Wednesday, April 30, 2014
In order to appear on the ballot for the office of Mayor of the City of Chicago, candidates must submit petitions signed by at least 12,500 registered voters. In the 2011 election for mayor, 20 candidates submitted petitions to run for Mayor. Three of the candidates submitted petitions that contained less than the required signatures - 2625, 250, and 10,200 valid signatures - and were disqualified. They and another candidate sued the Board of Election Commissioners, alleging that the signature requirement was unconstitutional. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, and they were not allowed on the ballot.
On appeal to the 7th Circuit, the candidates argued that the 12,500 signature requirement, the 90 day window for collecting signatures, and the rule that a voter cannot sign more than one candidate's petition in any election cycle violates ballot access rights under the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the candidates argued that these requirements severely burden the "Average Joes" and "Janes" who cannot afford to hire circulators to collect signatures.
The 7th Circuit disagreed, ruling in favor of the Board of Election Commissioners. First, the Court noted that 9 candidates satisfied the signature requirement, evidence that the burden was not severe. Second, 12,500 signatures is only about 1% of the registered voters in the City, much less than the signature requirements for office in other Cook County municipalities. Third, the 90 day window for collecting signatures was not a particularly short time-frame. The one-signature rule applies to all candidates, and was not a severe burden on ballot access. Finally, the Court noted that one of the purposes of the signature requirement was to block frivolous candidates from the ballot, an important goal. Stone v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago, (7th Cir. April 25, 2014)
Tuesday, April 29, 2014
Village's Feral Cat Ordinance Preempted
Tuesday, April 29, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
Cook County enacted a feral cat ordinance that allows residents in Cook County to maintain feral cat colonies provided they participate in trap, neuter and release programs. The Village of Bridgeview , a home rule municipality, had its own ordinance on feral cats that prohibits Bridgeview residents from operating feral cat colonies within its borders. Cook County sued the Village, claiming that the Village had no authority to adopt an ordinance that conflicted with the county feral cat ordinance.
The question before the appellate court was whether Bridgeview exceeded its home rule powers in adopting the feral cat ordinance. The court first determined that the regulation of feral cats is both a state and local issue, so the court must apply certain factors to determine which interest is more vital. In this case, the court noted that the Animal Control Act vests authority in the counties to regulate and control the animal population. Also, feral cats "freely roam" across municipal boundaries, beyond the control of the regulating municipality. Counties have traditionally had a role in animal control. Based on these factors, the court found that the state and counties have a greater interest and more traditional role in addressing the issues of animal control, including feral cats. As a result, Bridgeview exceeded its authority pursuant to its home rule powers and state statute when it enacted its own feral cat ordinance that conflicted with the county feral cat ordinance. County of Cook v. Bridgeview (April 25, 2014)
We first reported on this case in January.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Monday, April 28, 2014
RLUIPA Defense Blog: Synagogue Faces Neighbor Opposition
Monday, April 28, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
Hat tip to our friends at the RLUIPA Defense blog in reporting on a situation involving neighbor opposition to a proposed synagogue. You can read the entire story here: Village of Northbrook, Illinois Facing Familiar Threat of RLUIPA
According to RLUIPA Defense, a modern Orthodox Jewish congregation applied for a building permit to allow the construction of an 8,300 square foot synagogue and parking lot on a 1.5 acre lot zoned in the R-2 residential district. In Northbrook, religious uses are allowed by-right in the R-2 district. Consequently, no zoning approvals are required and the religious organization only needs a building permit to construct and operate the synagogue on the property. Neighbors attended a recent Village Board meeting to express their concerns about the proposed use, including the potential for increased traffic, drainage problems, and light pollution. They have asked the Village to address their concerns, including requiring a buffer to neighboring residential properties. In response, some trustees responded that a public hearing should be held to consider proposals involving significant changes in use even though the proposed use is allowed by-right in the residential district.
The authors of the RLUIPA Defense blog note that if the Village were to stray from their process, the religious institution might be able to make an RLUIPA equal-terms claim that prohibits local governments from treating secular and religious institutions differently through its land use regulations. That provision of RLUIPA requires municipalities to subject religious institutions to the same process and under the same standards as those submitted by secular institutions.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Friday, April 25, 2014
Treasurers' Pay Cannot Decrease During Term of Office
Friday, April 25, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
The Illinois County Treasurers' Association sued the Illinois Department of Revenue and Comptroller claiming they violated Illinois law by not paying the county treasurers the full amount of their annual stipends. In support of its argument, the ICTA cited the Illinois Constitutional provision that prohibits an increase or decrease in an elected official's salary during their terms - the same provision that Illinois legislators cited in their lawsuit against Governor Quinn when he suspended their pay last year. The defendant state agencies responded that the General Assembly failed to appropriate sufficient funds to pay the county officials and that the separation of powers doctrine barred the ICTA's lawsuit.
The circuit court ruled in favor of the defendants on the separation of powers issue, finding the ICTA's lawsuit barred. The appellate court reversed, however, finding that the county treasurers were constitutionally entitled to receive their full pay, and the decision to decrease that pay during the treasurers' terms of office violated the Illinois constitution. The court was not persuaded by the defendants' argument that the legislature was to blame for not appropriating sufficient money to pay the county treasurers. Illinois County Treasurers Assoc. v. Hamer (April 22, 2014).
Thursday, April 24, 2014
School Not Liable for Student's Death Caused by Dangerous Game
Thursday, April 24, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
Parents of a middle school student sued the school district after their son collapsed and died after playing a game with other students called "body shots" where students take turns punching each other in the chest, abdomen, and ribs. The parents claimed that the student's death was the result of wilful and wanton conduct on the part of the district.
The court dismissed the case, and ruled in favor of the school district. Brooks v. McLean County District Unit 5 (April 18, 2014). Although the court did find that the school district had a duty to supervise the students and was on notice that students had been injured playing this game in the past, the court did not find that the conduct of the school district rose to the level of wilful and wanton conduct. As a result, the district was protected by the Tort Immunity Act, and the case was properly dismissed.
Wednesday, April 23, 2014
Village Liable under TIF Agreement with School District
Wednesday, April 23, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
In 1986, the Village of Gardner entered into an agreement with the Gardner-South School District. The agreement granted the Village a license to use the District's outdoor recreational facilities located within a TIF district in exchange for the Village paying the District a set percentage of taxes received by the Village through the TIF.
From 1986 to 2012, the Village paid the District over $4.5 million under the agreement. In 2012, however, the Village withheld payment. The District sued to enforce the agreement, and the Village responded with two reasons for its non-payment: (1) the District was spending the money on employee salaries and benefits which was not allowed under the TIF Act and (2) the District's expenditures adversely affected the Village's reporting obligations under the TIF Act.
The court rejected the Village's argument in Village of Gardner v. Gardner-South School District (April 17, 2014), and ruled in favor of the School District. First, the court held that the agreement did not restrict the District's use of the money it received from the Village in any way. Second, the TIF Act expressly allows a municipality to enter into agreements to provide payments to other taxing districts like the license agreement between the Village and the District. Finally, the TIF Act itself does not limit how a taxing district spends funds received through a license agreement with a municipality.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Tuesday, April 22, 2014
PAC Issues 2nd Opinion of 2014
Tuesday, April 22, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
In an opinion that shouldn't surprise anyone (and not just because the PAC ruled against the public body), the PAC found a public body in violation of FOIA for denying a request for legal invoices. PAC Op. 14-002. The News-Gazette had requested copies of payments to and invoices from a law firm that had provided legal services to the City of Urbana. The City denied the request, asserting a number of exemptions, including that the information was protected as an attorney-client communication and that the records related to collective bargaining matters.
The PAC reviewed the request, appeal, and the billing records and concluded that the City violated FOIA by denying the request in its entirety. The PAC first stated that the dates on which legal services were performed, the initials of the attorney performing the work, the number of hours billed, and the corresponding amount billed for each entry did not reveal any privileged attorney-client communication and was not, therefore, exempt under FOIA. The PAC did, however, acknowledge that information contained in the billing descriptions or explanation of the work being performed could be exempt as an attorney-client communication under the Illinois appellate court reasoning in Ulrich v. Stukel, 294 Ill.App.3d 193 (1997), except for general descriptions that do not reveal any privileged information (i.e., holding a telephone conference, exchanging emails, or drafting and revising a memo).
This opinion is consistent with a previous opinion issued by the PAC in 2012 that interpreted (and some would argue extended) the Ulrich holding to require a public body to conduct a line-by-line analysis of their attorney invoices before releasing them in order to redact any privileged information and release the remainder.
Hopefully, we will see future PAC opinions that actually provide guidance on some of the unanswered questions about FOIA compliance, rather than continue to see "repeats" of the same analysis and decisions.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Court Filing Fee is Constitutional
Tuesday, April 22, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
On
April 10, 2014, an Illinois appellate court upheld as constitutional an $8.00 filing
fee imposed on all civil litigants in Peoria County. Lipe v. Edward O’Connor
When the plaintiff filed a small claims action in Peoria County, he was charged an $8.00
“neutral site custody exchange fee.” He
paid the fee under protest, and then filed a class action complaint challenging
the fee’s constitutionality, arguing that the fee “unreasonably interfered with access to the courts and
deprived him and other plaintiffs of property without due process.” The trial court granted the county’s motion to
dismiss the case, finding that the fee was constitutional.
On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the fee violated the free access clause of
the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides that “every person shall find
a certain remedy in the laws for all the injuries and wrongs” and “shall obtain
justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.” The appellate court disagreed, and upheld the filing fee. First, the filing fee was imposed equally on all litigants. Second, the fee was intended to support
ancillary court services and compensate the county for services related to the
operation and use of the neutral site custody exchange for family visitation.
Post Authored by Tiffany Nelson-Jaworski, Ancel Glink
Monday, April 21, 2014
Bill Would Ban Confidentiality Provisions in Severance Agreements
Monday, April 21, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
The Illinois House recently passed HB 3664 that would amend the Freedom of Information Act to prohibit public bodies from including confidentiality provisions in severance agreements with public employees. The bill is, in part, a response to the recent controversy surrounding the more than $700,000 severance package provided to outgoing Metra CEO. The bill passed the House by a vote of 106-0 and is now awaiting a vote in the Senate.
The bill would amend Section 2.20 of FOIA, the settlement agreement provision, as follows (text that is underlined is proposed new language):
Sec. 2.20. Settlement and severance agreements
(a) All settlement agreements entered into by or on behalf of a public body are public records subject to inspection and copying by the public, provided that information exempt from disclosure under Section 7 of this Act may be redacted.
(b) A severance agreement that is funded in whole or part by public moneys or that releases a claim against a public body shall not require or impose any condition on any party to keep allegations, evidence, settlement amounts, or any other information confidential, except that which is necessary to protect a trade secret, proprietary information, or information otherwise exempt from disclosure under Section 7 of this Act.
(c) The changes made by this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly do not apply to severance agreements signed before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly.
The bill would also amend FOIA to add a definition of "severance agreement, as follows:
(h) "Severance agreement" means a mutual agreement between any public body and its employee for the employee's resignation in exchange for payment by the public body.
The bill raises a few questions in my mind.
First, it is not entirely clear why the legislature included this language in the FOIA statute, since it really has nothing to do with the release of public records upon request and instead is a limit on a public body's power to contract with its employees.
Second, although the new contractual limitation applies only to contracts entered into after the law becomes effective, there is still an open question as to the ability to enforce existing confidentiality provisions in severance and settlement agreements since the current language of section 2.20 makes these agreements public records subject to release. This issue comes up frequently when a FOIA request is submitted for an employment agreement that has confidentiality provision. Many public bodies are left to wonder whether they should risk a FOIA lawsuit or a breach of contract lawsuit in deciding how to respond to one of these FOIA requests. This bill doesn't answer that question, since it applies only to prospective agreements.
Third, the bill seems to leave open the ability to still redact information in a severance agreement that would be exempt under Section 7 of FOIA. That would still leave public bodies with the ability to redact information that might fall under the "privacy" or other exemption listed in Section 7, but not those exemptions listed under Section 7.5 (including information protected by the Personnel Records Review Act, HIPAA and other statutory exemptions). That is probably an oversight by the drafter of the bill , but could prove problematic in administering this law if it passes.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Friday, April 18, 2014
Banana Lady Loses Copyright Lawsuit
Friday, April 18, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
From Strategically Social comes this fun Friday case: Banana Lady Loses Copyright Lawsuit
I wish this case had been decided before April 1st, because it sounds like a bad April Fools joke.
I wish this case had been decided before April 1st, because it sounds like a bad April Fools joke.
The self-described "Banana Lady" (a singer and performer) was hired to perform a singing telegram at a credit union trade association event. After the event, she filed suit against the credit union association claiming they violated her intellectual property rights when employees and other audience members posted photos and videos of her performance on their personal Facebook pages. She claims that she made it clear to the arrangers of the event that audience members were not to take photos or videos and that they failed to inform the audience of these limitations until her performance had ended.
Judge Posner wasted no time in finding that the plaintiff's claims had no merit, and rejecting her argument that her version of the "banana dance" was copyright protected. The rest of the court's opinion includes a summary of the plaintiff's many other lawsuits relating to her "Banana Lady" persona, including at least 8 federal lawsuits and 9 state lawsuits with similar allegations as the one before the 7th Circuit. The court concludes by suggesting that the district court consider enjoining the plaintiff from filing further lawsuits until she pays her litigation debts, which are well into six figures.
I wanted to post a photo of the Banana Lady [here] but restrained myself. You can see a full-color photograph on page 2 of the 7th Circuit's opinion at Conrad v. AM Community Credit Union (7th Cir. April 14, 2014)
Thursday, April 17, 2014
Fee for Electronic Records Excessive Under FOIA
Thursday, April 17, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
A couple of years ago, we reported on a 5th District Illinois Appellate Court case holding that a fee charged for production of real estate records violated Section 6 of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Sage Information Services v. Humm. The Second District recently decided a similar issue, and citing Humm, found the Winnebago County Assessor in violation of FOIA for charging a requester $6,290.45 (five cents per parcel) to provide an electronic copy of the current real property assessment file for the entire county. Sage Information Services v. Suhr (2d Dist. April 14, 2014)
The Assessor had argued that it was expressly authorized under the Property Tax Code to charge a reasonable fee to provide assessment records. The requester countered that FOIA "trumped" the Tax Code with respect to electronic records. The appellate court agreed, holding that Section 6 of FOIA prohibits a fee for reproduction of electronic records in excess of the cost of the electronic medium. In this case, the Assessor could only charge for the cost of the CD/DVD, nothing more.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Wednesday, April 16, 2014
Loitering is in the Air
Wednesday, April 16, 2014 Julie Tappendorf
As the weather grows warmer, municipalities can expect to see an age-old problem re-emerge - loitering. Concerns about crime, public order, and property rights have prompted municipalities throughout the country to pass ordinances taking action against loitering. Many of these ordinances, however, have not passed constitutional muster, as courts have found them to violate constitutional rights. An ordinance passed in Winter Park, Florida, met such a fate.
The Winter Park City Council passed an ordinance in 2012 to address picketing targeted specifically against an individual residing in a single family home. The City noted that this targeted picketing had become an increasing problem. This ordinance allowed residents to post a “no loitering” sign on their property that prevented anyone from remaining in a “public area,” which included a park, sidewalk, street, or public right-of-way, within fifty feet of that residence. The ordinance also gave property owners the right to call the police to order people to leave the fifty foot zone around their property.
In Bell v. City of Winter Park, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals found that this part of the ordinance violated the First Amendment. The court explained that citizens have a right to free speech in “traditional public fora,” public spaces like parks, streets, sidewalks, etc. While this speech can be regulated by content-neutral restrictions that pertain to the time, place, and manner that speech may occur, these laws must be applied equally to each person. Speech cannot be arbitrarily regulated for no articulated purpose. The court noted that the ordinance permitted private citizens to control the speech of other private citizens by calling the police to disperse anyone “loitering” on public property within fifty feet of their residence. No justification needed to be provided for this dispersal. In fact, the ordinance did not even define how long a person needed to remain in one place to be considered loitering. “Five minutes? One minute?” the court asked. “Citizens are left to wonder.”
The court did uphold a second part of the ordinance that banned picketing or protesting within fifty feet of any residence, and made it illegal to picket or protest in any public space if this activity interfered with the rights of others to travel safely in these areas. The court found it served a significant government interest, the right of a property owner to be secure in his residence, and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The court pointed to a Supreme Court decision that upheld an ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of someone’s residence because the government has a significant interest in “protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of a home.” The government is allowed to prohibit picketing if it is not targeted at disseminating a message, but instead harasses and intrudes upon a particular individual’s rights. The ordinance must not discriminate against a particular viewpoint, and must leave open alternative channels of communication. Here, picketers had alternative means to disseminate their message; they could do so standing fifty-one feet from a property. The ordinance did not favor a particular point-of-view, and it applied equally to everyone. Its primary purpose was to protect a resident from harassment, a significant interest worth protecting. Therefore, at least that portion of the ordinance was constitutional.
Municipalities can take away a few lessons from Winter Park’s experience. First, while municipalities must tread lightly when passing anti-loitering ordinances, they can do so if they have a good reason for the ordinance. Ordinances seeking to uphold property rights and public order are purposes favored by courts. Second, anti-loitering ordinances must not be enforced arbitrarily. In Winter Park, the court took exception to the fact that private citizens could choose when to enforce the anti-loitering ordinance without providing any justification for doing so. Third, the terms of an anti-loitering ordinance must be clearly defined. The vague definition of “loitering” made Winter Park’s ordinance unconstitutionally broad. Any anti-loitering ordinance must define all potentially ambiguous terms.
As the weather warms up and people return to the streets, municipalities need not fear loiterers. With clear goals and a well-drafted anti-loitering ordinance, a municipality can still keep control of its streets.
Post Authored by Matt DiCianni, Ancel Glink
Post Authored by Matt DiCianni, Ancel Glink
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