Post Conviction Proceeding Records Were Not Entirely Exempt Under FOIA

Post Conviction Proceeding Records Were Not Entirely Exempt Under FOIA

  Monday, June 30, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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After an inmate submitted several FOIA requests to a state’s attorney’s office (SAO) seeking records regarding his pending post conviction proceeding, the SAO denied the request in its entirety based on the FOIA exemption that protects from release records that would interfere with a pending law enforcement proceeding. The SAO argued that disclosing the records would interfere with a pending law enforcement proceeding because the requester’s civil postconviction proceeding was still pending at the time of receiving the FOIA requests. The requester filed a lawsuit against the SAO alleging they improperly denied his FOIA requests, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the SAO, finding that disclosing the requested records to the requester would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings.

On appeal, the First District Appellate Court reversed the circuit court, finding that the SAO did not prove that all of its responsive records were exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Taylor v. Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office.

First, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the circuit court incorrectly treated his civil postconviction proceeding as a law enforcement proceeding, finding that civil postconviction proceedings do fall within the scope of Section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA (the pending law enforcement proceedings exemption).

Nevertheless, the Appellate Court determined that the SAO improperly withheld the responsive records under that exemption. Although an affidavit from the SAO’s FOIA officer stated that its responsive records were entirely exempt because disclosure would interfere with a pending postconviction proceeding, the Appellate Court determined that the affidavit was insufficient because it was conclusory and did not specifically explain which records were exempt from disclosure, and why the records were categorically exempt from disclosure. It is important to note that the Appellate Court held that the pendency of a postconviction petition, in and of itself, was not sufficient to entirely exempt records under the cited exemption.

The Appellate Court ordered the SAO to either disclose the responsive records or justify withholding its responsive records by preparing an index and a detailed affidavit explaining why disclosing each document would interfere with or harm pending or prospective law enforcement proceedings

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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PAC Determined that a City Committee was a Subsidiary Body Subject to OMA

PAC Determined that a City Committee was a Subsidiary Body Subject to OMA

  Thursday, June 26, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A member of the public submitted a "request for review" to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) claiming that a City pool committee (Committee) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by holding meetings closed to the public regarding building a new pool in the City. After analyzing a four-factor test established by the Illinois Supreme Court to determine whether the Committee would constitute a “subsidiary body” subject to OMA requirements, the PAC concluded that the Committee is a subsidiary body of the City subject to the requirements of OMA. PAC Op. 25-007.

First, the PAC determined that the Committee did not legally exist independently of the City, because the City created the Committee as part of the City’s planning process to construct a new pool in the City. Although the City argued the Committee was an informal advisory committee, the PAC stated that labelling the Committee or its gatherings as “informal” does not shield its gatherings or discussions about public business from OMA requirements.

Second, the PAC determined that the City exerts a significant amount of government control over the Committee, because the Mayor appoints the members of the Committee, the Committee’s recommendations are subject to City Council approval, and the City has been directly involved in and controlled multiple facets of Committee activities relating to building a pool in the City, including providing assistance related to finance, engineering and zoning, and parks and recreations matters.

Third, although the PAC noted that it was unclear whether the Committee uses any public resources for its activities (e.g., holding meetings on city property), and the City noted that Committee members are unpaid volunteers, the PAC asserted that the Committee receives at least some indirect public funding by virtue of being part of the City, and City officials and employees devote their time to supporting the Committee’s activities.

Lastly, the PAC determined that the City utilizes the Committee to perform governmental functions, because the Committee is tasked with assessing the potential designs, costs, and locations for a new City pool, and reporting its findings to the City, which the PAC argued are roles typically performed by a municipal committee.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA Relating to Settlement Records

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA Relating to Settlement Records

  Tuesday, June 24, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A city received a FOIA request seeking copies of the department’s settlement records concerning a class action lawsuit against a named alderperson. In response to the request, the city disclosed certain responsive records, but withheld a record concerning the settlement that was signed by the alderperson and a city attorney pursuant Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA, which exempts from disclosure privileged attorney-client communications between a public body and its attorneys.

After the requester submitted a request for review, the PAC issued its sixth binding opinion of 2025, concluding that the department improperly withheld the responsive record pursuant to Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 25-006. In connection with the withheld record at issue, the PAC determined that because the alderperson was represented by a private attorney, while the city was represented by attorneys from its law department, the parties had separate interests in the subject matter of the withheld record. Because (1) no legal advice pertaining to the litigation or the settlement was sought from or provided to the alderperson from the city attorney who signed the record, and (2) there was no indication the city attorney was acting as the alderperson’s attorney in connection with the settlement, the PAC determined that the withheld record was not a privileged attorney-client communication under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.

Additionally, because the withheld record was not a communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, and related to the obligation, receipt, or use of city funds regarding the settlement, the PAC determined that the public had a right to know the purposes for which public funds were expended in connection with the settlement. 

Post Authored by Eugene Boltnikov, Ancel Glink

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Seventh Circuit Upholds Preliminary Injunction Barring Enforcement of School’s “Sex Assigned at Birth” Restroom Policy

Seventh Circuit Upholds Preliminary Injunction Barring Enforcement of School’s “Sex Assigned at Birth” Restroom Policy

  Monday, June 23, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a district court's preliminary order prohibiting a school district (District) from enforcing its policy that requires transgender students to use restrooms that are gender-neutral or correspond to their sex assigned at birth. D.P. v. Mukwonago Area School District, et al.

The District enacted a policy requiring all students to use restrooms and locker room facilities according to their sex assigned at birth, or otherwise use gender-neutral alternatives. The policy included procedures allowing students to request an exception, which would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with the student and their parents. Prior to adoption of the policy, a transgender middle-school student (Student) regularly used the girls’ bathroom. Following adoption of the policy, the Student and her mother sent a letter to the District demanding that the policy be rescinded. The District responded, offering to go through the evaluation process for an exception under its policy. Shortly thereafter, the Student filed a federal lawsuit claiming violations of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

At the time she filed her lawsuit, the Student also submitted a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to prevent the District from enforcing the policy while the case was ongoing. The District opposed the request for temporary relief but did not request an evidentiary hearing or submit any additional evidence. The district court granted the Student’s request for a TRO and—five days later—converted it to a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the District’s policy until the case was fully resolved. The District appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that (1) the judge erred by not holding a hearing prior to granting the preliminary injunction, and (2) the preliminary injunction should be voided because the Student was not likely to succeed on the merits of her claims.

The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Student and upheld the preliminary injunction entered by the district court. The Seventh Circuit noted that an evidentiary hearing is only required when an opposing party raises genuine issues of fact in response to a motion for preliminary injunction but because the District did not dispute the factual record established by the Student, and failed to request a hearing, the Court found no error in granting the preliminary injunction based solely on the written submissions of the parties.

The Seventh Circuit also determined that the preliminary injunction was properly entered because the Student demonstrated she was likely to succeed in the case and would suffer irreparable harm if she were made to comply with the District’s policy during litigation. The Court cited several key cases addressing the issue of transgender students’ use of restrooms and noted that the District’s policy would likely be ruled unlawful discrimination based on sex under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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Supreme Court Rules for Student Regarding Proper Standard for ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

Supreme Court Rules for Student Regarding Proper Standard for ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

  Friday, June 20, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion setting forth the standard that must be applied by courts in cases involving alleged failures to accommodate students with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act). A.J.T., et al. v. Osseo Area Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, et al.

In this case, a student with a rare form of epilepsy filed several claims under various federal statutes alleging that her school district failed to accommodate her when it refused to provide certain services to her, which she claimed resulted in her receiving fewer instructional hours than her peers without disabilities. The student’s disorder caused her to have frequent seizures, particularly in the mornings, which she claims prevented her from attending school before noon. For the first few years she attended school, the student was granted various accommodations, including at-home evening instruction to supplement the hours she was otherwise unable to attend school.

In 2015, the student and her family moved to a different state, and the student’s new school district (District) denied her parents’ request to include evening instruction in her individualized education program (IEP), resulting in her receiving just over 4 hours of schooling every day (significantly less time than the typical school day for her peers). In 2018, the student’s schedule was reduced even further, and the family’s requests for accommodation were continually denied by the District. 

The student first filed a claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), alleging that the failure to accommodate her requests for evening instruction deprived her of a “free appropriate public education” as required under IDEA. Both the state board of education and a federal trial court ruled in favor of the student and ordered the District to provide her with at-home instruction on school nights.

After succeeding on her IDEA claim, the student sued the District in federal court, claiming violations of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Both of these federal laws were enacted to ensure that people with disabilities have an equal opportunity to benefit from government services, including public education. The District argued the case should be dismissed because the student failed to meet the standard for a successful claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. The district court and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the District, finding that the student failed to show that the District acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment when it denied her accommodations requests. The Eighth Circuit determined that a school district’s “simple failure” to provide a reasonable accommodation is not enough to trigger liability under either statute.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the student did not need to show bad faith or gross misjudgment by the District to move forward with her claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Instead, the student need only show that the District acted with “deliberate indifference” when it denied her reasonable accommodation requests—an easier standard to meet. The opinion of the Court (authored by Chief Justice Roberts) noted that the standard that had been advocated by the District was uniquely difficult to satisfy. Outside of the context of elementary and secondary education, claims of disability discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not require a showing of an intent to discriminate, or animus against individuals with disabilities. The Supreme Court found there was no evidence in the statutory language or legislative history that supported imposing such a high burden on students when other groups with disabilities would not be required to show bad faith or gross misjudgment to bring a discrimination claim. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the student and determined that students with disabilities filing claims under these statutes are held to the same standard as other individuals alleging disability discrimination in different contexts.

In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act were enacted with an awareness that discrimination against individuals with disabilities is often the product of neglect and thoughtlessness, rather than deliberate hostility. 

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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Ancel Glink Relaunches "The Workplace Report" Blog

Ancel Glink Relaunches "The Workplace Report" Blog

  Wednesday, June 18, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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We’re excited to share that Ancel Glink has officially relaunched its labor and employment law blog, The Workplace Report! Designed for public sector employers, HR professionals, and attorneys, the blog delivers timely insights on workplace policy developments, legal trends, and key court decisions affecting employers in Illinois and beyond.

Whether you’re navigating complex personnel issues or staying ahead of legislative changes, The Workplace Report is a valuable resource for practical guidance and legal perspective.

Check out the relaunch and subscribe to receive the latest posts directly in your inbox.

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PAC Issues Binding Opinion Finding Public Body Failed to Respond to FOIA Request

PAC Issues Binding Opinion Finding Public Body Failed to Respond to FOIA Request

  Friday, June 13, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 5th binding opinion for 2025, finding a public body in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 25-005. The requester had filed a multi-part FOIA request asking for all emails and texts for a 4 year period between various village officials and employees, payroll records, meeting minutes and ordinances, and resident communications regarding the mayor's salary and for a four year period. When the village failed to respond to the request, the requester filed a "request for review" with the PAC office. The PAC reached out to the village, but according to the opinion, the village did not respond, and the PAC issued this binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA request. Nothing new in this opinion besides a reminder that public bodies have an obligation to respond to FOIA requests.

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Ordinance Prohibiting Yoga Instruction in City Parks Struck Down

Ordinance Prohibiting Yoga Instruction in City Parks Struck Down

  Thursday, June 12, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In an interesting twist (pun intended), a federal court of appeals determined that yoga is a protected free speech activity under the First Amendment in a challenge to a municipality's ordinance that prohibited teaching yoga to four or more persons at City parks and beaches. Hubbard v. City of San Diego, (9th Cir. June 4, 2025)

The City had enacted an ordinance restricting the teaching of yoga on City parks and beaches. After two yoga instructors were informed by park rangers that they could no longer each yoga at City parks, they filed a lawsuit, challenging the ordinance as unconstitutional. The district court ruled in favor of the City, and the yoga instructors appealed.

On appeal, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that yoga is protected by the First Amendment because yoga teachers communicate and disseminate information about yoga’s philosophy and practice through speech and expressive movements. Second, the Court held that the City’s shoreline parks are traditional public forums. Third, the Court determiend that the City’s prohibition on teaching yoga at those parks was content-based, and, therefore, did not qualify as a valid time, place, and manner regulation. As a result, the ordinance was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the First Amendment and, since the City could not demonstrate any plausible connection between the instructors teaching yoga and any threat to public safety and enjoyment in the City’s shoreline parks, the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 

Note that this decision was decided in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, so it is not binding on Illinois, which is in the Seventh Circuit.

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 94: Discussing Supreme Court Decisions at the APA-ISS Conference

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 94: Discussing Supreme Court Decisions at the APA-ISS Conference

  Wednesday, June 11, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink just released its 94th episode of its Quorum Forum Podcast - Episode 94: Recent Supreme Court Decisions. Information about this episode is below.

How can decisions issued by the nation’s highest court impact community development at the local level? Find out as Megan Mack and Erin Monforti join the APA-ISS Spring Planning Conference to discuss two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, City of Grants Pass v. Johnson and Sheetz v. County of El Dorado. 

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Court Dismisses Lawsuit by Former Fire Captain Terminated for Social Media Posts

Court Dismisses Lawsuit by Former Fire Captain Terminated for Social Media Posts

  Tuesday, June 10, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A federal court of appeals recently upheld a municipality's decision to terminate a fire captain for posting content on social media that his employer (the City) found to be offensive attacks on transgender persons. Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg (4th Cir., June 5, 2025).

While employed as a fire captain, Misjuns maintained two Facebook pages - one was a personal page and the other was a public figure page. According to the Court of Appeals opinion, in 2021, Misjuns posted four cartoons on his public figure Facebook page that depicted offensive stereotypes of transgender women in bathrooms and participating in sports. Although Misjuns didn't identify himself as a City employee on his Facebook page, City residents who saw the posts identified him as a City employee, and subsequently filed complaints with the City about the posts.

After Misjuns became aware of the resident complaints, he posted a meme on his Facebook page that stated the following: “In the beginning, God created Adam & Eve. Adam could never be a Madam. Eve could never become Steve. Anyone who tells you otherwise defies the one true God. Threatening anyone for believing & saying this is most likely a hate crime.” 

Following an investigation by the City, Misjuns was terminated, and he filed a lawsuit against the City, claiming the termination constituted a breach of contract, and violated his equal protection rights, as well as his free speech and religion rights under the First Amendment, among other claims. The district court dismissed his claims, and he appealed to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.

First, the Court of Appeals determined that Misjuns failed to adequately plead his First Amendment (free speech and religion) and equal protection claims against the City. To hold a municipality liable for a constitutional civil rights violation, a plaintiff must show that the execution of a policy or custom of the municipality caused the violation, commonly referred to as Monell liability. Here, the Court determined that Misjuns failed to plead Monell liability. 

Second, the Court rejected his claim that the City's employee handbook constituted a binding contract between the City and its employees, so his breach of contract claim also failed.

Finally, the Court rejected his wrongful termination and conspiracy claims since those claims were solely brought against the individual defendants (and not the City), and those defendants had been previously dismissed from the lawsuit. 

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Court Upholds Late Fee for Vehicle Sticker Tax

Court Upholds Late Fee for Vehicle Sticker Tax

  Monday, June 09, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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 An Appellate Court upheld Chicago's city sticker tax (wheel tax) in Zibrat v. City of Chicago.  

The City adopted a "wheel tax license fee" in 2011, and vehicle owners who failed to purchase the city sticker were assessed a late fee. After a vehicle owner purchased the city sticker after the deadline and was assessed a late fee, she filed a lawsuit claiming the late fee was an unconstitutional tax or impermissible fee. The circuit court dismissed the case, finding that although the late fee was a tax, it was not unconstitutional. She appealed, and the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal, finding that whether the late fee was considered a fee, penalty, or tax, it was permissible.

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Court Upholds Denial of FOIA Request Based on Ongoing Law Enforcement Investigation Exemption

Court Upholds Denial of FOIA Request Based on Ongoing Law Enforcement Investigation Exemption

  Friday, June 06, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to separate FOIA requests submitted to a city’s police department and its office of emergency management seeking records regarding a 2021 fatal crash, both public bodies denied the requests because disclosing its responsive records would interfere with a pending or anticipated law enforcement proceeding. After the requester sued both public bodies seeking to compel disclosure of the withheld records, the circuit court ruled in favor of the public bodies, finding that disclosing the withheld records would interfere with an ongoing police investigation concerning a fatal collision, and that the requested body camera (BWC) footage was exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The requester appealed.

On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the public bodies. NBC Subsidiary (WMAQ-TV), LLC v. Chi. Police Dep't & Off. of Emergency Mgmt. 

First, the Appellate Court determined that the affidavit submitted by the police department provided case-specific details demonstrating why and how disclosing its withheld records would interfere with an ongoing police investigation (e.g., disclosing footage could expose witnesses to risk of harm or retaliation because of the primary suspect’s criminal history, alter witness memories and undermine the value of subsequent interviews, alert the suspect that they were being investigation and allow them to evade capture, or give the suspect time to create an alibi or fabricate evidence).

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that he was entitled to receive redacted versions of the withheld records, because the public bodies demonstrated that its responsive records were entirely exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA’s pending or contemplated law enforcement exemption, because the court held that this particular FOIA exemption broadly protects entire records, in contrast to other FOIA exemptions which generally authorize redacting only discrete exempt information contained in records.

Third, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the police department’s prior disclosure of information concerning the accident undermined its argument that disclosing the withheld records at issue would interfere with an ongoing police investigation. The Appellate Court explained that the police department’s prior, more limited disclosure of information about the accident in a crash report and a community alert did not eliminate the risk of interference to the police department’s pending investigation if the department were forced to disclose the more detailed records at issue.

Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the body camera recordings capturing witness statements should have been disclosed, because the witnesses made their statements to police officers on a public street and allegedly did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their statements. The Appellate Court explained that reasonable people in the position of the witnesses would reasonably expect that their statements would not be publicly disclosed, because disclosure could expose them to acts of retaliation and otherwise depict the witnesses in a vulnerable state after witnessing a traumatic accident. Therefore, because the witnesses captured in the withheld BWC recordings had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the recordings, and the witnesses did not provide their written consent to disclose the recordings, the public bodies properly withheld the BWC recordings from disclosure.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Bill Requiring Local Libraries to Stock “Opioid Antagonists” Passes Both Houses of General Assembly

Bill Requiring Local Libraries to Stock “Opioid Antagonists” Passes Both Houses of General Assembly

  Thursday, June 05, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The spring 2025 legislative session of the Illinois General Assembly has come to an end after months of debate on a wide variety of proposed legislation. One update that caught our attention is the unanimous approval of House Bill 1910 (Bill) by both chambers. If signed by the Governor, this Bill would amend the Local Library Act to require all "libraries open to the public" to maintain a supply of approved “opioid antagonists,” such as Naloxone (Narcan), for use in assisting individuals experiencing an opioid overdose.

The Bill requires libraries to take all reasonable steps to make sure that, during operating hours, there is at least one person present in the library trained to (1) recognize and respond to an opioid overdose and (2) administer the opioid antagonist to reverse the effects of the overdose. Library personnel may administer an opioid antagonist to any person who they believe is experiencing an overdose on library property or at a library-sponsored event. The Bill provides immunity for libraries and their personnel related to the administration of an opioid antagonist, except in situations where they engage in willful or wanton misconduct.

After reviewing the Bill, we want to flag two items of interest for our readers. 

First, the Bill only amends the Local Library Act, and there appears to be no corresponding legislation to amend the Public Library District Act. While the Bill states that these new requirements apply to "[a]ll libraries open to the general public" in Illinois, the Local Library Act (the only statute this Bill amends) only covers public libraries established under the Local Library Act and not library districts. This raises a question as to the scope of the Bill's application, given the inconsistency of language used in the Bill (applies to all public libraries) and the only statute the Bill proposes to amend (the Local Library Act).

Additionally, the Bill provides that libraries may obtain an approved opioid antagonist from “any lawful source,” but does not reference funding to cover the cost of the medication or training for library personnel. Absent further legislation, grants, or other opportunities for funding, libraries may need to be prepared to cover the costs associated with compliance.

The Bill has been sent to Governor Pritzker for consideration. If the Bill is signed into law, Illinois libraries (at the very least, those libraries established under the Local Library Act) will need to stock a supply of opioid antagonists, work with staff to complete the required training, and otherwise ensure compliance with the requirements of the new law. 

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Seventh Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of Indiana’s Buffer Law

Seventh Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of Indiana’s Buffer Law

  Wednesday, June 04, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The State of Indiana has a "buffer law" that makes it a crime for a person to knowingly or intentionally approach an officer who is “lawfully engaged in the execution of the law enforcement officer’s duties after the law enforcement officer has ordered the person to stop approaching.” A citizen journalist who maintains a YouTube channel with over 23,000 subscribers, records and livestreams police conduct in the City, was told by City police officers to move backwards while he was recording the police after shots were fired, invoking the buffer law. The citizen journalist filed a lawsuit against the City, bringing a "facial challenge" to the buffer law, meaning he challenged its constitutionality "on its face” rather than as it was applied to him specifically. The district court ruled in favor of the City, finding the buffer law to be constitutional because it only had an “incidental effect” on the public’s First Amendment right to record and scrutinize police activity. He appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the ruling in favor of the City. First, the Seventh Circuit determined that the buffer law was content-neutral, because it regulates all forms of speech equally. 

Next, the Seventh Circuit determined that the law was narrowly tailored because it does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s interests in passing the law. The Court found that the buffer law reasonably served the government’s interest in maintaining police, citizen, and onlooker safety and protecting the integrity of police investigation. Because the law still allows those who are already present and recording to continue doing so beyond the buffer area, the Court held that the law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary.

Finally, the Court determined there were adequate open alternative channels of communication because under the buffer law, an onlooker could stay in place and record, or move to a different location to record, as long as they were not approaching an officer after being told to stop. As a result, the Seventh Circuit upheld the state's buffer law finding it to be a reasonable "time, place, and manner" restriction within the bounds of the First Amendment. Nicodemus v. City of South Bend, Indiana, No. 24-1099 (7th Cir. 2025)

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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School Board Member's Blocking of Users on Social Media Violated First Amendment

School Board Member's Blocking of Users on Social Media Violated First Amendment

  Tuesday, June 03, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Last March, we reported on two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court addressing challenges to government officials' deletion of comments and blocking of users from their personal social media pages. (Lindke v. Freed and Garnier v. O'Connor-Ratcliff). The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a new two-part test for when a government official's social media activities on their personal accounts might tigger the First Amendment. The Court held that a government official can be liable under the First Amendment for actions taken on their personal social media accounts if (1) the official had the authority to speak on behalf of the government and (2) the official exercises that authority. The Supreme Court then remanded the two cases back to the lower courts to apply the new test.

Last month, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in the Garnier v. O'Connor-Ratcliff case. That case involved a challenge to two school board members who had blocked parents from their personal social media pages. The Ninth Circuit applied the U.S. Supreme Court's new two-part test. First, the Ninth Circuit held that one of the board members (the school board president) had actual authority to speak on the school district's behalf through California state statute and the school district's bylaws that encouraged electronic communication of school business and delegated communication authority to the board president. Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the board president was purporting to exercise that official authority on the president's social media accounts when she regularly communicated about district business, and had no disclaimer that her views were personal rather than official. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the board president's social media activities constituted "state action" under the civil rights statute and, as a result, the First Amendment limited her abilities to delete comments or block users if those actions would violate users' free speech rights. The Ninth Circuit found the case against the other board member was moot because he was no longer on the school board.

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that public officials can limit the risk of liability as the U.S. Supreme Court advised last year, stating as follows:

We emphasize that public officials assuredly do have the right to speak on public affairs, including issues related to their official duties, in their personal capacity. As the Supreme Court advised in Lindke, public officials can limit the risk of liability for personal speech on social media by, for instance, “keep[ing] personal posts in a clearly designated personal account,” including a disclaimer, or refraining from labelling their personal pages as official means of communication. (cite omitted)

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Illinois Supreme Court Upholds Village's Prosecution of Cannabis DUI For Driver’s Education Student

Illinois Supreme Court Upholds Village's Prosecution of Cannabis DUI For Driver’s Education Student

  Monday, June 02, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In Village of Lincolnshire v. Olvera the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a 16-year-old high school student for driving under the influence (DUI) during a driver’s education class. 

The Village brought state DUI charges against the student, who was later found guilty in a bench trial. The student appealed and his case made its way to the Illinois Supreme Court, where he argued that (i) the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI and (ii) there was insufficient evidence to prove he was under the influence of cannabis.

The student claimed that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI because it failed to present written permission from the State to prosecute the case under state statute. He argued that the Village was required to submit evidence of its written permission into the record during trial. Both the Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that the statute does not require the Village to submit written authority into the record at trial.

The student also argued that the Village failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of cannabis, and that it was to a degree that “rendered him incapable of safely driving.” The Illinois Supreme Court noted that at trial, the Village presented testimony from the driving instructor, who observed the defendant’s erratic driving, head slumping, nervousness, and failure to stop the vehicle, which required the instructor to manually intervene several times by grabbing the wheel or applying the instructor-side brake. The instructor testified that by itself this behavior is often observed in any nervous inexperienced driver, however additional evidence supported the DUI charge, including the student's failure of multiple field sobriety tests administered by the school resource officer. Although, the student did not exhibit the smell of burnt cannabis, a student safety search revealed a “joint” in his wallet. Also, the student acknowledged possession of marijuana and admitted to the Dean of Students that he had used marijuana the night before. Surveillance footage from the high school was admitted into evidence showing the student stumbling through the school hallways before exiting to the driver’s education vehicle.

When viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the student was under influence of cannabis and was incapable of safely driving, upholding his conviction.

Post Authored by Glen Batista and Megan Mack, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Court Upholds Zoning Board's Denial of Variance for Accessory Structure

In the Zone: Court Upholds Zoning Board's Denial of Variance for Accessory Structure

  Friday, May 30, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In 2022, building plans were submitted to the County for approval of a proposed reconstruction of a boathouse. According to the relevant County ordinances, in order for a structure to qualify as a boathouse, it must be used to store boats, may not contain other rooms, must be built over an earthen floor or water slip, and may not be used for human habitation. If a structure does not qualify as a boathouse under the regulations, it must be built at least 30 feet from the shoreline, unless it is granted a variance.

The building plans that were submitted to the County depicted a structure with two stories, an enclosed wooden floor that was heated, windows, recessed lighting, cabinetry, sky lights, ceiling fans, and a door – all of which indicated atypical features and activities for boathouses. The building plans also depicted people congregating inside the structure, indicating that it was intended to be used for human habitation. For these reasons, the County Zoning Board decided that the structure was not a boathouse under the County’s regulations and was, therefore, subject to the 30-foot setback requirement.

The builders also sought a variance for their structure to avoid the 30-foot setback requirement. The builders argued that because the area 30 feet from the shoreline was particularly steep, exceptional circumstances and practical difficulties existed in adhering to the setback requirement to justify a variance. The builders also argued that their plan was harmonious with the purpose of the regulations because the structure would not be used for habitation and because the large floor plan was justified by their extensive storage needs.

The Zoning Board denied the variance, finding that there was nothing so unique about the builders’ property that would not allow them to either build the structure 30 feet from the shoreline or modify their plans so that the structure would qualify as a boathouse. On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the Zoning Board's decision, finding, among other things, that a builder's dissatisfaction with the County's zoning regulations and personal preferences do not “manufacture a practical hardship justifying a variance.” Atwater v. Lake Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2025 IL App (2d) 240276-U.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Seventh Circuit Rules in Favor of Federal Agency in Federal FOIA Dispute

Seventh Circuit Rules in Favor of Federal Agency in Federal FOIA Dispute

  Thursday, May 29, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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After a federal law enforcement agency did not respond to a FOIA request seeking records relating to a named person and his application for legal permanent residency, the requester filed a lawsuit claiming the agency violated the federal FOIA statute. During the litigation, the agency disclosed several responsive records, but withheld others citing a federal FOIA exemption that protects certain law enforcement records related to ongoing enforcement proceedings. The district court ruled that (1) the requester was not entitled to a declaratory judgement that ICE violated FOIA solely because ICE did not timely respond to his FOIA request, (2) that ICE properly withheld certain records under the federal FOIA statute, but needed to disclose certain personal information about the requester within the records, and (3) that the FOIA statute provides an adequate remedy for delayed disclosures, which precluded the requester’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act.

After the requester appealed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s rulings. Libarov v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf't. First, the Seventh Circuit rejected the requester’s argument that he was entitled to relief because the request became moot once the agency disclosed its responsive records, and there was no “case or controversy” regarding the adequacy of the records disclosed, so the requestor could not seek a declaratory judgment resulting solely from a delayed response. 

Second, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the agency properly withheld some records under the law enforcement exemption because the district court had reviewed the record in camera, and had an adequate factual basis to determine that (1) the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes and (2) disclosing parts of the records could reasonably be expected to interfere with the agency’s enforcement proceedings.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the requestor could not seek relief under the Administrative Procedure Act for a violation of FOIA, because the FOIA statute provided an adequate remedy to a requester seeking the disclosure of documents, namely a court order requiring compliance with FOIA.

Although this case interprets the federal FOIA statute, the Illinois FOIA statute is patterned after the federal statute, so decisions interpreting federal FOIA are sometimes relevant to construing similar provisions in the Illinois law.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Fifth Circuit Dismisses Patron Free Speech Challenge to Library Book Removal Decision

Fifth Circuit Dismisses Patron Free Speech Challenge to Library Book Removal Decision

  Wednesday, May 28, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A federal court of appeals issued a ruling last week dismissing a First Amendment lawsuit brought by library patrons to challenge the removal of certain books from a public library in Texas on free speech grounds. Little, et al. v. Llano County, et al.

Library patrons sued the librarian and board members of a county public library after the library officials removed 17 books because of their treatment of racial and sexual themes. The patrons claimed that the removal of these books violated their right to receive information under the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The federal district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction against the library. 

Last year, a panel of the Fifth Circuit upheld the federal court's injunction. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted an "en banc" rehearing of the appeal, and last week issued a lengthy ruling holding that the "right of information" does not apply to a public library's decision to remove books. Instead, the court of appeals determined that the library's collection decisions are government speech and, therefore, not subject to free speech protections under the First Amendment. 

The court of appeals also rejected the patrons claims that the library's actions were in the nature of book banning, holding that patrons could still purchase the removed books from a bookstore or online. 

The court of appeals also determined that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico (a school book removal case) carries "no precedential weight" in the Fifth Circuit. The court of appeals also overruled a 30 year old decision in their own circuit court (Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School) that found unconstitutional a school's book removal decision, finding that this case created confusion because libraries are not able to determine whether a book removal violates the First Amendment.

There were a number of justices who joined in a dissenting opinion that disagreed with the majority's ruling. The dissenting justices would apply the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Pico and find that the book removal decision of the county library was based on discriminatory intent rather than simply "weeding" books from the library's collections. The dissenting justices would also have left in place the 30 year old Fifth Circuit decision in Campbell that the majority overruled.

This decision is limited to the Fifth Circuit and the three states within its jurisdiction (Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana), and does not apply in Illinois. However, because the decision appears to limit the Pico decision on book removals that was previous issued by the U.S. Supreme Court, this case might make its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which could have an impact on Illinois libraries.

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Court Upholds Denial of Police Officer’s Line-of-Duty Disability Benefits

Court Upholds Denial of Police Officer’s Line-of-Duty Disability Benefits

  Friday, May 23, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A police officer filed an application for line-of-duty disability benefits after being injured during mandatory “wellness and resiliency” training, which involved classroom instruction and stretching, yoga, and other physical movements. During the stretches, the officer experienced back pain and was later diagnosed with various spinal conditions, undergoing two unsuccessful surgeries. Despite receiving treatment, the officer was unable to return to work with the police department.

The Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (Pension Board) found that the officer was entitled to ordinary disability benefits, but denied her duty disability benefits because her injury did not result from an “act of police duty inherently involving special risk,” as required by the Illinois Pension Code. Ordinary disability benefits are 50% of the officer’s salary, as opposed to 75% for duty disability benefits.

On appeal, both the circuit court and the appellate court affirmed the Pension Board’s denial of the officer’s duty benefits. To determine if an officer is injured “in the performance of an act of duty” to be eligible for duty disability benefits, courts look at the capacity in which the officer was acting when injured, rather than the precise physical act that caused the injury. Here, the courts found that the officer was stretching and performing breathing exercises while dressed in plain clothes, for the purpose of relaxing and living a healthier lifestyle. As a result, the courts found that the officer was injured in the capacity of an individual seeking to calm herself and live a healthier lifestyle, as any regular civilian might do – but not in a police officer capacity. Additionally, although the training was mandatory, an activity being mandatory does not automatically make it an “act of duty” when the activity has a clear counterpart in civilian life. Gonzales v. Retirement Bd. of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 2025 IL App (1st) 242166-U.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Police Department in Violation of FOIA for Withholding Arrest Video

PAC Finds Police Department in Violation of FOIA for Withholding Arrest Video

  Thursday, May 22, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A municipal police department denied a FOIA request seeking a video recording of a former deputy chief's DUI arrest citing Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA, which exempts records relating to a public body's adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases. After the requester submitted a request for review with the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) challenging the denial, the PAC issued its fourth binding opinion of 2025 concluding that the Village improperly withheld the video recording. PAC Op. 25-004.

The Village argued that because the video recording was used as evidence in an adjudicatory proceeding to determine the appropriate disciplinary measures to impose against the former deputy chief, that the recording was therefore “related to” an adjudicatory proceeding of an employee disciplinary matter. However, the PAC disagreed that the video was “related to” the adjudicatory proceeding, because it was created before any disciplinary proceeding took place and existed independently on the subsequent adjudication. Instead, the PAC determined that records can only "relate to" an adjudication within the meaning of the FOIA exemption contained in Section 7(l)(n) if they are created in the process of conducting the adjudication itself.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Court Upholds Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Against Sheriff's Office

Court Upholds Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Against Sheriff's Office

  Wednesday, May 14, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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 An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit challenging a sheriff's department's response to a FOIA request in Tynis v. McHenry County Sheriff's Department. 

An inmate in county jail filed a FOIA request with a county sheriff's department seeking certain electronic communications and other records relating to a specific police report. The sheriff responded that (1) it had no text messages responsive to the request, (2) it released a copy of certain redacted emails; and (3) it withheld certain records because they contained confidential witness and juvenile information, LEADS records protected by state law, among other exempt information under FOIA and other laws. 

The inmate filed a lawsuit against the sheriff's office asking the court to order the release of the requested records and to award him fees and costs. The sheriff's office filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. While that motion was pending, the court reviewed the unredacted records "in camera" (a confidential review outside of public view) and found the sheriff's office in compliance with FOIA when it redacted and/or withheld information that was exempt under FOIA and other applicable laws. As a result, the court dismissed the FOIA complaint, and the inmate appealed.

On appeal, the Appellate Court determined that the sheriff's redaction of email addresses, the address and phone number of the victim, and certain investigatory information from the responsive records was proper, as this information was exempt from FOIA. The Appellate Court also upheld the sheriff's decision to withhold LEADS information as that information is prohibited from release under state law. Finally, the Court determined that an award of fees and costs was not appropriate as the inmate did not prevail in the proceeding since the trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was proper. 

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep 93: APA-CMS Bar Exam

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep 93: APA-CMS Bar Exam

  Monday, May 05, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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 Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast just released Episode 93: 2025 APA-CMS Bar Exam.

The American Planning Association Chicago Metro Section recently teamed up with Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast for the 10^th annual “Bar Exam” planning law session. This event is a realistic simulated law school experience testing planners and land use professionals on important planning law cases on group housing, short-term rentals, and more! The 2025 session featured in this episode was recorded live at One Lake Brewing in Oak Park. As is tradition, everyone literally "passed the bar" after attending this session. This episode also marks seven years of Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum podcast! 

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PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA For Not Responding

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA For Not Responding

  Thursday, May 01, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A requester filed a FOIA request with a transit authority asking for certain records relating to the authority's use of security K-9 animals. The requester filed a request for review with the PAC claiming the transit authority violated FOIA by failing to respond to the FOIA request. In the PAC’s third binding opinion of 2025, the PAC concluded that the transit authority violated FOIA by not timely complying with or denying the FOIA request. PAC Op. 25-003. 

While this opinion does not provide any new guidance to public bodies in complying with FOIA that hasn't already been said through other binding opinions, it is a reminder to public bodies that they are obligated to respond to FOIA requests in a timely manner or utilize the various extension or other provisions of FOIA to provide additional time for response. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Village’s Claims Related to Annexation Agreements

In the Zone: Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Village’s Claims Related to Annexation Agreements

  Tuesday, April 29, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court dismissed a lawsuit filed by a municipality asking the court to enforce terms in annexation agreements relating to a land donation from a developer and university foundation. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Northern Illinois University Foundation.

In 1999, the Village and Northern Illinois University Foundation (Foundation) entered into an annexation agreement to construct a Northern Illinois University (NIU) branch in exchange for annexing 342 acres into the Village. The agreement stated if a certain 20-acre parcel (the old parcel) was not developed as a NIU branch within ten years, the parcel would be donated to the Village. In 2005, the Village, Foundation, and a developer entered into a second agreement. This agreement amended certain provisions of the 1999 agreement including a provision that the Foundation would exchange the old parcel to the developer in exchange for the developer deeding a different parcel to NIU (the new parcel).

In 2021, after NIU failed to build a branch on the new parcel, the Village sued to demand the Foundation donate the new parcel to the Village. The trial court dismissed the Village’s lawsuit, finding that the 2005 agreement was an amendment to the 1999 agreement that continued its terms except for the provisions related to donations, and the 2005 agreement did not obligate the Foundation to donate any parcel to the Village. The trial court also dismissed the Village’s claim for unjust enrichment because the statute of limitations had passed.

On appeal, the Appellate Court found the two agreements clear and unambiguous. The Appellate Court found that the 2005 Agreement had express provisions that stated it was the complete agreement of the parties, and because the 2005 Agreement had no requirement for the Foundation to donate the new parcel to the Village, there was no basis for the Village to receive a land donation. Further, the Appellate Court rejected the Village’s claim that the developer was bound to the land donation terms of the 1999 agreement because the Village admitted in a court filing that the 2005 agreement superseded the prior terms. Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the Village’s argument that the Court’s decision violated the public interest element of annexation agreements because the Village did not previously raise that issue before the trial court.  

Post Authored by Daniel Lev, Ancel Glink

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Appellate Court Upholds Demolition Order for Hotel in Violation of City Codes

Appellate Court Upholds Demolition Order for Hotel in Violation of City Codes

  Monday, April 28, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a trial court's demolition order against a hotel cited for numerous unabated municipal code violations. City of South Beloit v. New Charter Group, Inc.

City code enforcement officers inspected the hotel several times in 2019 and issued numerous citations to the hotel owner for violations of the City’s property maintenance and building codes. The hotel was ultimately condemned and declared unfit for occupancy until the hotel owner made repairs and corrected the code violations. In 2021, the City engineer inspected the hotel and prepared a report estimating the repair costs to correct the City code violations would cost approximately $7 million. The hotel’s assessed property value in 2023 was $499,836.

The City filed a lawsuit seeking a demolition order from the court and assessment of fines against the hotel owner for past and continued code violations. Based on testimony from the City’s code official and engineer, the trial court found the hotel was dangerous, unsafe beyond reasonable repair, and that the repair costs far exceeded the hotel’s current value. As a result, the court granted the City’s demolition order and awarded the City fines exceeding $8 million for the code violations.

On appeal, the hotel owner argued the City failed to prove the repair costs exceeded the hotel’s value, that the City assumed control of the hotel and blocked repairs from being made, and that the City failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. 

The Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision and upheld the City’s demolition order.

First, the Appellate Court rejected the hotel owner’s argument that the City failed to prove repair costs exceeded the hotel’s value, finding that the trial court reasonably relied on the City engineer’s estimate of repair costs as he testified that he was familiar with local construction costs. 

Second, the Appellate Court held that the City only prohibited occupancy of the hotel by guests and did not prohibit the hotel owner from accessing the hotel to make repairs and remedy the code violations at the property. Additionally, the Court ruled the hotel owner failed to show the asserted defense of “unclean hands” applied to a demolition order and assessment of fines for code violations. The Appellate Court also found that the City provided adequate notice of the code violations at the hotel by citing the specific municipal code sections the hotel owner allegedly violated in the citation notices. 

Finally, the Appellate Court ruled the City was not required to exhaust administrative remedies as state law permits municipalities to also enforce local ordinance violations through lawsuits filed in a circuit court.

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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Federal District Court Allows Public Employee’s First Amendment Claim to Proceed to Trial

Federal District Court Allows Public Employee’s First Amendment Claim to Proceed to Trial

  Thursday, April 24, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Recently, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (District Court) issued an opinion allowing a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed to trial. Caparelli-Ruff v. Bd. of Educ. of East Aurora Sch. Dist. 131.

The Executive Director of Student Services (Director) of a school district (School District) was employed by the School District under a one-year contract for the 2021-2022 school year. In the spring of 2022, the Director began her campaign for County Regional Superintendent of Schools—a position unrelated to her employment with the School District.

To raise campaign contributions, the Director held a gun raffle, which she advertised on her personal Facebook page. Within weeks of posting the advertisement, the Director was placed on paid administrative leave for the remaining term of her employment contract with the School District. The Director filed a lawsuit against the School District, claiming she was terminated (and her contract was not renewed) in retaliation for her post about the gun raffle. The Director argued that the School District’s actions violated her First Amendment right to free speech and constituted a breach of her employment contract. The School District defended its decision to place the Director on leave and not rehire her for the following school year because of her poor performance (and not her speech activity). 

The District Court ruled in favor of the School District on the breach of contract claims, finding that the Director’s contract did not entitle her to automatic renewal of her employment for the following school year. Because the Director could not establish that her employment contract was breached, or that the School District had agreed to retain her for the following school year, her contract claims were dismissed. 

On the Director’s First Amendment retaliation claim, however, the District Court denied the School District's motion for summary judgment and allowed that claim to move forward to trial. The Court undertook a balancing test to evaluate whether the Director’s interest in speaking as a private citizen outweighed the School District’s interest in maintaining orderly operations. 

First, the Court found that the raffle advertisement was clearly posted in the Director’s personal capacity, since it related to her campaign for public office that was separate from her employment.

Second, in evaluating whether the Director’s post interfered with the School District’s operations, the District Court considered the actual impact of her post on the school community based on several factors, including (1) whether the post disrupted harmony among co-workers, (2) whether the post interfered with the Director’s job duties, and (3) the context of the post, among others.

The School District argued that the advertisement was very disruptive, since it was posted around the same time of the school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, in May 2022 and staff had raised concerns about the Director’s judgment in advertising a gun raffle at that time. The Director argued that the School District had taken the post out of context: the post was made to her personal Facebook page, and she had not discussed the raffle while at work. Furthermore, her campaign did not impact her ability to do her job as Director. Taking all of these factors into consideration, the District Court found that the School District was unable to demonstrate that the post unduly interfered with its operations or the Director’s performance of her duties. Because the School District had not shown that its interests outweighed those of the Director in speaking freely, it did not meet its burden for summary judgment.

For these reasons, the District Court determined that the Director’s First Amendment retaliation claim could move forward to trial.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Appellate Court Overturns ZBA’s Decision Concerning Special Use Permit for Clinic

In the Zone: Appellate Court Overturns ZBA’s Decision Concerning Special Use Permit for Clinic

  Tuesday, April 22, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently overturned a municipality's zoning determination that a property owner complied with the terms of a preexisting special use permit for the property. Rylatt v. Christensen

A doctor purchased a home that was subject to a preexisting special use permit (SUP) to allow a medical clinic (chiropractor) to operate as a home occupation, which included a variance to permit one nonresident of the home to work in the clinic. The doctor who purchased the property planned to operate a family planning clinic on the property. Initially, the city zoning official determined that the proposed business did not comply with the SUP because no employee would reside at the home so it could not qualify as a home occupation. After several discussions, the doctor stated that one of the clinic employees would reside at the property, and the City found the proposed use would comply with the SUP’s requirements.

A group of plaintiffs appealed the zoning official’s determination, arguing the proposed clinic would negatively impact neighboring properties, and the City's ZBA held a hearing on that appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ZBA upheld the determination that the clinic conformed with the SUP and found that none of plaintiffs had standing to challenge the determination.

Plaintiffs then filed a lawsuit to challenge the ZBA's rulings. The trial court dismissed the case and upheld the ZBA's decision that plaintiffs had no standing and dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining claim that the ZBA violated state law. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court found that the plaintiffs who resided within 550 feet of the clinic raised sufficient arguments about the potential impact of the clinic on his home to have standing to challenge the City's determination before the ZBA. However, the Appellate Court upheld the ZBA's finding that the other plaintiffs had no standing.  The Appellate Court provided a detailed discussion of the factors used in determining standing in these type of cases, with a thorough analysis of the standing cases.

The Appellate Court also held that the ZBA erred in affirming the zoning determination that the clinic was consistent with the SUP’s terms. The Court expressed concerns that the original SUP was never produced, making it difficult to justify the City's detemination that its terms were complied with. Also, the Court determined that there was no evidence the doctor would work or live on property, unlike the previous property owner. The Court noted that there was a lot of information lacking with regard to the SUP and the proposed use, and the Court was skeptical about the City official's testimony about his interpretation of the City's code in making the determination.

As a result, the Appellate Court overturned the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal of the ZBA's determination and sent the case back to the trial court.

Post Authored by Dan Lev & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Court Interprets Procedural Requirements in Civil Forfeiture Statute

Court Interprets Procedural Requirements in Civil Forfeiture Statute

  Thursday, April 17, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Last January, police arrested a driver for driving under the influence. The driver was charged with aggravated DUI because he was driving with a suspended license from a prior DUI offense, and his truck was not insured at the time of the arrest. The police also seized the truck the Defendant was driving pursuant to state civil forfeiture of vehicle laws. 720 ILCS 5/36-1.5(a)

A month after the arrest, the State filed notice and a petition for preliminary determination of probable cause at the court’s next available hearing, which was 18 days after police seized the driver's truck. State law required the State to “seek” a preliminary determination over whether the police had probable cause to seize property within 14 days of taking it. 

At the hearing, the driver asked the court to dismiss the action, arguing that because more than 14 days had passed since police seized his truck, it did not comply with state law. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the petition was filed on time, and that probable cause existed for the police to seize the vehicle. 

On appeal, the main question was whether the State was required to obtain a preliminary determination of probable cause within 14 days of seizing the truck, or if requesting a hearing within that time frame was enough to satisfy the statutory requirement. This question turned on the meaning of the word “seek” in the statute. The driver argued that “seek” meant the State had to obtain a court ruling on probable cause to satisfy the requirement. However, the Appellate Court determined that the word “seek” only required the State to “request or try to acquire” a preliminary determination on probable cause within the 14-day time frame. As a result, the Appellate Court held that the State satisfied the statutory requirement by requesting a hearing within the 14-day period. Illinois v. 2008 Ford F-250 Super Duty, 2025 IL App 3d 240194.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Illinois Supreme Court Dismisses Redistricting Challenge to State Legislative Maps

Illinois Supreme Court Dismisses Redistricting Challenge to State Legislative Maps

  Friday, April 11, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Supreme Court issued a ruling addressing time requirements for bringing constitutional challenges to a legislative redistricting plan adopted by the Illinois General Assembly. McCombie v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections.

Following the 2020 decennial census, the Illinois General Assembly adopted a redistricting plan (2021 Map) drawing new legislative districts to elect state representatives and state senators beginning at the 2022 general election. Plaintiffs challenged the 2021 Map arguing it was unconstitutional as the new legislative districts were not compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population as required under the Illinois Constitution. Additionally, Plaintiffs argued the 2021 Map was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander that denied voters and Republican candidates for the General Assembly a fair election.

The Illinois Speaker of the House and Illinois Senate President intervened in the case arguing the Plaintiff’s lawsuit was not timely filed and was barred under a latches defense because they had filed their  lawsuit more than three years since the 2021 Map was first adopted and two elections for General Assembly members had occurred based on the 2021 Map. The intervenors argued the lawsuit should be dismissed under their laches defense because Plaintiffs lacked due diligence in bringing their lawsuit and the opposing party experienced prejudice due to the delay.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled against Plaintiffs and dismissed the lawsuit based on a laches defense. The Court noted Plaintiffs could have challenged the 2021 Map when it was first adopted and that waiting multiple election cycles to reveal the effects of the redistricting was unpersuasive. According to the Court, allowing Plaintiffs to challenge the 2021 Map now “would be prejudicial and create uncertainty for voters and officeholders alike, now and in the future, as to whether any redistricting plan in Illinois is ever final.”

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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Quorum Forum Podcast: Episode 92: Not in my Park!

Quorum Forum Podcast: Episode 92: Not in my Park!

  Monday, April 07, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast just released Episode 92: Not in My Park! Regulating Controversial Park Activities

Park agencies manage many acres of public space where sometimes controversial activities take place. What authority does your organization have to address E-Scooters & E-Bikes, First Amendment activities, public camping and more? Find out as Ancel Glink attorneys Megan Mack, Erin Monforti, and Tyler Smith join Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast to present “Not in my Park!” at the 2025 IAPD/IPRA Soaring to New Heights Conference! 

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Court Dismisses Candidate's Appeal of Electoral Board Decision for Late Filing and Failure to Serve

Court Dismisses Candidate's Appeal of Electoral Board Decision for Late Filing and Failure to Serve

  Thursday, April 03, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A candidate (Candidate) filed nomination papers to run for the office of Township Supervisor. An objection to the Candidate’s nomination was filed, based on a violation of section 10-4 of the Election Code (regarding form of petitions for nomination). The Electoral Board sustained the objection, finding that the Candidate’s nomination papers were invalid.

The Candidate, with legal representation, appealed the Electoral Board’s decision, but the appeal was not timely filed as it was filed more than five days after the decision and he included no proof of service in the filing. The Candidate then filed a series of motions pro se (without legal representation), including a motion to amend his appeal, claiming his lawyer was responsible for the delay in filing and seeking to delete all references to the lawyer. The Candidate also filed “proof of delivery” with the motions, but that proof did not indicate that the parties were actually served in compliance with the statutory requirements.

The Electoral Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to review its decision because the Candidate failed to file his petition in time and to properly serve the parties. In response, the Candidate did not dispute that he filed the petition late, but argued his attorney’s misconduct caused the delay, so he should not be penalized. The trial court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Electoral Board that it did not have jurisdiction to review the matter.

The Candidate appealed that decision. The Candidate argued that the trial court failed to consider the impact of his attorney’s conduct, and asked that the dismissal of his appeal be overturned. He cited several cases to support his argument that the filing requirement should have been relaxed due to his attorney’s actions. However, the Appellate Court found that the cases he cited did not exist, except for a U.S. Supreme Court case that dealt with federal law rather than Illinois law. Because the Candidate filed his appeal of the Electoral Board’s decision late, and because he never properly served the parties by registered or certified mail, the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the Candidate's appeal. Moore v. Thornton Township Electoral Board, 2025 IL App (1st) 250349-U

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Police Department in Violation of FOIA in Withholding Resignation and Termination Records

PAC Finds Police Department in Violation of FOIA in Withholding Resignation and Termination Records

  Wednesday, April 02, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request seeking copies of resignation/termination records and payroll records for city law enforcement officers, a city police department (Department) disclosed the payroll records, but withheld resignation/termination records citing various exemptions under FOIA. After the requestor appealed to the Public Access Counselor of the Attorney General's Office (PAC), the PAC issued binding opinion PAC Op. 25-002 finding that the Department improperly withheld its responsive termination/resignation records.

First, the PAC determined that the Department did not provide detailed factual basis demonstrating how and why disclosing its withheld termination/resignation records would interfere with either (1) a pending or actually and reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceeding or (2) an active administrative enforcement proceeding. Even if the Department had established the existence of an active administrative enforcement proceeding, the PAC opined that the Department improperly withheld its records under a cited exemption because they were not created in the course of that proceeding.

The PAC also rejected the Department’s argument that disclosing the withheld records would create a substantial likelihood of depriving people of a fair trial or an impartial hearing, because the Department did not demonstrate that (1) a trial or adjudication was pending or imminent, and (2) that is was more probable than not that disclosing the records would interfere with a fair trial of impartial hearing. Notably, the PAC stated that the existence of a pending investigation/proceeding or the possibility of criminal charges being filed is not sufficient to establish that a trial is “pending or imminent” for purposes of Section 7(1)(d)(iii) of FOIA.

The PAC also rejected the Department’s argument that the resignation/termination records were confidential and not subject to disclosure under Section 7(1)(d-6) of FOIA, which exempts:

Records contained in the Officer Professional Conduct Database (Database) under Section 9.2 of the Illinois Police Training Act (Act), except to the extent authorized under Section 9.2 of the Act.

Although Section 9.2(c) of the Act generally requires the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board (Board) to maintain the confidentiality of certain local law enforcement records that are obtained by or disclosed to the Board, these confidentiality restrictions prohibit the Board, not local law enforcement entities, from disclosing public records shared with the Board. Because the Act expressly states that local law enforcement agencies are not exempt from disclosing public records subject to FOIA, the PAC reasoned that the Department was authorized to disclose its responsive termination/resignation records, even if those records had been shared with the Board. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Appellate Court Decides Damages Claims in Development Agreement Dispute

In the Zone: Appellate Court Decides Damages Claims in Development Agreement Dispute

  Tuesday, April 01, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A developer entered into a 2012 development agreement with a Village to, among other things, purchase property and grade it for the Village’s later use. The agreement required the developer to transfer the property to the Village within three years. This development agreement resulted in years of litigation between the parties, which recently resulted in an Appellate Court decision on the issue of damages for the breach of contract claims. PML Development, LLC v. Village of Hawthorn Woods.

In 2015, the developer filed a lawsuit against the Village claiming that while it was working on the property, the Village issued restricting permits and stop-work orders while it developed a plan for its use of the property, which it claims interfered with the work on the property and caused it to incur additional costs. The Village filed a counterclaim against the developer, alleging that the developer failed to repair the road leading to the property, failed to pay taxes on the property, and the failure to fund the project draw-down account.

In 2020, the trial court found both parties in material breach of the agreement and both parties appealed. In a previous ruling, the Appellate Court agreed that both parties were in breach but held that neither was entitled to damages. The case made its way to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that both parties alleged viable breach of contract claims and remanded the case back to the trial court to hear and decide the parties' damages claims. We reported on the previous Appellate Court decision here and the Illinois Supreme Court's decision here. 

On remand from the Illinois Supreme Court, the trial court awarded $5,349,677.70 to the developer for costs incurred as a result of the Village’s interference with the development, and $408,000.00 to the Village for the developer’s failure to fund the draw-down account and the failure to repair the road. The developer was awarded attorneys fees for the initial proceedings, but the court denied the request for additional fees. Both parties appealed.

On appeal, the Village contends the developer was not entitled to any damages because it did not establish damages to a reasonable degree of certainty because it had no history of profits. The Appellate Court reviewed the developer’s expert witness testimony and held that the damages were not based entirely on speculation and the calculations were credible. The Village also argued that the trial court erred because it did not award damages for the developer’s failure to convey the property. The Appellate Court held that the Village was not entitled to these damages because it did not pursue monetary damages on this issue until the final appeal.

The developer argued it was improperly denied damages related to overhead costs because of the Village’s delay. However, at trial, multiple witnesses recognized that even if everything had gone according to the plan the project would not have been completed by December 31, 2015. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision because the damages the developer sought were not reasonably certain.

Finally, both parties challenged the award of attorney fees. The trial court had ruled that the developer was the prevailing party at the first trial, but neither of the parties were prevailing at the following hearings. The Appellate Court did not agree with the trial court's ruling and held that the developer was the prevailing party entitled to all reasonable costs associated with all of the stages of this case.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Court Dismisses Electoral Board Appeal for Improper Service

Court Dismisses Electoral Board Appeal for Improper Service

  Monday, March 31, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In November 2024, a candidate for the position of School Board Member (Candidate) filed a statement of candidacy which affirmed that her residence was within the School District. A resident of the School District (Objector) objected to the Candidate’s nominating papers, alleging that her address was incorrect and that she resided outside of the District, making her ineligible for a School Board Member position.

The Objector requested that the Electoral Board find that the Candidate was ineligible to appear on the April 2025 ballot. At the Electoral Board hearing, the Candidate moved to dismiss the objection claiming the objection failed to state an “interest” as required by the relevant statute. In response, the Objector argued that being a resident of the School District was enough of an interest to satisfy the requirement. Because the statute required a statement of interest, and the objection failed to state an interest, the Electoral Board granted the Candidate’s motion, dismissing the objection.

The Objector appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that the objection included the Objector's status as a resident of the School District, so no further information was required. The trial court ruled in favor of the Candidate, finding it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Objector failed to send certified copies of the petition to the parties as required by statute. The trial court also addressed the merits of the appeal, affirming the Electoral Board’s decision dismissing the objection as not “clearly erroneous.”

The Objector appealed that decision, and the Appellate Court also held that the court had no jurisdiction over the appeal because the Objector failed to comply with the service requirements of state law. Although the Objector stated in the petition for review that he served the parties by registered or certified mail, the evidence showed he only sent it by regular mail, which was not sufficient under the statute. As a result, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, vacated the portion of the opinion that addressed the merits of the appeal, and affirmed the Electoral Board’s decision dismissing the objection. Mosley v. Holbrook, 2025 IL App (5th) 250096-U

Note that the Petitioner also filed identical objections against two other School Board Member Candidates for living outside the School District. The trial court in all three cases reached the same result – dismissing the objections because the Petitioner failed to state an “interest” on his objection. It was also the same result on appeal in all three cases – dismissal for improper service after the Petitioner sent his petitions for review by regular mail rather than certified mail. Mosley v. Holbrook, 2025 IL App (5th) 250097-U; Mosley v. Holbrook, 2025 IL App (5th) 250098-U.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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