Appeal of Pension Board Decision Dismissed for Violation of Court Rules in Use of AI

Appeal of Pension Board Decision Dismissed for Violation of Court Rules in Use of AI

  Tuesday, November 25, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently dismissed the appeal by a former police officer of a pension board's denial of pension benefits because he violated Illinois Supreme Court Rules when he filed an appellate brief almost wholly created with the aid of artificial intelligence (AI). Pletcher v. Village of Libertyville Police Pension Board.

The plaintiff was hired as a police officer in 2003, and filed an application for a non-duty disability pension in 2020. He subsequently withdrew his application, and returned to full duty. In 2022, he was placed on a performance improvement plan for certain violations of department orders and policies. Shortly thereafter, he filed a second application for a non-duty disability pension. The pension board held a hearing on the application and ultimately denied his application, finding that the officer's condition could have been remedied with medication, which the pension board found the officer refused to regularly to take.

The officer filed a complaint for administrative review with the trial court to appeal the pension board's decision, along with a brief supporting his complaint. In his brief, he cited to several cases that did not exist. At the hearing, the officer also attempted to introduce new evidence and exhibits that were not part of the original hearing. The pension board brought the nonexistent cases to the attention of the trial court and objected to the introduction of new evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court upheld the pension board's denial of his pension application.

The officer then appealed to the Appellate Court. After he filed his brief with the Appellate Court, the pension board filed a response and a motion for sanctions alleging that the officer violated Illinois Supreme Court Rules for fictitious citations to the administrative record, citations to nonexistent cases, and fictitious holdings from actual cases. The Appellate Court noted that all parties in litigation (even pro se litigants) are obligated to comply with court rules and procedures. The Court also noted that the officer had cited five cases in his appellate brief that did not exist, and that the some of the actual cases cited in his brief did not stand for the propositions stated in his brief. The Court stated that the officer's status as a "pro se" party does not excuse his careless reliance on AI, and that he was aware of the risks of using AI-generated research when this same issue was raised at the trial court and yet he still chose to use AI in this manner in his appellate brief. After holding oral argument on the motion to dismiss the appeal, the Appellate Court granted the pension board's motion and the officer's appeal was dismissed.

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Appellate Court Interprets 50 Pages "Free of Charge" FOIA Provision

Appellate Court Interprets 50 Pages "Free of Charge" FOIA Provision

  Wednesday, November 19, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a public body in a FOIA case filed by a requester who claimed the public body violated FOIA when it consolidated his six FOIA requests in applying FOIA's fee provision. Walters v. McHenry County Sheriff's Office.

A requester filed six FOIA requests on the same day with a county sheriff's office seeking Department of Corrections inspection reports for six different years (one year per request). The sheriff's office responded to the requests by providing 50 pages free of charge, and stating that the requester would have to pay 15 cents per page for the 113 remaining pages. The requester filed a lawsuit claiming that the sheriff's office violated FOIA by consolidating the six requests for purposes of applying the provision of FOIA requiring public bodies to release 50 pages free of charge, arguing that each of the six requests should have been treated separately. The sheriff's office filed a motion to dismiss the case arguing that because the requester submitted the six requests together in one envelope on the same date, it was appropriate to aggregate and combine the requests in applying FOIA's fee provision. The trial court agreed with the sheriff's office, finding that the request was properly consolidated for purposes of applying FOIA's fee provision. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of the sheriff's office but applied a different interpretation to the FOIA fee provision. The Appellate Court noted that the statute provides that “[n]o fees shall be charged for the first 50 pages of black and white, letter or legal sized copies requested by a requester.” The Appellate Court held that it was irrelevant whether the requester's FOIA requests were separate and distinct requests for different public records, and instead held that the requester's status as a single requester is what matters in applying this provision of FOIA, stating as follows:

Under the plain language of the statute, plaintiff—the “requester”—was entitled to “the first 50 pages *** requested” from defendant—the “public body”—free of charge. Id. Defendant provided 50 free pages to plaintiff and properly assessed fees for the additional 113 pages. Thus, plaintiff has not stated a valid claim against defendant for a FOIA violation, and the court was correct to dismiss his complaint. 

In short, the Appellate Court held that a requester is entitled to the first 50 pages free of charge requested by that requester from that public body, and since the sheriff's office provided the first 50 pages at no charge, there was no FOIA violation and the requester's complaint was properly dismissed.

It is important to note that this appears to be the first time an Appellate Court has interpreted this FOIA fee provision in this manner, and that this is an unreported order not a published opinion. So, it remains to be seen whether other Illinois courts would rule in the same manner (i.e., that the 50 pages "free of charge" provision applies to the requester and not to each request). 

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Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund

Officer Precluded from Membership in Second Police Pension Fund

  Tuesday, November 18, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a pension board's decision to deny an application for pension membership in Kooistra v. Board of Trustees of Sycamore Police Pension Fund.

A deputy chief in a municipal police department retired from that department and began receiving a retirement pension. Subsequently, he was hired as a patrol officer in a second municipal police department and submitted an application for membership in the second municipality's pension fund. His application was denied by the police pension board based on section 3-124.1(b) of the Police Pension Code, which states as follows: 

(b) If a police officer who first becomes a member on or after January 1, 2019 is receiving pension payments (other than as provided in Section 3-109.3) and re-enters active service with any municipality that has established a pension fund under this Article, that police officer may continue to receive pension payments while he or she is in active service, but shall only participate in a defined contribution plan established by the municipality pursuant to Section 3-109.4 and may not establish creditable service in the pension fund established by that municipality or have his or her pension recomputed.” 40 ILCS 5/3-124.1(b)

The pension board determined that this statute precluded the officer from membership in the second municipality's pension fund because he was already receiving pension payments from the first municipality's pension fund; however, he could participate in a defined contribution plan. The officer appealed the pension board's decision to the circuit court which upheld the pension board's decision, and that ruling was then appealed to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court analyzed the language in Section 3-124.1(b) and determined that it applied to the officer who was drawing a pension from his former employer. The Court rejected the officer's argument that the statutory provision did not apply to him because he became a "member" of the first municipality's pension fund before January 1, 2019. Instead, the Court agreed with the pension board's interpretation of the statute that it applies to the officer because he became a member of the second municipality's police department after the statutory cutoff date. In the Court's view, that was the most logical interpretation because the officer "first" becomes a member of the second municipality's police department upon reentry into active service, which would allow him to continue to receive pension payments from the first municipality but preclude him from participating in the second municipality's pension fund. The Court noted that this interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent of this section which was to prevent "double dipping" in two pension funds. 

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City Violated FOIA When it Charged a Fee for an Electronic Copy of an Incident Report

City Violated FOIA When it Charged a Fee for an Electronic Copy of an Incident Report

  Monday, November 17, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request seeking an electronic copy of an incident report, a city denied the request and directed the requester to contact the city police records department to purchase the report at a cost of $5 for residents, or for $10 for non-residents. After the requester submitted a request for review, the PAC issued its 13th binding opinion of 2025, finding the City in violation of Section 6(a) of FOIA by improperly assessing a fee for disclosing an electronic copy of the incident report. PAC Op. 25-013.

The PAC relied upon the language of Section 6(a) of FOIA, which states that:

Except to the extent that the General Assembly expressly provides, statutory fees applicable to copies of public records when furnished in a paper format shall not be applicable to those records when furnished in an electronic format.” (Emphasis added.)

Although the city argued that the report fees were listed on its website, the PAC determiend that the city did not cite a FOIA provision or any other law that authorized the city to charge a special fee for disclosing electronic copies of incident reports. Even if the city had adopted an ordinance establishing those fees, the PAC determined that a municipal ordinance is not a statute. Here, because the Illinois legislature had not expressly authorized a statutory fee in excess of the cost of the recording medium for electronic copies of incident reports, and it was feasible for the city to disclose the report in the electronic format sought by the requester without the need to purchase a recording medium, the city was prohibited by FOIA from assessing the requester a fee for disclosing an electronic copy of the incident report.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Appellate Court Vacates Zoning Violations Against Tree Service Business

Appellate Court Vacates Zoning Violations Against Tree Service Business

  Friday, November 14, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A tree service business owned property in a village's general business district. The village informed the business owner that its use of the property was not permitted by the village's zoning ordinance and conducted an administrative hearing on the alleged violation. At the administrative hearing, the business owner argued it was not operating a landscape contractor business as the village claimed, and that its operations were compliant with the village's zoning ordinance. At the conclusion of the hearing, tje administrative hearing officer found the business owner to be in violation of the zoning ordinance because (1) it was storing commercial vehicles and equipment on the property outside of an enclosed building, (2) the business operated a landscaping company which was not permitted in the general business district; and (3) commercial vehicles were parked on the property on an overnight basis in violation of the ordinance. The hearing officer issued a $150,000 fine against the business. 

The business filed a complaint seeking administrative review of the village's decision that it was in violation of the zoning ordinance. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer's decision, and that decision was appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the village's hearing officer's decision against the business, finding that (1) the business was operating a "contractor's shop" which was a permitted use in the business disrict; and (2) the parking of the businesses' commercial vehicles was allowed by the zoning ordinance, which allowed parking of commercial vehicles accessory to a business use. Because the Appellate Court found that the business was not in violation of the village's ordinances, it vacated the $150,000 fine. Tomax Tree Service, LLC v. Village of Westmont

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

  Monday, November 10, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum recently released 98: E-Bikes and E-Scooters at the APA-IL State Conference

In this episode, Ancel Glink attorneys Tyler Smith and Eugene Bolotnikov discuss options for local governments to navigate the current regulatory landscape of e-bikes and e-scooters. The discussion aims to help communities address concerns regarding public safety while providing some clarity to the owners and operators of these vehicles. Tyler and Eugene recently presented on this topic at the 2025 APA-IL State Conference, delving into the regulatory options available to communities in Illinois.

Special Segment: Public Comment Live from the APA-IL Conference

• The episode includes a public comment segment featuring a live question and answer session focused on e-bike and e-scooter regulations, recorded live at the 2025 APA-IL State Conference.
• Participants ask questions about communities shifting regulation away from state-defined classes (such as regulating by wattage instead), the inconsistency of regulations between neighboring communities, and the overlapping jurisdiction of municipalities and park districts.
• The presenters note that there has been a significant rise in regulatory attention in Illinois, especially in Cook County suburbs, following high-profile, fatal collisions involving e-bikes and vehicles.

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In the Zone: General Assembly Sends "People Over Parking Act" to the Governor

In the Zone: General Assembly Sends "People Over Parking Act" to the Governor

  Wednesday, November 05, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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During the recent veto session, the Illinois General Assembly passed a large mass transit bill (Senate Bill 2111) which, among other things, would create the "People Over Parking Act." If signed by the Governor, the Act would take effect on June 1, 2026, and restrict local authority to require minimum off-street automobile parking near public transit.

Prohibition on Minimum Off-Street Parking Near Transit

The fundamental effect of the Act is to prohibit local governments from setting requirements for mandatory off-street parking for automobiles in specific areas. With limited exceptions, a unit of local government may not impose or enforce any minimum automobile parking requirements on a development project that is located within:

• one-half mile of a public transportation hub; or
• one-eighth mile of a public transportation corridor.

Definitions

“Minimum automobile parking requirements” means any law, code, or policy that requires a minimum number of off-street, private parking spaces for new residential and commercial developments. This would include the minimum off-street parking requirements that are common in many local zoning ordinances.

The Act defines “development project” broadly to include nearly any project undertaken for the purpose of development of land. “Development project” does not include a project where any portion is designated for use as a hotel or other specified types of transient lodging.

 A “public transportation hub” includes:

• a rail transit station,
• a boat or ferry terminal served by either a bus stop or rail transit station, and
• an intersection of two or more bus routes with a combined frequency of bus service interval of 15 minutes or less during the morning and afternoon peak commute periods.

A “public transportation corridor” means a street on which one or more bus routes have a combined frequency of bus service interval of 15 minutes or less during the morning and afternoon peak commute periods. The Act does not define “morning and afternoon peak commute periods.”

This means the Act could affect Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) stations, Metra stations, Amtrak stations, and certain CTA or Pace bus routes providing frequent bus service.

Impact on Local Authority (Preemption of Home Rule Authority)

The Act applies to home rule and non-home rule units of local government.

Reserved Powers and Exceptions for Local Governments

While minimum automobile parking requirements would be generally prohibited near transit under this Act, local governments would retain the authority to regulate other aspects of parking and development, including:

1. Maximum Parking: A unit of local government is not prevented from enacting or enforcing local laws that establish a maximum parking requirement.
2. On-Street Parking: The Act does not prevent a unit of local government from regulating access to on-street parking.
3. Bicycle Parking: The Act does not restrict a unit of local government from enacting or enforcing local laws that establish a minimum parking requirement for bicycles, including electric-assisted bicycles.
4. Regulation of Voluntarily Provided Parking: If a developer chooses to provide off-street automobile parking voluntarily, the local government may require parking spaces to be:

• made available for car-share vehicles;
• shared with the public; or
• made available only for a fee (a local government may not require voluntarily provided parking to be provided free of charge).

Application to Existing Agreement or Site Plan

The Act would not apply if the requirements conflict with a contractual agreement or approved site plan that was executed or approved on or before the effective date of the Act. However, the prohibition would apply to any amendment or extension to the contractual agreement or approved site plan, if that amendment or extension increases automobile parking requirements. The Act does not define “contractual agreement” or “approved site plan,” so local governments should consult their attorneys about whether the Act would apply.

Next Steps

Local governments may need to evaluate areas in their community near transit that could be affected by the Act, and analyze their current zoning regulations for those areas, specifically their current parking requirements.

If the Governor signs the encompassing transit bill, the Act will be effective on June 1, 2026. If the Act does become effective, local governments could still encourage developers to voluntarily provide more off-street parking by (1) requiring parking spaces to be shared with the public; or (2) adopting on-street parking restrictions. Local governments could also amend their zoning application forms to ask an applicant to proactively assert whether the Act applies, so planning staff can review the grounds for that claim. In any event, local governments should contact their attorneys to evaluate how the Act might affect areas served by public transit.

Post Authored by Daniel J. Bolin, Ancel Glink

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Both Houses Pass the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act

Both Houses Pass the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act

  Tuesday, November 04, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois General Assembly passed a number of bills in the veto session that may be of interest to local governments, including HB 576 which creates the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act. While HB 576 was designed to protect certain state legislative and executive officials, and certain county officials (and not local government officials), the bill's ban on "government agencies" displaying or posting personal information about public officials who make a request that this information not be publicly disclosed expressly applies to units of local government and school districts. The bill has been sent to the Governor for signature.

If signed by the Governor, the Public Official Safety and Privacy Act would prohibit government agencies (including units of local government) from displaying, posting, or disclosing a public official's personal information if the government agency has received a written request from the public official to refrain from disclosing that personal information. It would also require government agencies to remove that content within five business days of a written request under the new Act. The Act also prohibits persons, businesses, and associations from publicly posting or displaying a public official's personal information online when the public official has made a written request that this information not be disclosed. 

"Personal information" is defined in the bill as follows:

"Personal information" means a home address, home telephone number, mobile telephone number, pager number, personal email address, social security number, federal tax identification number, checking and savings account numbers, credit card numbers, marital status, and identity of children under the age of 18.

"Public official" is defined in the bill as follows:

"Public official" includes 

(1) members or former members of the Illinois General Assembly;

(2) constitutional officers or former constitutional officers; 

(3) elected or appointed State's Attorneys

(4) appointed Public Defenders; and

(5) county clerks and members of the Board of Election Commissioners whose responsibilities include administering and overseeing elections.

The bill would also make it unlawful for anyone to knowingly publicly post on the Internet the personal information of a public official or his or her immediate family of the person knows or reasonably should know that publicly posting that information poses an imminent and serious threat to the health and safety of the public official or the public official's immediate family and if the violation is a proximate cause of bodily injury or death of the public official or family member. Violation of this provision would be a Class 3 felony. 

The bill would also amend FOIA to expressly exempt the personal information of public officials from disclosure. 

The would also make several other changes to various statutes, including the Election Code. First, the bill would amend a provision limiting expenditures by a political committee so that it does not apply to expenses relating to personal security services or cybersecurity measures for public officials. It also requires the State Board of Elections to redact the home addresses of public officials and current and past officers of political committees upon written request, and home addresses of candidates for public office upon expiration of the objection filing period, upon request. The bill would also amend the Vehicle Code and FOID card statute to allow public officials to use their work addresses rather than home addresses on their ID cards and vehicle registration applications.

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Court Rules in Favor of Sheriff's Office in FOIA Challenge

Court Rules in Favor of Sheriff's Office in FOIA Challenge

  Monday, November 03, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a sheriff's office in a lawsuit challenging the sheriff office's response to a FOIA request submitted by an arrestee who had been detained in county jail. Staake v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Office.

Plaintiff was arrested, booked, and detained in a county jail on various criminal charges. While in county jail, plaintiff allegedly made statements to others over the jail's recorded phone lines about an order of protection his wife had against him as well as the criminal offenses that led to his arrest. Plaintiff filed multiple FOIA requests with the sheriff's office asking for those recordings, but the requests were denied by the sheriff's office. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the sheriff's office claiming it violated FOIA in denying his FOIA request. The trial court ruled in favor of the sheriff's office, agreeing with the sheriff's office that the records were exempt from FOIA because plaintiff failed to establish how those recordings were "relevant" to his pending or potential claims or cases. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court reviewed section 7(1)(e-10) of FOIA, which exempts from FOIA the following:

(e-10) Law enforcement records of other persons requested by a person committed to the Department of Corrections, Department of Human Services Division of Mental Health, or a county jail, including, but not limited to, arrest and booking records, mug shots, and crime scene photographs, except as these records may be relevant to the requester's current or potential case or claim.

The Appellate Court analyzed whether Section 7(1)(e-10) applied to the plaintiff's FOIA request and determined that it did, finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the requested records "may be relevant" to any pending or potential case or claim. Because he did not meet his burden, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's ruling in favor of the sheriff's office.

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In the Zone: Court Finds No Procedural Due Process Violation in Zoning Challenge

In the Zone: Court Finds No Procedural Due Process Violation in Zoning Challenge

  Friday, October 31, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Appellate Court recently issued an opinion in a zoning challenge overturning a trial court's ruling that a city's zoning decision violated a neighboring property owner's procedural due process rights. Clark v. City of Galena.

In 2022, a developer filed an application requesting annexation and zoning approvals for a proposed mixed-use development on 80 acres of land in and adjacent to the city. The project included rental cottages, vineyard and winery, gardens, etc. The city's zoning board held a public hearing where the developer presented its application, and neighboring property owners and other interested parties spoke in opposition to the project. After closing the public hearing, the zoning board voted and sent its recommendation to the city council. The city council considered the zoning board's recommendation, and also allowed citizens to provide public comment on the project before voting in favor of both the proposed annexation and zoning approvals for the project. A few months later, the developer proposed amendments to the project, including annexation of additional property, and another zoning board hearing and city council meeting were held, and citizens were again allowed to provide testimony and public comment. The requested zoning changes and annexation of additional territory were approved by the city council.

A neighboring property owner who opposed the project filed a lawsuit against the city and developer to challenge the city's zoning decisions. She claimed that the zoning decisions violated various constitutional rights, including her procedural due process rights. The trial court ruled in favor of the city and developer on all counts except for the neighbor's claim that her procedural due process rights were violated. 

The city and developer appealed, and the Appellate Court overturned the trial court's ruling in favor of the neighbor on her procedural due process claims. The Appellate Court noted that zoning decisions are presumed valid, and that the neighbor had the burden to overcome that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the Appellate Court reviewed the process that was held by the city, including the two public hearings held by the zoning board where citizens were allowed to, and did in fact, speak about the project, including the neighbor who filed the lawsuit, and the multiple city council meetings on the project where the city council also allowed public comment, in which the neighbor participated as did other interested citizens. The Court found that both the zoning board and city council discussed the project in detail during that process, and went through the criteria for granting relief, before voting on the project.

The Appellate Court rejected the trial court's determination that the city's procedure deprived the neighbor of her procedural due process rights because the city failed to proactively offer her an opportunity to cross-examine the developer's witnesses. The Appellate Court held that the neighbor had an unlimited opportunity to pose questions about the project, and that she had not made a request to directly cross-examine the developer's witnesses, nor did the city deny such a request, so there was no deprivation of her due process rights. 

In sum, the Appellate Court found that the city's process was "thorough and allowed an interchange of evidence and opinions regarding the project," and that the city has an interest in an efficient process. The Court further found that the city was not required to proactively offer an opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses without a request by a citizen, as that would impose an additional burden for little benefit given the process provided in this case. As a result, the Court held that the neighbor failed to meet her burden to provide by clear and convincing evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated by the city's approval of the project. The Court also noted that the neighbor's failure to raise an objection to the city's process at the hearing resulted in a forfeiture of that issue in court.

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Local Government Law Institute 2025

Local Government Law Institute 2025

  Monday, October 20, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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It's that time of year for all of my local government lawyer readers and friends to register for this year's Local Government Law Institute hosted by the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education (IICLE). This year's conference will be held on Friday, December 5, 2025, from 8:55 to 3:45 pm. at the UBS Center in Chicago, with a cocktail reception to follow. The conference will be offered by webcast as well.

As always, the agenda for this annual conference is packed with educational and informational (and often entertaining) local government law topics, including the following "can't miss" sessions:

• Case Law and Legislative Update
• Development and Economic Incentives
• The First Amendment & Public Forum Spaces
• Federalism
• Local Government Attorney's Guide to What Not to Do in Employment Law
• Intergovernmental Cooperation: How to Work Together and Tips for Drafting IGAs
• Ethical Issues and AI in Local Government Law

More information about this year's conference and registration can be found on IICLE's website here.

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Illinois General Assembly Passes Bill Amending OMA and FOIA

Illinois General Assembly Passes Bill Amending OMA and FOIA

  Thursday, October 16, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Both houses of the Illinois General Assembly passed SB 243 that amends the Open Meetings Act and the Freedom of Information Act in a number of ways. The bill (which passed October 15, 2025) now goes to the Governor for his signature. If signed by the Governor, the bill states it would become effective on January 1, 2026.

1.    Meetings of Public Bodies Prohibited on Election Day

The bill would amend the OMA to prohibit public bodies from holding or scheduling a regular or special meeting on the day of a general, consolidated, or primary election. 

2.   Military Service as a Reason to Attend Meeting Remotely

The bill would also amend the OMA to add language allowing a member of a public body to attend a meeting remotely for the member's "performance of active military duty as a service member." Note that the bill did not change the requirement that a quorum of the public body be physically present to conduct a meeting.

3.     Township OMA Training Option

The bill would further amend the OMA to allow members of township boards to obtain the required OMA training through a course sponsored or conducted by an organization that represents townships created under the Township Code. This new provision is similar to provisions allowing members of municipal, school district, park district, fire protection district, soil and water conservation district, and drainage district public bodies to take training courses offered by organizations that represent those bodies rather than the electronic training offered by the Attorney General's office.  

4.    Immunity for Compliance with PAC Opinion

The bill would also amend provisions relating to the Public Access Counselor's office to clarify that officers and employees of a public body are immune from liability if they disclose records in accordance with an opinion of the PAC office.

5.    Section 4 FOIA Posting Requirements

Section 4 of FOIA currently requires public bodies to post certain information (description of the public body and its subdivisions, total operating budget, offices, number of employees, members of advisory bodies, FOIA procedures, etc.) at its administrative offices. This bill would amend section 4 to require posting only on the public body's website rather than at the administrative offices (unless the public body has no website, in which case the information must be posted at the administrative offices). 

6.    Junk Mail Excluded from FOIA Definition of Public Records

The bill would amend the FOIA to clarify that public records for purposes of FOIA expressly excludes "junk mail." Junk mail is defined as unsolicited commercial mail or email sent to a public body and not responded to by an official, employee, or agent of the public body. 

7.    Electronic FOIA Submissions Must Be in Body of Submission

The bill would amend FOIA to require that electronic FOIA requests include the request in the body of the electronic submission, rather than as an attachment or hyperlink, for cybersecurity reasons. If a public body receives an attachment or hyperlink request, it must notify the requester of the new requirement that requests must be in the body of the submission.

8.    Verification that FOIA Requester is a Person

The bill would amend FOIA to allow a public body that has a reasonable belief that a request was not submitted by a person to require the requester to verify orally or in writing that the requester is a person. The deadline for response would be tolled until the requester verifies that he or she is a person and if the requester fails to do so, the public body can deny the request.

9.    New FOIA Exemptions

The bill would also amend FOIA to add a couple of new exemptions for records held by a criminal justice agency and documents deemed sensitive by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Note that this bill has not yet been enacted into law - it needs the Governor's signature to become effective.

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Homeowner Not Entitled to Compensation for Property Damage in Search of Home

Homeowner Not Entitled to Compensation for Property Damage in Search of Home

  Friday, October 10, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the dismissal of a homeowner's Fifth Amendment "takings" claim lawsuit brought against a city and county seeking compensation for damages caused by law enforcement officers who entered her home pursuant to a search warrant to search for a fugitive they incorrectly believed was inside the home. Hadley v. City of South Bend, Ind.

In 2022, law enforcement believed that a murder suspect was residing in a South Bend home based on social media posts and the suspect's IP address, and obtained a search warrant to search the home for the suspect. Although the homeowner informed the officers that she had no connection with, or knowledge of, the suspect, officers forcefully entered her home, breaking windows, launching 30 cannisters of tear gas, wrecking internal security cameras, punching holes in walls, ransacking furniture and a closet, and tearing down a wall panel and fan. The suspect was not found in the home.

When the city and county refused to reimburse the homeowner for the damages to her home, she filed a civil rights lawsuit against the city and county, claiming that law enforcement violated the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when it damaged her property and that she was owed $16,000 in "just compensation." The district court dismissed her case, and she appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment did not entitle her to compensation, holding that the government is not obligated to compensate for property damage resulting from law enforcement officers executing a lawful search warrant. Because the warrant was lawful, the Seventh Circuit held that her lawsuit against the city and county was properly dismissed as she was not entitled to compensation for the property damages.

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From The Workplace Report: Opinion Letter Issued by DOL on Calculating Overtime

From The Workplace Report: Opinion Letter Issued by DOL on Calculating Overtime

  Thursday, October 09, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In case you don't already follow Ancel Glink's employment law blog, The Workplace Report (and you should!), you may want to check out a recent blog post about a Department of Labor opinion letter clarifying that "emergency pay" premiums provided to firefighters and other non-exempt employees during declared emergencies must be included in the regular rate of pay when calculating overtime premiums under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 

You can read the blog post at the following link: Opinion Letter Issued by the Department of Labor on Calculating Overtime

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Ancel Glink at the APA-IL Conference

Ancel Glink at the APA-IL Conference

  Wednesday, October 08, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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If you are attending the American Planning Association Illinois State Chapter's (APA-IL) Conference this week, be sure to stop by to check out one or more of the sessions presented by Ancel Glink attorneys:

Wednesday, October 8th 

2:15 pm -3:15 pm - Municipal Initiated Upzonings: Lessons Learned

Presenters: Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink), Katharyn Hurd (City of Chicago), Eric Van Buskirk (City of Champaign), and Meagan Jones (City of Evanston)

Thursday, October 9th

1:00 pm - 2:00 pm     Injunctions & Dragons: Planning Law Fantasy Adventure

Presenters:  Dan Bolin (Ancel Glink), Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink), Trevor Dick (Village of Lombard), and Phil Green (Village of Hoffman Estates)

3:30 pm - 4:30 pm     GovLove + APA-IL Live Podcast: Award-Winning Planners

Presenters: Dan Bolin (Ancel Glink) and Andy Cross (The Lakota Group)

3:30 pm - 4:30 pm     Small But Mighty: ADUs, Tiny Homes & Cottage Communities

Presenters: Greg Jones (Ancel Glink), Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink), David Silverman (Ancel Glink), Angela Mesaros (Village of Homewood), Falon Young (City of Chicago), and Samar Jha (AARP)

3:30 pm - 4:30 pm     "Wait" A Ride: Navigating the Regulatory Landscape of E-Bikes and E-Scooters

Presenters: Eugene Bolotnikov (Ancel Glink) and Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink)

Friday, October 10th

2:15 pm - 3:15 pm     E-Scooters, E-Bikes & Public Camping Regulations: Strategies for Municipal Planners to Avoid Legal Roadblocks

Presenters: Megan Mack (Ancel Glink) and Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink)

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Workers Compensation Benefits Barred Where Pension Board Denied Line-of-Duty Benefits

Workers Compensation Benefits Barred Where Pension Board Denied Line-of-Duty Benefits

  Tuesday, October 07, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently held that a pension board's decision to deny line-of-duty benefits and award a police department employee a non-duty pension barred him from receiving workers compensation benefits for that injury. City of Zion Police Department v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission.

A detective in a city police department filed an application for workers compensation benefits for bilateral wrist injuries he claimed he sustained while performing a “burpee” exercise during a firearms training event. The city argued that the employee's workers compensation claim was barred due to a prior decision by a pension board that had denied the employee's request for line-of-duty disability benefits and awarded him nonduty disability benefits for the wrist injuries. Both the arbitrator and the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission ruled in favor of the employee, finding that the issues litigated before the pension board were different than those presented in the workers compensation case. The city appealed.

On appeal, the circuit court reversed the Workers Compensation Commission's decision, and held that the employee was "collaterally estopped" from relitigating the issues relating to his wrist injuries, where that issue had already been decided by the pension board when it found that his wrist injuries were not caused by the training exercise. The employee appealed to the Appellate Court, which agreed with the circuit court that the employee was bound by the pension board's decision that his wrist injuries were not duty-related (which he did not appeal). As a result, the employee did not qualify for workers compensation benefits for the wrist injuries.

Disclaimer: Ancel Glink represented the City in this case.

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 97: Anatomy of a Redevelopment Agreement

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 97: Anatomy of a Redevelopment Agreement

  Monday, October 06, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast recently released Episode 97: Anatomy of a Redevelopment Agreement.

In this episode, Ancel Glink partner David S. Silverman, FAICP, provides an in-depth breakdown of the essential components and negotiation strategies for drafting effective Redevelopment Agreements (RDAs) from his presentation at the Southland Development Authority’s TIF Talk training session. David explains that the RDAs serve as a clear roadmap for the project, governing everything from development specifics to the flow of incentives and guarantees, requiring an internal logic that ensures it remains understandable for potentially decades. 

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Involuntary Annexation Upheld by Appellate Court

Involuntary Annexation Upheld by Appellate Court

  Wednesday, October 01, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently upheld a municipality's involuntary annexation of property in Husky Trans, Inc. v. Village of Barrington Hills. 

After the village board discussed the possible annexation of two unincorporated parcels of land, it sent notice to the owner that the village board would consider annexing the parcels at a board meeting. The notice also informed the owner that the property would be rezoned to the R1 single family residential zoning district upon annexation. The owner's attorney sent a response to the village that the owner objected to the forcible annexation, arguing that the parcels did not qualify for annexation under section 7-1-13 of the Illinois Municipal Code because the parcels were not "wholly bounded" by one or more municipalities, forest preserve, or park district property. 

After the village board annexed the property, the owner filed a lawsuit, claiming that the village lacked authority to annex the parcels because, among other things, the territory was not “wholly bounded” by one or more municipalities or a forest preserve or park district as is required by section 7-1-13 of the Illinois Municipal Code. The owner argued that two "gaps" in the boundary of the annexed parcels abutted unincorporated territory, thus defeating the annexation. The village responded that the gaps abutting railroad right-of-way should be treated differently for purposes of annexation and, in any event, the minor gaps in the boundary were "de minimus" and should not support invalidation of the annexation. 

The trial court ruled in the owner's favor, finding that the gaps in the boundary invalidated the annexation. The village appealed, and the Appellate Court reversed, holding that the annexation was valid. The Court agreed with the village that the annexed territory was entirely surrounded as required by state statute except for two small gaps created by railroad right-of-way. Since those gaps represented only 4.7 percent of the total perimeter of the annexed property, the Court found them to be inconsequential and insufficient to defeat the "wholly bounded" requirement of the annexation statute. As a result, the Court held that the annexation was valid.

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Ancel Glink at the 2025 ILA Conference

Ancel Glink at the 2025 ILA Conference

  Tuesday, September 30, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink attorneys Julie Tappendorf and Erin Monforti will be speaking at multiple sessions at this year's Illinois Library Association (ILA) conference taking place October 14-16 in Rosemont. If you will be at the ILA conference, we hope you can stop in to one (or more) of our sessions and say hi.

Ready for Anything: Responding to First Amendment Audits

• Tuesday, October 14, 2:45 p.m. - 3:45 p.m.
• Speakers: Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink; Dustin Smaby, Vernon Area Public Library District 

Courageous Belonging: Navigating Public Backlash and the First Amendment with Care 

• Wednesday, October 15, 1:45 p.m. - 2:45 p.m.
• Speakers: Holly Bartecki, Jasculca Terman Strategic Communications; Kelly Durov, Northbrook Public Library; Kate Hall, Northbrook Public Library; Stacy Oliver, Northbrook Public Library; Elizabeth Rupert, Joffe Emergency Services; Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink; Linda Vering, Northbrook Public Library 

Book Bans and Intellectual Freedom for Trustees 

• Thursday, October 16, 11:00 a.m. - noon
• Speakers: Sheri Doniger, Lincolnwood Public Library District; Becky Keane, Niles-Maine District Library; Elizabeth Lynch, Addison Public Library; Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink 
• Presented by the Intellectual Freedom Committee (IFC)

Keeping it Legal on Social Media

• Thursday, October 16, 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.
• Speaker: Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
• Presented by the Library Trustee Forum (LTF)

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Charges Brought in Wisconsin Regarding an Unlawful Recording of Closed Meeting

Charges Brought in Wisconsin Regarding an Unlawful Recording of Closed Meeting

  Friday, September 26, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Interesting development out of Wisconsin where two individuals were arrested for recording a closed session meeting of a county board. According to news reports, a city administrator and his sister were arrested after surveillance video showed that the city administrator's sister had placed her phone against the door to a closed meeting of the county board in an attempt to intercept the discussions during the closed meeting. Authorities charged both with intercepting an oral communication during a closed session which, in Wisconsin, is a Class H felony subject to fines of $1,000 and up to six years of prison time. The city administrator was charged after authorities discovered communications between the two that took place on Facebook Messenger during and about the incident. 

WPR reporting available here.

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Illinois Federal Court Applies Lindke Test in Social Media Lawsuit

Illinois Federal Court Applies Lindke Test in Social Media Lawsuit

  Thursday, September 25, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Thanks to one of our blog readers for sending today's case which involves the application of the "actual authority" test that was adopted in 2024 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lindke v. Freed case that applies to challenges to a public officials' or employees' actions on social media.

In 2015, a candidate for the office of Illinois state representative created a Facebook page. She won her election, and in 2024, created a separate "house minority leader" Facebook page where she engaged with citizens. She also continued to post on her original Facebook page and interact with citizens about state business. After someone posted critical comments on her original Facebook page, she deleted the negative comments and blocked the individual from her page. The individual then sued the state representative, claiming that the official's actions violated her First Amendment and civil rights.

This week, an Illinois district court judge dismissed the case on several bases, including that the complaint did not satisfy the two-part "actual authority" test that was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court last year in Lindke v. Freed. We reported on the Lindke case previously. In order for a government official's or employee's activities on social media (e.g., deleting comments or banning or blocking persons from commenting on their social media pages) to be considered "state action" for purposes of a First Amendment civil rights lawsuit, the person suing must show that the government official or employee (1) had actual authority to speak on behalf of the government on a particular matter and (2) purported to exercise that authority in the action being challenged.

Here, the court found that the complaint did not contain sufficient allegations that the state representative had "actual authority" in this matter. Specifically, the court said that the complaint did not refer to any law, policy, or regulation that vested the state representative with authority to speak on the state's behalf. The court acknowledged that the minority leader may have some authority to speak on the state's behalf, but the plaintiff had not identified any express authority, and that simply discussing state business on social media is not sufficient to meet the first prong of the Lindke test. The court also noted that the complaint failed to meet the second prong of the Lindke case since the plaintiff did not point to any specific Facebook posts where the state representative exercised actual authority to speak on the state's behalf.

In sum, the court dismissed the complaint, although has allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint if he can cure the deficiencies noted in the court's ruling. We will keep an eye on this case and report back if there are new developments. This case is worth a read for government officials and employees seeking guidance on how a court might apply the new Supreme Court two-part "actual authority" test for social media activities.

Devore v. McCombie

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City Could Withhold Employment Taxes from PEDA Benefits

City Could Withhold Employment Taxes from PEDA Benefits

  Friday, September 19, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Supreme Court issued an opinion this week finding that the Illinois Public Employee Disability Act (commonly referred to as PEDA), does not prohibit a city from withholding employment taxes from payments made under the PEDA statute. Bitner v. City of Pekin.

Two former police officers had applied for and were granted PEDA benefits after they were injured in the line of duty. PEDA provides that eligible employees who suffer an injury in the line of duty that causes them to be unable to perform their duties are entitled to be paid by their employer on the same basis as before their injury for a period up to a year. PEDA also states that no deduction can be made for sick leave credits, compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a pension fund while the employee is receiving PEDA benefits. The officers filed a lawsuit, claiming that PEDA prohibited the city from withholding employment taxes (federal and state income taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes) from their PEDA benefits. The trial court ruled in favor of the officers, but on appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of the city, and the officers appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.

The Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the language of section 1(b) of PEDA, and determined that there was no express language prohibiting an employer from withholding employment taxes, unlike the express prohibition in PEDA for leave deductions. The Court also held that the officers failed to provide any evidence that PEDA payments were exempt from federal income tax, and did not point to any statute or IRS ruling that prohibits a government employer from withholding taxes from PEDA payments. As a result, the Court held that employees receiving PEDA benefits could seek a refund or adjust their tax withholding to address the tax issue, rather than requiring employers to determine whether an employee has or does not have a tax liability. In sum, the Illinois Supreme Court found in favor of the city, holding that PEDA did not prohibit the city from withholding employment taxes from the PEDA benefits paid to the two officers. 

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Court Remands Challenge to Fast Track Demolition to Circuit Court

Court Remands Challenge to Fast Track Demolition to Circuit Court

  Thursday, September 18, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court issued an opinion in a case involving a municipality's use of a "fast track" demolition to demolish a a building. JB Distribution Market of SLC v. City of Peoria.

A city filed an action in circuit court under Section 11-31-1(e) of the Illinois Municipal Code to obtain an order authorizing the demolition of a building that the city argued was in an unsafe condition. The circuit court issued the order, and the city hired a contractor to demolish the building. The owner of the building filed a lawsuit asking the court to enjoin the city from demolition activities. The owner argued it was entitled to relief under the statute based on language that entitles an owner to a "stay" of demolition if the owner files a complaint before the municipality proceeds with the demolition activities authorized by the statute. The city argued its contractor had already proceeded with demolition activities, precluding relief under the statute. The circuit court agreed, and ruled in favor of the city and dismissed the complaint.

If, however, before the municipality proceeds with any of the actions authorized by this subsection, any person with a legal or equitable interest in the property has sought a hearing under this subsection before a court and has served a copy of the complaint on the chief executive officer of the municipality, then the municipality shall not proceed with the demolition, repair, enclosure, or removal of garbage, debris, or other substances until the court determines that that action is necessary to remedy the hazard and issues an order authorizing the municipality to do so. 65 ILCS 5/11-31-1(e)

On appeal, the Appellate Court disagreed with the circuit court's ruling, finding that it was not clear whether installation of fencing and asbestos testing was sufficient to start the process of demolition, and sent the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

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Court Rules in Favor of Park District In Tree Stump Injury Lawsuit

Court Rules in Favor of Park District In Tree Stump Injury Lawsuit

  Wednesday, September 17, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently ruled in favor of a park district in a lawsuit filed by a person injured when she fell on a tree stump on property owned by the park district. The injury occurred at a park owned by the park district, in an area directly behind the plaintiff's family member's home. The plaintiff was playing badminton that her family member had set up on park district property. In her lawsuit against the park district, she claimed the park district was liable for her injury because it occurred on park district land. The park district countered that the Tort Immunity Act applied to defeat her claims, arguing that the plaintiff was neither an intended nor permitted user of the property, and the tree stump condition and risk were "open and obvious." The circuit court ruled in favor of the park district, and the case was appealed.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the ruling in favor of the park district. First, the Appellate Court determined that the park district had enacted an ordinance that restricted games and sports in designated areas only, and the open space area located behind the home where the injury occurred was not a designated area for sports such as badminton. As a result, the plaintiff was not an intended user of that area when she was playing badminton. Second, the Appellate Court noted that the photos taken of the area showed that the tree stump condition was open and obvious and, as a result, she should have recognized the danger and taken care to avoid risk. Third, the Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the park district's conduct was "willful and wanton" as the park district had received no complaints about the tree stump, and the area where it was located was not a high traffic area. Wright v. Gurnee Park District.

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Court Rules in Favor of County Board on OMA Challenge

Court Rules in Favor of County Board on OMA Challenge

  Thursday, September 11, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A former county employee filed a lawsuit against a county board claiming the board violated various provisions of the Open Meetings Act (OMA). Specifically, the former employee claimed the county board improperly held three closed sessions to discuss his employment, which later led to his termination. He claimed that the county board failed to cite a statutory exemption before going into closed session and that the board did not have a quorum present at the meetings because they were held remotely. The former employee also claimed the county board failed to conduct timely semi-annual reviews of the board's closed session meeting minutes. He requested that the court order the board to comply with the OMA, release the minutes from the three closed sessions at issue, and award him costs and attorneys fees.

The county board filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on several grounds, including that some of his claims were moot and that his complaint was untimely because it was not filed within 60 days of the meetings at issue. The board also argued that his claims were the subject of previous lawsuits brought by the former employee and were, therefore, barred by res judicata. Finally, the board filed a motion for sanctions against the former employee for filing frivolous claims against the county.

The trial court ruled in the county's favor and dismissed the lawsuit. The court determined that the claims were barred by "res judicata" because they had already been decided in two previous cases. The court also found the OMA claims to be time-barred because they were not filed within 60 days of the meetings at issue, and that some of his claims were moot because the county board had resolved those claims. The court also ruled in favor of the county on its motion for sanctions, finding that the current lawsuit was frivolous because the former employee brought claims that had already been adjudicated, and ordered the former employee to pay the county $43,305.50.

The former employee appealed, and the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the case, finding that the OMA claims were not timely filed, some of the claims were moot, and all claims were barred by res judicata because they had been previously adjudicated. The Appellate Court rejected the former employee's argument that the OMA allowed a plaintiff to file a lawsuit within 60 days of discovering the OMA violation, holding that the "discovery rule" only applies to discovery of a violation of the OMA by the States Attorney. The Court also found that the former employee's claims that the county board failed to conduct its semi-annual review of closed session meeting minutes to be moot because the county board had since conducted a review. The Court also rejected the former employee's argument that the trial court erred when it did not conduct an "in camera" review of the closed session meeting minutes, finding that a review of the minutes was not necessary for the trial court to resolve the case on the county's motion to dismiss. Finally, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's award of sanctions but remanded the case back to the trial court to review the basis for its award. Dorman v. Madison County Board.

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 96: Artifical Intelligence v Alex Intelligence

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 96: Artifical Intelligence v Alex Intelligence

  Monday, September 08, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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On the latest episode of Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast, Ancel Glink Attorneys Dan Bolin and Alex Cambiazo put legal analysis to the test in "Artificial Intelligence v. AlexIntelligence!" Dan plays AI-generated summaries of recent, critical cases affecting local governments and employers, and Alex provides expert insights, corrections, and key takeaways from her own legal summaries. 

Cases Discussed:

• Undercover Officer Misconduct: Veronica Hinton v. The City of Chicago; Matthew O. Bryant; John Doe – Clarifying when an officer’s private actions fall "under color of state law" and the implications for municipal liability.

• Municipal Impoundment Fees: Matthew E. Carter v. The City of Alton – Examining the constitutionality of administrative fees for vehicle impoundment related to criminal offenses and the importance of administrative remedies.

• FOIA & Body Camera Footage: NBC Subsidiary (WMAQ-TV) LLC v. The Chicago Police Department and The Office of Emergency Management and Communications – Understanding law enforcement exemptions under FOIA and the "reasonable expectation of privacy" for body camera recordings of victims and witnesses.

• Employment Discrimination: Kara Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corporation – Highlighting the importance of clear, consistent, and well-documented performance review systems in defending against sex discrimination claims.

Also in this Episode:

• A Public Comment segment addressing school flyers and free speech limitations in limited public forums, drawing on E.D. v. Noblesville School District.

• The Department of Public Works discusses Ancel Glink's presence and sessions at the APA-IL State Conference.

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Municipal Minute Turns 14

Municipal Minute Turns 14

  Friday, September 05, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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On September 3, 2011, Municipal Minute published its first blog post called "Tweeting into Trouble?" At that time, Municipal Minute had two followers and they both worked at Ancel Glink! 14 years, 2,463 posts, and more than 3.3 million visits later, Municipal Minute is still going strong, providing timely updates on new laws, cases, and other topics of interest to local government officials and employees. A big thank you to all of our Municipal Minute followers and readers - your passion for local government is an inspiration to us, and we appreciate your continued readership.

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Local Grocery Tax Filing Reminder

Local Grocery Tax Filing Reminder

  Thursday, September 04, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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Just a quick reminder to those municipalities or counties that have adopted or are considering adopting an ordinance imposing the 1% local grocery tax that was authorized by the Illinois General Assembly after the legislature repealed the state grocery tax, that a certified copy of the grocery tax ordinance must be filed with the Illinois Department of Revenue no later than October 1, 2025 in order for the tax to take effect on January 1, 2026, and the revenue stream to continue. P.A. 103-0871.

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Public Body Properly Withheld Construction Plans under FOIA

Public Body Properly Withheld Construction Plans under FOIA

  Wednesday, September 03, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request seeking records related to a proposed commercial solar facility, a county land use department (department) disclosed certain records, but withheld two construction-related technical documents submitted to the department by a special use applicant pursuant to Section 7(1)(k) of FOIA. The requester subsequently submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC) claiming the department improperly withheld the construction-related technical documents, because the department did not show that disclosing them would compromise security.

In its 12th binding opinion of 2025, the PAC determined that the department properly withheld the two construction-related technical documents pursuant to FOIA. PAC Op. 25-012. The PAC clarified that Section 7(1)(k) of FOIA exempts two categories of records: (1) architects' plans, engineers' technical submissions, and other construction related technical documents for projects not constructed or developed in whole or in part with public funds; and (2) the same records for projects constructed or developed with public funds, but only to the extent that disclosure would compromise security.

In this case, the withheld documents were construction-related technical documents commissioned by the private company, and no public funds were used to construct or develop the project, so these records were per se exempt from disclosure under the plain language of Section 7(1)(k). The PAC rejected the requester’s argument that the department could not withhold the records without demonstrating that there disclosure would compromise security, because the “compromise security” language only applies to projects constructed or developed in whole or in part with public funds, which was not the case here.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Court Rejects Claim that Roadway was Dedicated to Township

Court Rejects Claim that Roadway was Dedicated to Township

  Tuesday, September 02, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A lot owner in a partially completed subdivision sued a township, claiming that the township was legally responsible for maintaining and controlling a road that provided access to the owner's lot. The lot owner also sued the owner of the remaining lots in the subdivision alleging that she interfered with his access by placing a locked gate on the road. The trial court dismissed the case against both defendants, and the lot owner appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Appellate Court determined that the lot owner did not provide sufficient evidence to meet the standard for establishing that the road at issue was, in fact, dedicated to the township. The Court acknowledged that the subdivision plat provided sufficient evidence of "donative intent" (i.e., that the parties intended that the road be dedicated to the township as a public road) but there was no evidence to support the lot owner's argument that the road dedication was actually accepted by the township. As a result, the Court determined that the trial court properly dismissed the claims against the township, finding that the road was not dedicated to the township as a public road, so the township had no responsibility over the road.

As for the claims against the subdivision owner, the Appellate Court reversed the dismissal, finding that the lot owner sufficiently alleged that the subdivision owner interfered with his rights to access his lot through the road by installing a gate or other barricade, and those claims could proceed at the trial court.

Apps v. Crete Township Highway Commissioner

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Public High School Teacher's Termination for Social Media Posts Upheld by Court of Appeals

Public High School Teacher's Termination for Social Media Posts Upheld by Court of Appeals

  Wednesday, August 27, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a school district's termination of a public high school teacher who had posted inflammatory comments on a Facebook page that was primarily followed by former students. Hedgepeth v. Britton,

A social studies teacher at an Illinois public high school for 20 years had been suspended twice by the school district for various actions, including swearing at students and profane outbursts in the classroom. In 2020, during the George Floyd protests, she made a series of posts to Facebook, including stating that protesters should be hosed down with high pressure water hoses. She also engaged with a former student on her Facebook page, stating that she found the term "white privilege" to be as racist as the "N" word. 

The day after the teacher made the posts, the school principal began receiving complaints from current high school students, alumni, another teacher, and a parent. The school district also received emails, calls, and media inquiries regarding the teacher's social media posts. After investigating the matter, the school district fired her, finding that she violated four school district policies, including one that governed teacher conduct on social media and the school's “just and courteous professional relationships” policy she had been disciplined for violating twice before. 

After she was terminated, she appealed her termination to the Illinois State Board of Education, which upheld the district's decision to terminate her. She also filed a lawsuit against the school district, claiming the termination violated her First Amendment rights. The district court also upheld the school's decision to terminate her and she appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that public employees do not relinquish their First Amendment rights as a condition of accepting government employment. Based on U.S. Supreme Court cases, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen on matters of "public concern." However, that right is not unlimited or unrestricted, and public employees are subject to certain limitations on their freedom, depending on the employee's role, particularly when they serve in a role of "trust." In order to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, the teacher had to prove three things: (1) that she engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) that she suffered a deprivation likely to deter that protected speech and (3) that the speech was a motivating factor in her termination.

The Seventh Circuit focused on the first prong of the test. That prong requires the employee to demonstrate that she was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern and, if so, the court will balance that interest against the government employer's interest in "promoting the efficiency of the public services." Even if an employee speaks on matters of public concern, they may not have First Amendment protections if the employer's interest outweighs their speech rights. This balancing test is known as the Pickering test that is derived from a U.S. Supreme Court case. 

In applying the test, the Seventh Circuit first found that the teacher was speaking on matters of public concern in the Facebook posts that were the subject of the lawsuit. However, the court determined that the school district's interests outweighed the teacher's speech rights for several reasons. First, the school had an interest in addressing actual disruptions to school operations where the district received over a hundred emails and numerous other complaints about the teacher's social media posts. Second, the school could reasonably look to the teacher's past conduct and disciplinary record in considering whether her speech could have a future impact to school operations. Third, the court rejected the teacher's argument that her posts were on her private social media account so should not be the basis for her termination, because the court found that her audience (i.e., her Facebook friends) primarily consisted of community members (80% were former students), which amplified her speech. The court also noted that public school teachers occupy a unique position of trust, which makes the government employer's interest even more compelling.

In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit found ample evidence of actual disruption to the school district from the teacher's social media conduct, and that the teacher's social media posts were not entitled to First Amendment protection.

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Court Finds No First Amendment Violation in School's Restrictions on School Club Flyers

Court Finds No First Amendment Violation in School's Restrictions on School Club Flyers

  Tuesday, August 26, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A high school student established a pro-life student club at her high school, which school administrators approved. She was allowed to have a table at the school's activities fair, where she displayed pro-life signs and recruited more than 30 members. However, when the student tried to post flyers with political slogans on school walls, she was told she had to revise them to comply with the school's neutral content rules for all student-club wall postings. She and her mother challenged the administrator's decision on the wall postings, and ultimately the club was suspended for the remainder of the semester but reinstated a couple of months later.

The student sued the school district claiming that the school's rejection of her flyers and suspension of the club violated her First Amendment rights. The district court disagreed, ruling in favor of the school district. That decision was appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. E.D. v. Noblesville School District.

The school defended its decision to reject the pro-life club's flyers because of their political content, arguing that it restricted all student club flyers to the club's name and the meeting time, date, and location. The school stated that the pro-life club's flyer included language such as "Defund Planned Parenthood" that went beyond what school club flyers were allowed to include. The school noted that once the students meet, they are free to talk about their common interests but that the flyers cannot contain content that is "political or that could disrupt the school environment." The school also defended its decision to suspend the club because the student's mother became involved in school club matters which were supposed to be student-led when she attempted to end run the process by lobbying another administrator to allow the flyers. 

The Seventh Circuit upheld the school's actions, finding that the flyers (and political content) could be perceived as having been endorsed by the school because they are posted on school walls. The court rejected the student's argument that this was a case about private student speech, instead finding it to be a case about whether the school must lend its resources (the school walls) to disseminate student speech. The court determined that it did not have to do so, noting that although the school walls were a limited public forum for student expression, the school can restrict the content in this manner to "create a stable, neutral educational environment." The court acknowledged that the school's flyer policy regulated content, but noted that it did not discriminate based on viewpoint since the school banned all political content from all school club flyers. As a result, the court found no constitutional violation in the school's actions regarding the club's flyers. The court also upheld the school's suspension of the school club, finding that it was not based on the club's viewpoint or message but instead because of the parent's involvement in the club that was inconsistent with the policy that school clubs be student-led.

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Court Upholds Village's Response to FOIA Request from Recurrent Requester

Court Upholds Village's Response to FOIA Request from Recurrent Requester

  Thursday, August 21, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In Dyler v. Village of Arlington Heights, an Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a Village in five consolidated lawsuits challenging the Village's response to multiple FOIA requests.

A requester filed various FOIA requests asking the Village to provide copies of bonds for specific Village employees. The Village responded to each request that it searched for responsive records, but did not locate any. About a year later, the Village did locate a requested bond from its insurer and sent it to the requester. The requester subsequently filed five separate lawsuits against the Village, all claiming that the Village violated FOIA. The requester also filed appeals with the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC), which ruled in favor of the Village, finding that it properly responded to the request because no responsive records existed. 

The trial court consolidated all five lawsuits and ruled in favor of the Village, finding that it properly responded to the requester's FOIA requests. That decision was appealed to the Appellate Court, which also ruled in the Village's favor, finding support for the Village's response in an affidavit submitted by the Village that no records existed. The Appellate Court also rejected the requester's claim that the Village improperly designated him a "recurrent requester" under FOIA. The Court noted that FOIA authorizes a public body additional time to respond to FOIA requests from a "recurrent requester" (21 business days rather than 5 business days), and that his multiple requests to the Village were properly counted for purposes of determining that he was a recurrent requester. 

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Board Violated OMA By Discussing Public Business at Private Energy Event

Board Violated OMA By Discussing Public Business at Private Energy Event

  Wednesday, August 20, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), claiming that a majority of a quorum of a county board held an improper “meeting” in violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) when it discussed public business at an informational event hosted by a private energy company. In its 11th binding opinion of 2025, the PAC concluded that a county board violated OMA by holding an improper private meeting in violation of Section 1.02 of the OMA. PAC Op. 25-011.

In this case, the board did not dispute that a majority of a quorum of the board attended the event. However, the board argued that the event was an informational presentation by a private energy company to discuss a proposed renewable energy project, and not a “meeting” where a majority of the quorum of the board discussed public business. The PAC disagreed, finding that board members engaged in a question and answer session with energy company’s representatives about their proposed operations in the county, which pertained to county business since the discussions centered around business or community interests impacting the county.

The board also argued that the event was not a meeting because there were no specific items concerning the energy company pending before the board. While the board did not reach an accord on any specific matter at the time of the event, the PAC determined that the event was nonetheless a meeting subject to OMA’s requirements, because a majority of a quorum of board members engaged in the collective inquiry phase of deliberations by gathering and exchanging information concerning the renewable energy project in anticipation of possibly taking future action.

This is a good reminder to members of public bodies that a meeting could be triggered even in informal settings where a majority of a quorum of the public body discusses public business.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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PAC Finds Separation Agreement Was Not Exempt in its Entirety From FOIA

PAC Finds Separation Agreement Was Not Exempt in its Entirety From FOIA

  Tuesday, August 19, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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In response to a FOIA request from a news agency seeking a named police officer’s resignation or termination records, a city’s office of public safety administration (OPSA) denied the request entirely citing the "private information" exemption in Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA, and the "personal privacy" exemption in Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. In its 10th binding opinion of 2025, the Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General’s office (PAC) concluded that OPSA improperly denied the request in its entirety. PAC Op. 25-010.

First, the PAC noted that the "personal privacy" exemption of Section 7(1)(c) provides an exemption for "the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information." However, that same FOIA exemption also states that the "disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy." Here, the PAC determined that the records withheld by OPSA concerned a public employee’s separation from employment which "bears on the public duties" of a public employee." As a result, the records should not have been entirely withheld under the "personal privacy" exemption of Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 

Second, the PAC acknowledged that Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA authorizes public bodies to discretely redact “private information” as that term is defined in FOIA. Because the responsive records to this request contained handwritten signatures and employee identification numbers (which fall within FOIA’s definition of private information), the PAC determined that this "private information" could have been properly redacted and the remainder of the record released to the requester. However, the PAC noted that this exemption would not justify withholding the records in their entirety.

Note that this opinion does not stand for the proposition that public bodies cannot redact personal privacy information contained in public records (e.g., separation records) so long as the public body demonstrates that disclosing that information would cause the subject a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink 

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PAC Finds Violation of OMA Where Board Did Not Name Candidate for Appointment

PAC Finds Violation of OMA Where Board Did Not Name Candidate for Appointment

  Monday, August 18, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's office (PAC) issued three new binding opinions recently, which we will summarize over the next few days.

In PAC Op. 25-009, the PAC concluded that a village board violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) becaues it failed to provide an adequate public recital before the board voted on the appointment of a person to fill a vacancy on the village board.

The village board defended its actions by arguing that it did not take final action at the meeting because the board voted against approving a motion to appoint a person to fill a vacant village trustee position. The PAC disagreed, finding that decisions that bring matters to a resolution—regardless of the outcome of the vote—constitute "final action" under the OMA. Here, the board decided not to approve the appointment presented by the village president to fill the vacancy on the village board. 

Because the board’s vote on the motion constituted a final action under Section 2(e) of the OMA, the PAC determined that the board’s vote had to be preceded by a public recital that (1) announced the general nature of the matter being considered (2) with sufficient detail to inform the public about the particular transaction or issue. Although the board did announce the general nature of the matter being considered (motion to appoint a person to fill a trustee vacancy), the PAC determined that the board did not provide sufficient detail to inform the public about the matter being voted on because the board did not name or identify the person whose appointment the board considered prior to taking the vote.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Teacher's Case Against School District's Naming Policy Moves Forward

Teacher's Case Against School District's Naming Policy Moves Forward

  Thursday, August 14, 2025    Julie Tappendorf

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An Indiana High School adopted a policy that required teachers to call students by their first names as they appeared in the school's database. For transgender students who had changed their first names, the database listed their new names. A teacher in the school objected to the school's name policy on religious grounds and requested an accommodation, which the school initially granted, which allowed him to call students by their last names. After a year, some students and teachers complained about the teacher's practice, and the school rescinded the accommodation, informing the teacher that he would face termination if he didn't call students by their first names. The teacher sued the school, claiming it failed to accommodate his religion. The district court ruled in the school's favor, and the teacher appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of the employee's religious practices or beliefs unless the employer can establish that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious practices or believes without undue hardship on the employer's business. To establish a Title VII case, the employee has to establish that his religious belief is "sincerely held." Then, the burden shifts to the employer to show that any reasonable accommodation would result in undue hardship. The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered that second part of the analysis (undue hardship) and held that the employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in "substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business." This new Supreme Court standard is more "rigorous" than the previous standard that defined "undue hardship" as anything that required an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee.

Applying the Supreme Court's new "undue burden" test to the school district, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, finding that the school district failed to introduce evidence that an accommodation to allow a teacher to call students by their last name resulted in the type of objective harm necessary to establish an "undue burden." The Court also rejected the school's argument that the accommodation caused a serious disruption to the learning environment. In short, the Court determined that there was a material factual dispute as to whether an accommodation would result in an undue hardship to the school, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation.

The dissenting opinion would have upheld the district court's ruling in favor of the student. The dissent noted that the school had initially accommodated the teacher, but after a year, determined that the accommodation had failed in practice, and the school had an obligation to the transgender students harmed by the accommodation. The dissent argued that the school did not discriminate against the teacher based on his religion, and had reasonably concluded that its initial accommodation was not justifiable. 

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