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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Friday, December 20, 2024

Day Nine: The New Year Countdown – Permit Fees for Disabled Veterans


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025.

Public Act 103-0621 amends the Counties Code, Township Code, and the Municipal Code. The Act provides that veterans with a disability will not be charged for building permit fees for improvements required to accommodate their disability. A veteran or their caregiver must provide proof of veteran status and attest to the fact that the improvements to the veteran’s residence are for disability accommodations. 

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Thursday, December 19, 2024

Day Eight: The New Year Countdown – Conservation and Education Program


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025.

Today, we are covering the Illinois Youth & Young Adult Conservation and Education Act that was passed by the General Assembly to provide education and employment opportunities for youth and young adults between the ages of 15-25.

The Act provides for creation of the Youth & Young Adult Conservation Pilot Program (Program). The Program will provide grants to units of local government to provide conservation education, job training programs, and internship opportunities with the Department of Natural Resources.

The curriculum of this program will be aimed at the development and maintenance of natural resources, environmental stewardship and civic responsibility, and improving the public land in Illinois.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, December 18, 2024

Day Seven: The New Year Countdown – Police Officer Disability


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025.

Public Act 103-0929 amends the Illinois Municipal Code to expressly state that a physical or mental disability that constitutes the basis of an application for benefits may not be used as a cause, either in whole or in part, for a municipality to discharge a police officer. The Act also provides that the chief of police must order an immediate reinstatement into service when an officer provides a receipt of certification that the officer is no longer disabled.  

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, December 17, 2024

Day Six: The New Year Countdown – First Responder Insurance


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025. Today, we will be covering two Acts passed by the General Assembly that made amendments to the Municipal Code, State Employees Group Insurance Act, and Counties Code.

Public Act 103-0818 requires insurance coverage for joint mental health therapy services for police and fire officers in Illinois. In order to be covered, the mental health therapy services must be provided by a licensed physician, therapist, psychologist, or social worker. Municipalities, including home-rule municipalities, must provide insurance coverage for these type of services to members of municipal police and fire departments and their spouses or partners residing with them if they are a self-insurer for health insurance. Similarly, counties that are self-insurers for health insurance must provide insurance coverage for members of the sheriff's office and any spouse or partner of the member who resides with the member, and fire protection districts that are self-insurers for health insurance must provide similar insurance coverage for members of the fire district and their spouses or partners residing with them.

Public Act 103-1011 makes similar amendments and requires coverage for mental health counseling services for first responders starting on June 1, 2025. The term “first responders” includes all police and corrections officers, deputy sheriffs, firefighters, emergency medical services personnel, medical dispatchers, public safety telecommunicators, and mental health professionals dispatched in response to emergency services. Municipalities, including home-rule municipalities, must provide insurance coverage for these services if they are a self-insurer.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Monday, December 16, 2024

Day Five: The New Year Countdown – Illinois Department of Transportation Studies


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025.

Public Act103-0694 provides that the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) must provide traffic and environmental studies or surveys to units of local government on request. The Act also provides that any study performed by IDOT may be substituted for a study required by construction projects affecting a state right-of-way.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Friday, December 13, 2024

Day Four: The New Year Countdown – Pesticide Notices


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025.

Today, we are covering Public Act 103-0976 which regulates the use of pesticides in municipalities. This Act provides that municipalities and government actors must provide 24-hours of notice to the public before applying a pesticide on a public right-of-way. The notice must include intended location, name of the product, the reason for application, any special instructions on the product label, and contact information for the Department of Agriculture. A violation of this act may result in fines up to $1,000. The notice must be written and is sufficient if posted in newsletters, websites, calendars, or other correspondence published by the government entity. Posting on a bulletin board is not sufficient.

The Act also provides that a municipality is exempt from these notice requirements if the pesticide application is in response to diseases in mosquito populations or a natural disaster recovery effort.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Thursday, December 12, 2024

Day Three: The New Year Countdown – Battery Charged Fences


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025.

Public Act 103-0796 (Act) restricts local control over land use regulations governing battery-charged fences. Staring January 1, 2025, municipalities, townships, and counties may not require a permit or other approval for the installation or maintenance of a battery-charged fence if the fence is on non-residential property and the electric charge produced by the fence is below the requirements set by the International Electrotechnical Commission.

Additionally, any battery-charged fence must have visible warning signs placed every 30-feet.

This Act contains an express preemption of home rule powers. A home rule municipality may not regulate battery-charged fences in a manner that is inconsistent with the Act.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, December 11, 2024

Day Two: The New Year Countdown – Statewide Building and Residential Code


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025.

Back in May, we reported on changes made by Public Act 103-0510 to the Capital Development Board Act and the Illinois Residential Building Code Act. The new law requires certain building code standards to be adopted to create a statewide building code.

Effective January 1, 2025, the new laws will prohibit any person from occupying a “newly constructed commercial building” or a “substantially improved commercial building” in any “non-building code jurisdiction” until the property owner has contracted with a qualified inspector to inspect the building.

Also effective January 1, 2025, the law requires any municipal or county building code to regulate the structural design of new buildings, rehabilitation work in existing buildings, and residential buildings in a manner at least as stringent as the applicable baseline code applicable to those buildings. This section also expressly preempts home rule municipalities.

 Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, December 10, 2024

Day One: The New Year Countdown – Bikeway Act


This year, Municipal Minute will be counting down to the New Year with updates on legislation that will be effective starting on January 1, 2025. Up first, we have the Bikeway Act!

The Bikeway Act provides that municipalities and counties can prepare a bicycle transportation plan to create safe and effective bikeways. Although not required to create a plan, the Act imposes some requirements for municipalities and counties that choose to do so.

If a municipality or county elects to create a bicycle transportation plan, it must include the following:

  1. The estimated number of existing bicycle commuters in the plan area and the estimated increase in the number of commuters resulting from the implementation of the plan;
  2. A map and description of existing and proposed land use and settlement patterns, bikeways, and bicycle parking and storing facilities;
  3. A map and description of existing and proposed bicycle transport and parking facilities for connections with use of other transportation modes, including public transit and parking lots;
  4. A description of bicycle safety and education programs conducted in the area including with the plan;
  5. A description of community involvement with the development of the plan, including letters of support;
  6. A description of how the transportation plan is consistent with other local or regional transportation plans;
  7. A description of the projects proposed in the plan and their priorities; and
  8. A description of past expenditures for bicycle facilities and any future financial needs.
Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Monday, December 9, 2024

Court Rejected Former Employee's Retaliatory Discharge and Whistleblower Claims


In Maxson v. City of Chenoa, an Illinois Appellate Court rejected whistleblower and retaliation claims brought by a former city employee against the City after his position was terminated.

On January 8, 2018, the city council voted to terminate a superintendent’s position in connection with a water main break on Grant Street. The city council based its decision on its position that the employee had ignored the situation and disregarded his duties. The former employee appealed his termination and was given the opportunity to have a hearing before the city council and call witnesses on his behalf. Following the hearing, the city council upheld the termination by a vote of 4 to 1.

The former employee then filed this lawsuit alleging violations the Whistleblower Act and retaliatory discharge. He claimed he became aware of unethical or illegal acts committed by the City's mayor involving use of public funds. The trial court held that the former employee did not offer sufficient facts to support his allegations of unethical acts and did not raise any complaints with any governmental or law enforcement agency, and the former employee appealed.

To establish a claim under the State of Illinois' Whistleblower Act, an employee must show: an adverse employment action by their employer that was in retaliation for the employee’s disclosure to a government or law enforcement agency of a suspected violation of law. A recent federal district court opinion also provides that an employee must show that the employer was aware of the employee’s disclosures of their illegal conduct to an enforcement agency.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the former employee's claim failed because he could not prove that the city council (1) knew of his disclosures of his whistleblowing, and (3) that he was fired because of it. Further, there was no evidence in this case that the mayor had any hand in the former employee's termination. Finally, the Court determined that the former employee failed to show evidence of a causal relationship between his activities—his reports of, or complaints about alleged unethical or illegal activities—and his discharge from employment, a necessary element of his common-law retaliatory discharge claim.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf

Thursday, December 5, 2024

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 89 - New Year, New Legislation, and Recent Decisions


Ancel Glink's Podcast, Quorum Forum, has released a new episode: Quorum Forum 89: New Year, New Legislation, and Recent Decisions

In this episode, the holiday season is here, and the Quorum Forum podcast team is ready to celebrate! To ring in the New Year, we will be reviewing case law and legislation that our local government listeners should be aware of as we head into 2025. 

Wednesday, December 4, 2024

The Top 10 Municipal Minute Posts of 2024


It’s that time of year folks! Today, we highlight the top 10 Municipal Minute blog posts of 2024. Thank you for your continued readership of Municipal Minute.

U.S. Supreme Court’s Analysis: Use of Social Media by Government Officials

The Supreme Court held that when a government official or employee posts on social media, the official’s or employee's speech will only be attributable to the government in limited circumstances. The Court adopted a two-factor test that looks at whether the official or employee had actual authority from the government and exercises that authority in his or her social media activities..

First Amendment Auditor Case Decided in Massachusetts

In a First Amendment auditor case, a Massachusetts court held that individual school defendants did not have qualified immunity for First Amendment claims.

PAC Finds Village Board Meetings Were Not Open or Convenient Under OMA

Village Board Meetings with limited seating capacity and heightened security measures did not properly accommodate the public under the OMA.

Regulating Election and Campaign Signs

To stay ahead of possible election issues, public bodies should confirm their sign ordinances do not single out political signs and that they allow candidates to place temporary signs on public property used as a polling place.

It’s Time to Establish Elected Officials’ Compensation for Terms Starting in 2025

The Local Government Officer Compensation Act specifies the compensation of elected officers must be fixed 180 days before the beginning of their terms.

New Illinois Law Regulates Low-Speed Electric Scooters

P.A. 103-0899 amends the Illinois Vehicle Code to add provisions for low-speed electric scooters.

Changes to Building Code Statutes

P.A. 103-0510 amends the Capital Development Board and the Illinois Residential Building Code Act to establish certain filing requirements for local codes and to further the standardization of building codes, among other changes.

Newly Hired Independent Contractor Reporting Requirements under Unemployment Insurance Act

All employers, including units of local government, must report newly hired employees and independent contractors within 20 days after the date the employee or contractor begins employment.

Court Upholds Contiguity Determination in Annexation Challenge

An Appellate Court ruled in favor of a city, finding a 19.5 shared boundary met the contiguity requirements for the annexation to be valid.

Seventh Circuit Upholds Denial of Outdoor Athletic Lights

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of a City in a lawsuit filed by a private religious school that claimed the City violated RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause, and vested rights law when the City denied a permit for outdoor athletic lighting.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, December 3, 2024

PAC Updates Indexes of Binding FOIA and OMA Opinions


The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) has posted an updated index of all of the FOIA and OMA binding opinions issued by the PAC office from 2010 to October of 2024. The index is categorized by topics which makes it easy to search for particular opinions on a specific issue. For example, the FOIA index lists a number of binding opinions issued on the topic of disclosure of personnel records, and the OMA index lists binding opinions issued on the topic of public comment at meetings. 

You can find these two resources here:

PAC index of FOIA binding opinions

PAC index of OMA binding opinions 

Tuesday, November 26, 2024

Court Finds No FOIA Violation


An inmate submitted an “inmate request/grievance form” to a county sheriff’s office (Sheriff), stating that the inmate was “requesting to talk with: FOIA/Legal/Dietary,” regarding a “Request for Preservation.” The inmate attached a list seeking nutritional information for food served at the jail. In response, the Sheriff disclosed several records responsive to the request within the Sheriff’s possession or custody. 

In January 2024, the inmate filed a lawsuit claiming the Sheriff violated FOIA by failing to comply with his request. The circuit court dismissed the case finding that (1) the inmate request did not seek “public records” as defined by FOIA but instead asked the Sheriff to preserve items and prepare data, which was improper under FOIA, (2) the Sheriff did not deny the inmate’s FOIA request because it disclosed all responsive records in its possession, (3) disclosing records did not waive the Sheriff’s argument there was never a valid FOIA request, and (4) even if the Sheriff’s response was untimely, there was no relief the court could provide and there was no willful or intentional lack of compliance by the Sheriff.

After the inmate appealed, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the case in McBroom v. Logan County Sheriff’s Office.

First, the Appellate Court held that portions of the inmate's request did constitute a valid FOIA request where (1) the inmate directed his request to “FOIA,” (2) the request sought specific documents allegedly maintained by the Sheriff, and (3) the Sheriff interpreted the request as a FOIA request and forwarded the request to the Sheriff’s FOIA officer. 

Second, to the extent the inmate's request asked for general information/data, answers to questions, or requesting the Sheriff to create new records, those requests were outside of FOIA and the Court held that the Sheriff was not required to comply with those requests.

Third, the Court found that the inmate failed to provide a counter affidavit or other evidence to counter the FOIA officer’s affidavit that the office had provided all responsive records.

Fourth, the Court rejected the inmate's argument that the Sheriff failed to timely respond to his request, finding that the Sheriff received the request on February 1, 2023, and responded to the request on February 7, 2023, within the five business day FOIA time-frame. The Court noted that even if the Sheriff’s response was untimely, once the Sheriff disclosed its responsive records to the request, the inmate’s claim for records already disclosed was moot.

Finally, the Court held that the Sheriff did not willfully or intentionally fail to comply with FOIA so the inmate was not entitled to civil penalties or attorneys' fees.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Monday, November 25, 2024

Illinois Supreme Court Upholds Road Impact Fees as Condition to Annexation


Last year, we reported on an Illinois Appellate Court decision that upheld the validity of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) between a county and municipalities that provided for the imposition of road impact fees on developers as a condition to annexation. That ruling was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court which issued a decision upholding the Appellate Court's ruling in Habdab v. County of Lake, et al.

In 2009, Mundelein (Village), Lake County (County), and two other municipalities entered an IGA to provide for construction funding for highway improvements that would serve each municipality. The IGA required that half of the costs of the improvements be paid by the public and the other half be paid by impact fees on future developers who build near the improvements. The fee amounts were calculated depending on the size and location of each parcel. The IGA required the municipalities to require that developers proposing to annex property into the municipality to enter into annexation agreements that would include provisions stating that a developer’s plans would not receive final zoning approvals until the required impact fees were collected.

A developer filed a lawsuit against Mundelein and the County when they tried to collect the road impact fees. The developer argued that the fees constituted road improvement impact fees that do not comply with the Impact Fee Law and that the fees were "unconstitutional conditions." Both the circuit court and Appellate Court rejected the developer's arguments and ruled in favor of the Village and County.

On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Court that the road impact fees imposed through the IGA did not constitute "road improvement impact fees" under the Impact Fee Law. The Court distinguished between the IGA imposed fees (which are a condition to annexation) and the Impact Fee Law's "road improvement impact fees" (which are imposed as a condition to the issuance of a building permit or certificate of occupancy). In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the annexation agreement statute expressly authorizes municipalites to require contributions of either land or monies as a condition of annexation. 

Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the developer's argument that the fees imposed through the IGA constituted "unconstitutional conditions," agreeing with the Appellate Court's finding that there was an essential nexus between the condition (impact fees) and a legitimaate state interest (preventing congestion and providing road improvements to ease it) and that a rough proportionality existed between the burden on the developer and the harm the government sought to remedy through the imposition of the fees.


 

Tuesday, November 19, 2024

Illinois Appellate Court Upholds Code Enforcement Agreement in Favor of Village


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a court order awarding a Village $45,000 in fines against a company that failed to timely install a fire alarm system in breach of a compliance agreement. Village of Plainfield v. Ionia Real Properties, LLC

In 2017, a real estate company purchased a vacant building within the Village. For the following year, the company repeatedly failed fire safety inspections for failure to install a proper fire alarm system. In 2018, the company and the Village entered into an agreement to resolve the issue. The compliance agreement required the company to install a fire alarm system within 60 days. It also provided that a $500 per day fine would be assessed if the company failed to install the system. 

When the fires system was not installed in the time period required by the compliance agreement, the Village filed a lawsuit against the company, asking the court to impose the fine for the company’s late compliance. Initially, the court ruled against the Village but in response to the Village's motion to reconsider, ultimately ruled ruled in favor of the Village and awarded it $45,000 in fines pursuant to the compliance agreement.

On appeal, the company argued the circuit court erred when it:

(1) ruled in favor of the Village;

(2) denied the company’s motion to disqualify the Village’s attorney;

(3) granted the Village’s motion to stop the company’s subpoenas for witnesses; and

(4) entered a $45,000 judgment against the company.

The Appellate Court upheld the circuit court's ruling in favor of the Village, finding that the delay on installing the fire alarm system was due solely to the company’s failure to sign a price quote with the installation company until four days prior to the agreement’s 60-day deadline, which led to the late work and resulted in a material breach of the compliance agreement. The Appellate Court also rejected the company's argument that the Village attorney should have been disqualified or that the subpoenas were necessary. Finally, the Appellate Court noted that the compliance agreement clearly stated the company would be fined $500 per day if it failed to install the fire alarm system by the agreement's deadline, which amounted to a $45,000 penalty. 

Post Authored by Daniel Lev & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Thursday, November 14, 2024

Appellate Court Rejects Due Process Claims in Nuisance Case


The City of Chicago filed a lawsuit against the unknown heirs of the deceased owner of a single-family home claiming the property had been neglected and was an unsafe public nuisance. In City of Chicago v. Dzendrowski, an Illinois Appellate Court rejected claims by family members of the deceased owner that they were denied due process because they were not properly notified of the City's lawsuit.

After the City discovered numerous violations of the City Code including warped flooring, missing electrical and plumbing fixtures, and damage to the home’s exterior from decaying trees, it searched the property’s title records to attempt to locate the heirs of the deceased owner. The City found eight possible relatives, including the two individuals involved in this lawsuit, and for over a year, the City made numerous unsuccessful attempts to serve the individuals. Eventually, it sought permission from the court to serve notice in a newspaper.  

At the first court hearing on the City's lawsuit, the court appointed a limited receiver to take all reasonable steps to remove the nuisances. After the hearing, two relatives of the deceased owner filed motions and argued they were not properly notified of the lawsuit. The circuit court denied the motions, allowed the limited receiver to remedy the issues with the property, and the City voluntarily dismissed the case. 

The two relatives appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, arguing, among other things, that their procedural due process rights were violated when the City voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit after the court denied the relative's motions but before they could file a counterclaim or otherwise defend against the merits of the lawsuit. The court rejected their claims, holding that the relatives had a 10-12 month period where they could have asserted a counterclaim or defense, but chose not to do so. The court said this was a reasonable time to defend against the allegations and held that their due process rights were not violated by the court's dismissal of the case.  

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, November 13, 2024

Administrative Decision Reversed and Remanded Due to Lack of Factual Findings to Support Decision


The Bond County Community United School District 2 (District) voted to close one of its public schools and transfer its 107 students to other schools. In response to the school closing, the "Sorento Parents Committee of Ten" (Parents Committee) filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees for Bond, Christian, Effingham, Fayette, and Montgomery Counties (RBST) proposing to detach the school from the District and attach its property to the Mount Olive Community Unit School District.

The RBST held a hearing on the detachment petition, and heard evidence presented by the Parents Committee, before issuing an administrative order to deny the petition. The RBST determined that the Parents Committee failed to establish that the students would receive significant direct educational benefits from switching school districts. The Parents Committee appealed the denial of its petition to the circuit court which upheld the decision of the RBST. The Parents Committee then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, which reversed and remanded the case back to the RBST in Sorento Parents Committee of Ten v. Regional Board of School Trustees for Bond.

The Appellate Court first reviewed the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, which requires administrative agencies to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in their final decisions. Because the RBST ’s administrative order did not contain any factual findings or legal conclusions, the Appellate Court held that there was no basis for a reviewing court to review the decision for error. As a result of the Board’s failure to meet these requirements in issuing its final decision, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and vacated the decision of the RBST. The case was remanded back to the RBST for further review, evaluation, and decision.

Post Authored by Madeline Tankersley and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink


Tuesday, November 12, 2024

Seventh Circuit Upholds Use of Pole Camera by Police to Record Activities at Front of Home


As part of a drug trafficking investigation, law enforcement installed a pole camera pointed at an individual's home. The evidence gathered from the camera, along with other evidence gathered by law enforcement, was used to charge the resident with intent to distribute methamphetamine, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, distribution of marijuana, among other crimes. The resident moved to suppress the evidence from the pole camera, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights, but the district court denied the motion. He was ultimately convicted by a jury. 

The resident appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled against him, finding no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit determined that he had no expectation of privacy for activities conducted in front of and outside of the resident's home. U.S. v. House (7th Cir. November 5, 2024). The Seventh Circuit noted that the resident had taken no action to shield the activities taking place at the front of the residence, and that law enforcement's use of the pole camera provided no greater view to the activities taking place at the front of the home than could have been observed by an ordinary passerby.

Post Authored by Madeline Tankersley & Julie Tappendorf

Friday, November 8, 2024

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 88 - Election Special


Ancel Glink just released Episode 88 of its Quorum Forum Podcast:  Quorum Forum 88: Election Special

The 2025 consolidated election season is kicking off with its usual verve and a host of complex issues to address. Local election officials and electoral boards have many responsibilities to make elections happen. Meanwhile, local governments are asked to enforce political sign regulations and electioneering laws. Local governments may get involved in elections themselves with their own referenda and public questions. To help listeners tackle these issues, Ancel Glink attorneys Erin Monforti and Katie Nagy update a classic Quorum Forum election special, featuring insight from Ancel Glink's own Keri-Lyn Krafthefer


Friday, November 1, 2024

Court Rejects Police Officers' First Amendment Lawsuit Relating to their Personal Social Media Activities


A federal district court recently rejected police officers' claims that their First Amendment rights were violated by a city after the officers were disciplined or terminated for their personal social media activities. Fenico v. City of Philadelphia.

The officers' Facebook posts were brought to light by the "Plain View Project," a database of public social media posts and comments of current and former police officers across the country. According to the district court's opinion, the database includes over 5,000 posts and comments by police officers which Plain View deemed likely to "undermine public trust and confidence in police." Over 3,000 of the posts were attributed to Philadelphia police officers according to the Plain View Project.

After the posts and comments of city police officers were brought to light, the city faced protests by a number of groups and organizations objecting to the social media activities of some of the city police officers. The city subsequently conducted an internal investigation which ultimately led to disciplinary action against many of the officers, including termination in some cases. A number of the officers filed a lawsuit against the city, claiming the city retaliated against them in violation of their First Amendment free speech rights.

The district court considered the following three factors to determine whether a government employee's free speech rights are violated: (1) whether the employee was speaking as a private citizen; (2) whether the employee spoke on a matter of public concern; and (3) whether the employee's and public's interest in the speech outweighs the government interest in avoiding disruption to government operations that could be caused by the speech. If the government employee can demonstrate they meet each of the three factors, they will prevail in a First Amendment lawsuit.

As to the first factor, the parties acknowledged that the officers spoke as "private citizens." 

With respect to the second factor, after analyzing the plaintiff-officers' social media posts, the court determined that they spoke on matters of "public concern." The court noted that even the most inappropriate, inflammatory, or controversial comments can touch on matters of public concern.

The third factor (called the Pickering Balance) required the court to balance the city's interest in avoiding significant disruption to police operations against the employee's and public's interest in the employee's speech. After analyzing the hundreds of social media posts that were part of the lawsuit (many of which are reprinted in the opinion itself), the court determined that the city established that the city's interest in protecting police operations outweighed any employee or public interest in that speech. The court noted that many of the social media posts and comments involved advocating for violence against members of protected classes, included sexist and racist imagery, etc. The city demonstrated that public confidence in these officers and the department in general was negatively impacted by the officers' social media activities, and that the activities impacted law enforcement operations for many reasons, including that the district attorney had issued letters to many of the officers that it would have to disclose their social media activities to defense attorneys in cases where the officer was involved. 

Because the plaintiff-officers did not meet the third factor required to demonstrate a First Amendment claim against the city, the court rejected the plaintiff-officers' First Amendment claims and ruled in favor of the city on all claims.

Monday, October 28, 2024

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation for Not Publishing Notice of Change to Regular Meeting Schedule


The Public Access Counselor of the Attorney General's office (PAC) issued its 13th binding opinion for 2024, finding a public body in violation of the OMA for failing to publish notice of a change to its regular meeting schedule. PAC Op. 24-013.

An individual filed a request for review with the PAC claiming that a village board failed to comply with the OMA when it voted to move its regular meetings from the third Monday of each month to the third Wednesday of each month. Specifically, the individual claimed the village did not publish notice of this change to its regular meeting schedule 10 days prior to taking action on the change, as required by section 2.03.

The PAC reviewed section 2.03 of the OMA and distinguished between (1) a change in a single regular meeting date that would be subject to the rescheduled or special meeting notice requirements (posting 48 hours in advance) and (2) a change to a public body's regular meeting dates "going forward" which requires 10 days prior notice by publication in a newspaper and posting notice at the principal office of the public body (see excerpt of section 2.03 below):

If a change is made in regular meeting dates, at least 10 days' notice of such change shall be given by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the area in which such body functions. However, in the case of bodies of local governmental units with a population of less than 500 in which no newspaper is published, such 10 days' notice may be given by posting a notice of such change in at least 3 prominent places within the governmental unit. Notice of such change shall also be posted at the principal office of the public body or, if no such office exists, at the building in which the meeting is to be held. Notice of such change shall also be supplied to those news media which have filed an annual request for notice as provided in paragraph (b) of Section 2.02.

Here, the PAC determined that because the village board changed its regular meeting schedule "going forward," it was subject to the 10 day prior notice requirement of section 2.03. Since the village board did not publish notice of the change in its regular meeting schedule 10 days prior to voting on that change, it violated the OMA. However, the PAC acknowledged that the village board subsequently published notice of its change to its regular meeting schedule, so no further action was necessary to remedy that violation.


Wednesday, October 23, 2024

Officer's PEDA Claim Subject to CBA Grievance Procedure


An Illinois Appellate Court recently ruled in favor of a City in a case brought by a police officer who claimed the City failed to comply with the Public Employee Disability Act (PEDA) after he was injured. Allenbaugh v. City of Peoria.

A police officer filed a lawsuit against a City claiming the City failed to comply with the terms of PEDA by denying him full pay after he was injured in the line of duty. The City argued the trial court had no jurisdiction over the officer's claim because the dispute was governed by the City's collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Specifically, the City argued that because the officer's claim would require an interpretation of the meaning of specific language contained in the CBA, it had to be resolved through the exclusive grievance procedure contained in that CBA. The officer argued that because the lawsuit involved a claim that the City violated state law, the court had jurisdiction over the claim. The trial court ruled in favor of the City, finding that because resolution of the officer's PEDA claim depended on an interpretation of the CBA, it was subject to the mandatory grievance provisions of that agreement.

On appeal, the Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that resolution of the dispute turned on an interpretation of the language in the CBA, and so the claims brought by the officer were subject to the exclusive grievance provision of the CBA. As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the ruling in favor of the City. 

Tuesday, October 22, 2024

City's Limited Curfew During Protests Did Not Violate First Amendment


The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in favor of a city in a First Amendment challenge to a curfew order in Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa.

In 2020, a police officer shot and killed a black teenager. After the District Attorney's (DA) office decided not to criminally charge the officer, and anticipating that this decision might spark violence in the community, the mayor issued a limited curfew order that went into effect after the DA's announcement. The curfew temporarily restricted pedestrian and vehicular traffic on city streets for five nights and ran from 7 pm to 6 am with exceptions for people traveling to and from work, government officials, the press, and social workers. 

A group of individuals who attended protests in the city (some of whom had been arrested for violating the curfew) sued the city to challenge the curfew, claiming it violated the First Amendment among other claims. The district court ruled in favor of the city on all claims and the plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court ruling in favor of the city on the plaintiff's First Amendment claims. 

First, the Court determined that the city had a "significant government interest" in enacting the curfew to protect the safety of persons and property. The Court noted that a government need not wait until violence or harm materializes to impose safety measures, and that preventative measures to promote public safety are a "basic contribution to government." The Court found the city's public safety concerns to be well founded after the city had experienced civil unrest for months leading up to the curfew. The Court also noted that the neighboring town of Kenosha had seen extensive property damage and serious physical injury in the wake of a police shooting weeks earlier. 

Next, the Court found that the curfew was narrowly tailored to keep people off the streets for a short period of time after the DA's announcement, and was not imposed arbitrarily because of a generalized fear amidst nationwide protests. It was also limited in duration, and had exceptions for certain groups of people. 

Finally, the Court held that the curfew order left plaintiffs with adequate alternative means of communication because they could protest during the daytime hours, or after the curfew expired.

In sum, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city on the First Amendment challenge to the curfew.

Monday, October 14, 2024

Lawsuit Challenging City's Authority to Enact Vaccination Policy Dismissed


An Illinois Appellate Court recently dismissed a challenge to a City's COVID-19 employee vaccination policy because the employees did not identify any legal authority to support their claim that the City violated the law in adopting the policy. Sokolovski et al v. Arwady, City of Chicago et al.

In 2021, the City adopted a COVID-19 vaccination policy that required every City employee, contractor, or vendor who had contact with certain persons in the City to be vaccinated against COVID-19 unless exempted. A group of City employees filed a lawsuit to challenge the policy, claiming the City had no authority to require vaccination. The case was dismissed and the employees appealed.

On appeal, the employees argued the policy was unlawful because the City did not expressly identify any state statutory authority or municipal authority for the City to adopt the vaccination policy. The employees also argued that because the policy itself did not specifically state that the Mayor or City Council created the policy, the City had no authority to adopt or enforce the vaccination policy. The City defended its policy claiming it had authority under the Illinois Municipal Code to manage its workforce and to make regulations for the promotion of health or the suppression of diseases. The Appellate Court rejected the employees' arguments, finding no support for their claim that the policy had to name a specific City official who authorized the policy and identify the express authority relied upon to enact the policy. As a result, the lawsuit against the City to challenge the vaccination policy was properly dismissed.

Wednesday, October 9, 2024

Local Government Law Institute - December 6, 2024


Calling all local government attorneys -- don't forget to sign up for the 2024 Local Government Law Institute hosted by the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education (IICLE). This year's conference will be held in-person at the UBS Center in Chicago and will also offer a webcast option. 

More details about the conference sessions and speakers and registration can be found here. Below is a brief summary of the sessions offered at this year's conference.

Local Government Law Institute, 2024

Friday, December 6, 2024

The conference begins at 8:55 a.m. and concludes at 4:15 p.m. (cocktail reception to follow)

UBS Tower, Chicago (and webcast)

Sessions include:

  • Case Law and Legislative Update
  • Due Process Considerations in Administrative Hearings
  • State and Federal Tort Immunity
  • Update on Takings and Impact Fees
  • Lunch Panel on Parliamentary Procedures/How to Run a Meeting
  • Zoning & Planning Issues and Overlap Between Taxing Bodies
  • Difficult World, Difficult Issues
  • From Polls to Policy: Election Law Updates
  • Secondary Trauma & Imposter Syndrome: Resilience Strategies for Local Government Attorneys


Monday, October 7, 2024

In the Zone: Seventh Circuit Dismisses Takings Challenge to City’s Short-Term Rental Regulations


The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a lawsuit against a city that argued that the city’s shared housing ordinance constituted an unconstitutional "takings" because it prevented a condo owner from renting his property on Airbnb and other homesharing platforms. Mogan v. City of Chicago

The city’s ordinance for shared housing units allowed condominium homeowners’ associations (HOAs) to determine whether short-term rentals would be allowed in their respective buildings. When an HOA prohibited rentals, they would contact the city to have that building added to a list of prohibited buildings for short-term rentals. Renting or listing a short-term rental in a prohibited building would subject the unit owner to a $5,000 fine each day the violation continued. 

A condo unit owner in a building that had been placed on the city's prohibited building list by the HOA and property management company sued, arguing that the city’s ordinance was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment and an inverse condemnation under the Illinois Constitution. The condo unit owner claimed he suffered financial losses because he had invested thousands of dollars to refurbish the apartment with the intent of using it as a short-term rental. The district court dismissed both claims, and the unit owner appealed.  

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit focused on language in the HOA covenants that governed the use of all units within the condo building. The covenants stated that no unit within the condominium could be leased for less than 30 days or greater than 30 days where hotel services were provided. Based on the language in the covenants that were in place at the time the owner purchases his condo unit, the court found that the owner was on notice he could not lease his unit for less than 30 days. As a result, the court reasoned that the owner could not prove the city’s ordinance had any economic impact on his unit or that the ordinance interfered with a reasonable investment-backed expectation (necessary elements to prove both the takings and inverse condemnation claims) because the unit owner never had a property right to lease his unit on a short-term basis.

Post Authored by Dan Lev & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Thursday, October 3, 2024

Public Body Properly Redacted 911 Callers' Phone Numbers in PAC Opinion


A law firm submitted a FOIA request seeking copies of 911 call recordings and other records related to a traffic crash, and the public body disclosed responsive 911 recordings, but redacted the callers' names and phone numbers. After the requestor submitted a request for review with the PAC challenging the redactions, the public body disclosed the names of the callers, but maintained that the home and personal phone numbers of the callers was exempt from disclosure under the "private information" exemption in FOIA. The PAC agreed with the public body and issued a binding opinion finding that the public body properly redacted the callers' phone numbers. PAC Op. 24-012.

First, the PAC rejected the requester’s claim that law firms are entitled to greater access to exempt information in public records because attorneys are officers of the court, noting that FOIA applies equally to all requestors and there is no statute supporting the existence of an “attorney-exception” that would allow attorney to have broader access to otherwise exempt information based on the professional credentials and motives of the requestor.

Second, the PAC rejected the requester's argument that the FOIA exemption in Section 7(1)(d)(iv) applies only to "confidential sources," finding that the exemption’s plain language includes people who file complaints with or provide information to law enforcement agencies, like the callers at issue.

Third, the PAC rejected the requester's argument that this same exemption does not apply when people call an agency and voluntarily provide their information, because the plain language of the exemption does not condition the confidentiality of a person’s name on whether those people have a reasonable basis to believe their names will be kept confidential. The PAC further noted that even if the 911 callers who provided their private phone numbers anticipated being contacted about what they witnessed, this possibility does not render this FOIA exemption inapplicable to the otherwise confidential identifying information of people who voluntarily contact law enforcement.

Finally, the PAC rejected the argument that the term "identities" in that FOIA exemption also includes at least one piece of personal information (e.g., home address, phone number, date of birth) in addition to a person's name, because there is no support for this claim. Indeed, the PAC determined that the term “identity” is typically defined as a person’s name, and a person’s other contact information is not necessary to provide an essential component of an "identity." Even if FOIA requires disclosing the identities of witnesses to traffic accidents, the PAC stated this does not diminish a public body’s authority to redact expressly exempt private information such as their phone numbers.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, October 2, 2024

In the Zone: Court Upholds Constitutionality of Horse Boarding Zoning Ordinance


An Illinois Appellate Court issued a ruling in favor of a Village in a longstanding dispute over a commercial horse boarding operation in Drury et al. v. Village of Barrington Hills, et al.

A property owner filed suit against the Village and his neighboring property owner to challenge the constitutionality of a zoning approval ordinance that allowed a horse boarding operation on his neighbor's property. The lawsuit claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it did not benefit the "public welfare" but instead was intended to personally benefit his neighbor. The trial court upheld the zoning ordinance finding that it was "rationally related to the legitimate public interest of promoting horse-boarding operations" in the Village and plaintiffs appealed. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling upholding the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. First, the Court held that even though the zoning approval ordinance had since been repealed, the constitutionality of the ordinance was still relevant because the operator of the horse-boarding facility had filed a separate lawsuit claiming he had a vested right to continue his operations. Second, the Appellate Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, holding that the "rational basis" test applied to their facial substantive due process challenge to the zoning ordinance. Applying the rational basis test to this challenge, the Court acknowledged that the Village had conducted extensive public hearings and received testimony and evidence from experts and numerous members of the public before acting on the zoning ordinance. The Court found the trial court's findings to be well reasoned and thorough, and agreed with its legal conclusion that the zoning ordinance was rationally related to a legitimate public welfare purpose. Finally, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the zoning ordinance's "retroactivity" provision only benefited his neighbor, finding that it was actually beneficial to a number of other horse boarders in the Village. 

Tuesday, October 1, 2024

Court of Appeals Weighs in On Recent First Amendment Decision Issued by U.S. Supreme Court


In March, we reported on two opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases involving First Amendment challenges to government officials’ use of social media on their personal social media accounts, including Lindke v. Freed. In Lindke, the Supreme Court announced a two-part test for establishing that an official’s actions on their personal social media acounts can be attributed to the government (and subject to First Amendment limitations. In order to show that an official’s social media activity on the official's personal social media account is subject to the First Amendment, it must be shown that the official:

  1.  has actual authority to speak on behalf of the government on a particular matter; and
  2.  purports to exercise that authority in the official's activities on social media.

The Lindke opinion was issued in response to a case challenging the social media activities of the City Manager of Port Huron, Michigan, who had deleted critical comments on his personal Facebook page that were left by an individual who was dissatisfied with the City’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to deleting the critical comments, the City Manager eventually blocked the critic from accessing his Facebook page altogether. The commenter sued the City Manager, claiming the deletion of comments and blocking violated his First Amendment rights. After the U.S. Supreme Court announced its two-part test, it sent the case back to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to assess whether the City Manager’s social media activities violated the First Amendment. In late August, the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion, providing more insight on the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court.

For the first part of the test announced by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit clarified that the City Manager must have had actual authority to speak on behalf of the City in his posts. The Sixth Circuit explained that the City Manager’s Facebook posts would need to be within his “portfolio of responsibilities” to bring his activity under First Amendment scrutiny. In other words, it would not be enough for an individual challenging his activities to show that he had some authority to speak on behalf of the City—rather, the posts must be clearly related to his role and responsibilities as City Manager. Additionally, the actual authority to speak on behalf of the government must come from a distinct statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage. While it is relatively easy to show that an ordinance or regulation gives an official authority to speak, the Court acknowledged it can be difficult to show actual authority by “custom” or “usage,” which rely on unwritten practices that have become so widespread or common that they carry the force of law. The Sixth Circuit, echoing the Supreme Court, cautioned that assessing actual authority requires a close review of an official’s duties, and will be found where those duties include making statements on behalf of the government consistent with their office.

If the critic is able to show that the City Manager had actual authority to speak on behalf of the City, he then has to establish that the City Manager exercised that authority in the social media activity being challenged. The Sixth Circuit clarified that this second step of the test announced by the Supreme Court requires a post-by-post analysis. The commenter must show that the City Manager was exercising his official authority in the posts where his comments were deleted. For the challenge to the City Manager’s choice to block the critic from his page, however, the assessment is much broader -- any post on the account that is shown to be an exercise of his actual authority to speak on behalf of the City could result in liability under the First Amendment if the City Manager censored protected speech. The Sixth Circuit noted that “context is everything” for the post-by-post analysis under the second part of the test announced by the Supreme Court and requires a close review of the challenged posts’ content and function. The Sixth Circuit provided several examples of social media activity that would most likely lead to a finding that the First Amendment applies: 

  • Posts expressly citing an official’s legal authority to post on behalf of the government;
  • Posts that have some legal consequence, such as the posting of a “burn ban” by a municipal fire marshal; or
  • Posts that were made using government staff or funding.

Because the test announced by the Supreme Court was not available to the parties when the Lindke case was brought, the Sixth Circuit sent the case back to the district court to provide an opportunity to establish facts that shed light on this new test. The Sixth Circuit noted, however, that the state action analysis set forth by the Supreme Court does not address several other important issues that are relevant to a First Amendment challenge (including forum analysis and the application of qualified immunity), suggesting that there will likely be more litigation challenging government social media activities in the future.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink


Monday, September 30, 2024

Court Finds in Favor of College that Protected Personal Information of Students from FOIA Release


The BGA submitted a FOIA request to City Colleges of Chicago (College) seeking various education records related to their 2018 graduation rate. The College withheld its responsive records citing Section 7(1)(a) of FOIA, claiming that the educational records contained personally identifying student information (PII) that was prohibited from disclosure by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) without the consent of the students, their parents, or guardians. The BGA sued the College alleging that its response violated FOIA, and the circuit court ruled in favor of BGA, finding that FERPA did not "specifically prohibit" the disclosure of the requested records because FERPA only conditioned the College's receipt of federal funding on its compliance with FERPA, and ordered the College to disclose the records.

The College appealed and the Appellate Court reversed the circuit court's ruling. BGA v. City Colleges of Chicago. In a matter of first impression in Illinois state courts, the Appellate Court examined the interplay between FERPA and FOIA, and concluded that FERPA specifically prohibited the College from disclosing PII in educational records without student, parental, or guardian consent. Thus, the Appellate Court held that the College properly withheld educational records containing PII in response to the FOIA request. The Court also found that the circuit court’s order requiring the College to disclose its records containing PII without consent was unreasonable, because FERPA imposes a binding obligation on schools that accept federal funds and prohibits schools from disclosing PII. As a result, the circuit court’s order for the College to disclose its PII without consent would force the Colleges to violate federal law, and risk losing its federal funding, which is essential to its operations.

The Appellate Court also declined to order the College to disclose its de-identified educational records with PII removed, and instead remanded the case back to the circuit court to review the College's responsive records "in camera" to determine whether the records can be redacted or segregated to protect the disclosure of PII.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Thursday, September 26, 2024

PAC Finds Police Department in Violation of FOIA for Withholding Police Report


In response to a FOIA request seeking a case report and related records for an incident, a municipal police department withheld responsive records from disclosure citing Section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA, which exempts records that would interfere with a pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law enforcement. The requestor then appealed the denial to the Public Access Counselor of the Attorney General's office (PAC). 

In PAC Op. 24-011, the PAC issued a binding opinion concluding that the police department violated FOIA by entirely withholding its responsive records. Specifically, the PAC noted that the case report indicated the police department had administratively closed its investigation into this matter. The PAC rejected the police department's argument that this exemption was still valid because the department was assisting other law enforcement agencies with similar incidents involving a suspect matching the same description, motive, and vehicle, finding that the department did not provide a detailed factual basis explaining with specificity how disclosing its responsive records would interfere with those ongoing joint law enforcement investigative efforts.

The PAC ordered the department to release the records, but stated the department could redact names, identifying information, and details that might disclose the identity of an at-large suspect pursuant to the personal privacy and private information exemptions.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, September 18, 2024

In the Zone: Join Us at the 2024 APA-IL State Conference


It’s that time of year again: the 2024 APA-IL State Conference is next week, from September 25–27, at the I Hotel and Illinois Conference Center in Champaign, Illinois. The Conference program is packed with great sessions and events, including several noteworthy presentations from Ancel Glink attorneys: 

  • Join attorney Dan Bolin on Wednesday, September 25 at 9:45 AM, at GovLove x APA-IL: Award-Winning Planners, for a discussion of notable contributions to the planning field that have been recognized for achievements in building safer, stronger, and more equitable communities.
  • Also at 9:45 AM on Wednesday, attorney Tyler Smith will be presenting important legislative and case law updates during the annual Speed Planning session.
  • At 2:30 PM on Wednesday, join Greg Jones for a session on Preparing for Legislative Action in 2025¸ featuring updates from the APA-IL Legislative Committee.
  • On Thursday, September 26, Greg Jones will be joining several esteemed colleagues and friends to provide a full-day Plan Commissioner training session, featuring a presentation on best practices for plan commissioners, networking opportunities, and a mock hearing (learn more and register here here).
  • On Thursday at 8:30 AM, Dan Bolin will be presenting on Planning for Migrant Arrivals to discuss best practices for responding to the influx of migrants and asylum seekers arriving in Illinois communities.
  • On Friday, September 27 at 11:00 AM, attorneys Dan Bolin, Adam Simon, and Erin Monforti will be participating in the Hot Ones Law Session to discuss the hottest topics in planning law while enjoying hot wings and refreshing questions from attendees.

The full program for the Conference is available here. We hope to see you next week!

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink, P.C.

Monday, September 16, 2024

Referendum Could Not Change "Manner of Selection" of Municipal Board of Ethics


In Schittino v. Village of Niles, an Illinois Appellate Court invalidated a referendum that had attempted to change the manner of selection of a municipal board of ethics from an appointed board to an elected one.

A home-rule municipality adopted an ordinance to establish an appointed board of ethics. In 2019, voters initiated a referendum to replace the appointed ethics board with an elected one. The referendum was delayed in litigation as the village clerk refused to certify the referendum, believing it was unauthorized by the Illinois Constitution. In 2021, an Illinois Appellate Court held that the clerk’s role under state law was limited to determining whether the petition was in “apparent conformity” with filing requirements—e.g., having the minimum number of signatures—and not matters of substantive constitutionality. As a result, the referendum was allowed to proceed and was subsequently approved by voters at the April 2021 election.

The village then placed a referendum on the June 2022 ballot to repeal the 2021 referendum and restore the ethics board to appointed positions. However, because voters failed to approve the 2022 referendum, the 2021 referendum remained in effect and the village scheduled elections for the ethics board at the next municipal election in 2023.

In 2023, a lawsuit was filed to challenge the 2021 referendum and asked the court to declare that the 2021 referendum was not authorized by the Illinois Constitution and to issue an injunction prohibiting  the village from certifying any 2023 election results for the elected ethics board members. The circuit court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and declared the 2021 referendum invalid and prevented its enforcement.

Intervenors in the lawsuit (including a candidate for the ethics board at the 2023 election) appealed the circuit court’s decision. The Appellate Court agreed with the circuit court and denied the appeal, as follows.

First, the Appellate Court held that the ethics board members did not qualify as “officers” as required under Section 6(f) of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution. Section 6(f) provides as follows:

  (f)  A home rule unit shall have the power subject to approval by referendum to adopt, alter or repeal a form of government provided by law, except that the form of government of Cook County shall be subject to the provisions of Section 3 of this Article. A home rule municipality shall have the power to provide for its officers, their manner of selection and terms of office only as approved by referendum or as otherwise authorized by law. A home rule county shall have the power to provide for its officers, their manner of selection and terms of office in the manner set forth in Section 4 of this Article.

The Appellate Court pointed to an Illinois Supreme Court case that held that “officers” referenced by section 6(f) are only those included in the form of government provided for in the Illinois Municipal Code. Here, the Appellate Court found no language in the Illinois Municipal Code providing for an ethics board as part of the form of municipal government. As a result, the ethics board members were not "officers" under Section 6(f) of the Illinois Constitution, and the "manner of selection" of their members could not be changed by the 2021 referendum.

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the intervenors argument that the suit was barred by the laches doctrine because the plaintiff waited two months before the 2023 election to file suit against the 2021 referendum, resulting in prejudice to the ethics board member candidate intervenor. The Appellate Court held that the intervenors failed to demonstrate any evidence to show prejudice and that the plaintiff did not unreasonably wait to file suit as the 2022 referendum could have repealed the 2021 referendum.

Post Authored by Katie Nagy & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, September 11, 2024

Seventh Circuit Dismisses Challenge to State's Mail-In Ballot Procedure


Last month, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to Illinois election laws that allow election officials to receive and count mail-in ballots for up to two weeks after the date of the election so long as the ballots are either (1) postmarked on or before the day of the election or, (2) if there is no postmark, the voter signs a certification that accompanies the ballot. Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections, et al.

A group of Illinois voters and political candidates filed a lawsuit against the State Board of Elections to challenge Illinois' mail-in vote procedure, arguing that it unlawfully expanded the time in which residents can vote. The district court dismissed the claims, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue and, even if they did, the challenge had no merits. 

Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the dismissal on standing grounds. The Seventh Circuit first rejected the voters-plaintiffs' argument that the plaintiffs votes will be "diluted" if mail-in ballots are counted after election day, finding that claim to be too generalized and not the type of particularized injury to support standing. Second, the Seventh Circuit rejected the candidate-plaintiffs' argument that they had to expend additional resources after election day to contest any objectionable ballots, finding that this future claim of harm was neither actual or imminent to support standing. The Court also rejected the candidates-plaintiffs' argument that they have an interest in ensuring that only legally valid votes are counted, finding that argument to be purely speculative. In sum, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit based on lack of standing.

Tuesday, September 10, 2024

Village Owed No Duty of Care to Bicyclist Injured on Sidewalk


An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a Village in a bike injury case in Johnson v. Village of Palatine.

In June 2020, a cyclist was riding his bicycle on a sidewalk adjacent to a high-traffic street. While riding his bike, the cyclist struck an uneven section of the sidewalk, and fell and was injured. He sued the Village, claiming the Village owed him a duty of care to maintain or repair the sidewalk, which he claimed the Village negligently failed to do, leaving it dangerous and unsafe for use.

The Village asserted the following defenses against the lawsuit:

(1)  under the Tort Immunity Act, the Village did not owe the cyclist a duty of care because the sidewalk was intended only for pedestrian use while bicyclists were only permitted users;

(2)  the Village also did not owe the cyclist a duty of care because the alleged defect in the sidewalk was an open and obvious condition; and

(3)  the Village had immunity under the Tort Immunity Act regarding its allocation of funding to its proactive sidewalk replacement program.

The cyclist argued he was an intended user of the sidewalk because there were no bike lanes available on the high-traffic street, leaving him no other choice but to use the sidewalk. He also claimed he was an intended user because the Village had ordinances regulating bicycle use on sidewalks where it was allowed so long as there was no signage prohibiting that use, of which there was none on the high-traffic street. The cyclist also claimed that since he was a citizen of the Village, it was intended that he would use the sidewalk, so the Village owed him a duty of care.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Village and the Appellate Court upheld that ruling on appeal. The Appellate Court first determined there was no merit to the cyclist’s claim that he was an intended user of the sidewalk. The Court noted that the sidewalk was not signed for cyclist use, nor were there pavement markings or other indicators that the sidewalk was intended for bicycle use. Further, the Village’s own ordinances defined sidewalk as being intended for pedestrians, with no mention of cyclists. The Court rejected the cyclist’s argument that because he was forced to use the sidewalk because of the dangerous nature of the busy road, that meant he was an intended user. 

The Appellate Court concluded that there was no merit to the Plaintiff’s contention that he was an intended user of the sidewalk and that his argument regarding his interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act contradicted all precedent. The Court did not address the Village’s “open and obvious” argument since it disposed of the case based on its finding that the cyclist was not an intended user of the sidewalk, and, as a result, the Village did not owe him a duty of care.  

Post Authored by Madeline Tankersley & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink