Municipal Minute

Thursday, November 5, 2026

Village Water Commission's Decision to Consolidate Water Meters in Strip Mall Upheld

Thursday, November 05, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a village water commission's decision to consolidate water meters in a strip mall in a lawsuit filed by the strip mall owner claiming that the consolidation violated the owner's equal protection rights and was arbitrary and capricious. B&D Investment Group v. Justice-Willow Springs Water Commission

A strip mall had multiple tenant spaces and separate water meters for each space. The village's water commission decided to consolidate most of the water meters into one meter and informed the owner of its decision. The owner argued that the consolidation of the meters would require him to calculate water usage and charge tenants for their use. He filed a lawsuit, claiming that the decision violated his equal protection rights because the water commission had not made the same decision for similarly situated properties. The circuit court ruled in favor of the water commission and he appealed.

On appeal, the owner argued that that he was irrationally singled out for consolidation of its water meters in a "class of one" equal protection claim. To prevail on that claim, he would need to show he was intentionally treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that there was no rational basis for different treatment. The Appellate Court determined that the owner failed to meet the first prong because he could not show that there were others who were similarly situated where the water commission demonstrated that his property was different because the tenants in his strip mall had more delinquent water bills that created additional administrative costs on the village's part. The Court also rejected the owner's argument that the commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious, finding that the commission's treatment of owner was not unreasonable based on the circumstances. As a result, the Court upheld the lower court's ruling in favor of the water commission.

Constitutional Issues

Monday, November 2, 2026

Federal Court Rules that City Social Media Comment Policy Violates First Amendment

Monday, November 02, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

A federal court in Georgia issued a summary judgment ruling in a challenge to a city's actions in deleting comments and blocking users from the official city Facebook page.

A user posted frequently on the city's Facebook page, and some of those posts were critical of the city, its departments, and city employees and officials. Shortly after posting certain criticism, he found he was no longer able to access the city Facebook page from his personal Facebook account, and when he searched for the page, the search returned the message "This Content Isn't Available." He was, however, able to access the page from his business Facebook account. He also discovered that another of his comments were "hidden" from public view. After being blocked from the city's page, he filed FOIA requests with the city seeking records regarding the city's blocking of him from the page. The city did not provide any responsive records. In response to questions about the city's actions to block him from the page, the city responded that no city employee blocked him, a "blocked user list" did not show his name, and that the city did not violate the First Amendment.

The user filed a lawsuit against the city, alleging that the city and certain city employees and officials violated his First amendment rights by blocking him from the page and hiding his comments and that the city should be sanctioned for its failure to preserve evidence of its blocked user list.

First, the district court found that the city had a duty to preserve records pertaining to its blocking of users from its Facebook page, i.e., the blocked user list. As a remedy, the court prohibited the city from making any argument at trial that its blocked users list did not contain the user's name.

Second, the court determined that the city's social media comment policy was unconstitutional because it banned comments that could constitute protected speech. For example, the court determined that the comment policy's ban on "personal attacks," "harassment," as well as "abusive," "racist," and "hateful" speech constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court also found that the policy provided too much discretion to administrators to apply these restrictions in a manner that would ban protected speech.

The court also struck down the comment policy's restrictions on "defamatory" comments, "unsupported accusations," and "off-topic comments," finding that the administrators had received no guidance or training on how to apply those terms and that the city employees had testified they thought "defamatory" meant that a user was bringing up past issues or "talking smack" about another person.

The court allowed some of the remaining claims to continue to trial.

You can read the court's ruling here.

Constitutional Issues / Social Media

Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Firefighter's Termination Upheld

Wednesday, October 21, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a city's decision to terminate a city firefighter from the fire department for using his late father's electrician's license to obtain electrical permits for his second job. Chicago Firefighters Union v. City of Chicago, et al.

A city firefighter had a second job working with an electrical contracting business with his father. His father held a city supervising electrician license. After his father died, the firefighter continued to renew and use his father's electrician's license to obtain electrical permits. After a city investigation, he was terminated for violating the fire department code of professional conduct, various city ordinances, the state's identity theft statute, and city personnel rules. He appealed his termination which went to arbitration, and the arbitrator found that he had violated several city ordinances and state law and that the city's termination was justified. He then filed a lawsuit in the circuit court which also upheld his termination.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the firefighter argued that the arbitrator's decision was in error because, among other things, the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in making a determination as to whether the firefighter violated city ordinances and state law. The Appellate Court disagreed, finding that the arbitrator did have that authority. The Court also rejected the firefighter's argument that a lesser discipline should have been imposed, finding that the CBA authorized termination where just cause exists.

Monday, October 19, 2026

Court Finds in Favor of Public Body in FOIA Case

Monday, October 19, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An individual sued a Sheriff’s Office alleging that the Sheriff’s Office violated FOIA (1) by not producing requested records (jail handbook, medical records, and federal detention standards) in response to his FOIA requests, (2) by improperly charging him fees for certain requested records, and (3) seeking civil penalties against the Sheriff’s Office because their alleged violations were willful and intentional, or otherwise in bad faith.

The trial court dismissed the case finding that: (1) the Sheriff’s Office was authorized to charge fees for requested documents exceeding 50 pages, (2) the non-existence of certain records in the Sheriff’s Office possession or custody was an affirmative defense to his complaint, (3) his prior receipt of requested records from the Sheriff’s Office made that part of his requests moot, and (4) the Sheriff’s Office response to his requests did not justify imposition of civil penalties.

On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the case in Walters v. Ogle County Sheriff’s Office.

First, because the individual had previously acknowledged that he received his requested medical records and jail handbook from the Sheriff’s Office, the Appellate Court found that claim "moot" because the court could not grant him relief by directing the Sheriff’s Office to produce documents he already had.

Second, the Appellate Court held that the Sheriff’s Office cannot violate FOIA by failing to produce records that do not exist in its possession or custody.

Finally, the Appellate Court held that the Sheriff’s Office did not willfully or intentionally, or otherwise in bad faith, violate FOIA by charging plaintiff fees for copies of records after providing 50 pages at no cost. The Court determined that, as a single requester, he was entitled to 50 free pages total, and the Sheriff’s Office was free to charge him for pages after 50 regardless of how many requests he had submitted.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Freedom of Information

Thursday, October 15, 2026

City Has Private Right of Action to Recover PEDA Benefits from Employee

Thursday, October 15, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a city in a lawsuit filed by the city to recover payments made to an employee under the Public Employees' Disability Act (PEDA). City of Monmouth v. Thomas.

A city employee received disability benefits from a city under PEDA. The city filed a lawsuit against the employee claiming he forfeited those benefits when he engaged in secondary employment, and that the city was entitled to a return of $55,370.66 in benefits. The circuit court held that PEDA does not provide a right of action to the city to recover benefits even where those benefits were forfeited under the statute, and that the city had an adequate remedy in its secondary "unjust enrichment" claim.

The city appealed, arguing that PEDA creates an implied right of action to recover payments made to an employee that the employee statutorily forfeits under the statute. The Appellate Court acknowledged that PEDA does not include express language authorizing a private right of action to recover benefits but noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had established four factors to consider in deciding whether a right might exist by implication. In applying those four factors, the Appellate Court held as follows:

Based on the foregoing application of the Fisher factors, we find it reasonable to conclude the Act implies a private right of action for public employers who suffer monetary injury resulting from disability payments made to public employees who are secondarily employed while receiving benefits under the Act. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the City could not pursue an action under the Act was in error.

The Appellate Court sent the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Wednesday, October 14, 2026

Court Upholds Electoral Board Decision Rejecting Objection to Referendum Petition

Wednesday, October 14, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a decision by a municipal electoral board that denied an objection to a petition for a referendum question in Peres v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board.

Village residents circulated a petition to submit a referendum question to village voters on the November 3rd ballot that stated the following: "Should the State of Illinois repeal laws that ban state investment in businesses that boycott the State of Israel?” The petition included 3,504 signatures, and on each page of the petition, the circulator certified that the signers were qualified electors and registered village voters. An objection was filed to the petition to challenge its validity and seeking to have the question not appear on the ballot. The objectors argued that the petition was invalid because it did not specifically attest that the signatures were "genuine." The village's electoral board held a hearing on the objection and voted to reject the objection, finding that the petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Election Code. The circuit court upheld the electoral board's decision, and the objectors appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court agreed with the electoral board that the petition substantially complied with the Election Code. The Court held that the omission of a statement that the signatures "are genuine" was a technical violation of the Election Code but not one that would "impair election integrity," particularly where the objectors provided no evidence that any of the 3,504 signatures were inauthentic and there was other language in the petition that demonstrated substantial compliance with the Election Code. As a result, the Court found the referendum petition to be valid.

Tuesday, October 13, 2026

Lawsuit Against Village Relating to Property Development Was Properly Dismissed

Tuesday, October 13, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

A property owner reached out to village officials about the procedures for building a structure on property in the village. He claims that a village trustee told him that he couldn't find any regulations that would deny or allow the project, and that he shouldn't worry about permits because the village wasn't issuing them and there was no current village employee to conduct inspections. Based on these conversations, the owner claimed the village approved his project and he began building the structure. He spent approximately $110,000 on materials and labor before he received a cease and desist letter from the village president. He was also served with a notice of fines owed to the village in the amount of $10,200 for violating the village's zoning ordinance. The owner filed a lawsuit against the village, arguing that the village was "equitably estopped" from enforcing its zoning ordinance based on the village trustee's assurances to him that the project could proceed (Count 1), and seeking money damages for the work he performed on the structure (Count 2). The circuit court dismissed the case, finding that the village had immunity from the claims in the lawsuit. He appealed.

The Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit against the village, although on different grounds. First, the Court held that the Tort Immunity Act did not apply to Count 1 requesting injunctive relief based on an "equitable estoppel" argument and only applied to Count 2 requesting money damages. However, the Court determined that Count 1 was, nevertheless, properly dismissed because the complaint did not include any allegations that the village trustee who communicated with the owner had express authority to act on behalf of the village, a required element for an equitable estoppel claim. As a result, the lawsuit was properly dismissed. Baum v. Village of Viola.

Land Use and Environmental

Wednesday, October 7, 2026

Court Upholds Termination of Hospital Pharmacist Who Refused Vaccine

Wednesday, October 07, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a county's termination of a county employee after she refused to obtain a COVID-19 vaccine as required by the county's pandemic policy in Mason v. Cook County.

In August of 2021, the county adopted a policy mandating that county hospital staff members receive the COVID-19 vaccine. A hospital pharmacist applied for an exemption from the vaccine mandate based on her Christian faith. The county denied her request, stating that doing so would compromise workplace safety and pose an undue hardship on the county. The county gave her 90 days to comply. When she refused to do so, she was fired, and she filed a lawsuit against the county claiming that the county violated her civil rights in not accommodating her religious beliefs. The district court ruled in favor of the county, finding that allowing the employee to work unvaccinated during a public health crisis would have jeopardized the health of county staff and patients, causing undue hardship on the county.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the county had sufficiently shown an undue hardship that justified denial of the religious accommodation. The Court noted that the employee worked as a pharmacist in a hospital setting and worked in the same room with other pharmacist, and regularly interacted with patients where the risks and consequences of spreading the COVID-19 virus were high, and that masking and social distancing alone did not adequately reduce those risks.

Constitutional Issues / Personnel

Tuesday, October 6, 2026

PAC Says Incident Reports Should Have Been Released

Tuesday, October 06, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's office (PAC) issued its 11th binding opinion for 2026 finding a public body in violation of FOIA when it denied a request for jail incident reports where those records could have been redacted and released. PAC Op. 26-011.

A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a sheriff's office seeking incident reports at a county jail relating to the use of restraint chairs. The sheriff's office denied the request in its entirety, citing to the personal privacy and private information exemptions of FOIA. The reporter filed an appeal with the PAC arguing that the sheriff's office had previously provided the same types of records with identifying information of the detainees redacted and that the sheriff's office should have released redacted records in response to this request.

The PAC analyzed the "invasion of personal privacy" claim of the sheriff's office based on the following four factors:

(l) the requester's interest in disclosure,
(2) the public interest in disclosure,
(3) the degree of invasion of personal privacy, and
(4) the availability of alternative means of obtaining the requested information.

The PAC applied the four factors and determined that the public's and requester's interest in the disclosure of records that shed light on law enforcement officials performing their official duties outweighed any privacy interests since the names of the detainees could have been redacted to protect the detainees' identities before the records were released. As a result, the PAC determined that the records should have been released with all identifying information of the detainees redacted.

Freedom of Information

Monday, October 5, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 110: Statement of Economic Interests

Monday, October 05, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

Ancel Glink released Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 110: Statement of Economic Interests.

Back by listener request, the podcast is taking a brief recess to revisit one of its classic episodes on Statements of Economic Interests (SOEI) for local government officials and candidates. Ancel Glink’s Daniel J. Bolin and Keri-Lyn J. Krafthefer break down the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act reporting questions, clear up common misconceptions about disclosable assets and debts, and offer practical guidance for local officials and employees.

Candidates running in the 2027 consolidated elections must file an SOEI and submit their receipt alongside nomination papers during the candidate petition filing period. While incumbent officials may have filed an annual statement earlier this year in relation to their current office, many choose or are advised to file an additional statement explicitly in relation to their candidacy.

Inflation-Adjusted Thresholds: On this year’s form, disclosable dollar thresholds have been updated for Question 1 (Single Assets: $11,600), Question 2 (Outside Income/Capital Gains; $8,700), Question 3 (Single Non-Public Debts: $11,600), and Question 6 (Gifts/Honoraria : $600).

Episode Breakdown:

Who Must File: Understanding filing obligations for elected/appointed local officials versus designated public employees and candidates.

Question 1 (Assets): Distinguishing disclosable single assets (stocks, bonds, investment real estate) from explicitly excluded personal items like primary residences, personal vehicles, savings/checking accounts, retirement funds, and pensions.

Question 2 (Income; Capital Gains): How to simplify your disclosure by relying directly on your federal income tax return (W-2s, 1099s, capital gains) while excluding compensation from your filing position.

Question 3 (Debts): How standard consumer debts (mortgages, credit cards, auto loans from financial institutions) are excluded from reporting.

Question 4 (Government Employment; Contracts): Disclosing other units of government where you or your spouse serve as an employee, officeholder, or contractor.

Question 5 (Lobbyist Relationships): Identifying disclosable business relationships or family members known to be registered lobbyists.

Question 6 (Gifts; Honoraria): Reporting disclosable sources of gifts or honoraria.

Question 7 (Public Utilities): Disclosing family members employed by non-governmental public utilities.

Practical Tips: Safe harbor protections for good-faith filings, relying on Illinois Secretary of State guidance, and handling county clerk online portals

Resources: Secretary of State Guidance

Elections / Personnel

Wednesday, September 30, 2026

Court Says Pension Should Have Been Calculated Based on Promotion Rank

Wednesday, September 30, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court held that a pension board erred in awarding a line-of-duty disability pension based on a firefighter's salary rather than a lieutenant's salary in Schneider v. Elgin Firefighters' Pension Fund.

A firefighter employed by a city's fire department injured his back while responding to a call. He was unable to return to duty and applied for a disability pension. During the time between his injury and the pension board hearing, the city had promoted him from the rank of firefighter to lieutenant. The pension board awarded him a pension based on a firefighter's salary and he appealed to the circuit court, arguing that his pension should have been based on a lieutenant's salary. The circuit court upheld the pension board's decision. He then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the pension board argued that it determined the pension award based on the firefighter having been injured while serving as a firefighter, having received workers' compensation benefits based on his firefighter salary, having never worked or qualified for work as a lieutenant, and having never contributed to the pension fund at the lieutenant rank. As a result, the board had concluded that the firefighter rank was the rank "held" at the time he was removed from payroll for purposes of determining his pensionable salary.

The firefighter argued that section 4-110 of the Pension Coe requires a line-of-duty disability pension to be calculated based on the "monthly salary attached to the rank held...at the date [the firefighter] is removed from the municipality's fire department payroll" and that since he was a sworn lieutenant at the time he was removed from the fire department's payroll, his pension should be based on that rank.

The Appellate Court agreed with the firefighter, finding that he had been promoted to lieutenant before he was removed from the fire department's payroll and, as a result, he should have been awarded a line-of-duty disability pension based on the lieutenant salary since that is the rank he held on the payroll-removal date.

Tuesday, September 29, 2026

Dual Circulation Prohibition Not Apply to Nonpartisan School Board Candidates

Tuesday, September 29, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a decision by a board of election commissioners that school board candidates did not violate the Election Code's prohibition on dual circulation in collecting signatures for an election involving non-partisan candidates. Sanchez v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.

Objections were filed to the nominating petitions submitted by certain candidates running for elected school board positions in the upcoming November 2026 election. The objections claimed that the candidates had violated the "dual circulation" prohibition of the Election Code because circulators who collected signatures for the candidates had also circulated petitions for partisan candidates in the primary election in March of 2026. The objection was heard by the board of election commissioners which denied the objections. The objectors appealed to the circuit court which upheld the board's decision and the case made its way to the Illinois Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court first examined the relevant statute, which states as follows:

[N]o person shall circulate or certify petitions for candidates of more than one political party, or for an independent candidate or candidates in addition to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or for such candidates and parties with respect to the same political subdivision at the next consolidated election. 10 ILCS 5/10- 4.

The candidates argued that the dual circulation prohibition of this statute applies only to candidates of political parties and independents, but does not apply to nonpartisan candidates. Because the school board candidates were nonpartisan candidates, the candidates argued that the statute did not bar circulators who had previously circulated petitions for partisan candidates in the primary election. The Appellate Court agreed, finding that the clear language of the statute only applied to partisan and independent elections and the school board election was, by statute, nonpartisan. As a result, the petitions circulated by the challenged circulators were proper and the candidates were not barred from running for office.

Monday, September 28, 2026

Court Finds in Favor of School District in Wrongful Death Lawsuit Involving Student-Athlete

Monday, September 28, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a ruling in favor of a school district in a lawsuit relating to a student-athlete’s death, holding that government tort immunity barred the family’s claims because the family could not show the district’s inaction caused the student’s death. (Falconer v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 (5th Dist.).

A student and football player collapsed during a preseason conditioning program in the school’s weight room. One of the coaches immediately called 911, and another coach checked his vital signs and found a “radial pulse.” Medical assistants from the school’s on-site health clinic and responding paramedics all confirmed that the student had a detectable pulse and respiration. Because he had a pulse and was breathing, no one administered a shock or performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The student was transported to the hospital, where he lost his pulse; CPR there was unsuccessful, and he died. An autopsy later revealed an undiagnosed heart condition.

The student’s mother sued the East St. Louis School District for negligence and willful and wanton conduct, arguing that school staff should have used the automated external defibrillator device in the weight room and performed CPR regardless of the pulse readings. She also argued that the school district violated Illinois’s AED Act and Physical Fitness Facility Medical Emergency Preparedness Act by failing to properly staff and prepare for a medical emergency.

The circuit court ruled in favor of the school district, finding that the district had immunity under the Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court agreed. The court found the district could not be held liable because its staff’s actions were not the actual or legal cause of the student's death; he was breathing and had a pulse throughout the time he was in the district’s care, and only stopped breathing and lost his pulse after he arrived at the hospital, under EMT and hospital staff supervision. The court also rejected the argument that the more specific AED Act and Facility Preparedness Act should override the Tort Immunity Act’s protections. Finally, the court held that several sections of the Tort Immunity Act independently shielded the district from liability, since staffing and the decisions in response to the emergency were purely discretionary in nature rather than mandated duties.

Post Authored by Betsy Lecy and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Lawsuit Challenging Village's Tow of Vehicle Was Properly Dismissed

Wednesday, September 23, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

A village police officer towed a vehicle that had five parking citations. The following day, an individual went to the police department and offered to pay $22 to the village, which he claimed satisfied the debt, and demanded the car be returned. The village refused to release the vehicle. Subsequently, the individual filed a lawsuit against the village alleging unjust enrichment on the village's part in keeping the vehicle, among other claims. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the individual had no standing to sue the village because he was not the owner of the vehicle and had no legal interest to sue the village for its return.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that he had no standing to sue the village. The individual had conceded he was not the owner of the vehicle, and the court found that his voluntary $22 payment towards the debt of another did not establish sufficient a "legal interest" to satisfy the standing requirements for his lawsuit. Bey v. Village of Midlothian, et al.

Constitutional Issues

Tuesday, September 22, 2026

Court Upholds City's Revocation of Liquor Licenses

Tuesday, September 22, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a local liquor commissioner's revocation of liquor licenses for two establishments in Raven Place v. City of Blue Island.

A licensee was issued liquor licenses for two establishments in a city. In 2021, 23 gunshots were fired towards one of the licensed establishments and the establishment's security personnel returned fire. The mayor (who also serves as the local liquor commissioner) issued an emergency seven day closure of that establishment. Later that month, the city entered into an agreement with the licensee that established certain conditions and restrictions to the continued operation of both licensed establishments in the city. Under the agreement, the licensee agreed to use ID scanners, impose age restrictions and restricted hours of operation, to pay a $7,500 fine, among other restrictions. A year later while the agreement was in effect, there was another shooting at one of the establishments and the mayor issued a second seven day emergency closure order, and subsequently conducted hearings and issued two orders determining that the businesses were a "nuisance" and that the licensee had failed to comply with the agreement with the city. The mayor revoked both liquor licenses. The licensee appealed the revocation orders to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, which upheld the city's decision to revoke both licenses. The licensee then filed an administrative review action with the circuit court challenging both revocation orders, which court ruled against the licensee finding that one of the appeals was untimely and the other appeal was unfounded.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, the licensee argued that the circuit court should have decided both appeals, that the businesses did not constitute a nuisance, and that the licensee's due process rights had been violated. The Appellate Court agreed with the circuit court that the licensee's appeal of the first revocation order was not timely and that it was improper for the licensee to combine both appeals into one administrative review action. Second, the court determined that both revocation orders were proper and upheld the city's decisions to revoke the liquor licenses for both establishments.

Constitutional Issues

Tuesday, September 15, 2026

Regional Board's Decision Allowing Property to Switch School Districts Struck Down

Tuesday, September 15, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court recently issued a ruling regarding a school detachment/annexation petition in a lengthy opinion analyzing the requirements for a property owner to detach their property from one school district and attach it to another school district. Board of Education of Jasper County Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, et al. The case has a convoluted history with multiple motions to reconsider and changes of position of both the Regional Board and circuit court, which partially explains the long opinion.

Homeowners of property located in Jasper County (petitioners) filed a petition with the Regional Board of School Trustees requesting that their property be detached from Jasper County School District (District 1) and annexed to Dieterich Community School District in Effingham County (District 30). Their property was located entirely within Jasper County and approximately 1.5 miles from the boundary of District 30 and did not touch any part of District 30. Owners of property located between the petitioners' property and the District 30 boundary joined the petition, asking that a 10 foot wide strip of their property be included in the detachment/annexation petition. The petition alleged that the territory to be detached and annexed was "contiguous" to District 30.

District 1 argued against the petition, saying it did not comply with section 7-4 of the School Code because the detachment, if granted, would result in districts that were not "compact and contiguous" as required by the Illinois Constitution and the School Code, and would create multiple "islands" that would destroy the compactness of both districts. The Regional Board conducted a hearing on the petition, hearing testimony from the petitioners and District 1 representatives. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Regional Board initially denied the petition, finding that the detriment to District 1 outweighed the benefit to the petitioners and District 30. The petitioners requested a rehearing, and at the conclusion of that rehearing, the Regional Board overturned its previous decision and granted the petition, allowing the detachment and annexation of the territory.

District 1 filed an administrative review action with the circuit court to appeal the Regional Board's decision. The circuit court initially reversed the Regional Board, finding its decision to grant the detachment/annexation petition to be contrary to the Illinois Constitution and the School Code. The petitioners again filed a motion to reconsider, and a new judge assigned to the case vacated the prior judge's order and upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

On appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, that Court reviewed the administrative record of the Regional Board's multiple hearings, as well as documentary evidence, including a map showing the petitioners' property and the narrow strip that would connect the petitioners' property to District 30 if annexed to that district (see photo from opinion below), and determined that the Regional Board erred in granting the petition. The Court found that the petitioners failed to show how the proposed detachment and annexation would result in "compact and contiguous" districts as required by Illinois case law, the Illinois constitution, and Illinois statutes. In sum, the Court held that the petition should not have been granted, and it reversed the Regional Board's order and the circuit court's decision upholding the Regional Board's order. There was a dissenting opinion which would have upheld the Regional Board's granting of the petition.

Constitutional Issues / Land Use and Environmental

Thursday, September 10, 2026

First District Appellate Court Interprets Civil Penalty Provision of FOIA Differently than Second District

Thursday, September 10, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

The First District Appellate Court overturned a trial court's denial of civil penalties in a FOIA case challenging a police department's response to a news media's FOIA requests. NBC Subsidiary v. Chicago Police Department.

NBC filed FOIA requests with a police department seeking surveillance video, incident reports, witness statements, and other records relating to a hit-and-run crash, as well as emails to and from two police officers relating to the crash. The police department responded by referring the requester to its records inquiry section for the crash reports and by denying the request for body-work camera footage. The response also denied other requested records claiming they were exempt because there was an ongoing criminal investigation. The police department sent an extension notice regarding the request for emails, but later denied that request citing to the same ongoing criminal investigation exemption.

NBC filed a lawsuit against the police department, claiming it violated FOIA. The trial court ruled in favor of the police department relating to certain counts in the complaint, including finding that the police department completed a reasonable search and that certain responsive records had been destroyed pursuant to the department's records retention policy. However, the court ruled against the department regarding its withholding of certain records in their entirety. The court also found that the department "willfully and intentionally violated FOIA" by not producing the requested records. The department subsequently produced the requested records, and NBC then filed a motion seeking its attorneys fees and an award of civil penalties against the department. The court granted NBC's request for attorneys fees. However, the court denied NBC's request for civil penalties, applying a Second District Appellate Court ruling that would require NBC to show that the department "willfully, intentionally, and in bad faith" (emphasis added) failed to comply with FOIA. In this case, the trial court found there was no evidence that the department acted with a "dishonest purpose" by withholding the records.

NBC appealed, arguing that FOIA does not require a showing of bad faith to justify the imposition of civil penalties if the public body is shown to have willfully and intentionally violated FOIA. The Appellate Court agreed with NBC, stating as follows:

We agree with this court’s decisions in Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that section 11(j) does not require separate showings that the public body both “willfully and intentionally” violated FOIA and did so “in bad faith,” or with a “dishonest purpose.” This analysis is true to the language of section 11(j), which allows for the imposition of civil penalties when “a public body willfully and intentionally failed to comply with this Act, or otherwise acted in bad faith.” 5 ILCS 140/11(j). We agree with Tobias and Lucy Parsons Labs that this court’s decision in Williams “failed to honor the disjunctive ‘or’” in section 11(j), and in doing so created a more demanding standard for the imposition of civil penalties than contemplated by the text of the statute. [citations omitted] Thus, we decline to follow Williams or Thomas.

Applying its interpretation of section 11(j) of FOIA, the First District Appellate Court found that the department's "deliberate and by design" conduct in denying the FOIA request was enough to justify the imposition of civil penalties. As a result, the Appellate Court sent the case back to the trial court to make a determination on an appropriate civil penalty against the police department.

This decision means that the First and Second District Appellate Courts have taken a different position on the type of conduct by a public body that justifies the imposition of civil penalties for a FOIA violation.

Freedom of Information

Tuesday, September 8, 2026

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid

Tuesday, September 08, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

Ancel Glink released Episode 109 of its Quorum Forum Podcast: Quorum Forum Ep. 109: The 100-Year Legacy of Euclid.

This year marks 100 years since the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark zoning case, Euclid v. Ambler Realty. In this episode, we share a recorded presentation from Ancel Glink's David Silverman, FAICP, and ZoneCo's Sean Suder, as a sneak preview of their upcoming live plenary session at the APA-IL State Conference on September 30, 2026!

Episode Highlights

The Public Safety Roots of Zoning: Why early 20th-century industrial chaos, street accidents involving children, noise, and pollution prompted the Supreme Court to step in

The Dual Legacy: How the "intensity of use" rules established in 1926 successfully protected neighborhoods but fostered exclusionary development patterns

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Wednesday, September 2, 2026

Village Immune From Liability For Firefighter's Injuries During Training Drill

Wednesday, September 02, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a village and village employees in a lawsuit filed by a firefighter claiming he was injured during a training drill. Hidalgo v. Village of Romeoville.

A village firefighter attended an advanced technician firefighter training course. As part of that training course curriculum, participants were required to perform a “bailout drill.” During a bailout drill, participants exit out a third-story window of a hose tower, one leg at a time, and then use rappel line to descend down the side of the tower. Participants could use a Class 1 harness, Class 3 pre-sewn harness, or a Class 3 “hasty” harness during the bailout drill. Class 1 harnesses are body harnesses that go around a person’s waist, while Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses are manufactured body harnesses that go around a person’s waist and shoulders. Class 3 “hasty” harnesses are harnesses made by the participants using available webbing, which is a tubular structure that can be tied into a knot.

The firefighter performed the bailout drill using a Class 1 harness and was injured after becoming separated from the harness and falling to the ground. He sued the village, claiming the village acted with “intentional/reckless conduct” in its instructions and usage of the harnesses during the bailout drill. He specifically claimed certain village employees involved in the training failed to provide adequate instructions on using and creating the Class 3 “hasty” harness. He also claimed the village’s omissions constituted negligence through willful and wanton conduct. The circuit court ruled against the firefighter, who then appealed.

An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the village, relying on Section 2-201 of the Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which states as follows:

Sec. 2-201. Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.

That Act distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts made by government employees when determining whether a government employee qualifies for immunity. The Appellate Court applied the two-prong test, which requires courts to determine (1) if the employee holds a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving an exercise of discretion and (2) if the employee also engaged in both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion when performing the act or omission from which the injury resulted. If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then the government employee will have immunity under that section of the Act.

As to the village’s assistant training course instructors, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion as to certain aspects of the bailout drill (i.e., whether a Class 3 harness needed to be used) and (2) used their discretion to decide how to secure ropes and lines to the harnesses. The court emphasized that the assistant instructors used their own discretion, rather than adhering to a mandate requiring them to act in a prescribed manner, in making any decisions regarding the bailout drill. As to the village’s lead and supervising training course instructor, the court found that they (1) held a position requiring an exercise of discretion to decide how to conduct bailout drills based on their knowledge and experience and (2) exercised discretion in determining that Class 3 pre-sewn harnesses were appropriate for the bailout drill. The court also found that the village was entitled to immunity under the Act. As to the claims of negligence by willful and wanton conduct, the court found that Section 2-201 immunity is absolute and not subject to exceptions for willful and wanton conduct.

Ultimately, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court ruling that both the employees and the village had immunity from the firefighter's claims relating to his injuries.

Post Authored by Rachel Stempler & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, September 1, 2026

PAC Says Third Party Communications Subsequently Forwarded to Attorney Not Exempt from FOIA

Tuesday, September 01, 2026 Julie Tappendorf

A reporter submitted a FOIA request to a city seeking copies of correspondence exchanged between a city official and a representative from a private company, which the city official subsequently forwarded to a city attorney for the purpose of seeking legal guidance. The city denied the request citing to FOIA exemption under Section 7(1)(m), stating that because these documents came into possession of a city attorney from a client, they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and are exempt from disclosure. The reporter then filed an appeal with the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) contesting the denial.

The PAC issued its 10^th binding opinion of the year, concluding that the city improperly withheld communications exchanged with a third party because they were not exempt from disclosure under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 26-010. The PAC reasoned that at the time the records originated, they were not sent to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice or services, or sent from an attorney providing legal advice. Instead, the communications were between a city official and a third-party contractor for the city. Even though a city attorney later obtained these records from their client (city official), the PAC determined that forwarding pre-existing communications between the city and a third-party to counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice did not transform those records into privileged attorney-client communications, because the records (1) did not originate in confidence between parties engaged in an attorney-client relationship and (2) at the time the records originated, they were not exchanged for the purpose of securing or providing legal advice.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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