Tuesday, October 15, 2019
In Briggs v. Potter
County, a federal court of appeals addressed a political
retaliation claim involving correctional officers at a county jail in
Pennsylvania after a contentious primary election that involved their boss, the chief deputy sheriff.
Hunt and Briggs—both correctional officers at the
jail—ran against Drake, the incumbent Chief Deputy Sheriff. Drake had recently
retired from the Pennsylvania State Police and was appointed as Chief Deputy
Sheriff, which was how the last three sheriffs were elected. As the primary campaign progressed, Hunt and Briggs were
publicly outspoken about this method of electing sheriffs. Hunt went a step
further and filed complaints against Drake with the District Attorney, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General, and the Potter County Commissioners for engaging
in political activity while on the job. Ultimately, Drake won the primary and
general elections.
Before Drake took office, but after he won, Briggs
received several reprimands, including sleeping during a shift. Eight days
after Drake took office, Briggs was terminated. Hunt, the union steward,
grieved for Briggs. Hunt was then fired after requesting video footage of other
officers sleeping on the job.
Briggs and Hunt filed suit against Drake and the County.
They argued that their First Amendment rights to speech and association
regarding political activities were violated. Hunt also claimed whistleblower
protections under Pennsylvania law. The district court did not find a viable
retaliation claim because of the length of time between the primary election
and the firing of both Hunt and Briggs. Further, the court found no whistleblower
protection because the correctional officers’ speech did not relate to a matter
of public concern.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed with the court’s ruling on the retaliation claims. The appeals court
found that Briggs was fired a mere eight days after Drake became sheriff and
that Hunt was unlawfully retaliated against for his union activities after
grieving Briggs’ termination. The appeals court also found whistleblower
protections for Hunt because he spoke on matters of public concern when he
filed complaints against Drake, including bringing claims of alleged corruption
within the sheriff’s department and campaign violations under county, state,
and federal law.
Although the court allowed the claims against Drake and members of his staff to move forward, the court dismissed all claims brought against the County because the officers failed to show a County
policy or custom that caused “the specific deprivation of constitutional rights
at issue” of the two officers.
Post Authored by Mike Halpin & Julie Tappendorf
Monday, October 14, 2019
Quorum Forum Podcast: Q&A on Recreational Marijuana
Monday, October 14, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Recreational marijuana is coming to Illinois on January 1, 2020, and local governments have a lot of questions about implementation of the new law and how it will impact communities. At this year's Illinois-APA conference in Evanston, Ancel Glink attorneys participated in a Q&A with Illinois planners about recreational marijuana. That Q&A is now available as a "special meeting" on Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 30, which you can access here.
Do you have questions about recreational cannabis? Email us at podcast@ancelglink.com.
Friday, October 11, 2019
No Federal Due Process Liability for Accident in City Swimming Pond
Friday, October 11, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals recently dismissed a case against a Wisconsin City involving an accident in a public swimming pond. Estate of Swannie Her v. City of West Bend (7th Cir. 9/6/19)
The City of West Bend, Wisconsin owns and operates a public park that includes a man-made swimming pond. The pond is divided into 3 zones, including a children's play area, a diving area, and a general swimming area. Six year old Swannie Her was at the park with her family when she left the children's play area of the pond to enter the diving area. She was found unresponsive at the bottom of the pond, and later died. Shortly thereafter, her family sued the City in federal court, claiming among other things that the City violated due process when it "created the danger" in operating a man-made swimming pond. The 7th Circuit rejected those claims, finding that the court would not impose a federal due process duty on the City for operating a swimming pond.
Thursday, October 10, 2019
Ninth Circuit Upholds City's Short Term Rental Ordinance
Thursday, October 10, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Last
Thursday, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a class action suit brought
against the City of Santa Monica that challenged the City’s short-term rental
ordinance on the basis of the dormant Commerce Clause. Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica.
The
City’s ordinance prohibits property rentals of 30 days or less but has an
exception for rentals where a primary resident remains on the property. A
resident and homeowner in Santa Monica who rents out her house on Airbnb filed
a lawsuit against the City claiming that the ordinance directly and indirectly
regulated and burdened interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. She also argued that the real purpose for the ordinance was to increase
demand for the City’s luxury hotels that pay a 14% hotel tax to the City after
the City experienced sharp declines in hotel tax revenues.
In upholding the dismissal of the case, the Court found that the complaint failed to allege a Commerce Clause
violation because the ordinance does not favor in-state over out-of-state
interests. The Court noted that the ordinance applies equally to persons
nationwide and to Santa Monica residents who rent a home from another resident.
Moreover, the Court also found that the home-sharing exception had no obvious
advantage for Santa Monica residents over out-of-state homeowners. At most, the Court
found that the ordinance resulted in “less accessible, available, and
affordable” travel lodging in Santa Monica. However, this was not enough to meet
the high burden of a dormant Commerce Clause claim, and there was a strong
enough governmental interest in “preserving the City’s available housing stock
and the character and charm which result, in part, from cultural, ethnic, and
economic diversity of its resident population.”
Post Authored by Rain Montero & Julie Tappendorf
Wednesday, October 9, 2019
Protest Policy at Public Arena Found to Violate First Amendment
Wednesday, October 09, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
An interesting First Amendment case was recently decided by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of a "protest policy" at a publicly-owned arena. Pomicter v. Luzerne County Convention Center Authority
The Luzerne County Convention Center Authority owns the Mohegan Sun Arena, a large event space in Pennsylvania. The publicly-owned arena hosts athletic and other entertainment events. The arena's "protest policy" allows people to express their views, subject to several limitations. These include (1) requiring protesters to stand in designated areas on the concourse, (2) prohibiting protesters from using profanity or vulgarity, and (3) prohibiting any artificial voice amplification.
An animal rights activist and organization protesting a circus event sued the Authority contenting that the protest policy violated the First Amendment. The district court agreed, finding all three challenged restrictions in the protest policy in violation of the First Amendment.
The Authority appealed to the 3rd Circuit, which upheld the decision in part and reversed it in part. First, the 3rd Circuit held that the policy's designated area restrictions were reasonable, as they were intended to maintain orderly and safe movement of patrons into and out of the arena. However, the 3rd Circuit agreed with the district court that the profanity ban was unreasonable and violated the First Amendment, finding that the profanity ban only applied to protesters and was not applicable to patrons attending the sporting and other events at the arena. Similarly, the 3rd Circuit struck down the amplification ban, finding that the Authority did not provide any reasonable justification for the ban.
Tuesday, October 8, 2019
Court Upholds Real Estate Transfer Tax on Transfers to/From Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae
Tuesday, October 08, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
The City of Chicago, like many other Illinois home rule municipalities, imposes a real estate transfer tax on the transfer of real property in the City. A group of residents recently challenged the City's imposition of that tax on transfers to and from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, arguing that the tax was preempted by federal law that expressly exempts governmental entities from state and local taxation. The City defended its tax, arguing that these organizations were not "governmental bodies" so they were not exempt from taxation. In a recent ruling, the Appellate Court agreed, upholding the circuit court's dismissal of the lawsuit. Trilisky v. City of Chicago.
Monday, October 7, 2019
Court Upholds City's Amusement Tax on Video Streaming Services
Monday, October 07, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
The City of Chicago has enacted a 9% "amusement tax" which it imposes on a wide variety of "amusements" in the City of Chicago. In 2015, the City issued Ruling 5, which expanded the scope of the amusement tax to include amusements that are delivered electronically to patrons in the City, which include the privilege of watching electronically delivered television shows, movies, or videos; the privilege of listening to electronically delivered music; and the privilege of participating in games, online or otherwise.
A group of Chicago residents challenged the constitutionality of the amusement tax as it applied to video streaming services such as Netflix, Hulu, and similar services. Specifically, the residents claimed that the tax was invalid because:
(1) streaming services are outside the scope of the City’s amusement tax ordinance;
(2) the City taxes streaming services differently than it taxes equivalent in-person amusements in violation of the Illinois Constitution’s uniformity clause;
(3) applying the tax to streaming services imposes a discriminatory tax on electronic commerce in violation of the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA); and
(4) the City is taxing activity outside its borders in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s commerce clause.
The Cook County Circuit Court ruled against the residents and upheld the tax, and the residents appealed. The Appellate Court upheld the City's imposition of the tax on video streaming services, rejecting the residents' arguments and finding the ordinance valid. It was significant that the residents challenged the ordinance on "facial" grounds, the most difficult challenge for the residents to prove because the City only had to show any circumstance where the ordinance could be validly applied. Labell v. City of Chicago.
Friday, October 4, 2019
Quorum Forum Podcast: Live from the IML 2019!
Friday, October 04, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
Ancel Glink's own podcast, Quorum Forum, just released a new episode: Episode 29: WAGERING, WATCHDOGS, AND WEBSITES - LIVE FROM IML 2019!
Details about this episode are below:
Details about this episode are below:
The latest Quorum Forum podcast was recorded live from Kitty O’Shea’s at the 2019 Illinois Municipal League Conference! State Rep. Chris Welch and Kurt Asprooth join us to discuss sports betting and gaming, while Keri-Lyn Krafthefer discusses government transparency and watchdog groups. Finally, Matt DiCianni takes a look at the future of local government websites.
You can access Episode 29 here.
You can access Episode 29 here.
What interesting things did you learn at IML this year? Email us at podcast@ancelglink.com!
This podcast is provided as a service to our public and private sector clients and friends. It is intended to provide timely general information of interest, but should not be considered a substitute for legal advice. Read our full disclaimer: ancelglink.com/disclaimers
Wednesday, October 2, 2019
PAC Again Addresses "Resident Only" Public Comment in Binding Opinion
Wednesday, October 02, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
More from the PAC Office of the Illinois Attorney General - this time, a binding opinion on public comment at meetings.
In PAC Op. 19-009, the PAC found a city in violation of the Open Meetings Act for prohibiting a member of the public from addressing the city council at a council meeting. A member of the public claims she stood up to speak at a city council meeting during public comment but was told by the mayor that he would not allow her to speak because she was not a city resident.
She subsequently filed a complaint with the PAC claiming the city council violated the OMA by not letting her speak at the meeting. The PAC first noted that the city council had not adopted public comment rules so the council could not impose a restriction on public comment. The PAC rejected the city's reliance on Roberts Rules of Order as its public comment rules since the city could not identify specific rules addressing public comment at meetings. Since it had no rules in place, the city council could not impose a "resident only" restriction. But, even if the if the city council had adopted a "resident only" rule for public comment, the PAC stated that such a rule would violate the OMA because the public comment requirement of the OMA allows "any person" to address the public body, whether they are a resident or not.
The PAC could have left its opinion there but instead it again seemed to engage in a First Amendment "designated forum" analysis of proper "time, place, and manner restrictions." Frankly, it isn't clear how the First Amendment would apply to this particular situation. But more concerning to this author, however, is that the PAC seems to be overstepping its statutory authority over OMA and FOIA issues by wading into constitutional issues best left to the courts. All that being said, the PAC has been clear in the past that public bodies should not adopt, impose, or enforce "resident only" restrictions or preferences for public comment at meetings, so that rationale is consistent with prior opinions.
Tuesday, October 1, 2019
PAC Publishes Index of Binding Opinions 2010-2019
Tuesday, October 01, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
I was checking out the PAC website to see if they had published any new binding opinions and discovered an index published by the PAC of all of its binding opinions from 2010 to-date. This is a very helpful resource for public bodies because it organizes the binding opinions by category, making it easier for a public body to find out whether the PAC has issued an opinion on a particular topic.
For example, if a public body wants to know whether the PAC has issued a binding opinion on the authority to charge for copies, whether resumes are releasable, or how the "preliminary records" exemption has been applied, it can consult the FOIA index to identify opinions in which these topics are discussed. Since all of the PAC's binding opinions are available on the Attorney General's website, the public body can just pull up the cited PAC opinion. Or, if you want to find summaries of all of the PAC binding opinions from 2010-2018, you can find them right here on the Municipal Minute blog. Yep, we've been around that long!
Monday, September 30, 2019
PAC Issues 8th Binding Opinion of 2019 Finding Police Department in Violation of FOIA
Monday, September 30, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
After a relatively quiet summer,
the Public Access Counselor (PAC) in the Office of the Illinois Attorney General
issued its 8th binding opinion this year. In PAC Op. 19-008,
the PAC found a police department in violation of FOIA when it redacted portions of its police reports.
A news reporter submitted a FOIA
request to a city police department (“PD”) seeking police
reports concerning the arrests of two individuals. The PD subsequently provided
him copies of the records, which consisted of two case reports and six officer
supplement reports related to two different case numbers. The PD had redacted
certain information from those records pursuant to Sections 7(1)(b) (private
information), 7(1)(c) (unwarranted invasion of personal privacy), 7(1)(d)(iii) (deprivation of fair trial or impartial hearing), and 7(1)(d)(iv) (disclosure
of confidential sources or witnesses) under FOIA.
The requester submitted a Request for
Review contesting the PD’s redactions of the narrative sections in each of the
police reports. In response to the Request for Review, the PD supplemented its exemptions by also citing 7(1)(a) (disclosure prohibited by other law), alleging some of the information was exempt under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 415(c). Rule 415(c) provides:
“[a]ny materials
furnished to an attorney pursuant to these rules shall remain in his exclusive
custody and be used only for the purposes of conducting his side of the case,
and shall be subject to such other terms and conditions as the court may
provide.”
The PD asserted that the request
sought information used in criminal cases in the Will County
Circuit Court, and that the Will County State’s Attorney’s Office objected to release of this information . The PD also asserted that disclosure of the information would
interfere with discovery in pending cases in Will County.
On September 24, 2019, the PAC issued its binding opinion making findings on each of the PD's cited exemptions for the redactions, as follows:
7(1)(a): The PD failed
to meet its burden in claiming this exemption. The PAC found that there was no legal precedence
to support withholding records under Supreme Court Rule 415(c). Further, there is no provision of FOIA that renders records
exempt from disclosure on the basis of another public body objecting to their
disclosure.
In a footnote, the PAC did state
that the PD could redact any information present in the records that is contained
in the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) since the Illinois
Administrative Code expressly precludes the public from viewing or possessing
such information.
7(1)(b): The PD failed to meet its burden in claiming this
exemption, in part. The PAC found that the PD properly redacted several types of “unique
identifiers” in the narrative sections of the police reports, including home or
personal telephone numbers, a motor vehicle license number, and a home address. But, the PD improperly redacted the rest of the narrative sections in the police
reports as the rest of the information did not fall within the plain language
of this FOIA provision.
7(1)(c): The PD failed to meet its burden in claiming this
exemption, in part. The PAC found that the PD improperly redacted information based on "invasion of personal privacy" because (1) it failed to provide an adequate
factual basis for withholding the information, and (2) the legitimate public
interest in inspecting the information concerning the investigations and
arrests outweighed the arrestees’ privacy rights.
The PAC did state, however, that
the PD could redact: (1) birth dates, and (2) information identifying a suspect
of a crime who has not been arrested or charged in the police reports.
7(1)(d)(iii): The PD failed to meet its burden in claiming this
exemption. The PAC found that the PD failed to set forth specific facts to show that
the disclosure of the information would create a substantial likelihood that
the arrestees would be deprived of a fair trial or an impartial hearing.
The PAC discounted the PD’s
assertion of Section 7(1)(d)(iii) because the requested records concerned individuals who were arrested just days before the FOIA
request was submitted. At the time of the FOIA request, there was no indication that a trial
or adjudication was pending or truly imminent at that time.
7(1)(d)(iv): The PD failed to meet its burden in claiming this
exemption, in part. The PAC found that the PD failed to articulate facts to support
the redaction of all the information in the narratives relating to the actual witness
statements. The redactions were, in part, improper because (1) some of the withheld
information did not fall within the scope of Section 7(1)(d)(iv), and (2) this
Section does not encompass information provided by criminal suspects under
questioning by law enforcement.
The PAC did allow the PD to
redact (1) the names of two witnesses under Section 7(1)(d)(iv), and (2) information
that would identify any undercover officers pursuant to Section 7(1)(d)(vi).
Post Authored by Ashton Tunk & Julie Tappendorf
Friday, September 27, 2019
Upcoming APA Webinar: Gentrification, Displacement and the Law
Friday, September 27, 2019 Julie Tappendorf
The American Planning Association will be presenting a webinar on October 10th on "Gentrification, Displacement, and the Law. A description of the webinar and information about registration is below:
Thursday, October 10,
2019
2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m. CT
CM 1.50 Law
CLE 1.50 through Illinois State Bar
Gentrification is one of
the complex planning challenges of our times, but the legal limits on how local
communities can respond to these pressures are often unclear. While there is no
shortage of well-meaning ideas about how to slow the gentrification process or
mitigate its impacts, some of those ideas may not be legal, and others could
have significant unintended consequences. This webinar will review those laws
that impose obligations to protect America's citizens against some forms of
pressure and discrimination, as well as those that prohibit certain local
government actions. This review will include the Community Reinvestment Act, the
Fair Housing Amendments Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
constitutional limits on interference with contracts or the fundamental right
to buy and sell property. However, the real action on gentrification is at the
local level, so panelists will also review selected municipal laws and
policies.
You can register for the webinar on the APA's website here.
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