Thursday, April 16, 2015
An Illinois appellate court recently affirmed an electoral board decision removing from the ballot a slate of new-party candidates in Franklin Park whose nomination papers had a fatal flaw in the circulators’ affidavits. Zurek v. Peterson, 2015 IL App (1st) 150508-U.
Section 10-4 of the Election Code requires all petition circulators to sign a sworn statement at the bottom of each petition sheet that must include, among other things, one of the following factual attestations: “(1) indicating the dates on which that sheet was circulated, or (2) indicating the first and last dates on which the sheet was circulated, or (3) certifying that none of the signatures on the sheet were signed more than 90 days preceding the last day for the filing of the petition.” The circulator affidavits on all of the petitions for these Franklin Park candidates failed to include any of the three factual statements, and instead included a legal conclusion that the sheets were circulated “within the statutory time period for petition circulation."
In ruling that the circulator affidavits failed to comply with the Election Code, the electoral board noted that a person cannot be prosecuted for perjury based on statements that are legal conclusions, rather than statements of fact. In the board's view, the purpose of section 10-4, which includes a penalty provision and is mandatory in nature, is to protect the integrity of the electoral process by making petition circulators accountable for their conduct and subject to perjury prosecution if there is a false swearing in their circulator affidavits. Since swearing to a legal conclusion does not put a circulator under penalties of perjury, and since the three options set forth in section 10-4 in regards to the time in which a petition was circulated all include affirmative statements of fact, the electoral board ruled, and the appellate court affirmed, that the failure to include any such factual statements in the circulator affidavits resulted in a failure to protect the integrity of the election. Therefore, when these circulators swore to the legal conclusion that the petitions were circulated “within the statutory period for petition circulation,” they failed to subject themselves to perjury penalties in violation of a statute that was designed precisely for the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process.
The appellate court also affirmed the electoral board’s ruling that the candidates’ new political party, as an entity, was not required to be named in the objector’s petition as a necessary party to the electoral board litigation. In a motion seeking to dismiss the objector’s petition, the candidates argued that their new political party should have been a named respondent and, therefore, should have been a party before the board in addition to the three individual candidates, each of whom were named as respondents. The electoral board ruled, and the appellate court affirmed, that no law or public policy requires political parties to be named respondents in electoral board actions. As the appellate court pointed out in its opinion, in this case the new political party never even came into existence, because the party would have been created only upon the filing of legally valid nomination papers, and this party’s nomination papers were judged to be legally invalid. Thus, the party could not have been named in the objector’s petition or served with a copy thereof.
DISCLOSURE: Ancel Glink attorney Adam W. Lasker was the court-appointed public-member chairman of the Franklin Park Municipal Officers Electoral Board for this case.
Post Authored by Adam Lasker, Ancel Glink
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
What Does Indiana’s Religious Freedom Bill Actually Say?
Wednesday, April 15, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
From The Workplace Report with Ancel Glink: What Does Indiana’s Religious Freedom Bill Actually Say?
If you paid attention to the news over the last few weeks, you probably heard about Indiana’s religious freedom law. The law, titled the "Religious Freedom and Restoration Act," sparked a firestorm of controversy around the country. Opponents of the bill claimed that it permitted discrimination against gays, lesbians, and the transgendered. Supporters claimed that it allows people the freedom to follow their religious beliefs. What was largely missing from the debate, however, was an objective legal analysis of what the law actually said.
What many people may find surprising is that the law says nothing about homosexuality, gay marriage, or anything related to that topic. The law does, however, state that the government may not "substantially burden a person’s right to exercise religion" unless there is a "compelling government interest" to do so, and it is the "least restrictive means possible." This means that the government cannot force someone to follow a law that would violate his or her religious beliefs unless it has a really good reason to do so.
These types of religious freedom acts are not uncommon—twenty states (including Illinois) and the federal government have them. What makes the situation in Indiana different from other states, including Illinois, is that Indiana has not enacted laws to protect a person's sexual orientation. For example, in Illinois, the Illinois Human Rights Act forbids an employer from refusing to hire or taking negative employment action against an employee because of his or her sexual orientation or gender identity. Illinois also includes "sexual orientation" in the state's nondiscrimination statute that bans discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, etc. Last year, same sex marriage became legal in Illinois.
Ultimately, the lesson employers can learn from the outcry over Indiana’s religious freedom act is that the public is sensitive to discrimination, legitimate or perceived, against gays and lesbians. Any action that may be seen as discriminatory could have serious ramifications for an employer, even if the employer is acting in accord with its religious beliefs.
Original Post Authored by Matt DiCianni, Ancel Glink
Tuesday, April 14, 2015
Settlement Not Approved by City Council is Unenforceable
Tuesday, April 14, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
Plaintiff sued the City after she was injured falling into a sinkhole near her home. The night before trial, the City Attorney, after conferring with members of the City Council's Code and Regulation Committee, offered to settle the case for $600,000, which plaintiff accepted. The plaintiff signed the settlement agreement, and two weeks later, the agreement was presented to the City Council for approval. Two of the council members who previously concurred in the settlement changed their votes and voted to reject the settlement. As a result, the settlement agreement was not approved. Meade v. City of Rockford, 2015 IL App (2d) 140645 (April 8, 2015)
The plaintiff sued to enforce the agreement against the City, arguing that the settlement agreement was effective when the City Attorney presented the offer with the concurrence of the Committee members.
The trial court certified 3 questions to the appellate court, which were answered as follows:
1. Is the settlement of litigation excluded from the statutory requirement that the city council approve items that involves the expenditure of money or creation of liability against the City under 65 ILCS 5/3.1-40-40?
The appellate court answered no, finding that a $600,000 payment to the plaintiff in the settlement of her case against the city required city council approval because it involved the expenditure of money and the creation of liability.
2. Are City Council members required to vote consistently with their previous authority to the City Attorney to make the settlement offer?
Again, the appellate court said no. There was no evidence that the Committee members told the plaintiff that no further approval was necessary or that they would not change their votes when the matter came to the City Council for approval. More importantly, the court would not adopt a position requiring Committee members to vote in accordance with their statements, if such statements had been made.
The court did, however, find the City's change of course on the settlement very troubling, and suggested that the City's conduct might even be sanctionable, remanding that issue back to the trial court.
3. Is a settlement agreement reached between the parties during a pretrial settlement conference enforceable against the City notwithstanding the City Council's subsequent vote to not approve it?
Not surprisingly, given the prior discussions, the court answered this in the negative. Because state statute requires city council approval of a contract involving the expenditure of money, this particular agreement was not enforceable because it was not approved by the council.
Parties who negotiate settlements with government bodies should be on notice that the settlement is not final until it is approved by the corporate authorities. There may be various exceptions (i.e., insurance settlements, legislative authority for expenditures of a certain amount), but as a general rule, settlement agreements are subject to the same approval process as other contracts.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Monday, April 13, 2015
New Dates for Police Deadly Force Training Sessions
Monday, April 13, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
For those of you who missed the police deadly force training in Bloomington on March 5th, we are happy to announce that two additional training sessions have been scheduled in May. The first will be held on May 4th in Lisle, and the second on May 8th in O'Fallon. Ancel Glink is a co-sponsor of this event with the Illinois Municipal League and the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police.
The one-day seminar brings together mayors, municipal managers, police administrators and attorneys to discuss issues which may arise from a controversial case of police use of deadly force. Topics to be covered include: training, transparency and accountability, crisis management and the law, community and media relations, leadership by elected officials, supporting the rank and file, and use of new technology. Recent events have shown that a crisis can occur in any community at any time. Listen to the experts and learn what steps to take so that your community doesn't go up in flames and your police officers don't turn their backs on their leaders.
Program registration is $105 and includes lunch.
You can see the program agenda here: PROGRAM AGENDA
Learn more about registration here: REGISTRATION INFORMATION.
Friday, April 10, 2015
Court Upholds Denial of Liquor License Based on Law Enforcement Problems
Friday, April 10, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
Last
month, an Illinois appellate court upheld Chicago’s Local Liquor Commission’s
denial of the issuance of a liquor license on the basis that it would “tend to
create a law enforcement problem” for the City. Move N Pick Convenience, Inc., v. Rahm Emanuel.
In
early 2012, Move N Pick applied for a packaged goods liquor license. Despite the background investigation
revealing no criminal history, the Liquor Commission denied the license stating
that a liquor license at the proposed location would “tend to create a law
enforcement problem.” The Commission
cited a letter from the police district commander stating that calls for
service and criminal activity would increase at that location if a liquor
license were granted, and that the alderman and residents of the areas
supported a denial of the license. On
appeal to the circuit court on administrative review, the court reversed the
decision of the Commission, rejecting the City’s justification for the denial.
The appellate court disagreed with the trial court, finding that denial of a liquor license on the basis that it would “tend to create a law enforcement problem” was sufficient regardless of the applicant never having violated liquor laws or other laws. The appellate court determined that the City could base its decision on other factors that could create a law enforcement problem such as gang problems and a high number of calls for police service. The court acknowledged that calls leading to arrests would tie up officers who would otherwise be addressing the gang and crime problems in the area. As a result, the appellate court upheld the commission’s denial of the license.
The appellate court disagreed with the trial court, finding that denial of a liquor license on the basis that it would “tend to create a law enforcement problem” was sufficient regardless of the applicant never having violated liquor laws or other laws. The appellate court determined that the City could base its decision on other factors that could create a law enforcement problem such as gang problems and a high number of calls for police service. The court acknowledged that calls leading to arrests would tie up officers who would otherwise be addressing the gang and crime problems in the area. As a result, the appellate court upheld the commission’s denial of the license.
Post Authored by Tiffany Jaworski, Ancel Glink
Thursday, April 9, 2015
TRO Against City's Ban on Charity Collection Boxes Upheld
Thursday, April 09, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the district court's issuance of a temporary restraining order against the City of St. John, Michigan relating to its ban on charity collection bins. Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns (6th Cir. April 6, 2015)
Last year, St. Johns adopted an anti-blight ordinance banning off-site donation boxes. Section 5.518(1)(a) of the ordinance defines a “[d]onation box” as “[a]n outdoor,
unattended receptacle designed with a door, slot, or other opening that is intended to accept
donated goods or items.” The ban states that "No person, business or other entity
shall place, use or allow the installation of a donation box within the City of St. Johns.” Section 5.518(1)(b) describes the purpose of the ordinance as follows:
It is the intent of this section to prohibit donation boxes to protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the city by preventing blight, protecting property values and neighborhood integrity, avoiding the creation and maintenance of nuisances and ensuring the safe and sanitary maintenance of properties. Unattended donation boxes in the city may become an attractive nuisance for minors and/or criminal activity. It is also the intent of this section to preserve the aesthetics and character of the community by prohibiting the placement of donation boxes.
After the ban was passed, the City removed two bins placed by the organization "Planet Aid." Shortly afterward, Planet Aid filed a lawsuit against the City challenging the ban, arguing that it violated Planet Aid’s First Amendment rights
because it infringed on Planet Aid’s protected speech of charitable solicitation and giving.
After holding oral argument, the district court granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction. The district court concluded that “Planet Aid’s operation of donation bins to solicit and collect charitable donations qualifies as protected speech under the First Amendment” and
that the Ordinance #was subject to strict scrutiny. The court held that
Planet Aid, in arguing that the ordinance fails strict scrutiny because it implements
an overly broad, prophylactic ban on all bins so the City can avoid dealing with
hypothetical nuisances or other issues that may arise with certain bins in the
future, proved a substantial likelihood of succeeding on
the merits of its free speech claim.
The case was appealed to the 6th Circuit, which upheld the district court's issuance of the TRO. The appeals court determined that the ordinance "clearly regulates protected speech on the basis of
its content. The ordinance does not ban or regulate all unattended, outdoor receptacles. It bans
only those unattended, outdoor receptacles with an expressive message on a particular topic—
charitable solicitation and giving" - an expression that the U.S. Supreme Court has found "worthy of strong constitutional protection." As a result, the ordinance was subject to strict scrutiny, which the City could not satisfy.
The remainder of the case will move forward, subject to the injunction against enforcement of the ordinance.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
NLRB Law Judge Affirms Employee Right to Use Employer Email
Wednesday, April 08, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
From the Workplace Report with Ancel Glink: NLRB Law Judge Affirms Employee Right to Use Employer Email
We are often asked by our clients whether they can adopt and enforce a workplace policy prohibiting employees from using their government email for personal activities. We've expressed concerns about a blanket prohibition on use of employer emails because such a policy could implicate certain employment protections, including protected concerted activities, particularly in light of past NLRB rulings and decisions, including one issued last month.
In this case, an NLRB administrative law judge struck down an employer rule that prohibited employees from using business email to “engage in activities on behalf of organizations.” The law judge said the prohibition was too broad and violated the National Labor Relations Act. Purple Communications Inc. and Communication Workers of America, 2015 WL 1169344 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 16, 2015). The employer had argued that allowing blanket use of emails by employees “on behalf of organizations” may introduce computer viruses to the system. The administrative law judge rejected that argument, stating that the employer's concerns could be addressed by software programs and rules more specifically targeted to downloading external content.
While Illinois Labor Boards have not yet adopted the new NLRB position on use of an employer’s email system, it is likely it would, should it be presented with a similar case. Employers should review their email policies to make sure their policies do not prohibit employee organizing rights. Also, care should be taken when disciplining an employee for violation of an existing email policy. That existing policy may now be considered invalid if it is a barrier to employees exercising rights under state labor laws.
Original post Authored by Steve Mahrt, Ancel Glink
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
Use of Photos Without Permission Costs Lawyer $8000
Tuesday, April 07, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
From Strategically Social: Use of Photos Without Permission Costs Lawyer $8000
Now, here's an interesting (and maybe a little ironic) case out of D.C. involving use of stock photos without permission. The plaintiff company claims that the defendant used two of the company's photos on the defendant's website without the company's permission. The suit sought $150,000 for each instance. The irony is that the defendant happens to be a patent lawyer. Upon notice of the alleged infringement, the lawyer removed the photos, but didn't respond to the company's efforts to settle so the company filed the complaint. The case eventually did settle, to the tune of $8,000.
Now, here's an interesting (and maybe a little ironic) case out of D.C. involving use of stock photos without permission. The plaintiff company claims that the defendant used two of the company's photos on the defendant's website without the company's permission. The suit sought $150,000 for each instance. The irony is that the defendant happens to be a patent lawyer. Upon notice of the alleged infringement, the lawyer removed the photos, but didn't respond to the company's efforts to settle so the company filed the complaint. The case eventually did settle, to the tune of $8,000.
Lesson? You can't just copy or upload photos on your own site without permission - just because they are already on the internet does not necessarily make them fair game to everyone.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Monday, April 6, 2015
Owner Responsible for Tenants' Unpaid Water Bills Under Local Ordinance
Monday, April 06, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
A property owner of rental units filed a lawsuit against the Village of Dolton and its administrator claiming that the Village's failure to "red tag" his tenant's units violated the Village's own ordinances. Mack argued that because of the Village's failure to shut the water off in these delinquent units, as the owner, he was left solely responsible for paying the unpaid water bills which, in some cases, exceeded $700, for a total amount of $18,000 for all of the unpaid bills for his tenants' properties. In his lawsuit, he asked the court to declare the Village's actions unlawful and to award him attorneys fees. Mack Industries, Ltd. v. Village of Dolton, 2015 IL App (1st) 133620.
The city filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the Tort Immunity Act. Specifically, the Village argued it was immune from liability under section 2-103 for failing to enforce its own ordinances and from section 2-104 for failing to issue permits or certificates. The court granted the motion, and Mack appealed.
The appellate court first held that the Village's ordinance clearly imposed joint and several liability for water charges on both the user (in this case, the tenant) and the owner (in this case, Mack). The ordinance authorized, but did not obligate, the Village to shut off water to a user for unpaid invoices by using language that provide that premises with delinquent accounts 'may be considered for red tagging in preparation for shut off of water to the premises." Consequently, Mack was not entitled to declaratory relief, because he had no right to the relief being requested - i.e., that the Village go after the tenant alone for the unpaid charges.
The court also rejected Mack's breach of contract argument, finding that the provision of water service "represents the exercise of its police power" and not the establishment of a contractual relationship between the Village and the water user or property owner.
Finally, the court rejected Mack's argument that the administrator engaged in "willful and wanton conduct" in not following the Village's ordinance.
Illinois municipalities may want to review their own water service regulations and ordinances to see whether they have similar language that authorizes, but does not obligate, the Village to shut off water to a property with unpaid water invoices. Additionally, if a municipality wants to hold the owner responsible for the unpaid invoices of its tenants (which can be particularly in situations where tenants move out without bringing their water account current), there should be language in the ordinance stating that an owner is jointly and severally responsible for these invoices.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Friday, April 3, 2015
Update on State Legislation Affecting Local Governments
Friday, April 03, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
The Illinois General Assembly is officially on "spring break" until April 13th. A lot happened right before the legislators headed out to Ft. Lauderdale, South Padre Island, or their home district. The Illinois Municipal League has done a great job summarizing some of the more substantive actions taken in their March 27th IML Statehouse Briefing.
Here's a brief summary of just a few of these bills:
SB 1815 proposes to restrict the amount a municipality can charge for connecting to water and sewer facilities. We've posted about this legislation before, and expressed our concerns about the impact this legislation would have on municipal finances and facilities, and how it might affect previously established special service areas, recapture agreements, and bonds. This bill is still in committee.
HB 2717 is one of the many bills requiring units of government to post an extensive amount of information and documentation on their websites. This bill even requires a government to create a website if they don't already have one. This bill has moved out of committee and is going to the house floor for a vote.
SB 1206 would amend the TIF Act to require all municipalities to approve a tax increment redevelopment plan or project (not just the municipality who is establishing the TIF) if a school district overlaps multiple municipalities. This bill is now in second reading.
SB 36 would amend the School Code to require school districts to comply with local zoning.
There are many, many other bills pending in the legislature that affect local authority and control.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Thursday, April 2, 2015
Webcast— Ethical Rules and Considerations for Planners, Planning Commissioners, and Lawyers
Thursday, April 02, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
The Planning and Law Division of the American Planning Association is hosting an upcoming webcast "Ethical Rules and Considerations for Planners, Planning Commissioners, and Lawyers" on Wednesday, April 8th from 12:00 to 1:30 pm (Central Time).
Registration is $20 for PLD members, $40 for nonmembers, and $45 for webinar registration plus a Planning and Law Division membership. This webcast explores the ethical rules and considerations governing planners, planning commissioners, and lawyers who work with planners and appear before planning commissions. The webinar will cover the primary sources of ethical rules, common ethical mistakes, and procedures to correct common mistakes. In addition, the webinar will have an interactive component that will enable participants to interact with the presenters and other participants on ethical scenarios.
Ancel Glink Partner David Silverman will moderate the panel. Speakers include Hiram Peck, FAICP, Director of Planning and Community Development, Town of Simsbury, CT; Brian Smith, Partner at Robinson & Cole, LLP; and Evan Seeman, Associate at Robinson & Cole, LLP.
Ancel Glink Partner David Silverman will moderate the panel. Speakers include Hiram Peck, FAICP, Director of Planning and Community Development, Town of Simsbury, CT; Brian Smith, Partner at Robinson & Cole, LLP; and Evan Seeman, Associate at Robinson & Cole, LLP.
Register here.
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
Should Illinois Municipalities be Authorized to File for Bankruptcy?
Wednesday, April 01, 2015 Julie Tappendorf
A question that has come up recently in Illinois is whether Illinois municipalities can file for bankruptcy. We've seen larger cities in other states (like Detroit) go through the bankruptcy process, but have had any experience in Illinois. That has less to do with the current financial condition of Illinois municipalities and more to do with the current state of the law in Illinois.
Under Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code, municipalities have the authority to file for bankruptcy provided they meet certain criteria. One of those requirements is that bankruptcy is authorized by state statute. Illinois does not currently have a statute specifically authorizing municipal bankruptcies, although more than half of all states do authorize municipal bankruptcy.
With the increase in unfunded mandates by the state legislature, and the potential for Illinois municipalities to lose 50% of their income tax revenues, the Illinois Municipal League has issued a position statement in support of legislation authorizing Illinois municipalities to file for bankruptcy. That bill is HB 298. You can read more about the IML's position on its website here.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
