Tuesday, April 30, 2019
As
we recently
reported, amendments to the Human Trafficking Resource Notice Act
require organizers of a public gatherings or special events on property open to
the public that require the “issuance of a permit” from a unit of local government
to post required notices
to assist victims of human trafficking.
It's important to note that this new law also comes with new enforcement powers for local governments. While the
Department of Labor was previously responsible for enforcement of the Act, now enforcement is up to the “governmental entity regulating a
business or establishment and local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction...” In most cases, the enforcing authority will be a municipality or other unit of local government.
These
new enforcement powers come with some practical problems.
First, the phrase “public
gathering or special event that is conducted on property open to the public and
requires the issuance of a permit” is somewhat ambiguous. Based on the Act's emphasis on “public gathering” and “open to the
public,” it seems that the law would only apply to events open to the general
public, and not to private events such as a family celebration in a park district pavilion.
Second, although the Act specifically refers to events that require a "permit," it isn't clear whether that also extends to events that simply require local government approval or permission without the formality of a permit process.
Finally,
the law requires local governments to give reasonable notice of a violation and
a 30-day cure period before the Attorney General or State’s Attorney can prosecute violations and seek fines under the Act. But, it's likely the event will be over long before the 30-day cure
period expires.
As
a result, local governments interested in enforcing the notice requirement may
wish to address these practical issues by ensuring that organizers of these events are on notice of the new requirements. That might include incorporating language into permit applications about the new notice requirements, and even requiring applicants to acknowledge when the
Act applies to their events and that failure to post required notices will be subject to enforcement.
Post Authored by John Reding & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Monday, April 29, 2019
6th Circuit Amends Opinion in "Chalking" Case
Monday, April 29, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Last week we reported on a 6th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion finding a city's practice of chalking vehicles for parking enforcement to be an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. Just two days after the decision was issued, the 6th Circuit published an amended opinion, which you can read in its entirety at Taylor v. Saginaw.
Unfortunately, the amended opinion did not change the Court's ruling that the city's chalking practice was unconstitutional. It does, however, add the following new paragraph to the opinion's conclusion:
Taking the allegations in Taylor’s complaint as true, we hold that chalking is a search under the Fourth Amendment, specifically under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. This does not mean, however, that chalking violates the Fourth Amendment. Rather, we hold, based on the pleading stage of this litigation, that two exceptions to the warrant requirement—the “community caretaking” exception and the motor-vehicle exception—do not apply here. Our holding extends no further than this. When the record in this case moves beyond the pleadings stage, the City is, of course, free to argue anew that one or both of those exceptions do apply, or that some other exception to the warrant requirement might apply.
It is quite unusual for a court to amend its opinion after it has been released except to correct typographical errors so this is significant. Given the widespread concern raised across the country about this ruling, the Court may have felt it was necessary to clarify that its ruling is limited to the facts presented in this case, and that the city could still make other arguments to justify its chalking practice on remand.
Thanks to a reader for reaching out about this amended opinion.
Friday, April 26, 2019
City Not Liable For Pothole Injury to Driver Who Was Illegally Parked
Friday, April 26, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
An Illinois appellate court ruled in favor of a municipality in a case involving an individual who was allegedly injured when she stepped into a pothole in the street while returning to her parked car. The City had argued that the individual was not an "intended and permitted" user of the street because she had parked her car 5 feet into a marked no-parking zone within 15 feet of a hydrant. She argued that most of her car was legally parked, and that the pothole was outside of the no-parking zone. The court agreed with the City, finding that because she was illegally parked in violation of a City ordinance, she was not an "intended and permitted user." As a result, the City did not owe a duty to her under the Tort Immunity Act. Ramirez v. City of Chicago.
Wednesday, April 24, 2019
"Chalking" Practice in Parking Enforcement Found Unconstitutional by Sixth Circuit
Wednesday, April 24, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
In a surprising decision out of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, the court struck down a City's practice of "chalking" the tires of parked cars to track how long they have been parked as part of the City's parking enforcement program. Taylor v. City of Saginaw.
Like many other municipalities across the country, the City of Saginaw, Michigan's parking enforcement officers place chalk marks on the tires of parked cars, then return to the car after the posted time for parking has passed to see if the chalk marks are still there - a sign that the vehicle has not moved. If they remain, the officer issues a citation. Taylor, a frequent recipient of parking tickets, sued the City and one of its parking enforcement officers claiming that the chalking practice violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search. The district court did find that the City's practice of "chalking" was a search under the Fourth Amendment, but found that the search was reasonable and dismissed the case.
Is chalking a search?
On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals also held that the practice of "chalking" was a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. The court compared chalking a tire to the placement of a GPS device on a car, which the Supreme Court has held was a government trespass on the vehicle and a search. Similarly, the court said that that the City's placement of chalking on a vehicle's tire was a government trespass for the purpose of obtaining information. And, like the placement of a GPS device, the placement of chalk constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Was the "search" reasonable?
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals then addressed the issue of whether the search was reasonable, acknowledging that not all government searches are unconstitutional. The district court had found the chalking practice reasonable because there is a lesser expectation of privacy in automobiles and it fell within the "caretaker" exception to the warrant requirement. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both reasons, however. First, the Court of Appeals found that the City needs probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant, and no probable cause existed in this circumstance. Second, the City failed to show how the search related to the protection of public safety, where the parked car did not create any hazard. Instead, the purpose of chalking is to raise revenues, and not in furtherance of public safety concerns.
In sum, the Court of Appeals held that the City did not demonstrated that the need to deter drivers from exceeding the time permitted for parking was sufficient to justify a warrantless search.
It's important to note that this decision is in the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, so it does not cover Illinois. However, if a similar challenge was made in the 7th Circuit (which covers Illinois), it might provide some guidance to that Court of Appeals.
Following the release of this decision, some commentators have suggested that municipalities might avoid a similar challenge by changing to the use of photographs or chalking the street rather than the tires to document parking times. Those particular practices were not discussed or addressed in this case, but might avoid the "trespass" issue that was crucial to the Court of Appeals decision since "trespass" was defined by the Court as "physical contact" or a "physical intrusion" to the private property of another. A focus on the safety reasons for any traffic enforcement practice is also important.
Tuesday, April 23, 2019
Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 23: Arbor Day Special!
Tuesday, April 23, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Just in time for this Friday's Arbor Day celebration, Ancel Glink has released Episode 23 of its Quorum Forum Podcast: Arbor Day Special! A summary of this episode is below:
Make like a tree and leaf your
headphones on for our Quorum Forum Arbor Day Special! Brandon Naser
and Joe Hansen
of Park Ridge's Forestry Division discuss Arbor Day in the City, and the
important benefits trees provide the community. They also share important
tree-sources from the Chicago Region Trees
initiative, including a their recent 2050 Master Plan and a video
encouraging tree investment.
How does your community celebrate Arbor Day?
Tree-mail us at podcast@ancelglink.com!
Post Authored by Dan Bolin, Ancel Glink
Monday, April 22, 2019
New Law Expands County Authority Over Wind Facilities
Monday, April 22, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Last week, the Governor signed P.A. 101-004 amending the Counties Code regarding county regulation of wind farms and and other wind energy facilities. The new law expressly authorizes counties to establish standards for wind farms, wind devices, and wind energy facilities in unincorporated areas even if the county has not adopted a zoning ordinance. The law also provides that only counties are authorized to regulate wind farms, devices, and facilities in unincorporated areas and outside of the 1.5 mile radius surrounding a municipality.
The bill was introduced to address a situation in Douglas County, where a Texas company planned to build a wind farm. Douglas County had not enacted a zoning ordinance although it did regulate wind farms. Two townships in the County that were opposed to the wind farm development enacted stricter zoning regulations that would have precluded the wind farm development. Under this new law, a county's wind farm regulations would control over any township restrictions.
The bill was introduced to address a situation in Douglas County, where a Texas company planned to build a wind farm. Douglas County had not enacted a zoning ordinance although it did regulate wind farms. Two townships in the County that were opposed to the wind farm development enacted stricter zoning regulations that would have precluded the wind farm development. Under this new law, a county's wind farm regulations would control over any township restrictions.
Thursday, April 18, 2019
Circuit Court Upholds Village's Billboard Regulations
Thursday, April 18, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
The
ability of Illinois municipalities to regulate billboards along interstate
highways has been the subject of much litigation over the past few decades.
These disputes usually center around the sometimes-conflicting provisions of the
Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971 (“Highway Act”).
The
Highway Act provides maximum size, spacing, and lighting restrictions for
interstate highway billboards that are permitted by IDOT. However, the Highway Act also expressly authorizes
municipalities to adopt more restrictive regulations for interstate highway
billboards than those imposed by the Highway so long as the municipal regulations are consistent with
“customary use.” Many advertisers have challenged municipal billboard
regulations on the grounds that they exceeded the authority provided under the
Highway Act or were inconsistent with the “customary use” of billboards. A number of Illinois courts have upheld home rule municipal bans on billboards, and both home rule and non-home rule municipal restrictions on the size and location of billboards.
A recent decision by an Illinois circuit upholding the billboard
regulations of a non-home rule municipality may provide more clarity to the
issue. In WC Media v. Village of Gilberts,
an advertiser challenged the Village’s size, spacing, and lighting regulations
for interstate billboards. The Village had adopted billboard size restrictions that
mirrored the restrictions that apply to all signs in the Village’s commercial
and industrial districts.
An advertiser filed a lawsuit against the Village alleging that the Village’s billboard
regulations violated the Highway Act because (1) the size limitations were so
strict that they eliminated a billboard’s commercial value, which acted as an
effective prohibition on billboards; and (2) the Village’s billboard
regulations were inconsistent with the customary use of billboards preferred by
advertisers. The lawsuit claimed that the Village's ordinance was "facially" unconstitutional. The Village filed a motion to dismiss the advertiser’s complaint based on the various Illinois cases upholding a municipality's authority to restrict billboards, among other defenses.
The
court sided with the Village and dismissed the advertiser’s complaint with
prejudice. In addition to finding that the advertiser did not meet its burden to challenge the ordinance on "facial" grounds, the court also found that the size and spacing restrictions imposed by the Village
did not violate the Highway Act or the “customary use” of billboards. While not directly deciding the question, the
ruling also seemed to imply that non-home rule municipalities could completely
prohibit billboards, stating that “if a total ban on highway billboards does
not run afoul of the act, it follows that Defendant’s ordinance must be
valid.”
The advertiser has filed an
appeal of the decision, and we will keep you updated when a final ruling is
issued. However, if upheld, this ruling
will confirm the authority of non-home rule municipalities to tailor their
billboard regulations to local circumstances without violating the Highway Act.
Post Authored by Kurt Asprooth & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Disclaimer: Ancel Glink represented the Village in this case.
Wednesday, April 17, 2019
Illinois Governor Signs Bill Barring Local Governments from Establishing “Right to Work” Zones
Wednesday, April 17, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Last Friday, Governor J.B. Pritzker signed the Collective
Bargaining Freedom Act (P.A. 101-003) barring local governments from establishing “right-to-work
zones.” The new law takes effect immediately (April 12, 2019).
Post Authored by David Warner, Ancel Glink
The Act provides that
the state has exclusive authority to enact laws governing agreements between
employers and unions that (i) spell out the extent to which workers can be
compelled to belong to a union or and (ii) whether the employer will collect
dues and fees on behalf of the union. The Act expressly prohibits any local government from enacting or enforcing any local law, ordinance, rule, or regulation that "prohibits, restricts, tends to restrict, or regulates the use of union security agreements between an employer and labor union. The Act declares any ordinance inconsistent with the Act to be void. Finally, the Act preempts home rule authority.
A prior version of the Act was introduced in 2015 after an
Illinois municipality passed an ordinance allowing employees to work for a
company in union-protected positions without having to join the union or pay
the full share of union dues. That ordinance was struck down by a federal court of appeals court last year, and the previous bill was vetoed by former Governor Bruce Rauner in 2017. The legislation was reintroduced during the current session and passed in the House with a vote
of 101-8 and the Senate 51-0 before being signed by the Governor.
Post Authored by David Warner, Ancel Glink
Monday, April 15, 2019
Changes to Human Trafficking Law Affect Public Events
Monday, April 15, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Organizers
of public gatherings on property open to the public have new responsibilities
when it comes to posting notices under the Human Trafficking Resource Center
Notice Act.
Effective
January 1, 2019, P.A.
100-0671 amended several sections of the Human Trafficking Resource Center
Notice Act which adds to the list of entities that are required to post the
notice under the Act. Specifically, the new law now requires the
organizer of a public gathering conducted on property open to the public
that requires a permit from a unit of local government to post
a notice that complies with the requirements of the Act in a conspicuous and
accessible place on the premises in clear view of the public where similar
notices are customarily posted. 775 ILCS 50/5(d).
The
notice is intended to inform the public and victims of human trafficking of telephone
hotline numbers to seek help or report unlawful activity. The Act requires
specific posting mandates, language requirements, and penalties of up to $500
per violation for failure to post. In addition, each mandated business is
required to post the notice in English and Spanish. For helpful model notices, you can find State of Illinois resources HERE.
Post Authored by Dan Bolin and John Reding, Ancel Glink
Friday, April 12, 2019
Court Says Electoral Board in Best Position to Assess Weight of Evidence
Friday, April 12, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
A candidate for trustee in the Village of Burnham filed 16 pages of nominating papers with 182 signatures. 34 signatures were required to
qualify for the ballot. An objector challenged the validity
of the signatures and, after a hearing, the Village’s electoral
board declared the papers invalid and struck the candidate’s name from the
ballot. The board found an “unmistakable pattern of fraud, false
swearing, and disregard for the mandatory requirements of the Election
Code.”
The board’s decision was based on finding that 105 of the
182 signatures were invalid because the signer was either not the proper
person, not a registered voter in the Village, or not located there. In
addition, the board discovered that 60 of the 105 invalid signatures were
contained within 5 consecutive pages of the signature sheets. At the
hearing, the candidate testified that he personally obtained and witnessed
every signature in his nomination papers by going door to door. The board
found his testimony to be untruthful because the 5 consecutive pages came from
multiple streets and did not include “a single consecutively listed address on
the same street.” Furthermore, the signatures on those pages appeared to be
written in the hand of just a few people.
The candidate appealed, and the court in Hodges
v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of Burnham, agreed
with the board. According to the court, a board is in the best position
to assess the candidate’s credibility and determine the weight to be given to
his testimony. As such, a court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the board absent a finding that the board’s decision was clearly erroneous.
Post Authored by David Warner, Ancel Glink
Thursday, April 11, 2019
Tobacco 21 Law Signed By Illinois Governor This Week
Thursday, April 11, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
On April 7, 2019, Governor Pritzker
signed P.A. 101-002 into law. This landmark legislation makes
Illinois the 11th state to enact what has become known as “Tobacco 21
law.” The law takes effect on July 1, 2019. This legislation is not a
novel concept to Illinois municipalities. Before its enactment, more than 30
Illinois municipalities had adopted ordinances to raise the local minimum legal
sales age to 21.
The bill amends various state statutes
regarding tobacco to raise the legal age to 21 for the purchase or sale of
tobacco products, electronic cigarettes, and alternative nicotine products. The
law also provides a formal definition for electronic cigarettes to include
electronic nicotine delivery systems, whether or not the solution contains
nicotine.
For those who may have been following the legislation from its introduction, the law remains substantively similar, but the few changes it imposes have come with sharp criticism. One criticism is that the law focuses on the sale or purchase of tobacco or alternative products by persons under 21 but not the possession of those products. That means that municipal ordinances could regulate different conduct (i.e., possession by underage persons in addition to sale and purchase) than the state law will regulate once the law becomes effective.
Because municipal ordinances may currently regulate conduct based on
the previous age minimum of 18, municipalities might consider updating their
ordinances to be consistent with state law.
Post Authored by Dan Bolin & Julie
Tappendorf
Wednesday, April 10, 2019
Subsequent Lot Owners Responsible for Public Improvements in Annexation Agreement
Wednesday, April 10, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Land use
litigation arising out of the 2008 economic downturn continues to percolate
through the courts as municipalities seek to complete long-delayed public
improvements contracted for in annexation agreements. A recent court decision
may help local governments looking to hold subsequent purchasers accountable
for obligations entered into by bankrupt developers.
In City of Yorkville v. Fidelity et
al., an Illinois appellate court found two homebuilders liable
for building public improvements a bankrupt developer had agreed to provide the
City in a 2003 annexation agreement. Through various transactions, the
Richardson Group (TRG) and William Ryan Homes (WRH) purchased lots subject to
the annexation agreement from bankrupt homebuilder Kimball Hill Homes. The
annexation agreement included the following provision:
“This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding
upon the OWNERS, DEVELOPER and their successors in title and interest, and upon
the CITY, and any successor municipalities of the CITY. It is understood and
agreed that this Agreement shall run with the land and as such, shall be
assignable to and binding upon each and every subsequent grantee and successor
in interest of the OWNERS and DEVELOPER, and the CITY. The
foregoing to the contrary notwithstanding, the obligations and duties of OWNERS
and DEVELOPER hereunder shall not be deemed transferred to or assumed by any
purchaser of a [sic] empty lot or a lot improved with a dwelling unit who
acquires the same for residential occupation, unless otherwise expressly agreed
in writing by such purchaser.”
TRG and
WRH both claimed the provision absolved them of responsibility for completing
the public improvements agreed to by KH (the DEVELOPER) in the annexation
agreement because they merely purchased “empty” lots. The court disagreed,
finding such a reading would result in a windfall for subsequent purchasers
which would clearly not be what the parties intended. Instead, the court said
any subsequent purchaser of an empty lot will be proportionally liable for
completing the obligations in the annexation agreement even if it is the
purchaser of a single lot.
The court
distinguished its decision from a case we reported on in
October last year, Doyle v. Village of Tinley Park, that
found the purchaser of a lot in a subdivision had no authority to bring a cause
of action against a developer for failing to complete public improvements under
an annexation agreement. According to the court in Yorkville, the annexation agreement covered the “Subject Property or
any parcel or phrase thereof” while the agreement in Doyle presumably
only covered the subject property as a whole.
The
court’s decision appears to rely heavily on the public policy favoring the
fulfillment of annexation agreements and the particular status of the
subsequent purchasers. As large homebuilders, the court implies that
common sense suggests both TRG and WRH should have expected to have some
responsibility for the public improvements necessary to enable them to build
homes. On the other hand, litigation may have been avoided if the
annexation agreement had more clearly outlined the specific rights and
obligations of subsequent owners.
Post Authored by David Warner, Ancel Glink
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