Friday, August 30, 2013
Don't miss the Chicago Metro Section of the American Planning Association's fall conference in Chicago on October 4, 2013, where the APA-CMS will present dozens of sessions and workshops to educate planners, attorneys, and other land use professionals. Topics include law, ethics, economic development, housing, and zoning issues. Attorneys from Ancel Glink's land use group will participate in the following educational and interactive session:
APA Law Explosion 2013
9:15-10:45 a.m., October 4th
DePaul Center, Chicago
Presenters: David Silverman, Adam Simon, Dan Bolin, and Greg Jones, Ancel Glink
This session will review the latest legislation and cases affecting planning and zoning officials, the use of social media to encourage and enhance public participation, land use tools to address the challenges of climate change, zoning tools to promote urban agriculture, getting the most out of your development agreement, and more.
You can find out more and register on the APA-CMS website.
Wednesday, August 28, 2013
Strategically Social: Social Media and the HIPAA Privacy Rule
Wednesday, August 28, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
Recently, a former Northwestern University student filed a lawsuit against Northwestern Memorial Hospital and one of its doctors after a doctor posted on Facebook a picture of the student being treated in the ER for overconsumption of alcohol. The student claims that the hospital and doctor violated the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which protects information about a patient and his or her medical condition and treatment.
To read more about the lawsuit, and the importance of training employees about the potential HIPAA issues that can arise in their use of social media, check out Strategically Social: Social Media and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
To read more about the lawsuit, and the importance of training employees about the potential HIPAA issues that can arise in their use of social media, check out Strategically Social: Social Media and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
Tuesday, August 27, 2013
The Taking Issue: Upcoming Symposium on Takings Law
Tuesday, August 27, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
The Touro Law School will present The Taking Issue, the 40th Annual Symposium on takings law on October 3-4, 2013. The conference will be held at the law school in Central Islip, New York, and is co-chaired by Dean Patricia Salkin (Touro), and Professor David Callies (University of Hawaii, William S. Richardson School of Law).
The two day event will feature a welcome and introduction by the co-chairs, seven substantive sessions on takings law, a keynote speaker, and a special dedication to Fred Bosselman, who co-authored The Taking Issue in 1973. Sessions include an historical overview of takings law, discussions of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on takings, including Lucas and Nollan/Dolan/Koontz, and a panel on unconstitutional conditions on which Ancel Glink attorney Julie Tappendorf will participate.
You can learn more about the event and register on the law school's website.
Monday, August 26, 2013
Vacant Property Ordinance Not Enforceable Against FHFA
Monday, August 26, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
The City of Chicago, like many other municipalities, has enacted vacant property regulations requiring the owners or responsible parties to register vacant properties and buildings with the City and maintain their properties and buildings. The purpose of the vacant property/building registry was to provide a municipality with information about the owner and/or responsible party for a vacant property, and to ensure that these properties were adequately maintained and secured.
On Friday, a federal district court judge ruled that Chicago could not enforce its vacant building registry against the Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA), the overseer of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Federal Housing Finance Authority v. City of Chicago. The City had enacted its vacant property ordinance in 2011. That ordinance requires owners and lenders to register a building after it becomes vacant, pay a $500 registration fee to the City, and continue to maintain the property. A month after the ordinance was effective, the FHFA filed a lawsuit challenging the ordinance on a variety of grounds, including that the City was preempted from enforcing the municipal ordinance against the federal government and that the registration fees were a tax on federal governments. Those were the two grounds upon which Judge Thomas Durkin relied in ruling against the City and in favor of the FHFA. In his ruling, Judge Durkin also rejected the City's argument that the vacant property ordinance was a local "land use" regulation that was not subject to federal preemption.
This ruling could impact municipalities across the state (and country) that have enacted similar vacant building/property registration ordinances. According to the Chicago Tribune, more than 1,000 municipalities have enacted ordinances requiring the registration and maintenance of vacant properties.
For those municipalities with vacant property ordinances in place, there are a couple of key take-away points from this case:
First, this case did not strike down the City's vacant property ordinance in its entirety. Instead, the decision restricts a municipality's enforcement of this type of ordinance against Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of federal preemption limits. Therefore, Chicago can continue to enforce its ordinance against owners of vacant property.
Second, Chicago's ordinance was amended in 2011 to specifically require mortgage holders to comply with the registration and other requirements. Prior to that 2011 amendment, only owners were subject to the registration and maintenance obligations. Many vacant property ordinances that were enacted by municipalities other than Chicago are restricted to owners or other title holders. The decision does not affect the enforcement of vacant property regulations against property owners.
In light of this decision, municipalities that have vacant property ordinances in place may want to review the scope of those regulations because the FHFA may decide to challenge similar ordinances enacted by other municipalities.
For those municipalities with vacant property ordinances in place, there are a couple of key take-away points from this case:
First, this case did not strike down the City's vacant property ordinance in its entirety. Instead, the decision restricts a municipality's enforcement of this type of ordinance against Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of federal preemption limits. Therefore, Chicago can continue to enforce its ordinance against owners of vacant property.
Second, Chicago's ordinance was amended in 2011 to specifically require mortgage holders to comply with the registration and other requirements. Prior to that 2011 amendment, only owners were subject to the registration and maintenance obligations. Many vacant property ordinances that were enacted by municipalities other than Chicago are restricted to owners or other title holders. The decision does not affect the enforcement of vacant property regulations against property owners.
In light of this decision, municipalities that have vacant property ordinances in place may want to review the scope of those regulations because the FHFA may decide to challenge similar ordinances enacted by other municipalities.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Strategically Social: Lawyer Disciplined for Advising Client to Clean up Facebook Page
Monday, August 26, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
A lawyer in Virginia had his law license suspended last month for five years after he advised his client to clean up his Facebook page. The lawyer was representing a plaintiff in a lawsuit brought against a driver who allegedly caused the death of his wife. Shortly after the defense filed discovery requests for screen shots and other information from the plaintiff's Facebook page, the Virginia lawyer instructed his paralegal to tell the client to delete certain photos. The defense lawyers recovered the deleted photos before trial, and the lawyer was brought before the state bar disciplinary board for violation of ethical rules governing candor toward the tribunal, fairness to opposing party and counsel, and misconduct.
This post appeared on Julie's other blog, Strategically Social, last week.
This post appeared on Julie's other blog, Strategically Social, last week.
Friday, August 23, 2013
APA Planning & Law Division Newsletter Released
Friday, August 23, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
The Planning and Law Division of the American Planning Association just released its summer 2013 edition of the Planning & Law Newsletter.
This edition contains numerous interesting and cutting edge articles and information relating to planning and land use, including an article by Brent Denzin of Ancel Glink titled "Wake of the Flood: Flood Waters, Bloated Budgets, and a Plan to Save Your Community."
Other articles include a summary of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Management District, and articles on land banking, form-based codes, and the biofouling problem for the Florida manatee (you will have to read the newsletter to learn what "biofouling" is!).
You can access the complete newsletter here.
Thursday, August 22, 2013
Supermarket Could Not Challenge Competing Supermarket Developer
Thursday, August 22, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
A supermarket sought review of a decision
of the town zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) which granted a variance to an
ordinance restricting the size of any single building in the commercial
district to a competing supermarket developer. The petitioner owns and operates
a 36,541 square foot supermarket in a commercial zone where the zoning
ordinance limits the size of buildings to 40,000 square feet. Subsequently, a
different company sought a variance to build a supermarket in a commercial zone
with a size of 78,332 square feet, located 3.8 miles from the petitioner’s
property. Although the petitioner participated in the zoning board hearings on
the matter, the board denied petitioner’s motion for a rehearing on the grounds
that petitioner was not a “person directly affected” by the decision, and thus
without “legal standing” to contest the variance. The Superior Court agreed and
petitioner appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
The court explained that a person may have
access to the courts for review if he or she is either a) a party
entitled to participate in the case or b) any person directly affected
thereby. Hannaford Brothers Company v Town of Bedford, 64 A.3d 951 (NH 2013) Here, the Court found that the petitioner was not a party to the
case because it was not a direct abutter of the site (the sites were 3.8 miles
apart). Therefore, petitioner had to prove it was “directly affected” by the
variance. Petitioner’s objection to the variance was that it permitted a direct
competitor operating the same type of business to build a much larger facility
in the same type of zone in the same town. The Court rejected the argument, finding
no standing and noting, “An appeal of a ZBA decision is not a weapon to be used
to stifle business competition.”
Wednesday, August 21, 2013
Site Approval for Liquor License Not a Property Right
Wednesday, August 21, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
The City of Peoria revoked the liquor license held by a Shop Rite grocery store shortly after the store president was arrested for selling Viagra at the store (the store had no pharmacy, and the seller was not a licensed pharmacist). The City also revoked "site approval" for the sale of liquor at the shopping center. Frey, the owner of the shopping center in which the Shop Rite was a tenant, challenged the City's revocation of the site approval revocation, arguing that the City's revocation violated its due process rights. The district court rejected Frey's arguments, and Frey appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria (August 16, 2013)
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit examined Frey's substantive and procedural due process claims. First, the court determined that Frey waived any argument that a site approval is a land use regulation similar to zoning. The court acknowledged that it was an interesting argument, but did not address its merits because Frey did not raise it previously. Second, the court held that although issuance of a liquor license to the grocery store tenant was a protected property right, the underlying site approval to the shopping center was not because Illinois law is silent on the issue of site approval. Finally, the court held that because there was no protected property interest in the site approval, Frey was not due any notice or procedure prior to revocation. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that the City provided Frey with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the revocation hearing.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Tuesday, August 20, 2013
Tattoo Parlor Protected by the First Amendment
Tuesday, August 20, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
Although Psychic Sophie was not entitled to First Amendment protection for her business (see yesterday's post), a tattoo parlor in Mesa, Arizona was when a court determined that tattoos are "pure speech" and the process of tattooing is "expressive activity" under the First Amendment.
In the City of Mesa, tattoo
parlors and other specified businesses must obtain a “Council Use Permit” too
operate in the city. The City denied a permit for a tattoo parlor, and the
tattoo artists sued arguing, among other things, that the ordinance violated
their rights to free speech. The trial court granted the City’s motion to
dismiss, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the business of
tattooing is entitled to First Amendment protection.
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme
Court surveyed the divided case law on the subject, and concluded that a tattoo
is pure speech, and the process of tattooing is expressive activity for First
Amendment purposes, even though the artists may use standard designs and
require payment for their services. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352. In other words, “[t]he fact that a tattoo
artist may use a standard design or message, such as iconic images of the
Virgin de Guadalupe or the words ‘Don't tread on me’ beside a coiled
rattlesnake, does not make the resulting tattoo any less expressive.” The
artists argued that the ordinance was not a valid time, place, and manner
regulation, and the Supreme Court agreed because the permit scheme did not
contain adequate standards to guide the Council’s unbridled discretion.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the tattoo artist’s complaint
for failure to state a claim.
Monday, August 19, 2013
Fortune Telling a "Way of Life" Not a Religion
Monday, August 19, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
It is possible for a municipality
to regulate fortune tellers without running afoul of the First Amendment's protection of free speech and religion.
In
Chesterfield County, Virginia, a “fortune teller” engaged in the occupation of
“occult services,” including fortune tellers, palmists, astrologists, or other
advisor “who in any other manner claims or pretends to tell fortunes or claims
or pretends to disclose mental faculties of individuals for any form of
compensation.” In addition to the payment of business license fees and other
regulations, “occult sciences” are only allowed in select zoning districts by
conditional use permit.
Rather than pay the required
license fee for her spiritual counseling business, Patricia Moore-King (a.k.a
“Psychic Sophie”) challenged the County regulatory scheme as a violation of her
rights to free speech and free exercise of religion, in addition to her rights
under RLUIPA. The District Court granted the County summary judgment, finding
the business of predicting future events to be “quintessential deception”
entitled to no First Amendment protection. Alternatively, the District Court found
the regulation to be permissible regulations of commercial speech, or valid
time, place, and manner restrictions.
Psychic Sophie appealed, and the
Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found that fortune telling is entitled to some measure of First
Amendment protection because it is not “inherently deceptive” on the basis it
involves predictive speech. Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, Va., 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, the
Court upheld the County's regulations, relying on the “professional speech” doctrine which allows the government
to employ generally applicable regulations for those providing services
involving speech without running afoul of the First Amendment. The fact that no
accrediting institution exists for fortune tellers supports the County’s additional
regulatory requirements. Finally, the Court concluded that Psychic Sophie’s
collection of beliefs amounted to a “way of life,” rather than a religion
entitled to protection under the First Amendment's right to free exercise of religion or RLUIPA.
Psychic Sophie continues to practice her "way of life" on psychicsophie.com, where she provides readings via email and Skype, and payment can be made using your paypal account.
Post Authored by Dan Bolin, Ancel Glink
Wednesday, August 14, 2013
Ancel Glink Defense E-News Released
Wednesday, August 14, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
Ancel Glink released the Second Quarter, 2013 edition of its Defense E-News, containing summaries of a number of recent cases involving government entities and other news important to local governments and their officials and employees. The E-News summarizes four cases addressing governmental tort immunity protections and two Title VII employment retaliation cases, among others. As an example, the E-News includes a summary of the following recent case:
Governmental Immunity: Actual or
Constructive Notice
City had no actual or constructive
notice of 2 inch height differential in sidewalk.
Zameer v. City of Chicago,
2013 IL App (1st) 120198 (July 19, 2013)
The Illinois Appellate Court ruled in
favor of the City under Section 3-102 of the Tort Immunity Act after
determining there was insufficient evidence of either constructive or actual
notice to the City of a two inch height difference between two sidewalk slabs
where the plaintiff fell and was injured. The Court found the plaintiff failed
to meet her burden to provide facts showing the City had notice of the
condition that caused her fall with adequate time to have repaired the
sidewalk.
You can read the E-News in the Resource Center on Ancel Glink's website. Tuesday, August 13, 2013
The "Seasonal Worker" Exception under the ACA
Tuesday, August 13, 2013 Julie Tappendorf
Even though the Employer Shared Responsibility provisions of the ACA will not be effective until January 1, 2015, public employers in Illinois are nevertheless concerned about their obligation to provide insurance to full-time employees under that statute. Central to that obligation is the determination of whether the public body is a "large employer" -- that is, one that employs 50 or more full-time and full-time equivalent (FTE) employees.
The usual calculation to determine "large employer" status is as follows:
(1) For each month, a full-time employee is one who works at least 130 hours that month (including seasonal employees);
(2) To determine FTE employees for each month, add up the number of hours worked by non-full time employees and divide by 120;
(3) To determine the total number of FTE employees employed by the public body, add the total number of full-time employees in (1) and the number of FTE employees in (2) and divide by 12. If that number is 50 or more, the public body is a large employer.
But there is an important exception to that determination - the "seasonal worker" exception. That exception provides that "[i]f the sum of an employer’s full-time employees and FTE’s exceeds 50 for 120 days or less (four calendar months or less) during the preceding calendar year, and the employees in excess of 50 who were employed during that term are seasonal workers, the employer is not considered to employ more than 50 full-time employees (including FTE’s) and the employer is not an applicable large employer for the current calendar year…. The four calendar months and the 120 days are not required to be consecutive."
The seasonal worker definition applies to employers, such as municipalities and park districts, that hire college and high school students for summer jobs as pool lifeguards and grounds maintenance. If these seasonal employees work four months or less, and their presence on the payroll tips the balance as to large employer status by causing the employer to exceed 50 FTE employees on a year-round average basis, then the seasonal worker exception may make the difference between large employer status and non-large employer status for ACA purposes.
Public employers who use seasonal employees, especially in large numbers in comparison to the number of year-around employees, should use the seasonal worker calculation during 2014 to determine large employer status for 2015. If there are questions concerning the calculation and whether it tips the balance one way or the other, please feel free to contact us by telephone or e-mail.
Post Authored by Don Anderson, Ancel Glink
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