Wednesday, March 22, 2017
The Illinois Attorney General (PAC office) recently issued its first binding opinion for 2017. In PAC Op. 17-001, the PAC found the Illinois State Police in violation of FOIA for improperly denying a request for an ISP field report referenced in an accident report the requester had previously received. The ISP had denied the request in its entirety, claiming release would interfere with a pending law enforcement proceeding.
The requester filed a complaint with the PAC, which determined that the ISP failed to provide a "detailed factual basis" as to how the release would interfere with its law enforcement investigations. In the PAC's opinion, the mere existence of an open investigation is not enough to satisfy this exemption, and the ISP was required to explain, in some detail, why release would interfere with the open investigation.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Tuesday, March 21, 2017
Court Rejects Challenge to Ordinance Ban on Texting While Driving
Tuesday, March 21, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
Illinois has a law that prohibits a person from driving while using an electronic device (cell phone, smart phone, etc.). In 2005, the City of Chicago adopted an ordinance prohibiting similar conduct - i.e., using cell phones while operating a vehicle.
After Simic was issued a ticket by a Chicago police officer for texting while driving, she challenged Chicago's ordinance in court, claiming it is unconstitutional. In her lawsuit, Simic claimed that the ordinance violated her due process rights and Eight Amendment's excessive fines clause. She sought damages in excess of one million dollars.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Simic, finding that she had no standing to challenge the ordinance or seek monetary damages. Simic v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 2017). The Court rejected any argument that a driver has a constitutional right to drive while using a cell phone, since that conduct is prohibited by state law. The Court also rejected her claim for damages, finding that she incurred no injury since her ticket was set aside in the administrative adjudication process. Finally, the court upheld the ordinance against a preemption claim, finding that Chicago had the authority to enact the ordinance and impose the fines pursuant to its home rule powers.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Monday, March 20, 2017
Court Denies Preliminary Injunction in Case Challenging Chicago's Short Term Rental Ordinance
Monday, March 20, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
Late last year, we reported on a lawsuit challenging the City of Chicago's short-term rental ordinance. Chicago had adopted Ordinance O2016-5011 to regulate "shared housing units" by requiring hosts to register with the City and pay a 4% surcharge on the leasing charge for all rentals. The ordinance also required the hosting companies (i.e., AirBnb, Home Away, etc.) to pay a licensing fee (from $10,000 and up) and obtain a license from the City. The lawsuit claims that the ordinance is unlawful for a variety of reasons, including that the required inspections constitute warrantless searches, the noise restrictions are unreasonable, and the 4% surcharge is a discriminatory tax.
Recently, the plaintiffs in the case filed a motion asking the judge to issue a preliminary injunction against the City of Chicago to prohibit the City from implementing and enforcing the new ordinance. Last week, U.S. District Court Judge Sara Ellis denied plaintiffs' motion for an injunction.
According to the written order, Judge Ellis expressed her doubts concerning the ability of the plaintiffs to show how the ordinance violates their constitutional rights or how they would suffer irreparable harm if the new rules take effect. Specifically, the Judge held that plaintiffs were not likely to establish that the City's shared housing ordinance targets expressive conduct or speech to trigger First Amendment protections. She also questioned plaintiffs' ability to succeed on its due process claims that the ordinance is vague. Finally, she noted that the City had a legitimate interest in adopting rules for the home sharing industry to address issues such as ensuring safety, protecting the residential character of neighborhoods, among others.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
According to the written order, Judge Ellis expressed her doubts concerning the ability of the plaintiffs to show how the ordinance violates their constitutional rights or how they would suffer irreparable harm if the new rules take effect. Specifically, the Judge held that plaintiffs were not likely to establish that the City's shared housing ordinance targets expressive conduct or speech to trigger First Amendment protections. She also questioned plaintiffs' ability to succeed on its due process claims that the ordinance is vague. Finally, she noted that the City had a legitimate interest in adopting rules for the home sharing industry to address issues such as ensuring safety, protecting the residential character of neighborhoods, among others.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Friday, March 17, 2017
Recap: Illinois Planners Legislative Action Day 2017
Friday, March 17, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
Each year, the Illinois division of the American Planning Association organizes an annual legislative action day to reach out to state legislators on important planning issues. This year's event occurred on March 14, 2017. Illinois planning professionals from around the state assembled in Springfield for APA Illinois’ third annual Planners’ Legislative
Action Day (#PLAD17).
The #PLAD17 attendees started their day over breakfast and enjoyed a lively and engaging discussion with Tom
Henderson, Executive Director of the Illinois Tax Increment Association, on the
importance of legislative advocacy by experts such as planners on matters
involving the planning profession, practice, economic development, and land use
regulatory powers. We also discussed how to approach your legislators to
effectively make your concerns known about legislation that affects the
planning profession and practice in Illinois. Finally, ideas were shared about
how to increase APA Illinois’ profile in Springfield and become a recognized
asset for legislators concerned about planning and development in Illinois.
#PLAD17 attendees toured the Capitol, sat in on
both House and Senate floor sessions, attended committee meetings, and met with
legislators to discuss a set of legislative priorities. Among these priorities
were bills concerning:
- Municipal annexation powers;
- Urban agricultural zones;
- Regional storm water management;
- Rehabilitation and revitalization tax credits; and
- Small wireless facilities deployment on public rights of way and other properties.
Details on the #PLAD17 legislative priorities can be
found here.
The day was capped off by our End of the Day
Reception at Arlington’s. Attendees shared their experiences and thoughts on next year’s Planners Legislative Action Day. We
were also treated to a surprise visitor, Rep. Al Riley (D-38th
Dist.). Rep. Riley is a certified professional planner and had many
ideas on how the Chapter can become a resource for legislators and had very
strong opinions, shared by the attendees, on the importance of Illinois
planners making their voices heard in Springfield. Rep. Riley pointed out that
planners occupy a very important and prominent role in the economic vitality of
Illinois; they are, therefore, essential voices, in state policy-making
concerning planning and development.
The APA Illinois Legislative Committee will be working over the balance of 2017 to:
- Raise awareness of legislative matters,
- Use data to better target legislative action messages to membership, and
- Educate membership on the importance of legislative advocacy, and
- Provide recommendations on how members can get more involved in a way that balances legislative advocacy and responsibilities to their communities.
As always, if you are interested in becoming
involved with the Legislative Committee, have ideas on legislative initiatives
or priorities, or simply have questions about the legislative process,
including how you can make a difference, do not hesitate to contact any member
of the Legislative Committee, including Ancel Glink's very own David Silverman.
Post Authored by David Silverman, Ancel Glink
Thursday, March 16, 2017
Court Finds that Church Sufficiently Stated Claims Under RLUIPA
Thursday, March 16, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
A recent decision
from an Illinois Appellate Court addressed whether a village may have violated
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) when it sought
to compel a church to repair a historic building. Village
of West Dundee v. The First United
Methodist Church of West Dundee.
According to
the complaint, the property was a historic building owned by the defendant
church which had fallen into disrepair. The church had previously applied for a
permit to demolish the building.
However, the permit was denied by the village’s appearance review
commission, who wanted to see the building restored. The church did not appeal this initial
denial. Several years later, the village
cited the church for numerous property maintenance code violations following an
inspection of the building. When the
church failed to remedy the violations, the village filed suit seeking to
compel the church to repair the building. The church filed a counterclaim alleging
various claims, including violations of RLIUPA. The church also sought an order
authorizing demolition of the building. However, the church’s counterclaim was
dismissed, and the church was ultimately ordered to repair the building.
On appeal, the
court first reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the church’s demolition
counterclaim, explaining that when a municipality seeks one form of relief (either
repair or demolition) under Section 11-31-1(a) of the Illinois Municipal Code, the
building’s owner is entitled to file a counterclaim seeking the alternative form
of relief.
The court then
addressed the church’s claims under RLUIPA.
The church claimed that requiring the building to be repaired instead of
demolished would cost large sums of money, and would potentially ruin the
church financially. The court found that the alleged repair costs could qualify
as a “substantial burden” on the church’s free exercise of its religion in
violation of RLUIPA if ultimately proved at trial. Further, the court rejected
the village’s argument that its property maintenance code was not a “land use
regulation” covered by RLUIPA’s protections. The church had alleged that the
village’s application of its property maintenance code restricted its use of
the land, which the church intended to use as parking for its congregation. The
court found these allegations clearly fell within the purview of RLUIPA, and
that the church’s claims should not have been dismissed.
The court also
found that the church had a viable unequal treatment claim under RLIUPA. The village had previously authorized the
demolition of several other historic structures for commercial uses, in
contrast to its denial of the church’s demolition request. The court found that
these allegations of arbitrary enforcement were sufficient to state an unequal
treatment claim under RLIUPA.
Finally, the
court found that the church had sufficiently alleged an inverse condemnation
claim. The court cited the church’s
allegations that the village had effectively denied it the use of the property,
even if only temporarily, without instituting an eminent domain action. The court held that this was all the church
was required to allege in order to state an inverse condemnation claim against
the village.
Post authored by Kurt Asprooth, Ancel Glink
Wednesday, March 15, 2017
PAC Says Liquor Commission Not Subject to OMA
Wednesday, March 15, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
The PAC recently issued two advisory opinions finding that a
Liquor Commission was not a public body subject to the Open Meetings Act.
In 2016 PAC 43179, a requester had submitted a request for
review to the PAC, alleging that the Bloomington liquor commission violated
Section 2.01 of the Open Meetings Act by
conducting a special meeting and taking action without a quorum present. The Mayor, who also served as the City's liquor
commissioner, conducted the meeting.
The
PAC looked to the definition of “public body” to determine whether the
commission is subject to the Open Meetings Act. Section 1.02 of the OMA defines “public body” as:
“…all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited to committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or in part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the General Assembly and committees or commissions thereof. "Public body" includes tourism boards and convention or civic center boards located in counties that are contiguous to the Mississippi River with populations of more than 250,000 but less than 300,000. "Public body" includes the Health Facilities and Services Review Board. "Public body" does not include a child death review team or the Illinois Child Death Review Teams Executive Council established under the Child Death Review Team Act, an ethics commission acting under the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act, a regional youth advisory board or the Statewide Youth Advisory Board established under the Department of Children and Family Services Statewide Youth Advisory Board Act, or the Illinois Independent Tax Tribunal.” 5 ILCS 120/1.02.
The PAC also looked to the Liquor Control Act of 1934, which
provides that the Mayor “may appoint a person or persons to assist him in the
exercise of the powers and the performance of the duties herein provider for
such local liquor control commissioner.” 235 ILCS 5/4-2. The PAC found
that this language confirmed that a liquor commission only acts to assist the Mayor in
carrying out his duties as liquor commissioner, and does not assist him in
carrying out his duties as head of the City Council. As such, the PAC determined that the
commission is not an advisory or subsidiary body of a public body such as the
City Council and no violation of the OMA occurred.
The same requester then submitted another request for
review, 2016 PAC 42868, alleging that the Bloomington Liquor Commission
violated the OMA by holding a meeting that was not open to the
public. The requester also alleged that
the members of the commission violated section 1.05 of the OMA by
failing to complete electronic training.
The commission responded that the commission is not a “public body” as
defined by the OMA, and the PAC agreed. The PAC looked to its opinion in 2016 PAC
43179, in which it found that the commission is not a public body subject to
the OMA. The PAC followed
its previous opinion and again found that a liquor commission is not a public body and no
violation of the OMA occurred.
While these opinions are not binding on any other public body in the state, they do offer some guidance on how the PAC might review similar circumstances.
Post Authored by Erin Baker, Ancel Glink
Monday, March 13, 2017
FOIA Bill Addresses Repeated Commercial Requests
Monday, March 13, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
Another FOIA bill has been introduced. House Bill 4003 would amend section 3.1 of FOIA, the "commercial purposes" provision, to allow a public body to deny a request that meets all of the following three parameters:
- the request was made for a commercial purpose;
- the request is made by the same person for the same records previously provided; and
- the request is made less than 6 months after the previous request.
It is not clear what type of request this bill would cover that isn't already covered by section 3(g) of FOIA. Section 3(g) already addresses repeated requests from the same person and is arguably broader than the new bill since it is not limited to commercial requests or repeated requests made within 6 months. That section provides as follows:
Repeated requests from the same person for the same records that are unchanged or identical to records previously provided or properly denied under this Act shall be deemed unduly burdensome under this provision.We will keep you posted on this bill.
Post authored by Julie Tappendorf
Wednesday, March 8, 2017
Court Finds Park Policy Prohibiting Sex Offenders Unconstitutional
Wednesday, March 08, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
All Illinois local governments that
operate public parks should be aware of the recent decision from an Illinois
Appellate Court in People
v. Pepitone. In this decision, the
Court found a statute prohibiting sexual predators and child sex offenders from
entering public parks or park buildings unconstitutional.
In Pepitone,
the Court was presented with a challenge Section 11-9.4-1(b) of the Criminal
Code of 2012. Section 11-9.4-1(b) makes
it “unlawful for a sexual predator or a child sex offender to knowingly be
present in any public park building or on real property comprising any public
park.” The defendant, who had previously
been convicted of a child sex offense, was discovered by local law enforcement
walking his dog in a public park. The
police officer discovered the defendant’s prior conviction after running his
license plate, and arrested him for being a child sex offender in a public park
in violation of Section 11-9.41-(b).
After being convicted at trial, the defendant appealed, claiming that
Section 11-9.4-1(b) was facially unconstitutional.
The Court began its analysis by noting
that Section 11-9.4-1(b) was clearly meant to protect the public from sexual
predators and child sex offenders, but the real question was whether the total
ban on previously convicted sex offenders from all public parks and buildings
was a reasonable method of protecting the public. The Court noted that two prior decisions had
touched on the constitutionality of Section 11-9.4-1(b) and found the
ban valid. However, the Court
was not persuaded by these prior decisions, finding their analysis
incomplete.
Instead, the Court found Section
11-9.4-1(b) unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because the
statute criminalizes innocent conduct, as a person’s mere presence in a public
park building or public park, without more, is not unlawful conduct. The Court specifically mentioned that the
statute not only prohibits the innocent act of walking a dog in a public park,
but also prohibits a child sex offender from attending a wide variety of events
in public parks such as picnics, concerts, and rallies. The Court also noted that the statute
prohibits a child sex offender from attending a Chicago Bears game or from
visiting any of the major museums on the Chicago lakefront because they are
located on Chicago Park District property.
Additionally, the Court relied on the
fact that that the statute does not require that anyone, particularly a child,
even be present in the park or park building for a violation to occur, nor does
it attempt to assess the dangerousness of a particular individual or the
likelihood of an individual offending again.
Ultimately, the Court found that Section
11-9.4-1(b) is unconstitutional on its face because it is not reasonably
related to the goal of protecting the public, especially children, from child
sex offenders or sexual predators, and that the statute arbitrarily stripped
away the defendant’s rights as a citizen and taxpayer who had already paid the
penalty for his crime.
Although the Court found the prohibition contained in Section
11-9.4-1(b) unconstitutional, the Court did not address the constitutionality
of a similar provision, Section 11-9.3(a-10), which prohibits a child sex
offender from knowingly being present in any public park or park building “when
persons under 18 are present in the building or on the grounds and to approach,
contact, or communicate with a child of 18 years of age” unless the offender is
a parent or guardian of a minor present in the building or park. 720 ILCS
5/11-9.3(a-10). Although this provision
was not before the Court, the Court did reference a prior version of the
Criminal Code that contained this exact language. The Court noted that, unlike
Section 11-9.4-1(b), the language in Section 11-9.3(a-10) at least attempts to
tie the child sex offender’s presence to times that minors are actually present
in a public park or park building, and also requires that the offender approach, contact, or
communicate with a minor for a violation to occur.
Post Authored by Kurt Asprooth, Ancel Glink
Monday, March 6, 2017
PAC Finds No OMA Violation in Advisory Opinion
Monday, March 06, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
A long-time reader of the blog forwarded a copy of a recent advisory opinion issued by the Public Access Counselor (PAC) ruling in favor of a public body against a challenge that the body violated the OMA. 2016 PAC 42283
According to the opinion, an individual filed a request for review with the PAC alleging that the village board violated the OMA in two respects. First, the complaint alleged that the agenda for the village board meeting did not provide sufficient information to the public as to the action that was taken by the village board in approving a new residential development. Second, the complaint alleged that the board members held secret meetings and discussions outside of a properly noticed meeting to discuss changes to the development plan and approvals.
With respect to the first complaint, the PAC determined that the agenda was descriptive enough to comply with section 2.02(c) of the OMA. The agenda listed 3 separate action items relating to the development, including a reconsideration of a previous document, an ordinance granting a special use permit for a planned development, and a resolution approving the development concept plan and subdivision plat. The complainant argued that the agenda was deficient because it did not identify that this was a new 32-lot proposal or that it had been amended from a previously presented 34-lot proposal. The PAC ruled that there was no statutory requirement to identify the plan as new or amended or to otherwise provide more specific details about the plan, and found no violation.
As to the second complaint, the PAC determined that there was no evidence that Board members met or discussed the plan in violation of the OMA. The public body's counsel responded to the allegations in a letter to the PAC, reporting that he had discussed the allegations with individual board members and that there was no evidence to support these allegations. Based on these assertions, as well as the fact that the OMA does not apply to work performed by staff members or discussions by less than a quorum of the public body, the PAC found no support for this complaint.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Friday, March 3, 2017
Save the Date: 3rd Annual Planners Legislative Action Day
Friday, March 03, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
SAVE THE DATE!
THIRD ANNUAL APA-IL PLANNERS LEGISLATIVE ACTION DAY
#PLAD17
Tuesday, March 14, 2017
Springfield, IL
APA-IL’s
legislative action day events are open to planning professionals across the state and are designed for both first-time and previous participants. On
March 14th, #PLAD17 will start with breakfast and a guest speaker from the
General Assembly to discuss the importance of legislative advocacy and answer
questions about the legislative process. The group will then go over a list of
legislative priorities, before walking over to the Capitol to meet with
legislators, attend committee meetings and House and Senate floor sessions. The event
will close the day with a drinks and appetizers reception before returning
home.
More
details for #PLAD17 will follow soon, but as an immediate matter and depending
on interest, we will provide bus transportation from the Metro East and Chicago
areas. Please let Ancel Glink partner David Silverman, AICP,
APA-IL Legislative Committee Chair, know whether
you are interested in bus transportation from either Metro East or Chicago.
For
more information, transportation arrangements, or to assist with the event,
contact David Silverman at dsilverman@ancelglink.com.
Watch
for #PLAD17 updates at ilapa.org/legislative-committee and
via future email blasts.
Post Authored by David Silverman, Ancel Glink
Thursday, March 2, 2017
Court Dismisses Challenge to Legislative Counsel Ordinance
Thursday, March 02, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
An
Illinois appellate court recently upheld a decision by a village board majority
to retain legislative counsel against a variety of challenges by the village president, including that the board's decision unlawfully interferes with the president's executive authority and that the law firm had a
conflict of interest. Jones v. Brown-Marino, et al., 2017 IL App (1st) 152852-U.
In
2015, four trustees on a seven-member board desired to adopt an ordinance to
retain legislative counsel to advise the board members. They discussed hiring a law firm
that had previously represented them in a case against the village relating to
certification of their names on the 2015 ballot.
Two
days before the board passed the legislative counsel ordinance, the village
attorney filed a lawsuit on behalf of the village president seeking to stop the
trustees from passing the ordinance. The suit also sought
to invalidate the legislative counsel ordinance or have the court disqualify the
trustees’ law firm from serving as legislative counsel due to an alleged
conflict. The
village president argued the legislative counsel ordinance unlawfully usurped
his executive authority to appoint attorneys for the village and unlawfully
stripped certain duties and authorities from his duly appointed village
attorney. He also alleged the ordinance was invalid because it failed to
specify the time period in which it would be effective, and because there was
allegedly no prior appropriation in the village budget to pay for legislative
counsel.
The
appellate court ruled in favor of the trustees, dismissing the village president's case. The court held that a village board is statutorily authorized to retain
legislative counsel, that the ordinance was effective for as long as the board
majority so desired, that the legislative body was not usurping the president’s
executive authority, that there was an appropriate line item in the budget for
legal services, and finally that there was no conflict of interest with the village in
allowing the majority trustees to select their trusted law firm to serve as
legislative counsel.
Post
Authored by Adam Lasker, Ancel Glink
Disclaimer: Ancel Glink is the law firm serving as legislative counsel for the majority trustees.
Wednesday, March 1, 2017
Impaneling of Multiple Municipal Electoral Boards Upheld
Wednesday, March 01, 2017 Julie Tappendorf
Yesterday, we reported on a proposed bill to modify the way challenges to candidates for municipal and township offices are heard. As noted yesterday, currently, the electoral board that hears these challenges is comprised of local elected officials - for example, a municipal electoral board consists of the village president/mayor, clerk, and senior trustee/alderman. Because these municipal electoral boards hear challenges to candidates for municipal office, it is not uncommon to have a number of conflicts of interest on the boards. For example, a mayor who is running for reelection may be the subject of a candidate petition challenge that would be heard by the municipal electoral board on which the mayor sits.
In those cases where there is a conflict of interest, the Election Code has a process for replacing the conflicted member with either a replacement elected official or, in some cases, a "public member" appointed by the county circuit court clerk. That process is the subject of a recent case Ervin v. Municipal Officers Elected Board, 2017 IL App (1st) 170066-U.
In this case, Ervin had filed objections to 10 candidates for elected municipal offices. Because of various conflicts of interest, the regularly-constituted municipal electoral board (president, clerk, senior trustee) could not hear all 10 of the objections. So, the municipality established 4 different electoral boards to hear the objections, some of which had public members to replace members who had conflicts. Ervin filed suit, alleging that the differently constituted electoral boards violated the Election Code - she claimed that the municipality should have had established one electoral board made up of 3 public members to hear all 10 of her objections.
The appellate court addressed one issue - whether a municipality may create more than one electoral board for hearing objections under the Election Code. Based on a review of the language in section 10-9 of the Election Code, the court said yes, and upheld the municipality's decision to have multiple electoral boards. The court rejected Ervin's argument that once a statutory member was disqualified from serving on one electoral board, he or she could not hear any objections at that election. The court also rejected Ervin's argument that if one statutory member is disqualified then the remaining 2 statutory members should be disqualified and replaced with public members. In short, the court held that it was not uncommon for a municipality to have multiple electoral boards passing on objections during a particular election cycle and, that practice was entirely consistent with the Electoral Board
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
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