit:

(1)  under the Tort Immunity Act, the Village did not owe the cyclist a duty of care because the sidewalk was intended only for pedestrian use while bicyclists were only permitted users;

(2)  the Village also did not owe the cyclist a duty of care because the alleged defect in the sidewalk was an open and obvious condition; and

(3)  the Village had immunity under the Tort Immunity Act regarding its allocation of funding to its proactive sidewalk replacement program.

The cyclist argued he was an intended user of the sidewalk because there were no bike lanes available on the high-traffic street, leaving him no other choice but to use the sidewalk. He also claimed he was an intended user because the Village had ordinances regulating bicycle use on sidewalks where it was allowed so long as there was no signage prohibiting that use, of which there was none on the high-traffic street. The cyclist also claimed that since he was a citizen of the Village, it was intended that he would use the sidewalk, so the Village owed him a duty of care.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Village and the Appellate Court upheld that ruling on appeal. The Appellate Court first determined there was no merit to the cyclist’s claim that he was an intended user of the sidewalk. The Court noted that the sidewalk was not signed for cyclist use, nor were there pavement markings or other indicators that the sidewalk was intended for bicycle use. Further, the Village’s own ordinances defined sidewalk as being intended for pedestrians, with no mention of cyclists. The Court rejected the cyclist’s argument that because he was forced to use the sidewalk because of the dangerous nature of the busy road, that meant he was an intended user. 

The Appellate Court concluded that there was no merit to the Plaintiff’s contention that he was an intended user of the sidewalk and that his argument regarding his interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act contradicted all precedent. The Court did not address the Village’s “open and obvious” argument since it disposed of the case based on its finding that the cyclist was not an intended user of the sidewalk, and, as a result, the Village did not owe him a duty of care.  

Post Authored by Madeline Tankersley & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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New Illinois Law Regulates Low-Speed Electric Scooters

New Illinois Law Regulates Low-Speed Electric Scooters

  Friday, September 06, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Effective on August 9, 2024, Illinois Governor Pritzker signed SB 1960 into law as Public Act 103-0899, which amends the Illinois Vehicle Code to add provisions regarding low-speed electric scooters.

The new law defines a low-speed electric scooter as follows:

A device weighing less than 100 pounds, with 2 or 3 wheels, handlebars, and a floorboard that can be stood upon while riding, that is solely powered by an electric motor and human power, and whose maximum speed, with or without human propulsion, is no more than 10 miles per hour. "Low-speed electric scooter" does not include a moped or motor-driving cycle.

The law allows municipalities, park districts, forest preserve districts, or conservation districts (units of local government) to authorize and regulate the operation of low-speed electric scooters within their respective units of local government on any or all highways under their respective jurisdiction, sidewalks, trails, or other public rights-of-way where the operation of bicycles is permitted.

The law clarifies that the use of low-speed electric scooters within the units of local government is only allowed if a unit of local government authorizes their use within its jurisdiction.

The law also clarifies that any authorization or regulation by a park district, forest preserve district, or conservation district concerning low-speed electric scooters only applies on property owned, managed, or leased by the park district, forest preserve district, or conservation district.

The law also:

• exempts low-speed electric scooters operators from obtaining an Illinois driver’s license (or permit), registration, or a certificate of title to operate the scooter;
• prohibits operating a low-speed electric scooters unless a person is 18 years of age or older;
• prohibits operating a low-speed electric scooters while under the influence of drugs or alcohol;
• prohibits operating a low-speed electric scooters on a highway with a posted speed limit in excess of 35 miles/hour;
• prohibits operating a low-speed electric scooter on state highways;
• prohibits operating a low-speed electric scooter while carrying certain items that prevent the operator from keeping at least one hand on the wheel;
• prohibits a low-speed electric scooter from carrying more than one person at a time;
• prohibits attaching a low-speed electric scooter or its operator to any other vehicle being operated on a public right-of-way; and
• requires low speed electric scooters to be well-maintained, in good operating condition, and possess certain required equipment (e.g., lamps, brakes, sirens).

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Village Board Meetings Were Not Open or Convenient Under OMA

PAC Finds Village Board Meetings Were Not Open or Convenient Under OMA

  Thursday, September 05, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's Office issued its 10th binding opinion of 2024 in PAC Op. 24-010, finding a Village Board in violation of the Open Meetings Act for failing to make its meetings open and convenient to the public.

Multiple requests for review were filed against a Village relating to meetings held in June and July of 2024. Specific complaints included allegations that there was insufficient space in the meeting room for members of the public who wanted to attend and many were turned away from each of these meetings because of limited seating capacity,, and that police department measures impeded public attendance. 

The PAC analyzed the various requests for review and concluded that the two Village Board meetings at question were neither "open" nor "convenient" as required by the Open Meetings Act. 

First, the PAC determined that the Board had adequate notice that its meeting space would be inadequate as there had been significant public interest in the Village Board's activities and controversies. The PAC stated that the Board should have foreseen the public interest where the Board and Mayor were engaged in a number of conflicts and disputes at previous meetings of the Village Board. The PAC noted that the Board could have moved its meetings to a larger venue, offered standing room or overflow capacity in another room, or offered a remote option for members of the public to ensure members of the public could be accommodated in some fashion. 

Second, the PAC rejected the Police Chief's argument that heightened security concerns justified curtailing attendance by the public, including street closures, parking barricades, and excessive police presence that physically impeded members of the public from attending the meetings. 

Finally, the Board acknowledged that while public bodies are not required to ensure that every single person who wants to attend a meeting is able to do so in "full comfort," the "open and convenient" requirement of the OMA required the Board to implement measures to better accommodate the public, which it failed to do at both the June and July meetings.

The PAC concluded by directing the Village Board to take actions to ensure that future meetings are open and convenient to the public, including holding future meetings at alternative locations, if necessary, to accommodate the public. 

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Municipal Caucus Overview for the 2025 Consolidated Election

Municipal Caucus Overview for the 2025 Consolidated Election

  Wednesday, September 04, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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With municipalities across Illinois set to elect new local officers at the 2025 Consolidated Elections, an overview of the lesser-known nomination method of municipal caucuses may be helpful for smaller municipalities. Note that the overview discussed below applies to official caucus nomination methods established by statute, and not the informal "caucus" political party nomination process that is used in some municipalities. If you are not sure which system your municipality must follow, please consult with your legal counsel.

Illinois municipalities administer either partisan elections (where candidates are nominated and elected from political parties) or nonpartisan elections (where candidates are nominated and elected on a nonpartisan basis). For cities, villages, and incorporated towns with partisan election systems and populations below 5,000 persons, candidates are nominated by established political parties at municipal caucuses unless, on or before November 15, 2024, the municipality passes an ordinance requiring established political parties to hold a primary. These municipalities will hold their caucuses on December 2, 2024, and caucus candidates must file their certificates of nomination with the municipal clerk during the filing period of December 9 – 16, 2024.  10 ILCS 5/10-1(a). Clerks must certify the names of caucus candidates by no later than January 23, 2025.

At a municipal caucus, registered voters select candidates from their political party to nominate for offices up for election in the April consolidated election. Voters can only participate and cast votes at the caucus of one political party (for example a person who participates in the caucus of political party A cannot then participate in the caucus of political party B). An established political party may only nominate one candidate for an office to be elected by the caucus method. The candidate receiving the most votes at the caucus becomes the party’s nominee, and any candidate defeated at the caucus may not run for the same office as a different political party, independent, or write-in candidate.

After being nominated at a caucus, the candidates must then individually file nomination paperwork with the local election official to appear on the consolidated election ballot. If there are two or more political parties that have nominated candidates for an office, the local election official must hold a ballot placement lottery to determine the ballot order. Candidates nominated by caucus appear on the ballot in the same order as their names appeared on the caucus sheet. 

If a caucus will occur, November 22, 2024, is the last day for the municipal clerk to publish or post the notice of caucus. In municipalities with populations over 500 persons, the local election official must publish notice of caucuses in a newspaper published within their municipality. If no such newspaper exists, a local election official is required to publish notice of a caucus in a newspaper of general circulation within the county their municipality is located in. For municipalities with a population of 500 or less, the local election official must post notice of the caucus in three of the most public places within the municipality.

Post Authored by Keri-Lyn Krafthefer & Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink 

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In the Zone: Seventh Circuit Rejects Challenge to Local Sign Regulations

In the Zone: Seventh Circuit Rejects Challenge to Local Sign Regulations

  Tuesday, September 03, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion upholding municipal sign regulations against a First Amendment challenge brought by a billboard company. GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. City of Evansville, Indiana.

A City in Indiana had enacted sign regulations that distinguish between on-premises signs and off-premises signs. In a lawsuit that spanned several years and included various arguments under the First Amendment, these regulations were challenged by a billboard company on various grounds, including that: (1) the distinction between on- and off-premises signs in the City's sign code was an unconstitutional content-based classification; (2) the City’s criteria for reviewing variance requests were likely to take content into consideration in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) the sign code impermissibly exempts certain categories of non-commercial messages for preferential treatment.

The first challenge, based on the distinction between on- and off-premises signs, was successful in the district court. However, the Seventh Circuit ultimately vacated that decision after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in City of Austin v. Reagan, determining that distinctions between on- and off-premises signs are not unconstitutional content-based discrimination.

The second challenge to the City’s variance procedures was rejected by the district court, which found that the sign code’s criteria for variances did not include a review of the proposed sign’s content. Additionally, the District Court determined that the City’s sign code was sufficiently specific to avoid a First Amendment violation. The Seventh Circuit noted that its recent decision in GEFT Outdoor, LLC v. Monroe County all but foreclosed the billboard company’s arguments, since near-identical variance criteria were upheld against a similar challenge in that case.

In its third challenge, the billboard company attempted to argue that the City was clearly considering content in its sign ordinance, since certain regulations did not apply to political signs and signs with other non-commercial messages. The Seventh Circuit noted that, in order to succeed on this claim, the billboard company had to show that the regulations were unconstitutional on their face, meaning that the ordinance (or at least a substantial portion of the ordinance) was unconstitutional in any case, regardless of its application or enforcement. The Seventh Circuit again ruled against the billboard company, finding that it failed to argue that a substantial portion of the ordinance was unconstitutional. Instead, it had focused its claim on the specific application of the variance criteria to its request, effectively conceding that the bulk of the sign regulations were valid.

Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the billboard company had failed to show that the City unlawfully considered the content of its proposed off-premise sign in rejecting its request for a variance.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Regulating Election and Campaign Signs

Regulating Election and Campaign Signs

  Thursday, August 29, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Every election cycle presents unique challenges for public bodies. To stay ahead of these possible issues, one thing to add to your checklist is the review of your sign ordinance to make sure you are prepared to address any issues that arise related to the regulation of election and campaign signs. 

First, you should confirm your sign ordinances does not single out political signs. Municipal officials should be aware of restrictions on their authority to regulate temporary election and campaign signs on private property. Illinois law prevents municipalities from prohibiting the display of temporary outdoor political campaign signs on private residential properties. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1(12). Municipal sign codes also cannot impose stricter time restrictions on the display of temporary election and campaign signs than other signs (such as “for sale” signs or holiday decorations). Placing stricter time display requirements only on temporary political signs is a content-based regulation and could result in First Amendment lawsuits against a municipality. Your ordinance cannot, for example, permit real estate signs all year round, but only permit political signs for a certain time period. Your sign regulations must be content neutral.

Second, while your public body can prohibit campaign signs from being placed on government property (public rights of way, for example), it is important to know that candidates or their supporters are allowed to place temporary election and campaign signs on public property outside the designated campaign-free zone during the time period that polls are open for voting on primary and general election days. Special rules apply to political and campaign signs on public property during an election day, and an “election day” is considered any day that early voting may be occurring on your property - it is not just the official day of the election. If your governmental property is a polling place, Illinois law prohibits any electioneering activities within a polling place where voters cast ballots and within 100 feet of a polling place. 10 ILCS 5/17-29. As such, on an “election day,” no election or campaign signs may be placed within this 100-foot designated campaign-free zone, but congregating and engaging in electioneering activities (such as placing election and campaign signs) are permitted on public property outside the designated campaign-free zone. There are special rules for the location of the designated campaign-free zone depending on the unique characteristics of a polling place, which may result in you having to measure the distance from the polling place to see where the campaign-free zone ends. Depending on the measurements from your specific polling place location, you may actually have to permit electioneering within your public building outside of the 100 feet campaign-free zone.

Under section 17-29(c) of the Election Code, the regulation of electioneering on polling place property on election day, including the placement of temporary signs, is an exclusive power and function of the State, so this preempts home rule municipalities from adopting any laws inconsistent with this statute.

Post Authored by Keri-Lyn Krafthefer & Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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Special Considerations about Establishing Compensation of Elected Officials

Special Considerations about Establishing Compensation of Elected Officials

  Wednesday, August 28, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Note: this is part 2 in our 2-part series on elected officials compensation.

Our previous post discussed the time period by which public bodies must establish compensation for their officers to be elected in the April 2025 election. In this post, we address special factors to keep in mind when establishing compensation for elected officials.

First, section 3.1-30-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code requires municipalities to establish their compensation by ordinance – not by a resolution or motion. The salaries may be fixed in the annual appropriation or budget ordinance, provided that the salaries or compensation of an elected official may not take effect during the term of any officer holding an elective office and that they are adopted at least 180 days prior to the terms of office commencing. See 65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-10 and 3.1-50-5.

Second, the compensation of elected officials must specify whether the members of the corporate authorities are to be compensated at an annual rate or for each meeting for which a public notice of the meeting was given. 65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-15. Also, you might consider specifying whether this applies to both regular and special meetings, and whether an elected official will be paid for a meeting even if they fail to attend. 

Third, in addition to setting a salary or per meeting stipend, the compensation ordinance should specify whether the elected official’s compensation includes health insurance benefits or participation in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund. “Compensation” generally includes other benefits, like health insurance. See Ill. Attorney General Opinions 94-022  and 96-039.

Fourth, consider how to address expense reimbursement. If elected officials are submitting receipts and receiving reimbursement, that is permissible and not considered additional compensation under Section 3.1-50-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code. However, if an elected official is given a fixed lump sum expense allowance, that would be considered to be additional compensation. See DeSutter v. South Moline Township Board, 96 Ill.2d 372 (1983) and Hume v. Town of Blackberry, 131 Ill.App.3d 32 (1985). Also, if you provide a fix stipend amount for expenses, specify how that will comply with the requirements of the Local Government Travel Expense Control Act, 50 ILCS 150/1, et seq. Are travel expenses covered by the stipend or in addition to it?

Except for the clerk who can receive additional compensation for serving as collector (65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-25) and the mayor/village president who can receive additional compensation for serving as the local liquor control commissioner (235 ILCS 5/4-3), elected officials cannot receive additional compensation from the municipality, even for performing additional duties. See Ill. Attorney General Opinion 99-009. 

Finally, an ordinance that is adopted at least 180 days prior to the terms of office, can provide for a cost of living or other similar increase during the term of office according to the Illinois Attorney General, which has opined that such increases, during the term of office, do not violate the prohibitions against increasing salaries during a term of office because they are set 180 days in advance. See Illinois Attorney General Opinion S-1366. 

Post Authored by Keri-Lyn Krafthefer & Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

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It's Time to Establish Elected Officials' Compensation for Terms Starting in 2025

It's Time to Establish Elected Officials' Compensation for Terms Starting in 2025

  Tuesday, August 27, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Note: this is part 1 of a 2-part series on elected officials compensation. Stay tuned for part 2 tomorrow

Although the outcome of the November 2024 elections is still unresolved, it is time for Illinois local governments to start focusing on the 2025 elections. One important action step that needs to move to the top of your list is establishing compensation for the officers who will be elected in 2025. 

Section 2 of the Local Government Officer Compensation Act specifies that the compensation of elected officers “shall be fixed at least 180 days before the beginning of the terms of the officers whose compensation is to be fixed.” Section 3.1-50-10 of the Illinois Municipal Code contains the same requirement.  

For most units of local government that want to set the salaries of the officials who will be elected at the April 1, 2025 election, the precise calculations can be a little tricky, as discussed below, but most public bodies will meet this deadline if they take action before the end of October.  For townships, it is simple to calculate the 180-day deadline, because all township officials (except assessors and collectors) take office on the third Monday in May, which will be May 19, 2025. 60 ILCS 1/50-15. Township boards are also required to set the salary of the township assessor at the same time they set the compensation for the supervisor, so the same deadline applies, even though new assessors will not be seated until the following January 1st.  See 35 ILCS 200/2-70. For all townships, the latest date to set compensation of newly-elected officials is November 20, 2024.  

Similar to townships, the terms for public library district trustees begin on the third Monday in May or May 19, 2025. 75 ILCS 16/30-10. As a result, the latest date to set compensation of newly elected library trustees is November 20, 2024.

It is not as simple to calculate the deadline for other units of local government as there is no fixed date for elected officers to enter office. School boards generally seat new members at their organizational meetings, but dates for those meetings may vary. Park boards usually install officers at their first meetings after they receive their vote results. 

The Illinois Municipal Code specifies that terms for municipal elected officials commence “at the first regular or special meeting of the corporate authorities after receipt of the official election results from the county clerk…unless as otherwise provided by ordinance,” but that ordinance cannot provide for a date later than the first regular or special meeting in the month of June after the election. 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-15. The challenge with this requirement is the date that elected officials take office following the election varies depending on the form of government and, at times, upon the public body’s receipt of the election results. Therefore, a public body may not know precisely when 180 days in advance will be, because it cannot predict when it will receive the election results. It is possible, and likely, that one municipality will install officers on a different date than a neighboring municipality. The safest approach is to adopt any compensation ordinance well in advance of the deadline.

Any changes in compensation for people holding the same office (for example, village trustees) will only apply to the officials who are elected at the April 1, 2025 election, not those elected previously. Therefore, it is possible that trustees may be paid differently depending on when they were elected. 

Our next blog post will address special things to consider when establishing compensation of elected officials. 

Post Authored by Keri-Lyn Krafthefer & Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

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Appellate Court Reverses Ruling in PEDA Benefits Case

Appellate Court Reverses Ruling in PEDA Benefits Case

  Monday, August 26, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Former employees sued a City claiming it unlawfully withheld employment taxes and compensatory time from benefits they received pursuant to the Public Employee Disability Act (PEDA). PEDA provides benefits to certain eligible public employees who are injured in the line of duty for a period of up to a year. The trial court ruled in favor of the employees, but on appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. Bitner v. City of Pekin.

The employees claimed, among other things, that the City violated the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act when it withheld employment taxes from their PEDA benefits. On appeal, the Appellate Court determined that the City did not violate state law when it withheld employment taxes from benefits the employees received under PEDA. The Court referred to express language in PEDA that provides that an employee receiving PEDA benefits is to be paid on the same basis as the employee was paid before the injury (see below):

Whenever an eligible employee suffers any injury in the line of duty which causes him to be unable to perform his duties, he shall continue to be paid by the employing public entity on the same basis as he was paid before the injury, with no deduction from his sick leave credits, compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a public employee pension fund during the time he is unable to perform his duties due to the result of the injury, but not longer than one year in relation to the same injury.

Based on the Court's interpretation of this language, the City was not prohibited from deducting employment taxes from the PEDA benefit payments because there was no express mention of employment taxes or tax withholdings in the list of prohibited deductions (which referenced compensatory time and service credits but not taxes). 

The Court did remand the case back to the trial court to look further into the employees' claims that the City wrongfully deducted compensatory time from the PEDA benefit payments.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Seventh Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Church Zoning Dispute

In the Zone: Seventh Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Church Zoning Dispute

  Thursday, August 22, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ruling in favor of a municipality that its zoning code did not unlawfully discriminate against religious institutions where it only permitted religious institutions as special uses in certain zoning districts. Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest

A church was looking for a new permanent building for its 120-person congregation and wanted to buy property in a village. The village’s zoning code did not allow churches as permitted, by-right uses in any of its zoning districts, but some of the districts allowed churches as special uses. The church sued the village on multiple grounds claiming that the zoning code discriminated against religious assembly and forced religious institutions to go through the more onerous special use permit process. 

The district court ruled in favor of the village, rejecting the church's claims. First, the court held that RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) did not apply because the church never had a property interest in any real estate located in the village. Second, the court denied the church’s equal protection claim because: (1) the church’s decision not to seek a special use permit precluded any possibility of discrimination against it; (2) the church did not show that comparable secular organizations had been treated worse than churches; and (3) contrary to the church’s allegations, there was no property in the village that could accommodate the 120-member capacity the church said it needed. Finally, the district court rejected the church’s vagueness challenge, noting that the Seventh Circuit has upheld zoning ordinances with similar special use regulations. 

The church filed a request with the district court for it to reconsider its ruling, arguing that the court had applied the wrong version of the zoning code in ruling against the church. In 2008, the village had amended its zoning code to remove numerous businesses from its permitted and special use lists in the village's business zoning districts. The district court denied the church’s request to reconsider, and the church appealed.

The Seventh Circuit ruled against the church for three reasons. First, it found the district court would have ruled the same whether it used the pre-2008 or post-2008 version of the zoning code so its argument on reconsideration was irrelevant. Second, the 2008 zoning amendment removed secular businesses from the business zoning districts' list of permitted and special uses and had no bearing on religious assembly. Third, the Seventh Circuit held that the church waived its right to challenge amendments to the business district zoning district during the district court proceedings.

Post Authored by Daniel Lev, Ancel Glink

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DNC Safety Ordinance is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

DNC Safety Ordinance is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

  Wednesday, August 21, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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The Democratic National Convention is being held in Chicago from August 19-22, 2024. In preparation for the event, the Chicago Police Department and the Secret Service established security protocols for the areas surrounding the convention facilities. The City of Chicago also enacted an ordinance prohibiting items such as laptops, drones, pointed objects, and weapons inside the perimeters.

In Thayer v. City of Chicago, individuals who planned to protest at the DNC challenged the ordinance as unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, they challenged the prohibition of “pointed objects," arguing that this ban raised a question whether protesters could bring ballpoint pens or wear buttons secured with safety pins into the protected area.

The Illinois Appellate Court denied the protesters' request to temporarily suspend the safety ordinance and found that it was not unconstitutionally vague. While the ordinance does not provide a complete list of objects that are permitted or banned, the Appellate Court held that the ordinance has a core ascertainable meaning that was aimed at keeping people safe.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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