Appeal of Pension Board Decision Dismissed for Violation of Court Rules in Use of AI

Appeal of Pension Board Decision Dismissed for Violation of Court Rules in Use of AI

  Tuesday, November 25, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently dismissed the appeal by a former police officer of a pension board's denial of pension benefits because he violated Illinois Supreme Court Rules when he filed an appellate brief almost wholly created with the aid of artificial intelligence (AI). Pletcher v. Village of Libertyville Police Pension Board.

The plaintiff was hired as a police officer in 2003, and filed an application for a non-duty disability pension in 2020. He subsequently withdrew his application, and returned to full duty. In 2022, he was placed on a performance improvement plan for certain violations of department orders and policies. Shortly thereafter, he filed a second application for a non-duty disability pension. The pension board held a hearing on the application and ultimately denied his application, finding that the officer's condition could have been remedied with medication, which the pension board found the officer refused to regularly to take.

The officer filed a complaint for administrative review with the trial court to appeal the pension board's decision, along with a brief supporting his complaint. In his brief, he cited to several cases that did not exist. At the hearing, the officer also attempted to introduce new evidence and exhibits that were not part of the original hearing. The pension board brought the nonexistent cases to the attention of the trial court and objected to the introduction of new evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court upheld the pension board's denial of his pension application.

The officer then appealed to the Appellate Court. After he filed his brief with the Appellate Court, the pension board filed a response and a motion for sanctions alleging that the officer violated Illinois Supreme Court Rules for fictitious citations to the administrative record, citations to nonexistent cases, and fictitious holdings from actual cases. The Appellate Court noted that all parties in litigation (even pro se litigants) are obligated to comply with court rules and procedures. The Court also noted that the officer had cited five cases in his appellate brief that did not exist, and that the some of the actual cases cited in his brief did not stand for the propositions stated in his brief. The Court stated that the officer's status as a "pro se" party does not excuse his careless reliance on AI, and that he was aware of the risks of using AI-generated research when this same issue was raised at the trial court and yet he still chose to use AI in this manner in his appellate brief. After holding oral argument on the motion to dismiss the appeal, the Appellate Court granted the pension board's motion and the officer's appeal was dismissed.

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Appellate Court Interprets 50 Pages "Free of Charge" FOIA Provision

Appellate Court Interprets 50 Pages "Free of Charge" FOIA Provision

  Wednesday, November 19, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a public body in a FOIA case filed by a requester who claimed the public body violated FOIA when it consolidated his six FOIA requests in applying FOIA's fee provision. Walters v. McHenry County Sheriff's Office.

A requester filed six FOIA requests on the same day with a county sheriff's office seeking Department of Corrections inspection reports for six different years (one year per request). The sheriff's office responded to the requests by providing 50 pages free of charge, and stating that the requester would have to pay 15 cents per page for the 113 remaining pages. The requester filed a lawsuit claiming that the sheriff's office violated FOIA by consolidating the six requests for purposes of applying the provision of FOIA requiring public bodies to release 50 pages free of charge, arguing that each of the six requests should have been treated separately. The sheriff's office filed a motion to dismiss the case arguing that because the requester submitted the six requests together in one envelope on the same date, it was appropriate to aggregate and combine the requests in applying FOIA's fee provision. The trial court agreed with the sheriff's office, finding that the request was properly consolidated for purposes of applying FOIA's fee provision. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of the sheriff's office but applied a different interpretation to the FOIA fee provision. The Appellate Court noted that the statute provides that “[n]o fees shall be charged for the first 50 pages of black and white, letter or legal sized copies requested by a requester.” The Appellate Court held that it was irrelevant whether the requester's FOIA requests were separate and distinct requests for different public records, and instead held that the requester's status as a single requester is what matters in applying this provision of FOIA, stating as follows:

Under the plain language of the statute, plaintiff—the “requester”—was entitled to “the first 50 pages *** requested” from defendant—the “public body”—free of charge. Id. Defendant provided 50 free pages to plaintiff and properly assessed fees for the additional 113 pages. Thus, plaintiff has not stated a valid claim against defendant for a FOIA violation, and the court was correct to dismiss his complaint. 

In short, the Appellate Court held that a requester is entitled to the first 50 pages free of charge requested by that requester from that public body, and since the sheriff's office provided the first 50 pages at no charge, there was no FOIA violation and the requester's complaint was properly dismissed.

It is important to note that this appears to be the first time an Appellate Court has interpreted this FOIA fee provision in this manner, and that this is an unreported order not a published opinion. So, it remains to be seen whether other Illinois courts would rule in the same manner (i.e., that the 50 pages "free of charge" provision applies to the requester and not to each request). 

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Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund

Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund

  Tuesday, November 18, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a pension board's decision to deny an application for pension membership in Kooistra v. Board of Trustees of Sycamore Police Pension Fund.

A deputy chief in a municipal police department retired from that department and began receiving a retirement pension. Subsequently, he was hired as a patrol officer in a second municipal police department and submitted an application for membership in the second municipality's pension fund. His application was denied by the police pension board based on section 3-124.1(b) of the Police Pension Code, which states as follows: 

(b) If a police officer who first becomes a member on or after January 1, 2019 is receiving pension payments (other than as provided in Section 3-109.3) and re-enters active service with any municipality that has established a pension fund under this Article, that police officer may continue to receive pension payments while he or she is in active service, but shall only participate in a defined contribution plan established by the municipality pursuant to Section 3-109.4 and may not establish creditable service in the pension fund established by that municipality or have his or her pension recomputed.” 40 ILCS 5/3-124.1(b)

The pension board determined that this statute precluded the officer from membership in the second municipality's pension fund because he was already receiving pension payments from the first municipality's pension fund; however, he could participate in a defined contribution plan. The officer appealed the pension board's decision to the circuit court which upheld the pension board's decision, and that ruling was then appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court analyzed the language in Section 3-124.1(b) and determined that it applied to the officer who was drawing a pension from his former employer. The Court rejected the officer's argument that the statutory provision did not apply to him because he became a "member" of the first municipality's pension fund before January 1, 2019. Instead, the Court agreed with the pension board's interpretation of the statute that it applies to the officer because he became a member of the second municipality's police department after the statutory cutoff date. In the Court's view, that was the most logical interpretation because the officer "first" becomes a member of the second municipality's police department upon reentry into active service, which would allow him to continue to receive pension payments from the first municipality but preclude him from participating in the second municipality's pension fund. The Court noted that this interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent of this section which was to prevent "double dipping" in two pension funds. 

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City Violated FOIA When it Charged a Fee for an Electronic Copy of an Incident Report

City Violated FOIA When it Charged a Fee for an Electronic Copy of an Incident Report

  Monday, November 17, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request seeking an electronic copy of an incident report, a city denied the request and directed the requester to contact the city police records department to purchase the report at a cost of $5 for residents, or for $10 for non-residents. After the requester submitted a request for review, the PAC issued its 13th binding opinion of 2025, finding the City in violation of Section 6(a) of FOIA by improperly assessing a fee for disclosing an electronic copy of the incident report. PAC Op. 25-013.

The PAC relied upon the language of Section 6(a) of FOIA, which states that:

Except to the extent that the General Assembly expressly provides, statutory fees applicable to copies of public records when furnished in a paper format shall not be applicable to those records when furnished in an electronic format.” (Emphasis added.)

Although the city argued that the report fees were listed on its website, the PAC determiend that the city did not cite a FOIA provision or any other law that authorized the city to charge a special fee for disclosing electronic copies of incident reports. Even if the city had adopted an ordinance establishing those fees, the PAC determined that a municipal ordinance is not a statute. Here, because the Illinois legislature had not expressly authorized a statutory fee in excess of the cost of the recording medium for electronic copies of incident reports, and it was feasible for the city to disclose the report in the electronic format sought by the requester without the need to purchase a recording medium, the city was prohibited by FOIA from assessing the requester a fee for disclosing an electronic copy of the incident report.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Appellate Court Vacates Zoning Violations Against Tree Service Business

Appellate Court Vacates Zoning Violations Against Tree Service Business

  Friday, November 14, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A tree service business owned property in a village's general business district. The village informed the business owner that its use of the property was not permitted by the village's zoning ordinance and conducted an administrative hearing on the alleged violation. At the administrative hearing, the business owner argued it was not operating a landscape contractor business as the village claimed, and that its operations were compliant with the village's zoning ordinance. At the conclusion of the hearing, tje administrative hearing officer found the business owner to be in violation of the zoning ordinance because (1) it was storing commercial vehicles and equipment on the property outside of an enclosed building, (2) the business operated a landscaping company which was not permitted in the general business district; and (3) commercial vehicles were parked on the property on an overnight basis in violation of the ordinance. The hearing officer issued a $150,000 fine against the business. 

The business filed a complaint seeking administrative review of the village's decision that it was in violation of the zoning ordinance. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer's decision, and that decision was appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the village's hearing officer's decision against the business, finding that (1) the business was operating a "contractor's shop" which was a permitted use in the business disrict; and (2) the parking of the businesses' commercial vehicles was allowed by the zoning ordinance, which allowed parking of commercial vehicles accessory to a business use. Because the Appellate Court found that the business was not in violation of the village's ordinances, it vacated the $150,000 fine. Tomax Tree Service, LLC v. Village of Westmont

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

  Monday, November 10, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum recently released 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

In this episode, Ancel Glink attorneys Tyler Smith and Eugene Bolotnikov discuss options for local governments to navigate the current regulatory landscape of e-bikes and e-scooters. The discussion aims to help communities address concerns regarding public safety while providing some clarity to the owners and operators of these vehicles. Tyler and Eugene recently presented on this topic at the 2025 APA-IL State Conference, delving into the regulatory options available to communities in Illinois.

Special Segment: Public Comment Live from the APA-IL Conference

• The episode includes a public comment segment featuring a live question and answer session focused on e-bike and e-scooter regulations, recorded live at the 2025 APA-IL State Conference.
• Participants ask questions about communities shifting regulation away from state-defined classes (such as regulating by wattage instead), the inconsistency of regulations between neighboring communities, and the overlapping jurisdiction of municipalities and park districts.
• The presenters note that there has been a significant rise in regulatory attention in Illinois, especially in Cook County suburbs, following high-profile, fatal collisions involving e-bikes and vehicles.

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In the Zone: General Assembly Sends "People Over Parking Act" to the Governor

In the Zone: General Assembly Sends "People Over Parking Act" to the Governor

  Wednesday, November 05, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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During the recent veto session, the Illinois General Assembly passed a large mass transit bill (Senate Bill 2111) which, among other things, would create the "People Over Parking Act." If signed by the Governor, the Act would take effect on June 1, 2026, and restrict local authority to require minimum off-street automobile parking near public transit.

Prohibition on Minimum Off-Street Parking Near Transit

The fundamental effect of the Act is to prohibit local governments from setting requirements for mandatory off-street parking for automobiles in specific areas. With limited exceptions, a unit of local government may not impose or enforce any minimum automobile parking requirements on a development project that is located within:

• one-half mile of a public transportation hub; or
• one-eighth mile of a public transportation corridor.

Definitions

“Minimum automobile parking requirements” means any law, code, or policy that requires a minimum number of off-street, private parking spaces for new residential and commercial developments. This would include the minimum off-street parking requirements that are common in many local zoning ordinances.

The Act defines “development project” broadly to include nearly any project undertaken for the purpose of development of land. “Development project” does not include a project where any portion is designated for use as a hotel or other specified types of transient lodging.

 A “public transportation hub” includes:

• a rail transit station,
• a boat or ferry terminal served by either a bus stop or rail transit station, and
• an intersection of two or more bus routes with a combined frequency of bus service interval of 15 minutes or less during the morning and afternoon peak commute periods.

A “public transportation corridor” means a street on which one or more bus routes have a combined frequency of bus service interval of 15 minutes or less during the morning and afternoon peak commute periods. The Act does not define “morning and afternoon peak commute periods.”

This means the Act could affect Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) stations, Metra stations, Amtrak stations, and certain CTA or Pace bus routes providing frequent bus service.

Impact on Local Authority (Preemption of Home Rule Authority)

The Act applies to home rule and non-home rule units of local government.

Reserved Powers and Exceptions for Local Governments

While minimum automobile parking requirements would be generally prohibited near transit under this Act, local governments would retain the authority to regulate other aspects of parking and development, including:

1. Maximum Parking: A unit of local government is not prevented from enacting or enforcing local laws that establish a maximum parking requirement.
2. On-Street Parking: The Act does not prevent a unit of local government from regulating access to on-street parking.
3. Bicycle Parking: The Act does not restrict a unit of local government from enacting or enforcing local laws that establish a minimum parking requirement for bicycles, including electric-assisted bicycles.
4. Regulation of Voluntarily Provided Parking: If a developer chooses to provide off-street automobile parking voluntarily, the local government may require parking spaces to be:

• made available for car-share vehicles;
• shared with the public; or
• made available only for a fee (a local government may not require voluntarily provided parking to be provided free of charge).

Application to Existing Agreement or Site Plan

The Act would not apply if the requirements conflict with a contractual agreement or approved site plan that was executed or approved on or before the effective date of the Act. However, the prohibition would apply to any amendment or extension to the contractual agreement or approved site plan, if that amendment or extension increases automobile parking requirements. The Act does not define “contractual agreement” or “approved site plan,” so local governments should consult their attorneys about whether the Act would apply.

Next Steps

Local governments may need to evaluate areas in their community near transit that could be affected by the Act, and analyze their current zoning regulations for those areas, specifically their current parking requirements.

If the Governor signs the encompassing transit bill, the Act will be effective on June 1, 2026. If the Act does become effective, local governments could still encourage developers to voluntarily provide more off-street parking by (1) requiring parking spaces to be shared with the public; or (2) adopting on-street parking restrictions. Local governments could also amend their zoning application forms to ask an applicant to proactively assert whether the Act applies, so planning staff can review the grounds for that claim. In any event, local governments should contact their attorneys to evaluate how the Act might affect areas served by public transit.

Post Authored by Daniel J. Bolin, Ancel Glink

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Both Houses Pass the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act

Both Houses Pass the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act

  Tuesday, November 04, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois General Assembly passed a number of bills in the veto session that may be of interest to local governments, including HB 576 which creates the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act. While HB 576 was designed to protect certain state legislative and executive officials, and certain county officials (and not local government officials), the bill's ban on "government agencies" displaying or posting personal information about public officials who make a request that this information not be publicly disclosed expressly applies to units of local government and school districts. The bill has been sent to the Governor for signature.

If signed by the Governor, the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act would prohibit government agencies (including units of local government) from displaying, posting, or disclosing a public official's personal information if the government agency has received a written request from the public official to refrain from disclosing that personal information. It would also require government agencies to remove that content within five business days of a written request under the new Act. The Act also prohibits persons, businesses, and associations from publicly posting or displaying a public official's personal information online when the public official has made a written request that this information not be disclosed. 

"Personal information" is defined in the bill as follows:

"Personal information" means a home address, home telephone number, mobile telephone number, pager number, personal email address, social security number, federal tax identification number, checking and savings account numbers, credit card numbers, marital status, and identity of children under the age of 18.

"Public official" is defined in the bill as follows:

"Public official" includes 

(1) members or former members of the Illinois General Assembly;

(2) constitutional officers or former constitutional officers; 

(3) elected or appointed State's Attorneys

(4) appointed Public Defenders; and

(5) county clerks and members of the Board of Election Commissioners whose responsibilities include administering and overseeing elections.

The bill would also make it unlawful for anyone to knowingly publicly post on the Internet the personal information of a public official or his or her immediate family of the person knows or reasonably should know that publicly posting that information poses an imminent and serious threat to the health and safety of the public official or the public official's immediate family and if the violation is a proximate cause of bodily injury or death of the public official or family member. Violation of this provision would be a Class 3 felony. 

The bill would also amend FOIA to expressly exempt the personal information of public officials from disclosure. 

The would also make several other changes to various statutes, including the Election Code. First, the bill would amend a provision limiting expenditures by a political committee so that it does not apply to expenses relating to personal security services or cybersecurity measures for public officials. It also requires the State Board of Elections to redact the home addresses of public officials and current and past officers of political committees upon written request, and home addresses of candidates for public office upon expiration of the objection filing period, upon request. The bill would also amend the Vehicle Code and FOID card statute to allow public officials to use their work addresses rather than home addresses on their ID cards and vehicle registration applications.

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Court Rules in Favor of Sheriff's Office in FOIA Challenge

Court Rules in Favor of Sheriff's Office in FOIA Challenge

  Monday, November 03, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a sheriff's office in a lawsuit challenging the sheriff office's response to a FOIA request submitted by an arrestee who had been detained in county jail. Staake v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Office.

Plaintiff was arrested, booked, and detained in a county jail on various criminal charges. While in county jail, plaintiff allegedly made statements to others over the jail's recorded phone lines about an order of protection his wife had against him as well as the criminal offenses that led to his arrest. Plaintiff filed multiple FOIA requests with the sheriff's office asking for those recordings, but the requests were denied by the sheriff's office. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the sheriff's office claiming it violated FOIA in denying his FOIA request. The trial court ruled in favor of the sheriff's office, agreeing with the sheriff's office that the records were exempt from FOIA because plaintiff failed to establish how those recordings were "relevant" to his pending or potential claims or cases. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court reviewed section 7(1)(e-10) of FOIA, which exempts from FOIA the following:

(e-10) Law enforcement records of other persons requested by a person committed to the Department of Corrections, Department of Human Services Division of Mental Health, or a county jail, including, but not limited to, arrest and booking records, mug shots, and crime scene photographs, except as these records may be relevant to the requester's current or potential case or claim.

The Appellate Court analyzed whether Section 7(1)(e-10) applied to the plaintiff's FOIA request and determined that it did, finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the requested records "may be relevant" to any pending or potential case or claim. Because he did not meet his burden, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of the sheriff's office.

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