Federal Court Rules that City Social Media Comment Policy Violates First Amendment

Federal Court Rules that City Social Media Comment Policy Violates First Amendment

  Monday, November 02, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A federal court in Georgia issued a summary judgment ruling in a challenge to a city's actions in deleting comments and blocking users from the official city Facebook page. 

A user posted frequently on the city's Facebook page, and some of those posts were critical of the city, its departments, and city employees and officials. Shortly after posting certain criticism, he found he was no longer able to access the city Facebook page from his personal Facebook account, and when he searched for the page, the search returned the message "This Content Isn't Available." He was, however, able to access the page from his business Facebook account. He also discovered that another of his comments were "hidden" from public view. After being blocked from the city's page, he filed FOIA requests with the city seeking records regarding the city's blocking of him from the page. The city did not provide any responsive records. In response to questions about the city's actions to block him from the page, the city responded that no city employee blocked him, a "blocked user list" did not show his name, and that the city did not violate the First Amendment. 

The user filed a lawsuit against the city, alleging that the city and certain city employees and officials violated his First amendment rights by blocking him from the page and hiding his comments and that the city should be sanctioned for its failure to preserve evidence of its blocked user list.

First, the district court found that the city had a duty to preserve records pertaining to its blocking of users from its Facebook page, i.e., the blocked user list. As a remedy, the court prohibited the city from making any argument at trial that its blocked users list did not contain the user's name. 

Second, the court determined that the city's social media comment policy was unconstitutional because it banned comments that could constitute protected speech. For example, the court determined that the comment policy's ban on "personal attacks," "harassment," as well as "abusive," "racist," and "hateful" speech constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court also found that the policy provided too much discretion to administrators to apply these restrictions in a manner that would ban protected speech. 

The court also struck down the comment policy's restrictions on "defamatory" comments, "unsupported accusations," and "off-topic comments," finding that the administrators had received no guidance or training on how to apply those terms and that the city employees had testified they thought "defamatory" meant that a user was bringing up past issues or "talking smack" about another person.

The court allowed some of the remaining claims to continue to trial. 

You can read the court's ruling here.

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Court Upholds Termination of Hospital Pharmacist Who Refused Vaccine

Court Upholds Termination of Hospital Pharmacist Who Refused Vaccine

  Wednesday, October 07, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a county's termination of a county employee after she refused to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine as required by the county's pandemic policy in Mason v. Cook County.

In August of 2021, the county adopted a policy mandating that county hospital staff members receive the COVID-19 vaccine. A hospital pharmacist applied for an exemption from the vaccine mandate based on her Christian faith. The county denied her request, stating that doing so would compromise workplace safety and pose an undue hardship on the county. The county gave her 90 days to comply. When she refused to do so, she was fired, and she filed a lawsuit against the county claiming that the county violated her civil rights in not accommodating her religious beliefs. The district court ruled in favor of the county, finding that allowing the employee to work unvaccinated during a public health crisis would have jeopardized the health of county staff and patients, causing undue hardship on the county.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the county had sufficiently shown an undue hardship that justified denial of the religious accommodation. The Court noted that the employee worked as a pharmacist in a hospital setting and worked in the same room with other pharmacist, and regularly interacted with patients where the risks and consequences of spreading the COVID-19 virus were high, and that masking and social distancing alone did not adequately reduce those risks.  

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Lawsuit Challenging Village's Tow of Vehicle Was Properly Dismissed

Lawsuit Challenging Village's Tow of Vehicle Was Properly Dismissed

  Wednesday, September 23, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A village police officer towed a vehicle that had five parking citations. The following day, an individual went to the police department and offered to pay $22 to the village, which he claimed satisfied the debt, and demanded the car be returned. The village refused to release the vehicle. Subsequently, the individual filed a lawsuit against the village alleging unjust enrichment on the village's part in keeping the vehicle, among other claims. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the individual had no standing to sue the village because he was not the owner of the vehicle and had no legal interest to sue the village for its return.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that he had no standing to sue the village. The individual had conceded he was not the owner of the vehicle, and the court found that his voluntary $22 payment towards the debt of another did not establish sufficient a "legal interest" to satisfy the standing requirements for his lawsuit. Bey v. Village of Midlothian, et al.

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Court Upholds City's Revocation of Liquor Licenses

Court Upholds City's Revocation of Liquor Licenses

  Tuesday, September 22, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a local liquor commissioner's revocation of liquor licenses for two establishments in Raven Place v. City of Blue Island.

A licensee was issued liquor licenses for two establishments in a city. In 2021, 23 gunshots were fired towards one of the licensed establishments and the establishment's security personnel returned fire. The mayor (who also serves as the local liquor commissioner) issued an emergency seven day closure of that establishment. Later that month, the city entered into an agreement with the licensee that established certain conditions and restrictions to the continued operation of both licensed establishments in the city. Under the agreement, the licensee agreed to use ID scanners, impose age restrictions and restricted hours of operation, to pay a $7,500 fine, among other restrictions. A year later while the agreement was in effect, there was another shooting at one of the establishments and the mayor issued a second seven day emergency closure order, and subsequently conducted hearings and issued two orders determining that the businesses were a "nuisance" and that the licensee had failed to comply with the agreement with the city. The mayor revoked both liquor licenses. The licensee appealed the revocation orders to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, which upheld the city's decision to revoke both licenses. The licensee then filed an administrative review action with the circuit court challenging both revocation orders, which court ruled against the licensee finding that one of the appeals was untimely and the other appeal was unfounded.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the licensee argued that the circuit court should have decided both appeals, that the businesses did not constitute a nuisance, and that the licensee's due process rights had been violated. The Appellate Court agreed with the circuit court that the licensee's appeal of the first revocation order was not timely and that it was improper for the licensee to combine both appeals into one administrative review action. Second, the court determined that both revocation orders were proper and upheld the city's decisions to revoke the liquor licenses for both establishments. 

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Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down

Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down

  Tuesday, September 15, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently issued a ruling regarding a school detachment/annexation petition in a lengthy opinion analyzing the requirements for a property owner to detach their property from one school district and attach it to another school district. Board of Education of Jasper County Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, et al. The case has a convoluted history with multiple motions to reconsider and changes of position of both the Regional Board and circuit court, which partially explains the long opinion.

Homeowners of property located in Jasper County (petitioners) filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees requesting that their property be detached from Jasper County School District (District 1) and annexed to Dieterich Community School District in Effingham County (District 30). Their property was located entirely within Jasper County and approximately 1.5 miles from the boundary of District 30 and did not touch any part of District 30. Owners of property located between the petitioners' property and the District 30 boundary joined the petition, asking that a 10 foot wide strip of their property be included in the detachment/annexation petition. The petition alleged that the territory to be detached and annexed was "contiguous" to District 30.

District 1 argued against the petition, saying it did not comply with section 7-4 of the School Code because the detachment, if granted, would result in districts that were not "compact and contiguous" as required by the Illinois Constitution and the School Code, and would create multiple "islands" that would destroy the compactness of both districts. The Regional Board conducted a hearing on the petition, hearing testimony from the petitioners and District 1 representatives. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Regional Board initially denied the petition, finding that the detriment to District 1 outweighed the benefit to the petitioners and District 30. The petitioners requested a rehearing, and at the conclusion of that rehearing, the Regional Board overturned its previous decision and granted the petition, allowing the detachment and annexation of the territory. 

District 1 filed an administrative review action with the circuit court to appeal the Regional Board's decision. The circuit court initially reversed the Regional Board, finding its decision to grant the detachment/annexation petition to be contrary to the Illinois Constitution and the School Code. The petitioners again filed a motion to reconsider, and a new judge assigned to the case vacated the prior judge's order and upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, that Court reviewed the administrative record of the Regional Board's multiple hearings, as well as documentary evidence, including a map showing the petitioners' property and the narrow strip that would connect the petitioners' property to District 30 if annexed to that district (see photo from opinion below), and determined that the Regional Board erred in granting the petition. The Court found that the petitioners failed to show how the proposed detachment and annexation would result in "compact and contiguous" districts as required by Illinois case law, the Illinois constitution, and Illinois statutes. In sum, the Court held that the petition should not have been granted, and it reversed the Regional Board's order and the circuit court's decision upholding the Regional Board's order. There was a dissenting opinion which would have upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

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7th Circuit Addresses First Amendment Challenge to Town's Deletion of Comments on Website

7th Circuit Addresses First Amendment Challenge to Town's Deletion of Comments on Website

  Tuesday, August 11, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Schulte v. Leners, et al., the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to a municipal official's deletion of critical comments on the town's website, as well as the town's decision to entirely shut down future comments on its website.

A Wisconsin town maintained a website where it posted agendas and updates on pending town activities and business. The website allowed members of the public to comment on individual town posts, and many members of the public did express their opinions in the comment sections. The town did not have a policy to limit who could comment or what commenters could post. In 2022, the chairman of the town board posted on the website a notice criticizing the use of RVs in the town and advocating for greater regulations. A member of the public who owns an RV posted a comment disagreeing with the chairman's post, and other members of the public also took issue with the post. The chairman replied to one of the critical comments calling the comment disrespectful, and the commenter replied. The chairman then deleted the commenter's reply, as well as all other critical comments to the chairman's original post. A month or so later, the town board voted to end comment sections entirely on its website.

The original commenter sued, claiming the town and the town board chairman violated her First Amendment right to free speech by engaging in "viewpoint discrimination" in deleting her comments. She also claimed the town retaliated against her when it shut down all comments on the website. The chairman filed a motion to dismiss her case claiming he had qualified immunity for his actions. The district court denied the motion, rejecting the chairman's qualified immunity argument.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit agreed with the district court that the town chairman did not have qualified immunity for his actions in deleting the critical comments from his original post. The Court first determined that the comment section of the town's website was a public forum (at least during the time it was open to the public), and the town could not discriminate based on viewpoint, which the Court found the chairman did in deleting all critical comments from the original post. The Court likened the town's website that allowed comments to a social media site, noting there were numerous cases finding that public comment sections are a public forum subject to the First Amendment. The Court also rejected the town's argument that the website was "government speech," finding that the comment section of the website operated as a public forum for people to express opinions about government actions. The Court also noted that the town had no policy to control comments, which defeated any "government speech" argument. In sum, the Court found that because no reasonable official could have concluded that it was legal to selectively delete speech based on viewpoint, the chairman was not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in deleting the critical comments. 

The Court did not address the chairman's argument that he had qualified immunity for the town's decision to shut down comments entirely because it was not part of the district court's qualified-immunity analysis. So, we did not get a clear indication of how the 7th Circuit would rule on that particular issue. However, the Court did give a hint how it might analyze this issue in the following statement:

Just as the government can designate a forum on its previously nonpublic property, it reserves the right to close the forum at any time. 

This statement suggests that governments might be able to shut down comments entirely in a designated public forum like a website that allows comments or a social media page. However, because this statement was in the nature of "dicta," governments should consult with legal counsel before deciding to shut down comments entirely in a designated public forum.

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Employees First Amendment Retaliation Claims Rejected by Court

Employees First Amendment Retaliation Claims Rejected by Court

  Thursday, August 06, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Fox v. DuPage Township, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected former employees' First Amendment claim that they were terminated because they campaigned for an opposing candidate for election to government office. 

After an election that changed the make-up of township government, the township board voted to reorganize a senior center's leadership, resulting in the termination of two employees from their employment at the center. They sued, claiming that they were terminated in retaliation for their campaigning for the township supervisor's opponent in the election. The district court rejected their arguments and ruled in favor of the township, finding that the two former employees had failed to show that their protected First Amendment activity was a motivating factor in their termination. They appealed.

On appeal, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision. To make a retaliation case against the government in a First Amendment claim, the former employees were required to show that their speech was constitutionally protected, they suffered a deprivation likely to deter their speech, and their speech was "at least a motivating factor" in the government's action. Here, the Court held that the two former employees did not meet the third requirement because they provided no direct evidence that their participation in the opponent's campaign was a motivating factor in their terminations. Instead, they relied on an inference of "suspicious timing" which was not sufficient in this case because they could not show that the government knew of their protected conduct. The township also showed alternative reasons for their termination. As a result, the former employees failed to show they were retaliated against based on their First Amendment activities.

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11th Circuit Finds City Panhandling Ordinance Unconstitutional

11th Circuit Finds City Panhandling Ordinance Unconstitutional

  Wednesday, August 05, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Scott v. City of Daytona Beach, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals struck down several provisions of a city ordinance that restricted panhandling.

Daytona Beach, Florida, enacted Ordinance No. 19-27 in 2019. The ordinance banned “aggressive panhandling” throughout the city, banned traditional panhandling in numerous locations, and restricted certain methods of panhandling.

Four men who regularly panhandled in Daytona Beach challenged the ordinance both facially and as applied to them, arguing it violated their First Amendment free-speech rights. After conducting a lengthy standing analysis for each plaintiff and each challenged provision, the court addressed the merits of the constitutional claims.

First, relying on existing precedent, the Court reaffirmed that panhandling is protected speech under the First Amendment. The Court next determined that the challenged provisions were “content-based” rather than “content-neutral” regulations, meaning that the ordinance was subject to strict scrutiny, which is the highest standard of constitutional review, requiring a compelling government interest pursued through the least speech-restrictive means.

To satisfy strict scrutiny, the city argued that the ordinance was necessary to advance the compelling government interests of protecting public health and promoting traffic safety. While the Court acknowledged that both can be compelling government interests, it concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. The Court also noted that the city could pursue both interests through less speech-restrictive means, including the enforcement of existing laws such as disorderly conduct or trespassing.  

As a result, the Court struck down those portions of the ordinance that were found unconstitutional. The Court also upheld an award of $80,000 in damages to the plaintiffs.

Note that this decision covers the 11th Circuit and not the 7th Circuit in which Illinois is located. However, the content-based versus content-neutral analysis comes from U.S. Supreme Court precedent that applies to all states. 

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando, Ancel Glink

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Court Upholds Disqualification of Police Officer Candidate for Past Conduct

Court Upholds Disqualification of Police Officer Candidate for Past Conduct

  Tuesday, August 04, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A candidate applied for a probationary police officer position with a city police department. As part of the application process, the city conducted a background investigation that found two police reports that included allegations of assault and stalking by the candidate against two women. After investigating the incidents and interviewing the candidate, the city removed the candidate from the eligibility list for dishonesty during the interview and past criminal conduct. The candidate challenged his disqualification with the city's police board which upheld the decision. He then filed an appeal with the circuit court which also upheld the city's disqualification. 

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the candidate argued that the disqualification was "unjust" because he had never been arrested. He also claimed the allegations made by the two women were false. Finally, he claimed the city violated his due process rights. The city defended its disqualification decision, arguing that they had sufficient evidence to dispute his claims, including records of two prior arrests. 

First, the Appellate Court reviewed the bases relied upon by the city for its disqualification decision (impersonation of a police officer, conduct indicating violent tendencies, and false statements during the application process) and determined that the city had ample evidence to support its decision to disqualify the candidate from the eligibility list for the position of probationary police officer. 

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the candidate's claim that his due process rights were violated, finding that he received written notice of his disqualification, he took full advantage of the opportunity to challenge his disqualification through a written appeal to the police board, and that there is no legal requirement that disqualified applicants are entitled to an in-person hearing to confront witnesses. In sum, the Appellate Court upheld the city's decision to disqualify him from the police officer position. Navarro-Angulo v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, et al.

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Court Rules Against Journalists in Lawsuit Against Police Officers for Injuries Sustained at a Protest

Court Rules Against Journalists in Lawsuit Against Police Officers for Injuries Sustained at a Protest

  Monday, August 03, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Schukar, et al. v. Kenosha County, et al., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court’s decision in favor of police officers in a First and Fourth Amendment case brought by photojournalists relating to a protest incident.  

On August 25, 2020, two photojournalists were documenting a protest at the Kenosha County Courthouse. The protest was sparked by the shooting of a 29-year-old Black male by a City of Kenosha police officer. During the protest, both protestors and police officers launched objects at one another, including the officers’ launching of foam batons that hit and injured the journalists. Shortly after the incident, the journalists filed a lawsuit against two police officers who were at the protest. They claimed the officers intentionally struck them in retaliation for engaging in the First Amendment protected activity of protesting and used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled against the journalists, who appealed the district court’s ruling.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling in favor of the police officers. As to the journalists' First Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found there was no evidence that either officer intentionally targeted the journalists for engaging in their First Amendment right to protest. The Court found that the officers’ use-of-force reports (which failed to accurately state the total number of rounds deployed during the protest) were not enough to show that the officers intentionally targeted the photojournalists.

As to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found that the officers had qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit determined that it was not "clearly established" by case law whether an officer’s intentional deployment of less-than-lethal munitions that hit unintended targets during a protest constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, so the journalists could not defeat the officers' claims of qualified immunity.

Authored by Rachel Stempler, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Court Rejects "Takings" Challenge to City's Rental Assistance Ordinance

In the Zone: Court Rejects "Takings" Challenge to City's Rental Assistance Ordinance

  Thursday, July 23, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a "takings" challenge to a city ordinance that protects tenants in residential buildings when ownership is transferred through a foreclosure action. BBLI Edison, LLC v. City of Chicago.

In 2021, the City of Chicago adopted the "Keep Chicago Renting Ordinance." That ordinance requires anyone who obtains a rental property through a foreclosure action to negotiate new leases with existing tenants in good faith and if the tenant declines to renew a lease, pay the tenant $10,600 to assist with relocation expenses. When BBLI took control of a rental property through a sheriff's deed in 2024, BBLI followed the procedures under the ordinance for negotiating new leases, but at least five tenants declined new leases and requested the relocation assistance fee. BBLI filed a lawsuit against the city claiming that the ordinance violated its civil rights because requiring payment of the fee constituted an unconstitutional "takings" under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, and BBLI appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit uphold the dismissal of the case. 

First, the Court found that the city had authority to adopt the ordinance as a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship. 

Second, the Court rejected BBLI's argument that the relocation assistance fee requirement was a "physical" taking because it transfers wealth, finding this ordinance to be similar to rent control regulations which courts have found are not "physical" takings. 

Third, the Court did not find a "regulatory" taking because, among other things, the city's ordinance did not interfere with BBLI's "investment-backed expectations" since the ordinance was already in effect when BBLI purchased the property.

Finally, the Court rejected BBLI's "unconstitutional conditions" argument because BBLI was not asking for permission to build or engage in some other lawful activity that the city was withholding or imposing conditions on the issuance. Instead, the ordinance was enacted to further the city's interest in keeping its residents housed.

In short, the Court upheld the dismissal of BBLI's "takings" challenge to the rental assistance ordinance.

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Appeals Court Rules in Favor of City in Challenge to Firefighter's Termination for Social Media Posts

Appeals Court Rules in Favor of City in Challenge to Firefighter's Termination for Social Media Posts

  Tuesday, July 21, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A federal court of appeals upheld the termination of a city firefighter after he posted several racially charged and offensive posts on his personal Facebook account. Inendino v. Nance-Holt.

A firefighter worked for a city fire department for 16 years. Most of his work was at a station in a predominantly Black neighborhood of the city. As an EMT, he had frequent contact with the public and engaged directly with patients. He had a personal Facebook page which was publicly viewable. On his personal Facebook page, he identified himself as a city firefighter, and his profile picture depicted him on the back of a fire truck, wearing his firefighter gear. After the city received multiple complaints about content he posted on Facebook, the city conducted an investigation and prepared a report that found that a number of his Facebook posts were racist and offensive, targeted Black and Asian Americans, and showed a contempt for the residents of the community he served. The report recommended that the city terminate him. Shortly after, he was terminated for violating the city's personnel rules relating to social media and professional conduct. The firefighter filed a grievance under the city's collective bargaining agreement, but the arbitrator ruled against him, finding just cause for his termination.

The firefighter then sued the city, claiming it violated his civil rights in firing him, and challenging the city's policies as unconstitutional. The district court ruled in favor of the city, and he appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the city's termination, rejecting the firefighter's constitutional claims. The Court applied what is known as the "Pickering balancing test" which applies when a government employee challenges a negative employment action on First Amendment grounds.

First, the Seventh Circuit accepted for purposes of applying the Pickering balancing that some of his Facebook posts might address matters of public concern. However, the Court rejected the firefighter's argument that the First Amendment protected those posts, finding that (1) he identified himself as a city firefighter on his Facebook page, (2) his Facebook posts were racially offensive, (3) he targeted groups that his position required him to protect, and (4) that the city's interest in ensuring that its fire department succeed in performing its public safety mission outweighed any interest in his posting the offensive content on Facebook. 

In sum, the Court upheld the city's termination of the firefighter for his Facebook posts and comments.

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Public Comment Policy Overly Broad and Vague Under First Amendment

Public Comment Policy Overly Broad and Vague Under First Amendment

  Monday, July 20, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Merriott v. City of Bossier City, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a city's "decorum" policy for city meetings violated the First Amendment because it was overly broad as well as vague in prohibiting personal, impertinent, and slanderous remarks and "becoming boisterous" during public comment. 

An online journalist attended city council meetings where the city clerk read from the city's rules of decorum for public comment. Those rules included restrictions on cell phone usage, imposed time limits on speakers, and required the audience to maintain decorum. At one of the meetings, the city clerk read the following statement: 

Any person making personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks or who shall become boisterous while addressing the Council shall be forthwith, by the President Pro-tem, barred from further audience before the Council unless permission to continue by [sic] granted by a majority vote of the Council” (the “Policy”)....All remarks shall be addressed to the Council as a body and not to any member thereof. No questions shall be asked a [sic] Council person or the mayor except through the meeting chair. All other audience members are asked to please observe the meeting quietly. City Council appointed Sergeant at Arms have been instructed to maintain decorum and ask anyone in violation to step out of the meeting. Merriott again “criticiz[ed] the Council for failing to listen to the Mayor and the citizens. 

The journalist spoke during public comment at several meetings and criticized the city on a decision relating to term limits. He was interrupted by councilmembers reminding him of the decorum rules. After one of the meetings, the journalist wrote a letter to the city, requesting the council respect his First Amendment rights and not interrupt him during public comment. At the next meeting, he was again interrupted during public comment and threatened with removal. He then sued, alleging violations of the state's open meetings laws and his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed his case, and he appealed.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed part of the dismissal of his case, finding that the journalist had plausibly alleged in his complaint that the city's public comment policy was unconstitutional. First, the Court found that the policy's prohibition on "personal" remarks was too broad because its enforcement could capture protected free speech, such as criticism of individual councilmembers. Second, the Court found that the prohibition on "impertinent" remarks was also too broad because it allows the city council to decide which comments are permissible at its whim. Third, the Court struck down the policy's ban on "slanderous" remarks, finding that it was too broad because it placed a speaker in doubt about what he or she could say about public officials and public figures. Fourth, the Court found that the policy's ban on persons who "become boisterous" was too broad because it went beyond conduct and would also apply to speech, implicating the First Amendment. The Court also found the policy to be too vague because the terms "personal" and "impertinent" were undefined and, therefore, failed to provide speakers with a "reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited." 

In sum, the Court found that the city's public comment policy was overly broad and too vague, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. The Court upheld the district court's findings in favor of the city on the journalist's open meetings act and content-based discrimination claims, however.

Although this case is out of the Fifth Circuit (which does not cover Illinois), it is consistent with Illinois Attorney General opinions and court rulings that question public comment policies that go beyond regulating conduct.

 

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Court Rejects Excessive Force Claim Against Police Officers

Court Rejects Excessive Force Claim Against Police Officers

  Tuesday, July 14, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling upholding a district court's decision in favor of city police officers in an excessive force case. Davis v. City of Elgin. 

Police were dispatched to a home after someone called to report that an individual was threatening his ex-wife and roommate with a shotgun. Police called the suspect, who threatened to harm himself with a knife. The police then surrounded the house but the suspect had already left the home and gone to his neighbors.  The suspect came outside to the porch but when he refused police orders to come out further, police fired at him with a non-lethal impact weapon. After the suspect threatened to harm the officer who shot him, officers shot him again. The suspect eventually pled guilty to disorderly conduct, and then filed a lawsuit against the city and the police officers involved in the incident claiming that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court ruled against the suspect, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, finding that the suspect did not establish that the officers violated a clearly established right to be free from a particular use of force. The Court found that the officers had good reason not to want the suspect to go back into the house so he could potentially grab a weapon, and that the officers had knowledge of his earlier threats with a gun against his ex-wife, as well as his threat that he had a knife. In sum, the Court found that the officers had qualified immunity. The Court also held that the suspect did not meet his burden to show a theory of liability against the city itself.

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Seventh Circuit Upholds "Protect Illinois Communities Act" that Restricts Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines

Seventh Circuit Upholds "Protect Illinois Communities Act" that Restricts Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines

  Friday, July 10, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois General Assembly enacted the Protect Illinois Communities Act following a deadly shooting at a Chicago suburb’s Independence Day parade. That Act criminalizes the manufacture, sale, delivery, purchase, and possession of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, among other things. The Act contains a grandfather clause that allows preexisting lawful owners of the regulated items to continue possessing them. 

Shortly after the Act was adopted, several lawsuits were filed to challenge its constitutionality. The district court decisions were divided, with one court granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act and two district courts denying injunctive relief. Those appeals made their way to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which consolidated the cases and issued a ruling in 2023 that rejected preliminary relief to the challengers and sent the case back to the district courts for further proceedings.

One of the consolidated cases proceeded to a bench trial. The district court in that case held that much of the Act violated the Second Amendment and that the offending provisions were not severable, and the court enjoined enforcement of the Act in its entirety. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which recently reversed the ruling and upheld the Act, including its restrictions on AR-15s and thirty-round rifle magazines. Barnett et al., v. Raoul. 

First, the Seventh Circuit held that the challengers failed to meet their burden to show that all of the Act's regulations were facially invalid. Second, the Seventh Circuit assumed for purposes of its ruling that the regulated items constituted "arms" under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment, meaning that they were presumptively entitled to constitutional protection under the Second Amendment. Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the test established by the Supreme Court for challenges under the Second Amendment and determined that the Act was consistent with the principles that "underpin our regulatory tradition" because legislatures have long imposed restrictions on particularly dangerous weapons like those regulated by the Act. Further, the Seventh Circuit found the Act’s “burden on the right of armed self defense" to be minimal. In sum, the Seventh Circuit held that the challengers failed to meet their burden in a facial challenge to the Act's constitutionality under the Second Amendment. 

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Supreme Court Invalidates Hawaii Firearm "Owner Consent" Restriction

Supreme Court Invalidates Hawaii Firearm "Owner Consent" Restriction

  Wednesday, July 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In a 6-3 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Hawaii law that prohibited firearms on private property open to the public without the express and affirmative consent of the property owner. Wolford v. Lopez.

Following the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, which ended “may-issue” concealed carry licensing schemes, Hawaii enacted HRS § 134-9.5. The law provided that a person carrying a licensed firearm could not enter or remain on private property of another person “unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property.” Such authorization could be provided through unambiguous written or verbal consent or the posting of clear and conspicuous signage at the entrance of the building or elsewhere on the premises.

The Supreme Court held that the law conflicted with the common law presumption that members of the public, including those lawfully carrying firearms, may enter private property open to the public unless expressly prohibited from doing so. As a result, the Court concluded that Hawaii’s law unconstitutionally burdened individuals seeking to exercise their Second Amendment right to carry a firearm for self-defense. In addition, the Hawaii law could not be justified by the country's historical firearm regulations.

This ruling does not raise concerns regarding the applicability of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act (430 ILCS 66/et seq.). Illinois follows a system where firearms are presumptively allowed on private property unless the owner posts statutorily prescribed signage prohibiting them. This is consistent with the common law presumption. Hawaii took the opposite approach, presumptively prohibiting firearms on private property by requiring signage indicating that carrying firearms was authorized. Illinois law requires that property owners take affirmative steps to exclude firearms, whereas Hawaii’s approach required that property owners take affirmative steps to allow them.   

This decision impacts California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey, which have laws similar to Hawaii’s.

Post Authored by Luigi Laudando & Dan Bolin, Ancel Glink

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Supreme Court Says Government Not Liable to Pay Owner Fair Market Value in Tax Foreclosure Sale

Supreme Court Says Government Not Liable to Pay Owner Fair Market Value in Tax Foreclosure Sale

  Wednesday, June 24, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In a 9-0 opinion (with a couple of concurring opinions), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a government that forecloses and sells property for delinquent property taxes is not responsible to pay the owner the difference between the sale price and the hypothetical fair market value of the property. Pung v. Isabella County. 

Three years ago, the Supreme Court held that a government that forecloses and sells property for delinquent property taxes may be liable to return to the owner any surplus proceeds from tax foreclosure sales (i.e., the difference between the sales price and the taxpayer's debt). Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U. S. 631 (2023). 

In today's case, the question before the Supreme Court went a step further -  what if the sale price falls below the property's hypothetical fair market value, would the government be responsible for paying the difference to the owner as "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause? Yesterday, the Supreme Court said no, holding that the proper baseline for determining compensation under the Takings Clause is the price obtained in the tax sale so long as the sale was fairly conducted. The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not require the government to return the difference between the sale price and fair market value of the property that was sold. In this case, the Court held that the county was obligated to pay the surplus proceeds to the owner, but was not liable to pay more than what the county sold the property for at its tax sale auction. The opinion concluded with the following:

The Pung family lost its property because it failed to pay its taxes. The Fifth Amendment protects the family’s right to surplus proceeds from the tax sale, not compensation for the property’s fair market value. The Eighth Amendment offers no greater protections. 

So, when a government forecloses and sells property for delinquent taxes, (1) it must return any surplus proceeds from the sale (the difference between the sale price and the taxpayer's debt) but (2) is not required to pay more than what the government sold the property for even if the fair market value of the property exceeds the sale price. 

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School Board Violated First Amendment in Restricting Critical Public Comment

School Board Violated First Amendment in Restricting Critical Public Comment

  Thursday, June 18, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Although this case was decided by a different federal circuit court of appeals than the Seventh Circuit that governs Illinois, it is illustrative of how courts view restrictions on public comment at government meetings. Boddy v. Grech (6th Cir. June 10, 2026).

A school board in Xenia, Ohio held a public meeting where public comment was permitted under its public comment policy. While one of the speakers was expressing her views regarding the school district's alleged teaching of critical race theory, the school board president threatened to turn off the speaker's microphone and then grabbed the microphone and recessed the meeting. The speaker sued, claiming the school district violated her First Amendmnet rights. The school district defended the board president's actions, stating that the reason the speaker was silenced was because she violated rules of decorum by inciting and riling up the audience, by using terms such as "cowardice" and "failing" to describe the board and the school district,and by calling people "names" and spreading "baseless accusations." 

The district court rejected the speaker's request for a preliminary injunction against the school district, finding that although the speaker's criticism of the board was subject to some First Amendment protection, some of her speech was an "ad hominem" attack that was not protected by the First Amendment. The speaker appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and ordered the district court to grant the speaker a preliminary injunction against the board.

First, the Court determined that the speaker's use of "failing" and "cowardice" did not qualify as "fighting words" under the First Amendment. Instead, the speaker was simply criticizing the board and the superintendent for their policy decisions, while maintaining a calm demeanor and tone, which is protected by the First Amendment. The Court further stated that even if her words were "offensive," the First Amendment protects that type of speech and a contrary position would allow the government to ban the express of unpopular views, which would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. The Court further noted that the [f]reedom to criticize public officials and expose their wrongdoing is at the core of First Amendment values.”

Second, the Court rejected the school district's argument that restricting the speaker's speech was necessary to maintain decorum, finding that the real justification for shutting the speaker down was because she shared viewpoints critical of the board. 

Finally, the Court agreed with the speaker that the board's actions in shutting down her speech constituted a "heckler's veto," because the board appeared to be taking action based on the crowd's reactions to the speaker's public comments - i.e., silencing the speaker in an attempt to address a disruptive or unruly crowd. 

In sum, the Sixth Circuit found that the speaker was entitled to a preliminary injunction to stop the school board from enforcing its policy against her at future meetings.

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County Not Liable for Former Coroner's Actions in Keeping Skull

County Not Liable for Former Coroner's Actions in Keeping Skull

  Tuesday, June 16, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in favor of a county in a civil rights lawsuit involving the former county coroner's keeping of a family member's skull as a trophy. Betts v. Boone County.

In 1977, a high school student was kidnapped, raped, and murdered and then dumped in a field within the county. As part of the investigation, the county coroner examined the body, and returned the remains to the family, except for the skull, which the coroner kept. 

In 2022, the current county coroner contacted the family to inform them that the former coroner had kept at least three skulls, one of which was their family member's. After the family exhumed the casket to place the skull with her remains, they filed a civil rights lawsuit against the county, arguing that the coroner's actions unconstitutionally retained their property in violation of their due process rights. The district court dismissed the case, determining that the family did not show that the former coroner's actions established an official county policy, as required to hold the county liable for its employee's actions. 

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the legal standard for holding a government liable for civil rights claims for its employees' actions, which requires a person to show that the deprivation of a constitutional right was caused by a municipal policy or custom. Here, the Seventh Circuit held that because state law requires coroners to return all remains to the next of kin, the former coroner did not implement an “official policy” of the county when he kept the skull. Instead, he violated the law. Since the family members could not establish that the county was liable for its former employee's actions, the district court properly dismissed their case. 

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Seventh Circuit Upholds Removal of Public Employee for Social Media Posts

Seventh Circuit Upholds Removal of Public Employee for Social Media Posts

  Monday, June 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the removal of a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary after he refused to stop posting himself in uniform and making derogatory statements on social media in Wenzler v. United States Coast Guard, et al.

Wenzler had been a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary for about 15 years when a member of the public complained about his LinkedIn posts. One of the posts accused certain Supreme Court Justices of being racist, and another made a crude remark about the Girl Scouts. The Auxiliary conducted an investigation, and a supervisor directed him to remove from social media any photograph of himself wearing his uniform and to delete any reference to the Auxiliary. He responded that he would not comply with the directive and that he would file a complaint against the supervisor for racist action against him because he was white. He continued to post about his Auxiliary position on LinkedIn and another complaint was filed by a member of the public about one of his posts. He again stated he would not comply with the Auxiliary's social media directive, and formal disciplinary proceedings were started which resulted in the Coast Guard disenrolling him. After his administrative appeals failed, he sued in federal court claiming the Coast Guard's actions against him violated his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in the Coast Guard's favor, and he appealed.

The Seventh Circuit reviewed the standards for a First Amendment retaliation claim, which require a public employee to show that (1) their speech was constitutionally protected; (2) they suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and (3) their speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. In analyzing the first prong (whether his speech was constitutionally protected), the Court applied the two-step Pickering test: (a) whether the speech involved a matter of public concern and (b) if so, does the speaker's interest in commenting on the matter of public concern outweigh the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

In this case, the Court accepted that Wenzler's speech touched on matters of public concern (meeting the first step of the Pickering test). However, in applying the second step (balancing interests test), the Court determined that the Coast Guard deserved deference in assessing and responding to its members' speech when those members hold themselves out as members of the organization while wearing its uniform. The Auxiliary's structure as a uniformed organization within the Coast Guard with a military-like hierarchy was also relevant to the Court in balacing its interests against Wenzler's. In short, the Court held that the Auxiliary could reasonably determine that Wenzler's speech would be detrimental to the Auxiliary and its reputation, and reasonably expect that other members of the Auxiliary would be less likely to work with him because of his derogatory comments and attacks on others. As a result, the Seventh Circuit found no First Amendment violation in the Coast Guard's removal of Wenzler. 

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