Public High School Teacher's Termination for Social Media Posts Upheld by Court of Appeals

Public High School Teacher's Termination for Social Media Posts Upheld by Court of Appeals

  Wednesday, August 27, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a school district's termination of a public high school teacher who had posted inflammatory comments on a Facebook page that was primarily followed by former students. Hedgepeth v. Britton,

A social studies teacher at an Illinois public high school for 20 years had been suspended twice by the school district for various actions, including swearing at students and profane outbursts in the classroom. In 2020, during the George Floyd protests, she made a series of posts to Facebook, including stating that protesters should be hosed down with high pressure water hoses. She also engaged with a former student on her Facebook page, stating that she found the term "white privilege" to be as racist as the "N" word. 

The day after the teacher made the posts, the school principal began receiving complaints from current high school students, alumni, another teacher, and a parent. The school district also received emails, calls, and media inquiries regarding the teacher's social media posts. After investigating the matter, the school district fired her, finding that she violated four school district policies, including one that governed teacher conduct on social media and the school's “just and courteous professional relationships” policy she had been disciplined for violating twice before. 

After she was terminated, she appealed her termination to the Illinois State Board of Education, which upheld the district's decision to terminate her. She also filed a lawsuit against the school district, claiming the termination violated her First Amendment rights. The district court also upheld the school's decision to terminate her and she appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that public employees do not relinquish their First Amendment rights as a condition of accepting government employment. Based on U.S. Supreme Court cases, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen on matters of "public concern." However, that right is not unlimited or unrestricted, and public employees are subject to certain limitations on their freedom, depending on the employee's role, particularly when they serve in a role of "trust." In order to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, the teacher had to prove three things: (1) that she engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) that she suffered a deprivation likely to deter that protected speech and (3) that the speech was a motivating factor in her termination.

The Seventh Circuit focused on the first prong of the test. That prong requires the employee to demonstrate that she was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern and, if so, the court will balance that interest against the government employer's interest in "promoting the efficiency of the public services." Even if an employee speaks on matters of public concern, they may not have First Amendment protections if the employer's interest outweighs their speech rights. This balancing test is known as the Pickering test that is derived from a U.S. Supreme Court case. 

In applying the test, the Seventh Circuit first found that the teacher was speaking on matters of public concern in the Facebook posts that were the subject of the lawsuit. However, the court determined that the school district's interests outweighed the teacher's speech rights for several reasons. First, the school had an interest in addressing actual disruptions to school operations where the district received over a hundred emails and numerous other complaints about the teacher's social media posts. Second, the school could reasonably look to the teacher's past conduct and disciplinary record in considering whether her speech could have a future impact to school operations. Third, the court rejected the teacher's argument that her posts were on her private social media account so should not be the basis for her termination, because the court found that her audience (i.e., her Facebook friends) primarily consisted of community members (80% were former students), which amplified her speech. The court also noted that public school teachers occupy a unique position of trust, which makes the government employer's interest even more compelling.

In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit found ample evidence of actual disruption to the school district from the teacher's social media conduct, and that the teacher's social media posts were not entitled to First Amendment protection.

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Court Finds No First Amendment Violation in School's Restrictions on School Club Flyers

Court Finds No First Amendment Violation in School's Restrictions on School Club Flyers

  Tuesday, August 26, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A high school student established a pro-life student club at her high school, which school administrators approved. She was allowed to have a table at the school's activities fair, where she displayed pro-life signs and recruited more than 30 members. However, when the student tried to post flyers with political slogans on school walls, she was told she had to revise them to comply with the school's neutral content rules for all student-club wall postings. She and her mother challenged the administrator's decision on the wall postings, and ultimately the club was suspended for the remainder of the semester but reinstated a couple of months later.

The student sued the school district claiming that the school's rejection of her flyers and suspension of the club violated her First Amendment rights. The district court disagreed, ruling in favor of the school district. That decision was appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. E.D. v. Noblesville School District.

The school defended its decision to reject the pro-life club's flyers because of their political content, arguing that it restricted all student club flyers to the club's name and the meeting time, date, and location. The school stated that the pro-life club's flyer included language such as "Defund Planned Parenthood" that went beyond what school club flyers were allowed to include. The school noted that once the students meet, they are free to talk about their common interests but that the flyers cannot contain content that is "political or that could disrupt the school environment." The school also defended its decision to suspend the club because the student's mother became involved in school club matters which were supposed to be student-led when she attempted to end run the process by lobbying another administrator to allow the flyers. 

The Seventh Circuit upheld the school's actions, finding that the flyers (and political content) could be perceived as having been endorsed by the school because they are posted on school walls. The court rejected the student's argument that this was a case about private student speech, instead finding it to be a case about whether the school must lend its resources (the school walls) to disseminate student speech. The court determined that it did not have to do so, noting that although the school walls were a limited public forum for student expression, the school can restrict the content in this manner to "create a stable, neutral educational environment." The court acknowledged that the school's flyer policy regulated content, but noted that it did not discriminate based on viewpoint since the school banned all political content from all school club flyers. As a result, the court found no constitutional violation in the school's actions regarding the club's flyers. The court also upheld the school's suspension of the school club, finding that it was not based on the club's viewpoint or message but instead because of the parent's involvement in the club that was inconsistent with the policy that school clubs be student-led.

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Court Upholds Village's Response to FOIA Request from Recurrent Requester

Court Upholds Village's Response to FOIA Request from Recurrent Requester

  Thursday, August 21, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In Dyler v. Village of Arlington Heights, an Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a Village in five consolidated lawsuits challenging the Village's response to multiple FOIA requests.

A requester filed various FOIA requests asking the Village to provide copies of bonds for specific Village employees. The Village responded to each request that it searched for responsive records, but did not locate any. About a year later, the Village did locate a requested bond from its insurer and sent it to the requester. The requester subsequently filed five separate lawsuits against the Village, all claiming that the Village violated FOIA. The requester also filed appeals with the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC), which ruled in favor of the Village, finding that it properly responded to the request because no responsive records existed. 

The trial court consolidated all five lawsuits and ruled in favor of the Village, finding that it properly responded to the requester's FOIA requests. That decision was appealed to the Appellate Court, which also ruled in the Village's favor, finding support for the Village's response in an affidavit submitted by the Village that no records existed. The Appellate Court also rejected the requester's claim that the Village improperly designated him a "recurrent requester" under FOIA. The Court noted that FOIA authorizes a public body additional time to respond to FOIA requests from a "recurrent requester" (21 business days rather than 5 business days), and that his multiple requests to the Village were properly counted for purposes of determining that he was a recurrent requester. 

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Board Violated OMA By Discussing Public Business at Private Energy Event

Board Violated OMA By Discussing Public Business at Private Energy Event

  Wednesday, August 20, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), claiming that a majority of a quorum of a county board held an improper “meeting” in violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) when it discussed public business at an informational event hosted by a private energy company. In its 11th binding opinion of 2025, the PAC concluded that a county board violated OMA by holding an improper private meeting in violation of Section 1.02 of the OMA. PAC Op. 25-011.

In this case, the board did not dispute that a majority of a quorum of the board attended the event. However, the board argued that the event was an informational presentation by a private energy company to discuss a proposed renewable energy project, and not a “meeting” where a majority of the quorum of the board discussed public business. The PAC disagreed, finding that board members engaged in a question and answer session with energy company’s representatives about their proposed operations in the county, which pertained to county business since the discussions centered around business or community interests impacting the county.

The board also argued that the event was not a meeting because there were no specific items concerning the energy company pending before the board. While the board did not reach an accord on any specific matter at the time of the event, the PAC determined that the event was nonetheless a meeting subject to OMA’s requirements, because a majority of a quorum of board members engaged in the collective inquiry phase of deliberations by gathering and exchanging information concerning the renewable energy project in anticipation of possibly taking future action.

This is a good reminder to members of public bodies that a meeting could be triggered even in informal settings where a majority of a quorum of the public body discusses public business.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Separation Agreement Was Not Exempt in its Entirety From FOIA

PAC Finds Separation Agreement Was Not Exempt in its Entirety From FOIA

  Tuesday, August 19, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request from a news agency seeking a named police officer’s resignation or termination records, a city’s office of public safety administration (OPSA) denied the request entirely citing the "private information" exemption in Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA, and the "personal privacy" exemption in Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. In its 10th binding opinion of 2025, the Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General’s office (PAC) concluded that OPSA improperly denied the request in its entirety. PAC Op. 25-010.

First, the PAC noted that the "personal privacy" exemption of Section 7(1)(c) provides an exemption for "the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information." However, that same FOIA exemption also states that the "disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy." Here, the PAC determined that the records withheld by OPSA concerned a public employee’s separation from employment which "bears on the public duties" of a public employee." As a result, the records should not have been entirely withheld under the "personal privacy" exemption of Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 

Second, the PAC acknowledged that Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA authorizes public bodies to discretely redact “private information” as that term is defined in FOIA. Because the responsive records to this request contained handwritten signatures and employee identification numbers (which fall within FOIA’s definition of private information), the PAC determined that this "private information" could have been properly redacted and the remainder of the record released to the requester. However, the PAC noted that this exemption would not justify withholding the records in their entirety.

Note that this opinion does not stand for the proposition that public bodies cannot redact personal privacy information contained in public records (e.g., separation records) so long as the public body demonstrates that disclosing that information would cause the subject a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink 

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PAC Finds Violation of OMA Where Board Did Not Name Candidate for Appointment

PAC Finds Violation of OMA Where Board Did Not Name Candidate for Appointment

  Monday, August 18, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's office (PAC) issued three new binding opinions recently, which we will summarize over the next few days.

In PAC Op. 25-009, the PAC concluded that a village board violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) becaues it failed to provide an adequate public recital before the board voted on the appointment of a person to fill a vacancy on the village board.

The village board defended its actions by arguing that it did not take final action at the meeting because the board voted against approving a motion to appoint a person to fill a vacant village trustee position. The PAC disagreed, finding that decisions that bring matters to a resolution—regardless of the outcome of the vote—constitute "final action" under the OMA. Here, the board decided not to approve the appointment presented by the village president to fill the vacancy on the village board. 

Because the board’s vote on the motion constituted a final action under Section 2(e) of the OMA, the PAC determined that the board’s vote had to be preceded by a public recital that (1) announced the general nature of the matter being considered (2) with sufficient detail to inform the public about the particular transaction or issue. Although the board did announce the general nature of the matter being considered (motion to appoint a person to fill a trustee vacancy), the PAC determined that the board did not provide sufficient detail to inform the public about the matter being voted on because the board did not name or identify the person whose appointment the board considered prior to taking the vote.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Teacher's Case Against School District's Naming Policy Moves Forward

Teacher's Case Against School District's Naming Policy Moves Forward

  Thursday, August 14, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Indiana High School adopted a policy that required teachers to call students by their first names as they appeared in the school's database. For transgender students who had changed their first names, the database listed their new names. A teacher in the school objected to the school's name policy on religious grounds and requested an accommodation, which the school initially granted, which allowed him to call students by their last names. After a year, some students and teachers complained about the teacher's practice, and the school rescinded the accommodation, informing the teacher that he would face termination if he didn't call students by their first names. The teacher sued the school, claiming it failed to accommodate his religion. The district court ruled in the school's favor, and the teacher appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of the employee's religious practices or beliefs unless the employer can establish that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious practices or believes without undue hardship on the employer's business. To establish a Title VII case, the employee has to establish that his religious belief is "sincerely held." Then, the burden shifts to the employer to show that any reasonable accommodation would result in undue hardship. The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered that second part of the analysis (undue hardship) and held that the employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in "substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business." This new Supreme Court standard is more "rigorous" than the previous standard that defined "undue hardship" as anything that required an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee.

Applying the Supreme Court's new "undue burden" test to the school district, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, finding that the school district failed to introduce evidence that an accommodation to allow a teacher to call students by their last name resulted in the type of objective harm necessary to establish an "undue burden." The Court also rejected the school's argument that the accommodation caused a serious disruption to the learning environment. In short, the Court determined that there was a material factual dispute as to whether an accommodation would result in an undue hardship to the school, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation.

The dissenting opinion would have upheld the district court's ruling in favor of the student. The dissent noted that the school had initially accommodated the teacher, but after a year, determined that the accommodation had failed in practice, and the school had an obligation to the transgender students harmed by the accommodation. The dissent argued that the school did not discriminate against the teacher based on his religion, and had reasonably concluded that its initial accommodation was not justifiable. 

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Court Stops Enforcement of Indiana's Buffer Law

Court Stops Enforcement of Indiana's Buffer Law

  Wednesday, August 13, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Indiana adopted a "buffer law" that makes it illegal for a person to to "knowingly or intentionally" approach within 25 feet of a police officer who is lawfully engaged in the execution of the law after the officer ordered the person to stop approaching. A group of media organizations filed a lawsuit to challenge the law, arguing it was unconstitutionally vague and a violation of due process rights. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction blocking the state from enforcing the law. 

The state appealed that ruling to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the injunction. The Seventh Circuit first rejected the state's argument that the case was moot because the state had amended the buffer law, noting that the state acknowledged that both laws were still in effect. Second, the Seventh Circuit held that the media organization plaintiffs had standing to challenge the law. As to the substance of the challenge, the Court determined that the buffer law was "susceptible to arbitrary enforcement" and was, therefore, unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit noted that the law provides no guidance to the officer in determining whether a "do not approach" order should be issued in the first place, making the law subject to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. As a result, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's issuance of an injunction prohibiting the state from enforcing the buffer law. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. v. Rokita, et al. 

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No Standing to Challenge County Approval of Rodeos

No Standing to Challenge County Approval of Rodeos

  Tuesday, August 12, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A county was sued by an individual and two animal rights groups challenging the county's approval of temporary use permits for rodeos. Specifically, the plaintiffs had filed appeals with the county zoning board of appeals which they argued the county did not allow to proceed or canceled as moot. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved" by the county's approval of the temporary use permits for the rodeos in order to satisfy the standing requirement to appeal the county's decisions. 

The case was appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal. Specifically, the court held that to be "aggrieved" to appeal the county's decision, a plaintiff needed to be more than curious or concerned about the outcome and instead needed to possess a personal claim, status, or right and a distinct injury that can be fairly traced to the defendant's conduct. In this case, the Court rejected the individual plaintiff's argument that he had standing because he suffered an "aesthetic injury," finding that an aesthetic injury alone is not sufficient to satisfy standing. The Court also rejected the organizations' argument that they had associational standing for the same reason. Finally, the Court rejected organizational standing because plaintiffs did not establish that the county impaired the organizations' services or daily operations. 

Because none of the plaintiffs could establish they were "aggrieved" by the county's approval of the temporary use permits for the rodeos, they did not have standing and the Appellate Court held that the case was properly dismissed. Humane Farming Ass'n et al., v. Boone County Board, et al.

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Seventh Circuit Dismisses ADA Challenge to Local Zoning Regulations

Seventh Circuit Dismisses ADA Challenge to Local Zoning Regulations

  Monday, August 11, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a lawsuit brought against a municipality that sought to compel the municipality to issue a letter of zoning compliance for an addiction treatment center. Chosen Consulting, LLC v. Town Council of Highland.

After a change in ownership, a healthcare facility sought approvals to operate a treatment facility for patients suffering from addiction-related disorders. As part of the state licensing process, the facility was required to obtain a letter of zoning compliance from the town before it could receive a state license required to operate. Town officials informed the facility it would need a zoning variance to operate the facility. The facility never applied for the required variance, and town officials refused to issue the letter of zoning compliance requested by the facility. The facility sued the town claiming the town’s zoning regulations discriminated against disabled individuals. In its lawsuit, the facility sought an injunction from the court to order the town to stop obstructing the facility from treating addiction patients and compel the town to issue a letter of zoning compliance.

The district court ruled for the town and dismissed the facility’s lawsuit. Because the facility failed to apply for the required zoning variance, the court ruled the facility could not bring a lawsuit in federal court until it obtained a final zoning decision from the town on the desired change in use to operate the treatment facility.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit held that a lawsuit challenging a local zoning decision and seeking equitable relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act cannot be brought in federal court until a municipality has made a final, conclusive decision on an application for zoning relief. Since the facility never applied for a variance under the town’s zoning regulations, the court ruled the facility could not bring a lawsuit in federal court because there had been no final decision on the proposed change in use.

Post Authored by Tyler Smith & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink 

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Quorum Forum Podcast Re-Release: Tips for Newly Elected Officials

Quorum Forum Podcast Re-Release: Tips for Newly Elected Officials

  Friday, August 08, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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To celebrate the release of Ancel Glink's 2025 Newly Elected Officials Guide, we are re-releasing one of our most popular podcast episodes: Tips for Newly Elected Officials!

The Quorum Forum hotline is open and Ancel Glink attorneys called with their tips and congratulations for newly and not-so-newly elected local government officials in Illinois. Adam Simon, Erin Monforti, Derke Price, Julie Tappendorf, and Dan Bolin shared helpful tips on local government meetings, public comment, working with staff, and more! 

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Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Wind Farm Developer

Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Wind Farm Developer

  Thursday, August 07, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois municipality enacted a zoning regulation that restricted the generating power of wind energy conversion systems. A wind farm developer that sought to construct a wind farm on land outside the municipality but within 1.5 miles of its limits sued the municipality, claiming the zoning regulation was constitutionally invalid and outside the scope of the municipality's authority. The trial court ruled in favor of the municipality, but the Appellate Court reversed in Hickory Wind, LLC v. Village of Cedar Point.

After a municipality adopted a zoning regulation that prohibited any wind energy conversion structure or wind turbine designed to generate more than 120% of the electricity demand for the parcel on which it is located in the municipality and in the area within 1.5 miles of the municipality, a wind farm developer (Hickory Wind, LLC) filed a lawsuit challenging the regulation. The trial court found in favor of the municipality, holding that Hickory Wind failed to offer evidence that the zoning regulation exceeded the municipality's authority or was constituted impermissible exclusionary zoning, and that any "as-applied" challenge was not yet ripe. That ruling was appealed.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the ruling in favor of the municipality and ruled in favor of Hickory Wind on its "exclusionary zoning" claim. The Appellate Court noted that a zoning ordinance is "impermissibly exclusionary if the affected activity is effectively prohibited anywhere within the municipal limits." In this case, the Appellate Court determined that the zoning regulation on wind farms was not a "mere limitation" or restriction, but an outright ban. The Court acknowledged that municipalities have the authority to place reasonable limitations on things like height, blade length, tower density, and the like but that a regulation that restricts energy generation in such a way that it renders commercial wind power economically impossible is "both a violation of public policy and is also, in effect, an unauthorized ban." Because the municipality was non-home rule, it had to rely on statutory authority to regulate and the Court held that state law permitted regulation, but did not expressly authorize municipalities to ban commercial windmills. The Court declined to address the constitutional arguments since it resolved the case on non-constitutional grounds. 

There was a dissenting opinion in the case that would have deferred to the municipality on its own zoning regulations because state law specifically permits regulations of wind farms and no regulatory scheme preempts the municipality's zoning ordinance. The dissent also would have acknowledged the "potential impact that proposed 17 650-feet-tall windmills (taller than the St. Louis Arch) will necessarily have on the value of nearby homes and the possible chill they may place on subsequent residential and commercial development."

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Illinois Governor Signed a Number of Bills on August 1st

Illinois Governor Signed a Number of Bills on August 1st

  Wednesday, August 06, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Governor signed a number of bills into law on Friday, August 1st, including the following that affect local governments:

HB 42 - Authorizes library boards to charge nonresident library fees on a quarterly or biannual basis, rather than in one lump sum.

HB 1910 - Requires libraries to maintain a supply of opioid antagonists and have at least one employee trained to identify the signs of opioid overdose present at the library during operating hours to administer an antagonist. Effective January 1, 2026. As we have reported previously, this bill only amends the Local Library Act and does not amend the Library District Act.

HB 2336 - Amends the Fire Protection District Act and the Illinois Municipal Code to authorize fire districts and municipalities to charge reasonable fees from assisted living or nursing home facilities for lift-assist services. Those fees cannot exceed the actual personnel and equipment costs for all services rendered in connection with the lift-assist service. Effective January 1, 2026.

SB 1701 - Modifies the definition of "supervisor" for police officers. Effective July 1, 2026.

SB 1195 - Amends the Illinois Police Training Act to require instruction for probationary law enforcement officers on trauma-informed programs, procedures, and practices. Effective January 1, 2026.

HB 32 - Amends the Township Code to permit a temporary deputy township supervisor to administer a township's general assistance program and allows township parks and recreation departments to employ minors for youth sports activities.

HB 1367 - Amends provisions of the Township Code to modify a township's use and disposition of open spaces. Effective January 1, 2026.

SB 1612 - Raises the competitive bid threshold to $60,000 for the purchase of supplies or materials for park districts, conservation districts, and forest preserve districts (competitive bids for "work," as defined by the statute, remains at $30,000).SB 1380 - Authorizes counties and municipalities to use a state or locally-owned utility pole and public right of way for public safety purposes. Effective January 1, 2026.

SB 2285 - Amends the Vehicle Code to update the definition of bicycle to include low-speed electric bikes. Effective January 1, 2026. 

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Seventh Circuit Finds University's Social Media Page to be a Public Forum and its "Off Topic" Comment Rule Unconstitutional

Seventh Circuit Finds University's Social Media Page to be a Public Forum and its "Off Topic" Comment Rule Unconstitutional

  Tuesday, August 05, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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We reported previously about a Wisconsin federal district court case that determined that a University social media page was a non-public forum, and ruled against a former student who challenged the University's deletion of her comments from the University's accounts. That 2022 ruling had been appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which just recently issued an opinion reversing the district court and finding that the University's social media page was a limited public forum, and the University's actions violated the former student's free speech rights. Krasno v. Mnookin (7th Cir. August 1, 2025). 

The University of Wisconsin-Madison operates Facebook and Instagram pages where it communicates with students, faculty, and the general public. The University moderates its social media accounts in several ways, including hiding or deleting comments the University finds to be "off-topic," and using a "keyword filter" that hides comments that include words or phrases the University includes in the filter, such as "lab," "animal testing," "kill animals," and others. The University also turns off comments on certain posts to prevent users from commenting. A former student who worked in the primate testing center of the University sued the University after she claims her comments were automatically hidden or deleted by the University in violation of her First Amendment rights. In 2022, a federal district court ruled that the University's social media pages were "nonpublic forums" because the University had, by policy or practice, restricted comments by banning "off topic" comments, so the University's actions did not violate the former student's free speech rights.

The former student appealed, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court's ruling that the University's social media pages were non-public forums. Instead, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the former student on several grounds, holding that the interactive spaces on the University's social media pages (i.e., the comment section) were limited public forums and the University's "off topic" comment rule as applied to the former student was unconstitutional. 

The Seventh Circuit determined that the interactive space on the University's social media pages (i.e., the space where private users can post comments) was not government speech nor a traditional public forum, nor a nonpublic forum. Instead, the Seventh Circuit held that the interactive space on the University's social media pages was a "limited public forum" because it was opened up for the purpose of allowing the discussion of certain topics. The Seventh Circuit likened the University's social media page to the City of Boston's flag pole which the U.S. Supreme Court had found to be a public forum because Boston had opened its pole up to private groups to display their flags. Here, the Seventh Circuit found that the University opened its comment section on its social media pages to speech by private users.  

In a limited public forum, governments can establish restrictions, but those restrictions must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The Seventh Circuit applied that test to the University's "off topic" comment rule and found it to be unconstitutional because the University's use of a filtering program to hide comments that included certain words and phrases relating to animal testing was unreasonable and constituted viewpoint discrimination against the former student's anti-animal testing and pro-animal rights viewpoint. The Seventh Circuit also found the University's "off topic" social media statement to be too open-ended, inflexible, and vague, and the University's enforcement to be too discretionary to survive a First Amendment analysis. As a result, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling in favor of the University, and ordered the district court to enter judgment in favor of the former student on her First Amendment claims.

There was a dissenting opinion that would have found the University's social media pages to be a nonpublic forum, similar to the National Portrait Gallery or the letters section of the University's "On Wisconsin" magazine. 

The Seventh Circuit's ruling that the University's social media pages are public forums is consistent with other federal courts of appeals that have analyzed similar challenges. We noted in our post about the district court ruling that we thought the district court's finding that the University's social media accounts were nonpublic forums was an outlier, and it is not surprising that the Seventh Circuit ruling last week was more inline with those other rulings. Governments who enforce an "off topic" comment rule may want to consult with their legal counsel to advise them whether this ruling might have an impact on their own social media moderation activities.

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Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Residents' Case Against Village for Flooding

Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Residents' Case Against Village for Flooding

  Monday, August 04, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Homeowners sued a municipality, claiming that the municipality was responsible for recurrent, temporary flooding in their basements over the course of several years. Specifically, they claimed that the flooding violated the "takings clause" of the U.S. Constitution and constituted a nuisance and trespass to their properties, and that the municipality should be held liable because the municipality approved the development in a flood zone. The municipality filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that their claims were not timely brought and did not state a valid cause of action. The trial court agreed, and dismissed the case.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the homeowners' case against the municipality. First, the Court determined that the complaint did not include any allegations establishing that the municipality caused the recurrent, temporary flooding of the homeowners' basements. The Court noted that the homeowners did not claim the municipality constructed a structure that altered the flow of the river or caused the properties to be flooded, nor did the municipality create the rain, river, or floodplain. Instead, the Court found that the municipality did nothing more than allow the homeowners and their predecessors to "act upon their own choices" in purchasing a home in this development. As a result, the "takings" claim was properly dismissed by the trial court.

Second, the Court determined that the homeowners did not allege that their flooded basements resulted from the municipality's use of its own property, so the nuisance claim was also properly dismissed.

Third, the Court held that the flooding of the homes was caused not by the municipality's approval of construction plans, but by natural processes such as substantial rainfall, porous soil, and a shallow water table. As a result, the homeowners' trespass claim was also properly dismissed.

In sum, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court properly dismissed the homeowners' lawsuit because it did not state a valid cause of action against the municipality. Billie v. Village of Channahon.

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Residents of Mobile Home Park Entitled to Injunctive Relief for Water Shut Off

Residents of Mobile Home Park Entitled to Injunctive Relief for Water Shut Off

  Thursday, July 31, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently ordered a city to restore water service to a customer whose water had been shut off for nonpayment. Holmberg v. Kewanee Partners.

Residents in a mobile home park pay a monthly fee to the mobile home park owner for their water service, along with their rent payments. The owner of the mobile home park was then responsible for paying the water bill to the city for the entirety of the mobile home park's water service, which was served by a consolidated water service line. The mobile home park became the subject of a foreclosure action, and the park was placed in receivership. While in receivership, the city issued a water bill to the mobile home park for $500,000, reflecting delinquent payments for water service to the mobile home park and other properties. The city's notice stated that water service would be shut off to individual mobile homes in eh park if payment was not received by June 3rd. A few days prior to that deadline, one of the residents of the mobile home park filed a lawsuit against the city, claiming that terminating her water service would violate her constitutional rights. She also filed a request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop the city from shutting off water to her mobile home. Other residents joined the lawsuit.

The trial court granted the original plaintiff's TRO, stopping the city from shutting off water to the residents' mobile homes. However, the trial court denied relief to some of the other plaintiff-residents in the mobile home park, and one of those residents appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Illinois Appellate Court determined that the trial court should have granted injunctive relief to other plaintiff-residents whose water service was disconnected. In this situation, the court determined that the mobile home park owner was the party responsible to pay for water service, and the residents who filed a lawsuit against the city had the right to receive water from the city while the lawsuit proceeded. The court rejected the city's argument that the residents whose water was already disconnected were not entitled to relief. The court also noted that the residents had established that they were making payments for water service to the receiver. 

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Courts Decide Firefighter Pension Cases

Courts Decide Firefighter Pension Cases

  Monday, July 28, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Two on-duty disability pension cases were decided by the Illinois Appellate Courts recently, with one court finding in favor of the firefighter-applicant and the other for the Pension Board.

In Boyles v. Bolingbrook Firefighters Pension Fund, a firefighter filed an application for on-duty disability benefits relating to a back injury. The firefighter claimed he injured his lower back while helping to lift an injured person on a stretcher. The Pension Board determined that the firefighter was disabled, but did not qualify for a line-of-duty disability pension. On appeal, the trial court upheld the Pension Board's decision but the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and sent the case back to the Pension Board to award the firefighter a line-of-duty disability pension. The Appellate Court found the testimony of certain medical professionals that determined that the injury was caused by the performance of his firefighter duties to be more persuasive than the testimony of those medical professionals that found otherwise.

In Witteman v. Brookfield Firefighters Pension Fund, a firefighter filed an application for on-duty disability benefits relating to a back injury. He claimed he injured his back while helping lift an overweight patient. After conducting a hearing, the Pension Board denied the on-duty disability pension, citing to various inconsistencies in the firefighter-applicant's testimony about the incident, including that he changed his story as to how the injury occurred, his failure to report the injury to coworkers, and his evasive demeanor at the Pension Board hearing. The Pension Board also found testimony of his coworkers to be credible to support a finding that the firefighter's injury did not occur as he claimed. On appeal, both the trial court and Appellate Court upheld the Pension Board's denial of the line-of-duty pension. While the Appellate Court acknowledged that there was some inconsistency in coworkers testimony, they noted that all of his coworkers testified that the firefighter-applicant did not take part in lifting the patient onto a stretcher to transport him to the ambulance as he claimed.

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Appellate Court Reverses Dismissal of Challenge to Rental Inspection Ordinance

Appellate Court Reverses Dismissal of Challenge to Rental Inspection Ordinance

  Wednesday, July 23, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A municipality adopted a rental ordinance that requires annual inspections of rental properties. The ordinance requires landlords to conduct background checks for any new adult tenant and provide proof of that at each inspection. It also requires landlords to incorporate a "crime free agreement" as an addendum to each lease. A landlord of a rental property with 21 units, as well as a tenant in that property, filed a lawsuit against the municipality to challenge the ordinance. Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that the annual inspections were an unconstitutional warrantless and unreasonable search and that the background check requirement violated rights to privacy and equal protection, among other claims.

The municipality filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, which the trial court granted. The trial court found that the defendants' facial challenge to the ordinance failed because they did not adequately allege that warrantless searches took place. The trial court also determined that the municipality had a legitimate interest in ensuring crime-free neighborhoods and that all landlords and tenants were treated the same, so there was no equal protection violation.

The defendants appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court agreed with the trial court, in part, and upheld the dismissal of the defendants' "facial" challenge to the ordinance. The Court also upheld the dismissal of the defendants' right to privacy challenge to the background check requirement. However, the Appellate Court did not agree with the dismissal of the defendants' "as applied" challenge to the ordinance, and remanded those claims back to the trial court for further proceedings. The Appellate Court determined that the defendants' raised a viable argument that the ordinance, as enforced, may have violated the defendants' constitutional rights because the municipality imposed fines when an inspection was not allowed, raising potential questions of whether the ordinance enforcement violated constitutional rights against warrantless searches. The Appellate Court did, however note that the defendants would not be entitled to damages under the Tort Immunity Act and any relief they might obtain is limited to declaratory or injunctive relief.

DPH Aurora Properties LLC v. City of Aurora

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PAC Issues 8th Binding Opinion on FOIA Challenge

PAC Issues 8th Binding Opinion on FOIA Challenge

  Wednesday, July 16, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In March 2025, a news organization submitted a FOIA request to a school district seeking a copy of an email attachment sent by the school district’s board president to other board members. The attachment related to a billing dispute between the school district and its former legal counsel. The school district denied the request citing various FOIA exemptions.

After the news organization submitted a request for review with the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) challenging the denial of their request, the PAC issued its eight binding opinion of 2025, concluding that the school district improperly withheld the responsive record. PAC Op. 25-008.

First, the PAC determined that the requested record was not exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA, which exempts attorney-client privileged communications. The PAC acknowledged that billing invoices or statements containing confidential, privileged communications between a public body and its attorney for the purpose of seeking or providing legal advice are protected from disclosure under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. The PAC also acknowledged that billing invoices or statements describing the nature of services performed, a public body’s motive for seeking legal representation, or litigation strategy, are also protected from disclosure pursuant to Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. Here, however, the PAC determined that the contested record was not exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 7(1)(m) because it did not reveal the substance of matters for which the school district sought legal advice or any legal advice the school district’s former attorneys provided while acting as their legal advisor—rather, the record broadly pertained to a billing dispute between the school district and its former legal counsel. 

Second, the PAC rejected the argument that several Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) prohibited the school district from disclosing the contested record. Specifically, the PAC found that the Rules apply to and govern the conduct of attorneys, not their clients. In this case, the PAC determined that the Rules do not specifically prohibit public bodies from disclosing non-exempt public records in response to a FOIA request.

Lastly, the PAC found that the contested record was not exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA’s deliberative process exemption in Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA because the record did not reflect deliberations with a third party acting on the school district’s behalf. Instead, the PAC opined that the contested record was a communication to the school district from its former legal counsel, which, in that correspondence, was acting with independent interests that were not aligned with the school district’s interests at the time it received the correspondence. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 95: Legislative Update

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 95: Legislative Update

  Tuesday, July 15, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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After the Illinois General Assembly concluded its spring session, Ancel Glink’s Eugene Bolotnikov joined the Quorum Forum Podcast to talk about recent legislation local government should know, including updates on veteran housing, grant opportunities for libraries, law enforcement hiring practices and more. You can listen here: Episode 95: Legislative Update

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Court Finds Public Body Properly Denied FOIA Request for Fatal Accident Records

Court Finds Public Body Properly Denied FOIA Request for Fatal Accident Records

  Monday, July 14, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court issued an opinion in favor of a government body after a media outlet filed a lawsuit challenging its response to the media's FOIA request for records pertaining to a fatal accident. NBC Subsidiary v. Chicago Police Department.

An investigative television producer submitted a FOIA request to a municipal police deparrment (CPD) and the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) requesting various records relating to a fatal hit and run accident. CPD denied the request, citing various exemptions including that state law prohibited release of the officer body worn camera recordings, and that release of other records would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings or would obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation. The OEMC also denied the request submitted to it for police observation or surveillance camera recordings on the basis that release would impede CPD's open investigation

The requester filed a lawsuit against CPD and OEMC, and the trial court ruled against the requester, finding that the denials were proper under FOIA. The trial court found persuasive an affidavit of a CPD officer that detailed how release of the requested records would compromise the current investigation because the perpetrator was still at large and release of the requested records could negatively affect the CPD's ability to obtain witness cooperation, among other things.

The requester appealed, arguing that the officer's affidavit was insufficient to satisfy CPD's and OEMC's obligations under FOIA to prove by clear and convincing evidence that release of the withheld records would interfere with pending or reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings. The Appellate Court disagreed, finding that the officer's affidavit contained sufficient details to meet the statutory burden, and that the affidavit was not simply a conclusory or generic statement as the requester claimed.

The Appellate Court also held that the requester was not entitled to redacted versions of the law enforcement records at issue, finding that the case involved a small number of records, and there was nothing to suggest that the records contained information that was not exempt. So, the Court held that the records were properly withheld in their entirety in this case.

The Appellate Court also found no merit in the requester's argument that the voluntary disclosure of certain information in the traffic crash report undermined a denial of other records.

Finally, the Court rejected the requester's argument that the body worn camera recordings should be released because the witnesses and victim did not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Body Camera Act because their encounter with officers was in a public place. The Court noted that the phrase "reasonable exeptation of privacy" in the Body Camera Act was dependent on the context of the law enforcement encounter and the potential distribution of the recording, so that a reasonable person engaging with law enforcement would expect that a recording would not be publicly disseminated to the news media or public at large, even where the encounter is on a public street. The Court also acknowledged that individuals who have just witnessed a traumatic incident such as a fatal car accident would not reasonably expect the police to release video to the public of their vulnerable state or that a person receiving treatment in an ambulance would not reasonably expect the police to release video footage of their treatment.

In sum, the Court upheld the CPD and OEMC's denials of the requester records in their entirety.

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Seventh Circuit Allows First Amendment Retaliation Case to Continue

Seventh Circuit Allows First Amendment Retaliation Case to Continue

  Wednesday, July 09, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently allowed a lawsuit filed by a deputy sheriff of a county sheriff's department who claimed he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights to move forward. Reilly v. Will County Sheriff's Office.

In 2017, a deputy sheriff in a county sheriff's department announced he was running a campaign for county sheriff against his boss. During his campaign, the deputy publicly criticized his boss. While the campaign was ongoing and prior to the election, the deputy took a promotional examination and was placed first on the sergeant promotional list. The sheriff had the ultimate decision on the sergeant promotion, and between 2018 and 2019, the sheriff selected five other candidates on the promotional list to be promoted to sergeant. Ultimately, the deputy lost the election, and his boss was relected as sheriff.

The deputy filed a lawsuit against the sheriff's office and the sheriff, claiming they retaliated against him because of his criticism of the sheriff during the 2017 campaign. The deputy claimed the sheriff admitted publicly that he passed the deputy over for promotion because of his criticism during the 2017 campaign. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing the deputy's complaint did not state a valid claim and that it was untimely because it was filed more than 2 years after the promotional list expired. The district court agreed with the defendants, and dismissed the case and did not allow the deputy to file an amended complaint.

The deputy appealed the dismissal of his case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the dismissal, finding that the complaint stated a plausible claim for First Amendment retaliation, and that the district court applied too high of a standard in not allowing the deputy to file an amended complaint. 

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Court Upholds Termination of School Counselor for Speech at Rally

Court Upholds Termination of School Counselor for Speech at Rally

  Wednesday, July 02, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A Wisconsin school district terminated a school counselor after she delivered a profanity-laden speech denouncing gender ideology and transgenderism and their impact on children at a rally at the state capitol. The guidance counselor filed a civil rights lawsuit against the school board and three school officials claiming she was unlawfully fired in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court denied her request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed her First Amendment claim, finding that the school district's interests as a public employer outweighed her speech rights under these circumstances. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal in Darlingh v. Maddaleni (7th Cir. July 2, 2025).

After video of her speech at the rally appeared on YouTube, the school opened an investigation, ultimately firing her for violating school policies that prohibited abusive and intimidating language and bullying. The school also explained that her speech at the rally impaired her ability to perform as a guidance counselor, damaged the school's reputation, and undermined its mission to provide an equitable and supportive learning environment for all students.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the U.S. Supreme Court's Pickering balancing test to the counselor's First Amendment claim. That test requires a court to determine whether the public employer's interests outweigh the employee's free speech rights. In applying that test, the Seventh Circuit examined whether the counselor's speech was constitutionally protected - i.e., was she speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern? The Seventh Circuit determined that while the counselor's speech interests were strong, and the topic she spoke on was a matter of intense public concern, the context of her speech and her role as a school guidance counselor was important in the analysis. In balancing the school district's interest that guidance counselors have an "inordinate amount of trust and authority," against the guidance counselor's speech at the rally which the court found to be "a harsh, angry, and profanity-filled public pledge...that was hardly compatible with her obligation to build student and parental trust," the Seventh Circuit concluded that the school district's interests outweighed the guidance counselor's free speech rights in these circumstances. As a result, the guidance counselor's speech fell outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection as applied to public employment. 

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Post Conviction Proceeding Records Were Not Entirely Exempt Under FOIA

Post Conviction Proceeding Records Were Not Entirely Exempt Under FOIA

  Monday, June 30, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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After an inmate submitted several FOIA requests to a state’s attorney’s office (SAO) seeking records regarding his pending post conviction proceeding, the SAO denied the request in its entirety based on the FOIA exemption that protects from release records that would interfere with a pending law enforcement proceeding. The SAO argued that disclosing the records would interfere with a pending law enforcement proceeding because the requester’s civil postconviction proceeding was still pending at the time of receiving the FOIA requests. The requester filed a lawsuit against the SAO alleging they improperly denied his FOIA requests, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the SAO, finding that disclosing the requested records to the requester would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings.

On appeal, the First District Appellate Court reversed the circuit court, finding that the SAO did not prove that all of its responsive records were exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Taylor v. Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office.

First, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the circuit court incorrectly treated his civil postconviction proceeding as a law enforcement proceeding, finding that civil postconviction proceedings do fall within the scope of Section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA (the pending law enforcement proceedings exemption).

Nevertheless, the Appellate Court determined that the SAO improperly withheld the responsive records under that exemption. Although an affidavit from the SAO’s FOIA officer stated that its responsive records were entirely exempt because disclosure would interfere with a pending postconviction proceeding, the Appellate Court determined that the affidavit was insufficient because it was conclusory and did not specifically explain which records were exempt from disclosure, and why the records were categorically exempt from disclosure. It is important to note that the Appellate Court held that the pendency of a postconviction petition, in and of itself, was not sufficient to entirely exempt records under the cited exemption.

The Appellate Court ordered the SAO to either disclose the responsive records or justify withholding its responsive records by preparing an index and a detailed affidavit explaining why disclosing each document would interfere with or harm pending or prospective law enforcement proceedings

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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PAC Determined that a City Committee was a Subsidiary Body Subject to OMA

PAC Determined that a City Committee was a Subsidiary Body Subject to OMA

  Thursday, June 26, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A member of the public submitted a "request for review" to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) claiming that a City pool committee (Committee) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by holding meetings closed to the public regarding building a new pool in the City. After analyzing a four-factor test established by the Illinois Supreme Court to determine whether the Committee would constitute a “subsidiary body” subject to OMA requirements, the PAC concluded that the Committee is a subsidiary body of the City subject to the requirements of OMA. PAC Op. 25-007.

First, the PAC determined that the Committee did not legally exist independently of the City, because the City created the Committee as part of the City’s planning process to construct a new pool in the City. Although the City argued the Committee was an informal advisory committee, the PAC stated that labelling the Committee or its gatherings as “informal” does not shield its gatherings or discussions about public business from OMA requirements.

Second, the PAC determined that the City exerts a significant amount of government control over the Committee, because the Mayor appoints the members of the Committee, the Committee’s recommendations are subject to City Council approval, and the City has been directly involved in and controlled multiple facets of Committee activities relating to building a pool in the City, including providing assistance related to finance, engineering and zoning, and parks and recreations matters.

Third, although the PAC noted that it was unclear whether the Committee uses any public resources for its activities (e.g., holding meetings on city property), and the City noted that Committee members are unpaid volunteers, the PAC asserted that the Committee receives at least some indirect public funding by virtue of being part of the City, and City officials and employees devote their time to supporting the Committee’s activities.

Lastly, the PAC determined that the City utilizes the Committee to perform governmental functions, because the Committee is tasked with assessing the potential designs, costs, and locations for a new City pool, and reporting its findings to the City, which the PAC argued are roles typically performed by a municipal committee.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA Relating to Settlement Records

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA Relating to Settlement Records

  Tuesday, June 24, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A city received a FOIA request seeking copies of the department’s settlement records concerning a class action lawsuit against a named alderperson. In response to the request, the city disclosed certain responsive records, but withheld a record concerning the settlement that was signed by the alderperson and a city attorney pursuant Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA, which exempts from disclosure privileged attorney-client communications between a public body and its attorneys.

After the requester submitted a request for review, the PAC issued its sixth binding opinion of 2025, concluding that the department improperly withheld the responsive record pursuant to Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 25-006. In connection with the withheld record at issue, the PAC determined that because the alderperson was represented by a private attorney, while the city was represented by attorneys from its law department, the parties had separate interests in the subject matter of the withheld record. Because (1) no legal advice pertaining to the litigation or the settlement was sought from or provided to the alderperson from the city attorney who signed the record, and (2) there was no indication the city attorney was acting as the alderperson’s attorney in connection with the settlement, the PAC determined that the withheld record was not a privileged attorney-client communication under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.

Additionally, because the withheld record was not a communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, and related to the obligation, receipt, or use of city funds regarding the settlement, the PAC determined that the public had a right to know the purposes for which public funds were expended in connection with the settlement. 

Post Authored by Eugene Boltnikov, Ancel Glink

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Seventh Circuit Upholds Preliminary Injunction Barring Enforcement of School’s “Sex Assigned at Birth” Restroom Policy

Seventh Circuit Upholds Preliminary Injunction Barring Enforcement of School’s “Sex Assigned at Birth” Restroom Policy

  Monday, June 23, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a district court's preliminary order prohibiting a school district (District) from enforcing its policy that requires transgender students to use restrooms that are gender-neutral or correspond to their sex assigned at birth. D.P. v. Mukwonago Area School District, et al.

The District enacted a policy requiring all students to use restrooms and locker room facilities according to their sex assigned at birth, or otherwise use gender-neutral alternatives. The policy included procedures allowing students to request an exception, which would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with the student and their parents. Prior to adoption of the policy, a transgender middle-school student (Student) regularly used the girls’ bathroom. Following adoption of the policy, the Student and her mother sent a letter to the District demanding that the policy be rescinded. The District responded, offering to go through the evaluation process for an exception under its policy. Shortly thereafter, the Student filed a federal lawsuit claiming violations of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

At the time she filed her lawsuit, the Student also submitted a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to prevent the District from enforcing the policy while the case was ongoing. The District opposed the request for temporary relief but did not request an evidentiary hearing or submit any additional evidence. The district court granted the Student’s request for a TRO and—five days later—converted it to a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the District’s policy until the case was fully resolved. The District appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that (1) the judge erred by not holding a hearing prior to granting the preliminary injunction, and (2) the preliminary injunction should be voided because the Student was not likely to succeed on the merits of her claims.

The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Student and upheld the preliminary injunction entered by the district court. The Seventh Circuit noted that an evidentiary hearing is only required when an opposing party raises genuine issues of fact in response to a motion for preliminary injunction but because the District did not dispute the factual record established by the Student, and failed to request a hearing, the Court found no error in granting the preliminary injunction based solely on the written submissions of the parties.

The Seventh Circuit also determined that the preliminary injunction was properly entered because the Student demonstrated she was likely to succeed in the case and would suffer irreparable harm if she were made to comply with the District’s policy during litigation. The Court cited several key cases addressing the issue of transgender students’ use of restrooms and noted that the District’s policy would likely be ruled unlawful discrimination based on sex under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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Supreme Court Rules for Student Regarding Proper Standard for ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

Supreme Court Rules for Student Regarding Proper Standard for ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

  Friday, June 20, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion setting forth the standard that must be applied by courts in cases involving alleged failures to accommodate students with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act). A.J.T., et al. v. Osseo Area Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, et al.

In this case, a student with a rare form of epilepsy filed several claims under various federal statutes alleging that her school district failed to accommodate her when it refused to provide certain services to her, which she claimed resulted in her receiving fewer instructional hours than her peers without disabilities. The student’s disorder caused her to have frequent seizures, particularly in the mornings, which she claims prevented her from attending school before noon. For the first few years she attended school, the student was granted various accommodations, including at-home evening instruction to supplement the hours she was otherwise unable to attend school.

In 2015, the student and her family moved to a different state, and the student’s new school district (District) denied her parents’ request to include evening instruction in her individualized education program (IEP), resulting in her receiving just over 4 hours of schooling every day (significantly less time than the typical school day for her peers). In 2018, the student’s schedule was reduced even further, and the family’s requests for accommodation were continually denied by the District. 

The student first filed a claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), alleging that the failure to accommodate her requests for evening instruction deprived her of a “free appropriate public education” as required under IDEA. Both the state board of education and a federal trial court ruled in favor of the student and ordered the District to provide her with at-home instruction on school nights.

After succeeding on her IDEA claim, the student sued the District in federal court, claiming violations of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Both of these federal laws were enacted to ensure that people with disabilities have an equal opportunity to benefit from government services, including public education. The District argued the case should be dismissed because the student failed to meet the standard for a successful claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. The district court and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the District, finding that the student failed to show that the District acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment when it denied her accommodations requests. The Eighth Circuit determined that a school district’s “simple failure” to provide a reasonable accommodation is not enough to trigger liability under either statute.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the student did not need to show bad faith or gross misjudgment by the District to move forward with her claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Instead, the student need only show that the District acted with “deliberate indifference” when it denied her reasonable accommodation requests—an easier standard to meet. The opinion of the Court (authored by Chief Justice Roberts) noted that the standard that had been advocated by the District was uniquely difficult to satisfy. Outside of the context of elementary and secondary education, claims of disability discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not require a showing of an intent to discriminate, or animus against individuals with disabilities. The Supreme Court found there was no evidence in the statutory language or legislative history that supported imposing such a high burden on students when other groups with disabilities would not be required to show bad faith or gross misjudgment to bring a discrimination claim. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the student and determined that students with disabilities filing claims under these statutes are held to the same standard as other individuals alleging disability discrimination in different contexts.

In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act were enacted with an awareness that discrimination against individuals with disabilities is often the product of neglect and thoughtlessness, rather than deliberate hostility. 

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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Ancel Glink Relaunches "The Workplace Report" Blog

Ancel Glink Relaunches "The Workplace Report" Blog

  Wednesday, June 18, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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We’re excited to share that Ancel Glink has officially relaunched its labor and employment law blog, The Workplace Report! Designed for public sector employers, HR professionals, and attorneys, the blog delivers timely insights on workplace policy developments, legal trends, and key court decisions affecting employers in Illinois and beyond.

Whether you’re navigating complex personnel issues or staying ahead of legislative changes, The Workplace Report is a valuable resource for practical guidance and legal perspective.

Check out the relaunch and subscribe to receive the latest posts directly in your inbox.

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PAC Issues Binding Opinion Finding Public Body Failed to Respond to FOIA Request

PAC Issues Binding Opinion Finding Public Body Failed to Respond to FOIA Request

  Friday, June 13, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 5th binding opinion for 2025, finding a public body in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 25-005. The requester had filed a multi-part FOIA request asking for all emails and texts for a 4 year period between various village officials and employees, payroll records, meeting minutes and ordinances, and resident communications regarding the mayor's salary and for a four year period. When the village failed to respond to the request, the requester filed a "request for review" with the PAC office. The PAC reached out to the village, but according to the opinion, the village did not respond, and the PAC issued this binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA request. Nothing new in this opinion besides a reminder that public bodies have an obligation to respond to FOIA requests.

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Ordinance Prohibiting Yoga Instruction in City Parks Struck Down

Ordinance Prohibiting Yoga Instruction in City Parks Struck Down

  Thursday, June 12, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In an interesting twist (pun intended), a federal court of appeals determined that yoga is a protected free speech activity under the First Amendment in a challenge to a municipality's ordinance that prohibited teaching yoga to four or more persons at City parks and beaches. Hubbard v. City of San Diego, (9th Cir. June 4, 2025)

The City had enacted an ordinance restricting the teaching of yoga on City parks and beaches. After two yoga instructors were informed by park rangers that they could no longer each yoga at City parks, they filed a lawsuit, challenging the ordinance as unconstitutional. The district court ruled in favor of the City, and the yoga instructors appealed.

On appeal, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that yoga is protected by the First Amendment because yoga teachers communicate and disseminate information about yoga’s philosophy and practice through speech and expressive movements. Second, the Court held that the City’s shoreline parks are traditional public forums. Third, the Court determiend that the City’s prohibition on teaching yoga at those parks was content-based, and, therefore, did not qualify as a valid time, place, and manner regulation. As a result, the ordinance was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the First Amendment and, since the City could not demonstrate any plausible connection between the instructors teaching yoga and any threat to public safety and enjoyment in the City’s shoreline parks, the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 

Note that this decision was decided in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, so it is not binding on Illinois, which is in the Seventh Circuit.

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 94: Discussing Supreme Court Decisions at the APA-ISS Conference

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 94: Discussing Supreme Court Decisions at the APA-ISS Conference

  Wednesday, June 11, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink just released its 94th episode of its Quorum Forum Podcast - Episode 94: Recent Supreme Court Decisions. Information about this episode is below.

How can decisions issued by the nation’s highest court impact community development at the local level? Find out as Megan Mack and Erin Monforti join the APA-ISS Spring Planning Conference to discuss two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, City of Grants Pass v. Johnson and Sheetz v. County of El Dorado. 

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Court Dismisses Lawsuit by Former Fire Captain Terminated for Social Media Posts

Court Dismisses Lawsuit by Former Fire Captain Terminated for Social Media Posts

  Tuesday, June 10, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A federal court of appeals recently upheld a municipality's decision to terminate a fire captain for posting content on social media that his employer (the City) found to be offensive attacks on transgender persons. Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg (4th Cir., June 5, 2025).

While employed as a fire captain, Misjuns maintained two Facebook pages - one was a personal page and the other was a public figure page. According to the Court of Appeals opinion, in 2021, Misjuns posted four cartoons on his public figure Facebook page that depicted offensive stereotypes of transgender women in bathrooms and participating in sports. Although Misjuns didn't identify himself as a City employee on his Facebook page, City residents who saw the posts identified him as a City employee, and subsequently filed complaints with the City about the posts.

After Misjuns became aware of the resident complaints, he posted a meme on his Facebook page that stated the following: “In the beginning, God created Adam & Eve. Adam could never be a Madam. Eve could never become Steve. Anyone who tells you otherwise defies the one true God. Threatening anyone for believing & saying this is most likely a hate crime.” 

Following an investigation by the City, Misjuns was terminated, and he filed a lawsuit against the City, claiming the termination constituted a breach of contract, and violated his equal protection rights, as well as his free speech and religion rights under the First Amendment, among other claims. The district court dismissed his claims, and he appealed to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.

First, the Court of Appeals determined that Misjuns failed to adequately plead his First Amendment (free speech and religion) and equal protection claims against the City. To hold a municipality liable for a constitutional civil rights violation, a plaintiff must show that the execution of a policy or custom of the municipality caused the violation, commonly referred to as Monell liability. Here, the Court determined that Misjuns failed to plead Monell liability. 

Second, the Court rejected his claim that the City's employee handbook constituted a binding contract between the City and its employees, so his breach of contract claim also failed.

Finally, the Court rejected his wrongful termination and conspiracy claims since those claims were solely brought against the individual defendants (and not the City), and those defendants had been previously dismissed from the lawsuit. 

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Court Upholds Late Fee for Vehicle Sticker Tax

Court Upholds Late Fee for Vehicle Sticker Tax

  Monday, June 09, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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 An Appellate Court upheld Chicago's city sticker tax (wheel tax) in Zibrat v. City of Chicago.  

The City adopted a "wheel tax license fee" in 2011, and vehicle owners who failed to purchase the city sticker were assessed a late fee. After a vehicle owner purchased the city sticker after the deadline and was assessed a late fee, she filed a lawsuit claiming the late fee was an unconstitutional tax or impermissible fee. The circuit court dismissed the case, finding that although the late fee was a tax, it was not unconstitutional. She appealed, and the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal, finding that whether the late fee was considered a fee, penalty, or tax, it was permissible.

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Court Upholds Denial of FOIA Request Based on Ongoing Law Enforcement Investigation Exemption

Court Upholds Denial of FOIA Request Based on Ongoing Law Enforcement Investigation Exemption

  Friday, June 06, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to separate FOIA requests submitted to a city’s police department and its office of emergency management seeking records regarding a 2021 fatal crash, both public bodies denied the requests because disclosing its responsive records would interfere with a pending or anticipated law enforcement proceeding. After the requester sued both public bodies seeking to compel disclosure of the withheld records, the circuit court ruled in favor of the public bodies, finding that disclosing the withheld records would interfere with an ongoing police investigation concerning a fatal collision, and that the requested body camera (BWC) footage was exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The requester appealed.

On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the public bodies. NBC Subsidiary (WMAQ-TV), LLC v. Chi. Police Dep't & Off. of Emergency Mgmt. 

First, the Appellate Court determined that the affidavit submitted by the police department provided case-specific details demonstrating why and how disclosing its withheld records would interfere with an ongoing police investigation (e.g., disclosing footage could expose witnesses to risk of harm or retaliation because of the primary suspect’s criminal history, alter witness memories and undermine the value of subsequent interviews, alert the suspect that they were being investigation and allow them to evade capture, or give the suspect time to create an alibi or fabricate evidence).

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that he was entitled to receive redacted versions of the withheld records, because the public bodies demonstrated that its responsive records were entirely exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA’s pending or contemplated law enforcement exemption, because the court held that this particular FOIA exemption broadly protects entire records, in contrast to other FOIA exemptions which generally authorize redacting only discrete exempt information contained in records.

Third, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the police department’s prior disclosure of information concerning the accident undermined its argument that disclosing the withheld records at issue would interfere with an ongoing police investigation. The Appellate Court explained that the police department’s prior, more limited disclosure of information about the accident in a crash report and a community alert did not eliminate the risk of interference to the police department’s pending investigation if the department were forced to disclose the more detailed records at issue.

Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the body camera recordings capturing witness statements should have been disclosed, because the witnesses made their statements to police officers on a public street and allegedly did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their statements. The Appellate Court explained that reasonable people in the position of the witnesses would reasonably expect that their statements would not be publicly disclosed, because disclosure could expose them to acts of retaliation and otherwise depict the witnesses in a vulnerable state after witnessing a traumatic accident. Therefore, because the witnesses captured in the withheld BWC recordings had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the recordings, and the witnesses did not provide their written consent to disclose the recordings, the public bodies properly withheld the BWC recordings from disclosure.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Bill Requiring Local Libraries to Stock “Opioid Antagonists” Passes Both Houses of General Assembly

Bill Requiring Local Libraries to Stock “Opioid Antagonists” Passes Both Houses of General Assembly

  Thursday, June 05, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The spring 2025 legislative session of the Illinois General Assembly has come to an end after months of debate on a wide variety of proposed legislation. One update that caught our attention is the unanimous approval of House Bill 1910 (Bill) by both chambers. If signed by the Governor, this Bill would amend the Local Library Act to require all "libraries open to the public" to maintain a supply of approved “opioid antagonists,” such as Naloxone (Narcan), for use in assisting individuals experiencing an opioid overdose.

The Bill requires libraries to take all reasonable steps to make sure that, during operating hours, there is at least one person present in the library trained to (1) recognize and respond to an opioid overdose and (2) administer the opioid antagonist to reverse the effects of the overdose. Library personnel may administer an opioid antagonist to any person who they believe is experiencing an overdose on library property or at a library-sponsored event. The Bill provides immunity for libraries and their personnel related to the administration of an opioid antagonist, except in situations where they engage in willful or wanton misconduct.

After reviewing the Bill, we want to flag two items of interest for our readers. 

First, the Bill only amends the Local Library Act, and there appears to be no corresponding legislation to amend the Public Library District Act. While the Bill states that these new requirements apply to "[a]ll libraries open to the general public" in Illinois, the Local Library Act (the only statute this Bill amends) only covers public libraries established under the Local Library Act and not library districts. This raises a question as to the scope of the Bill's application, given the inconsistency of language used in the Bill (applies to all public libraries) and the only statute the Bill proposes to amend (the Local Library Act).

Additionally, the Bill provides that libraries may obtain an approved opioid antagonist from “any lawful source,” but does not reference funding to cover the cost of the medication or training for library personnel. Absent further legislation, grants, or other opportunities for funding, libraries may need to be prepared to cover the costs associated with compliance.

The Bill has been sent to Governor Pritzker for consideration. If the Bill is signed into law, Illinois libraries (at the very least, those libraries established under the Local Library Act) will need to stock a supply of opioid antagonists, work with staff to complete the required training, and otherwise ensure compliance with the requirements of the new law. 

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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