Public Comment Policy Overly Broad and Vague Under First Amendment

Public Comment Policy Overly Broad and Vague Under First Amendment

  Monday, July 20, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Merriott v. City of Bossier City, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a city's "decorum" policy for city meetings violated the First Amendment because it was overly broad as well as vague in prohibiting personal, impertinent, and slanderous remarks and "becoming boisterous" during public comment. 

An online journalist attended city council meetings where the city clerk read from the city's rules of decorum for public comment. Those rules included restrictions on cell phone usage, imposed time limits on speakers, and required the audience to maintain decorum. At one of the meetings, the city clerk read the following statement: 

Any person making personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks or who shall become boisterous while addressing the Council shall be forthwith, by the President Pro-tem, barred from further audience before the Council unless permission to continue by [sic] granted by a majority vote of the Council” (the “Policy”)....All remarks shall be addressed to the Council as a body and not to any member thereof. No questions shall be asked a [sic] Council person or the mayor except through the meeting chair. All other audience members are asked to please observe the meeting quietly. City Council appointed Sergeant at Arms have been instructed to maintain decorum and ask anyone in violation to step out of the meeting. Merriott again “criticiz[ed] the Council for failing to listen to the Mayor and the citizens. 

The journalist spoke during public comment at several meetings and criticized the city on a decision relating to term limits. He was interrupted by councilmembers reminding him of the decorum rules. After one of the meetings, the journalist wrote a letter to the city, requesting the council respect his First Amendment rights and not interrupt him during public comment. At the next meeting, he was again interrupted during public comment and threatened with removal. He then sued, alleging violations of the state's open meetings laws and his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed his case, and he appealed.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed part of the dismissal of his case, finding that the journalist had plausibly alleged in his complaint that the city's public comment policy was unconstitutional. First, the Court found that the policy's prohibition on "personal" remarks was too broad because its enforcement could capture protected free speech, such as criticism of individual councilmembers. Second, the Court found that the prohibition on "impertinent" remarks was also too broad because it allows the city council to decide which comments are permissible at its whim. Third, the Court struck down the policy's ban on "slanderous" remarks, finding that it was too broad because it placed a speaker in doubt about what he or she could say about public officials and public figures. Fourth, the Court found that the policy's ban on persons who "become boisterous" was too broad because it went beyond conduct and would also apply to speech, implicating the First Amendment. The Court also found the policy to be too vague because the terms "personal" and "impertinent" were undefined and, therefore, failed to provide speakers with a "reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited." 

In sum, the Court found that the city's public comment policy was overly broad and too vague, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. The Court upheld the district court's findings in favor of the city on the journalist's open meetings act and content-based discrimination claims, however.

Although this case is out of the Fifth Circuit (which does not cover Illinois), it is consistent with Illinois Attorney General opinions and court rulings that question public comment policies that go beyond regulating conduct.

 

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Court Sends Social Media Defamation Case Back to Trial Court to Award Compensatory Damages

Court Sends Social Media Defamation Case Back to Trial Court to Award Compensatory Damages

  Wednesday, July 15, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Although this case does not involve local governments, it is an interesting case involving social media posts and a defamation lawsuit. Sullivan v. Schiman. 

A patient posted on a local "updates and information" Facebook page about a doctor she had seen in the emergency room. Her post named the doctor and claimed that he had sexually assaulted her in giving a rectal examination. That Facebook post was then made a "featured post" by the Facebook page's administrator, which meant it was the first post on that Facebook page. When the doctor learned about the post, he filed a complaint against both the patient and the Facebook page's administrator alleging defamation "per se" among other claims. The case went to trial, and testimony by a nurse who was present during the exam contradicted the claims made by the patient in her Facebook post. At the end of the trial, the judge found in favor of the doctor on his defamation claim against both defendants, and awarded him $1.00 in nominal damages from both the poster and the page administrator.

The doctor appealed on two grounds. First, the doctor claimed the trial court erred in awarding only $1.00 in damages. Second, the doctor argued that the trial court should have imposed sanctions against the page administrator and his attorney for providing false answers in discovery.

The Appellate Court agreed with the doctor on both issues. First, the Appellate Court ruled that nominal damages were not reasonable in this case where several thousand people saw the Facebook post accusing him of a violent sexual assault, which, among other things, would support an award of compensatory damages rather than only nominal damages. Defamation "per se" occurs when a false statement is so inherently harmful that the damage to a person's reputation is obvious on its face, meaning the doctor did not need to prove actual monetary or special damages. The Appellate Court also found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying sanctions for the discovery violations. The Appellate Court  sent the case back to the trial court to enter an appropriate award of damages and to reevaluate the sanctions request. 

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Court Rejects Excessive Force Claim Against Police Officers

Court Rejects Excessive Force Claim Against Police Officers

  Tuesday, July 14, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling upholding a district court's decision in favor of city police officers in an excessive force case. Davis v. City of Elgin. 

Police were dispatched to a home after someone called to report that an individual was threatening his ex-wife and roommate with a shotgun. Police called the suspect, who threatened to harm himself with a knife. The police then surrounded the house but the suspect had already left the home and gone to his neighbors.  The suspect came outside to the porch but when he refused police orders to come out further, police fired at him with a non-lethal impact weapon. After the suspect threatened to harm the officer who shot him, officers shot him again. The suspect eventually pled guilty to disorderly conduct, and then filed a lawsuit against the city and the police officers involved in the incident claiming that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled against the suspect, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, finding that the suspect did not establish that the officers violated a clearly established right to be free from a particular use of force. The Court found that the officers had good reason not to want the suspect to go back into the house so he could potentially grab a weapon, and that the officers had knowledge of his earlier threats with a gun against his ex-wife, as well as his threat that he had a knife. In sum, the Court found that the officers had qualified immunity. The Court also held that the suspect did not meet his burden to show a theory of liability against the city itself.

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In the Zone: Court Denies Injunction Against Village's Proposed Storm Improvements

In the Zone: Court Denies Injunction Against Village's Proposed Storm Improvements

  Monday, July 13, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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To alleviate flooding, a municipality designed and planned certain modifications to its stormwater system. A quarry owner opposed the planned improvements and filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction to stop the municipality from modifying its stormwater system as planned. The trial court denied the injunction and ruled that the municipality possessed an easement across the quarry that was granted by a predecessor owner of the quarry. The owner appealed.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the ruling of the trial court. First, the Court determined that there was substantial evidence that the municipality held an easement across the quarry based on the installation of a stormwater pipe with the agreement of the predecessor quarry owner and language contained in an easement document. Next, the Court rejected the owner's argument that the municipality had abandoned its easement. Finally, the Court held that the owner had not established the elements necessary to obtain an injunction. In sum, the Court upheld the ruling in favor of the municipality. Hanson Aggregates Midwest, Inc. v. Village of La Grange.

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Seventh Circuit Upholds "Protect Illinois Communities Act" that Restricts Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines

Seventh Circuit Upholds "Protect Illinois Communities Act" that Restricts Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines

  Friday, July 10, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois General Assembly enacted the Protect Illinois Communities Act following a deadly shooting at a Chicago suburb’s Independence Day parade. That Act criminalizes the manufacture, sale, delivery, purchase, and possession of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, among other things. The Act contains a grandfather clause that allows preexisting lawful owners of the regulated items to continue possessing them. 

Shortly after the Act was adopted, several lawsuits were filed to challenge its constitutionality. The district court decisions were divided, with one court granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act and two district courts denying injunctive relief. Those appeals made their way to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which consolidated the cases and issued a ruling in 2023 that rejected preliminary relief to the challengers and sent the case back to the district courts for further proceedings.

One of the consolidated cases proceeded to a bench trial. The district court in that case held that much of the Act violated the Second Amendment and that the offending provisions were not severable, and the court enjoined enforcement of the Act in its entirety. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which recently reversed the ruling and upheld the Act, including its restrictions on AR-15s and thirty-round rifle magazines. Barnett et al., v. Raoul. 

First, the Seventh Circuit held that the challengers failed to meet their burden to show that all of the Act's regulations were facially invalid. Second, the Seventh Circuit assumed for purposes of its ruling that the regulated items constituted "arms" under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment, meaning that they were presumptively entitled to constitutional protection under the Second Amendment. Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the test established by the Supreme Court for challenges under the Second Amendment and determined that the Act was consistent with the principles that "underpin our regulatory tradition" because legislatures have long imposed restrictions on particularly dangerous weapons like those regulated by the Act. Further, the Seventh Circuit found the Act’s “burden on the right of armed self defense" to be minimal. In sum, the Seventh Circuit held that the challengers failed to meet their burden in a facial challenge to the Act's constitutionality under the Second Amendment. 

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Illinois Adopts Amendments to Child Care Licensing; Provides Direction to Newly Organized Department of Early Childhood

Illinois Adopts Amendments to Child Care Licensing; Provides Direction to Newly Organized Department of Early Childhood

  Thursday, July 09, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Two years ago, the State of Illinois began the process of consolidating the operation and management of programs previously administered by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS), Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE), and the Governor’s Office of Early Childhood Development (GOECD). As of July 1, 2026, the Illinois Department of Early Childhood (IDEC) began operations to complete the transition.

Just before IDEC began operating, the Governor signed into law Public Act 104-0480 adopting comprehensive reforms in license regulations for day care centers. The new act creates three tiers of licensing and registration:  Day Care Center Providers, Recognized Alternative Providers and Exempt Providers. Most importantly for local governments, the amendments re-affirm the State’s double exemption for programs operated by local governments so long as those programs meet defined statutory parameters. Eligible programs will be exempt from regulation as a Day Care Center Provider and from registration as a Recognized Alternative Provider.

To qualify for the double exemption, a local government (or combination of local governments pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement) may demonstrate it is operating a special activities program, such as athletics, recreation, crafts instruction, music, dance, drama, sports, or similar activities offered by a unit of local government, including special activities programs offered by 2 or more units of local government pursuant to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. (There are other exemptions for school-based extracurricular activities conducted outside of the school day.)

These types of special activities programs will qualify for the double exemption if they demonstrate all the following requirements:

(A) State law authorizes the unit of local government to offer the program and an elected or appointed board of the unit of local government has adopted policies governing the operation of the program, pursuant to Section 8-10 of the Park District Code or other applicable law.

(B) The program is offered to the following categories of children and the parent or legal guardian of each child has received written acknowledgement that the program is not licensed by the Department under this Act:

(i) children at least 5 years of age for no more than 100 continuous days in any 12-month period when school is not in session;

(ii) children at least 3 years of age for no more than 3.5 continuous hours at a time; or

(iii) children under 3 years of age for no more than one hour at a time.

(C) The program does not advertise to the public as a pre-school program, licensed early care and education provider, licensed child care, or licensed day care.

(D) The program conducts the following investigations on all employees of the program no less than once every 5 years:

(i) background investigations pursuant to Section 8-23 of the Park District Code, Section 16a-5 of the Chicago Park District Act, or other applicable law;

(ii) a (free) name check against State and national sex offender registries; and

(iii) a (free) Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System (CANTS) name check through the Department at no cost to the unit of local government.

(E) The program conducts the following investigations on all volunteers of the program no less than once every 5 years:

(i) background investigations pursuant to Section 8-23 of the Park District Code, Section 16a-5 of the Chicago Park District Act, or other applicable law;

(ii) a (free) name check against State and national sex offender registries; and

(iii) a (free) Child Abuse and Neglect Tracking System (CANTS) name check through the Department at no cost to the unit of local government.

(F) The unit of local government has an emergency preparedness and response plan for the location of the special activities program.

(G) The program does not participate in the Child Care Assistance Program (CCAP) or receive funding pursuant to the Early Childhood Block Grant.

If a program fails to satisfy all the requirements, it will be required to either obtain a license as a day care center or register as a recognized alternative provider.

Some local governments have recently been asked by DCFS to “apply” for exempt status. Public Act 104-0480 clarifies whether this is necessary. Section 3.01 of the Child Care Act, as amended, provides

The Department of Early Childhood shall provide written verification of exemption and description of compliance with standards for the health, safety, and development of the children who receive the services upon submission by the provider of, in addition to any other documentation required by the Department of Early Childhood, a notarized statement that the provider facility complies with: (1) the standards of the Department of Public Health or local health department, (2) the fire safety standards of the State Fire Marshal, and (3) if operated in a public school building, the health and safety standards of the State Board of Education.

The amendments related to licensing and registration requirements will become effective for all providers other than park districts on July 1, 2027, but not until July 1, 2028 for park districts.  Programs operating under a current 2-year licensing exemption shall be allowed to continue to operate under that exemption until it expires or until July 1, 2028, whichever is later.

Keep an eye open for IDEC adopting new administrative regulations implementing the revised statutory scheme. 

Post Authored by Adam Simon, Ancel Glink

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Supreme Court Invalidates Hawaii Firearm "Owner Consent" Restriction

Supreme Court Invalidates Hawaii Firearm "Owner Consent" Restriction

  Wednesday, July 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Hawaii law that prohibited firearms on private property open to the public without the express and affirmative consent of the property owner. Wolford v. Lopez.

Following the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, which ended “may-issue” concealed carry licensing schemes, Hawaii enacted HRS § 134-9.5. The law provided that a person carrying a licensed firearm could not enter or remain on private property of another person “unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property.” Such authorization could be provided through unambiguous written or verbal consent or the posting of clear and conspicuous signage at the entrance of the building or elsewhere on the premises.

The Supreme Court held that the law conflicted with the common law presumption that members of the public, including those lawfully carrying firearms, may enter private property open to the public unless expressly prohibited from doing so. As a result, the Court concluded that Hawaii’s law unconstitutionally burdened individuals seeking to exercise their Second Amendment right to carry a firearm for self-defense. In addition, the Hawaii law could not be justified by the country's historical firearm regulations.

This ruling does not raise concerns regarding the applicability of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act (430 ILCS 66/et seq.). Illinois follows a system where firearms are presumptively allowed on private property unless the owner posts statutorily prescribed signage prohibiting them. This is consistent with the common law presumption. Hawaii took the opposite approach, presumptively prohibiting firearms on private property by requiring signage indicating that carrying firearms was authorized. Illinois law requires that property owners take affirmative steps to exclude firearms, whereas Hawaii’s approach required that property owners take affirmative steps to allow them.   

This decision impacts California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey, which have laws similar to Hawaii’s.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Dan Bolin, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Police Department Violated FOIA in Withholding Investigative Records

PAC Finds Police Department Violated FOIA in Withholding Investigative Records

  Tuesday, July 07, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A news media requester submitted a FOIA request to a police department seeking records related to an investigation of an arrested individual for a domestic incident. The department entirely denied its responsive records to the request citing FOIA’s personal privacy exemption in Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. After the requester submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) challenging the denial, the PAC issued its sixth binding opinion of 2026 concluding that the department improperly withheld its responsive records. PAC Op. 26-006

The PAC first noted that previous PAC opinions were clear that there is a strong public interest in the disclosure of information concerning arrests that outweighs an arrestee's right to privacy. Also, because the requester is a news reporter seeking to report about a matter of high public interest (the arrest of a police officer), there was a heightened public interest in disclosure of information regarding this arrest. 

Because the department’s records contain information that was incidental or had no bearing on the arrest or circumstances leading to the arrest, including the names and personally identifying information (contact information, nature of relationship with arrestee) of witnesses and third parties, the PAC determined that the department was authorized to redact that personal information pursuant to Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. However, the department was required to release the remaining non-exempt parts of its responsive records to the request.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam

  Monday, July 06, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast released Episode 107: 2026 APA-CMS Bar Exam. In this episode,  the American Planning Association Chicago Metro Section recently teamed up with Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast for the 11th Annual “Bar Exam” Planning Law Session. Recorded live at Goodwin’s in Chicago, this realistic, simulated law school experience tests planners and land use professionals on the latest legal precedents in wind energy, annexation, and First Amendment protections. As is tradition, all participants passed the bar, and teams competed for the prestigious (and five-foot-tall) Ancel Glink Cup. In this episode, Ancel Glink’s Dan Bolin, Megan Mack, and Tyler Smith are joined by special guest Phil Green, a Local Gov 250 Government Champion, who undergoes a high-tech “firmware update” to become the session’s first AI-powered planning law assistant.

In This Episode

§  [00:00] The Roll Call: Host Dan Bolin calls the meeting to order with professors Megan Mack and Tyler Smith, plus local government champion Phil Green.

§  [05:00] Round 1: Democracy at the Doorstep: Phil discusses his recognition as a Local Gov 250 Champion and his work on “democracy at the doorstep” in Hoffman Estates.

§  [11:30] Case 1.1 - Wind Farm Bans: A look at Hickory Wind LLC v. Village of Cedar Point, exploring why outright bans on lawful land uses exceed non-home rule authority.

§  [19:00] Case 1.2 - Zoning Finality: In Chosen Consulting LLC v. Town Council of Highland, we learn why ADA and discrimination claims do not bypass the requirement for a final zoning decision.

§  [22:30] Case 1.3 - Cross-Examination Rights: A resort project in Galena highlights the importance of maintaining a record when residents forfeit their right to cross-examine witnesses.

§  [26:30] Round 2: The Road to Houston: Phil shares takeaways from serving as the Education Chair for NPC26 in Detroit and teases a “Moon Joy” theme for NPC27 in Houston.

§  [31:45] Case 2.1 - Forceful Annexation: We review a 4.7% perimeter gap in Husky Transportation v. Village of Barrington Hills to define the “wholly bounded” standard.

§  [35:45] Case 2.2 - First Amendment Retaliation: The saga of the Minocqua Brewing Co. demonstrates that permit denials are not retaliatory if they would have occurred regardless of protected speech.

§  [39:15] Case 2.3 - The Hamburger UFOs: A whimsical mural case from Kansas tests “intermediate scrutiny” and whether cities can prove that burger art is more distracting than flower art.

§  [42:00] The Future of Planning Law: Megan and Tyler discuss the responsible use of AI in legal practice and how municipalities are responding to data center controversies involving power and water consumption.

§  [46:15] The Reveal of A.I. CPU: Phil Green manifests as the A.I. CPU, an assistant that is 100% confident, 60% accurate, and requires massive amounts of “liquid cooling” to function.

§  [48:00] Round 3: AI-Assisted Answers: The A.I. CPU helps navigate cases on warrantless rental inspections, daily fine calculations, and why missing scaffolding is not a legal defense for safety hazards.

§  [1:02:30] Crowning the Champions: We announce the winners of the 2026 Bar Exam and award the shiny gold Ancel Glink Cup to the “Transit Masters.”

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Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA

Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA

  Thursday, July 02, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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After a police department failed to respond to a news agency's FOIA request, the requester filed a lawsuit. Although the department produced its responsive records during the litigation, the requester filed a petition for civil penalties against the department pursuant to Section 11(j) of FOIA, which states that:

If the court determines that a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith, the court shall also impose upon the public body a civil penalty of not less than $2,500 nor more than $5,000 for each occurrence. 5 ILCS 140/11(j).

After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that the department had willfully and intentionally violated FOIA because it had knowledge of FOIA’s response requirements and did not to demonstrate a good reason for non-compliance with those requirements. However, relying on prior Illinois cases that required a requester to demonstrate both (1) a willful and intentional violation of FOIA, and (2) that the FOIA violation was deliberate, by design, and done with a dishonest purpose, the circuit court ruled that the requester was not entitled to civil penalties, because the requester did not prove that the department had a dishonest purpose when violating FOIA.

After the requester appealed the circuit court’s ruling, an Illinois Appellate Court (First District) reversed the circuit court’s denial of civil penalties, and sent the case back to the circuit court to determine appropriate civil penalties. Lucy Parsons Labs v. Chicago Police Department. The Appellate Court determined that the “or otherwise acted in bad faith” language in Section 11(j) is a catch-all category of possible bad faith actions that a public body can take in violation of FOIA. In other words, the examples of bad faith conduct included in Section 11(j) of FOIA—willful and intentional noncompliance—is an illustrative example of bad faith conduct rather than an exhaustive list. The Appellate Court reasoned that interpreting Section 11(j) of FOIA to require demonstrating that a public body “willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith failed to comply with the FOIA” supplants the catchall term, and replaces it with the conjunctive “and,” which imposes a higher standard of proof to demonstrate bad faith non-compliance with FOIA, and eliminates the possibility that a “willful and intentional” violation of FOIA could, by itself, warrant civil penalties. In this case, because the circuit court found that the department intentionally and willfully violated FOIA, the Appellate Court ruled that the circuit court’s order finding that the requester had not met its burden of proof for the imposition of civil penalties against the department was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Court Rejects "Equitable Estoppel" Claim of Property Owner

In the Zone: Court Rejects "Equitable Estoppel" Claim of Property Owner

  Tuesday, June 30, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a municipality in a case brought by a property owner challenging the municipality's zoning decisions relating to the owner's commercial uses of property zoned in a Conservation zoning district. Deepe v. Village of Swansea Planning & Zoning Board.

The owner of two parcels of property applied for a zoning compliance certificate and construction permit to operate a commercial business on land zoned in the Conservation district. Over several years, the owner applied for and received permits and permission from the municipality to operate his business. After neighbors complained about the operation of the lawncare and storage businesses on the two parcels, the municipality notified the owner that his uses were nonconforming and he needed to bring his operations into compliance with the zoning regulations. The owner appealed the order to the zoning board, which ruled in favor of the municipality. He then appealed to the circuit court, which ruled in favor of the owner with respect to one of the parcels, finding that the municipality was "equitably estopped" from enforcing its regulations. However, the court found in favor of the municipality with respect to the second parcel. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's ruling in favor of the owner on his equitable estoppel claim. The Court first determined that the two parcels were zoned in the Conservation district, and the owner never applied for a rezoning to a more appropriate district. Second, the owner knew and even acknowledged that the Conservation district did not allow a storage business so he could not rely on any acquiescence by the municipality. Third, the Court acknowledged that while the municipality could have been more forceful in its enforcement, "slow enforcement" would not support an estoppel claim. In sum, the Court found in favor of the municipality, holding that the owner could not establish an "equitable estoppel" claim for its use of either parcel. 

There was a dissenting opinion that would have ruled in favor of the property owner on his equitable estoppel claims based on the actions of municipal officials and employees over the years with respect to the owner's uses. 

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Court Upholds Municipality's Administrative Adjudication Fine for Overweight Trucks

Court Upholds Municipality's Administrative Adjudication Fine for Overweight Trucks

  Monday, June 29, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Solano v. City of Chicago, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld a home rule municipality's authority to use its administrative adjudication hearing system and fine drivers of overweight trucks in an amount in excess of $250.00. First, the Court acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court in Cammacho v. City of Joliet had previously held that home rule governments could use administrative hearings to adjudicate moving offenses and reportable violations. Second, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that section 11-208.3 of the Illinois Vehicle Code restricts municipalities from imposing a fine of more than $250.00 for certain standing, parking, and other violations, finding that overweight trucks were not listed in the category of offenses identified in that section of the Code. As a result, the Court upheld the municipality's issuance of the fine against Solano.

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