Wednesday, January 29, 2020
There have been so many new bills introduced in the Illinois General Assembly recently that we can hardly keep track of them all. But, we thought our library readers might be interested in a new bill that, if passed, would amend the Library Records Confidentiality Act to expand the information that is prohibited from release beyond registration and circulation records to also protect from release "personal identifiable information" of a patron. That information would include a patron's name, address, IP address, social security number, phone number, or email address. SB 2523.
Wednesday, January 22, 2020
Village Can Bring Nuisance Action Without Separate Prosecution of Ordinance Violations
Wednesday, January 22, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
The Village of Orion filed a nuisance action against a Village resident after sending notice to the resident alleging a violation of the Village Code provisions prohibiting more than three cats on a property. The notice came after the state had charged the resident with harboring more than 70 cats on her property. The Village asked the court to issue an order to abate the nuisance and require the resident to comply with the Village Code. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the Village did not have authority to bring a nuisance lawsuit without having cited the resident in a separate proceeding.
The Village appealed, and the appellate court ruled in its favor, finding that a municipality does have the authority to bring a lawsuit to abate a nuisance situation without having to prosecute the ordinance violations in a separate proceeding. Village of Orion v. Hardi. The case was then sent back to the trial court for further proceedings on the Village's nuisance claims.
Tuesday, January 21, 2020
One Year Statute of Limitations Bars Challenge to Annexation
Tuesday, January 21, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
In Coldwater v. Village of Elwood, an appellate court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit against the Village claiming that the Village's annexation of property was invalid because the legal description included with the annexation ordinance was incorrect. The plaintiff had filed a lawsuit to nullify a corrected version of the annexation ordinance. The Village filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the lawsuit was filed too late because it was not within the one year statute of limitations in the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-46). The trial court agreed, and dismissed the case, but certified a question to the appellate court.
The certified question brought to the appellate court was whether section 7-1-46 bars the parties to an annexation from correcting errors in the legal description of an annexed property after the one year statute of limitations has expired. The appellate court said yes, meaning that the plaintiffs were barred from challenging the validity of the annexation after the one year had expired.
Friday, January 17, 2020
Bill Would Authorize Library Districts to Impose Cannabis Tax
Friday, January 17, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
The recent legalization of recreational cannabis in Illinois was tied to the imposition of a number of new taxes imposed at the state, county, and municipal level. A recent bill, if passed, would also authorize library districts to impose their own 1% tax on the sale of recreational cannabis. HB 4135.
If a library district imposes such a tax, the bill mandates that any applicable tax imposed by the county in which the library district is located be reduced by 1% and that all municipalities in the county in which the library district is located must also reduce their cannabis tax by 1%.
That mandatory reduction in county and municipal cannabis taxing authority is likely to raise some concerns with those governmental units that have already enacted a county or municipal cannabis tax, particularly since the proposed legislation is written so broadly as to seem to apply to all municipalities in the county in which the library district is located, without regard to where the library district is located.
Wednesday, January 15, 2020
Illinois Supreme Court Upholds Settlement Agreement Disclosure under FOIA
Wednesday, January 15, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
Last
month, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Rushton
v. Department of Corrections, 2019 IL 124552, that a settlement agreement between a
private healthcare provider who contracted with the state to provide medical services to prison inmates and the estate of an inmate who died is subject
to the Freedom of Information Act.
A
journalist for the Illinois Times filed a FOIA request with the Illinois
Department of Corrections (DOC) seeking settlement agreements involving the
death of a former inmate at Taylorville Correctional Center, including those
that involved private entities who were charged with providing health care to
the decedent; one being Wexford Health Sources, Inc. Wexford contracts with the
DOC to provide medical care to inmates. The DOC obtained a redacted version of
the agreement from Wexford, and the DOC provided it to the requester.
The
journalist and the Illinois Times filed a complaint against the
DOC seeking an unredacted copy of the settlement agreement. The trial court
ruled in favor of Wexford, holding that the agreement was not a public record because it was not “directly related” to the private company's provision of medical services for the
DOC under Section 7(2) of FOIA. The trial court did not rule on the issue of
whether any of the redactions in the agreement were proper. The requesters appealed and the appellate court reversed in their favor, finding that the
agreement was a public record because it “directly related” to the governmental function that it performed for
the DOC because it involved the settling of a claim arising out of its
rendering of medical care. Wexford then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
On
appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the agreement was subject to
disclosure under FOIA. First, the Court found that Section 2.20 of FOIA expressly
provides for the release of settlement agreements involving private entities.
The Court reasoned that the legislature’s enactment of Section 2.20 was
intended as a clarification for public bodies that settlement agreements are
public records subject to disclosure. Next, the Court analyzed whether Wexford
had contracted with the DOC to perform a governmental function on its behalf
and, if so, whether the requested settlement agreement directly related to that
governmental function. The Court determined that since the State has a
constitutional and statutory duty to provide healthcare to inmates, and that
the DOC contracted with Wexford to perform this governmental function on its
behalf, the Court found that the settlement agreement “directly related” to the
performance of the governmental function of rendering medical care to inmates, such
as the decedent, and is subject to disclosure under Section 7(2) of FOIA. In
other words, Wexford “stood in the shoes of the DOC” when it rendered medical
care to the decedent.
This
case provides guidance to local governments and its private contractors
that perform services related to a governmental function, that settlement
agreements may not be shielded from public inspection because of the
presumption of openness under FOIA. Nonetheless, local governments should be
diligent in reviewing the agreements and redacting them as necessary.
Post Authored by Ashton Tunk & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Tuesday, January 14, 2020
Bill Would Require All Elected and Appointed Officials to Wear Body Cameras
Tuesday, January 14, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
There are inevitably a few bills introduced in the Illinois legislature each year that are bound to raise an eyebrow or two. Last week, HB 4065 was introduced in the Illinois House that would create the Public Official Body Camera Act.
If passed, the new law would require all public officials (elected and appointed) in the state to wear body cameras whenever officials are engaged in official duties. The recordings would be exempt from FOIA but would not be exempt from use in legislative, administrative, or other proceedings. Incredibly, the bill contains no exceptions to when the camera should be turned off, so presumably the camera would be rolling even during closed session meetings, when officials consult with attorneys, when officials are dealing with sensitive personnel matters, and in other circumstances where privacy or confidentiality interests might be present. Oddly, the bill gives the State Board of Elections the jurisdiction to adopt rules in furtherance of the new requirements. The bill says nothing about funding for this state mandate that would require the state and all other units of government in the state to outfit all elected and appointed officials with body cameras.
We'll keep you posted on this proposed legislation but have a feeling this bill may not go very further.
Monday, January 13, 2020
Illinois Supreme Court Strikes Down Chicago Tax on "Other Tobacco Products"
Monday, January 13, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
Chicago received a lump of coal
days before Christmas as the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a 2016
city-wide tax on "other tobacco products" (such as e-cigarettes) in Iwan Ries & CO. v. City of Chicago.
The Illinois
Municipal Code allows not preempt a home rule municipality to impose a tax on
the number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products (provided, however, that a home rule municipality that has not imposed a tax based on the number of units of cigarettes or of units of cigarettes or tobacco products before July 1, 1993, shall not impose such a tax after that date). 65 ILCS 5/8-11-6a
A group of plaintiffs with ties
to the tobacco-product industry filed a complaint against the City for levying
the tax. The circuit court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the
tax violated state statute, specifically Section 8-11-6a of the Illinois Municipal Code.
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court, plaintiffs argued that the City's tax exceeded its statutory powers because
the Illinois Municipal Code preempts the imposition of new taxes on tobacco
products after July 1, 1993 after the General Assembly passed
section 8-11-6a as an amendment to the municipal code to consolidate tax
revenue from tobacco and other tobacco products into the state's coffers. The
General Assembly did, however, carve an exception for existing tobacco taxes
passed by municipalities with home rule authority but Plaintiffs argued that
the City's tax on "other tobacco products" was a new tax in violation of this statute.
The City argued that section 8-11-6a "grandfathers certain
municipalities—those that previously imposed taxes based on the number of units
of cigarettes or tobacco products sold—and not certain taxes." In the City's view, the General Assembly tried to strike a balance between
collection of revenue by state tobacco taxes and home rule authority under state law.
Although sympathetic to the
public policy ramifications of the loss of potential tax revenue from growing
demand in other tobacco products, the Illinois Supreme Court sided with the plaintiff's
argument, finding that the plain statutory language demonstrates
the "legislative intent to prohibit future municipal taxes on cigarettes
or other tobacco products unless the tax was enacted before July 1, 1993."
Post Authored by Mike Halpin and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Friday, January 10, 2020
Court Upholds Village's Denial of Zoning Variances to Subdivide Property into 3 Lots
Friday, January 10, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
It's not often that we see zoning cases out of the Illinois appellate court. Recently, an appellate court upheld a trial court's decision in favor of a municipality in a zoning challenge. First American Bank v. Village of Wilmette, 2019 IL App (1st) 181436
The owner of land filed an application with the Village seeking zoning variances to allow the subdivision of their property (consisting of 37,969.42 square feet in area) into 3 lots. The variances were needed because the newly created lots did not comply with the 60 foot lot width requirement and would not have street frontage. The ZBA held a public hearing on the proposed variances and recommended 4 to 2 in favor of the variances. The Village Board, however, denied the requested variances by a vote of 5 to 1. The owner then filed a lawsuit to challenge the denial, claiming the denial of the variances was arbitrary and capricious.
At the circuit court level, the judge held a bench trial, hearing evidence from the owner's planning and civil engineer consultants, as well as the owner and an appraiser. The Village presented its own witnesses, including planning experts, the fire chief, and public works director. After hearing from all witnesses, the court ruled in favor of the Village, finding that the denial of the variances was not arbitrary or capricious. The owner then appealed.
The appellate court first acknowledged that the review of the Village's variance denial was subject to the LaSalle factors test. Applying those factors to the plaintiffs' case, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the Village's decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Specifically, the Village had identified a number of concerns if the variances were granted and development were allowed. the court also noted that the plaintiffs were still able to use their property profitably. In sum, the Village's denial of the zoning variances was upheld.
The case provides helpful guidance to municipalities in how a court will apply the LaSalle factors in a zoning challenge.
The case provides helpful guidance to municipalities in how a court will apply the LaSalle factors in a zoning challenge.
Thursday, January 9, 2020
Names Exempt From FOIA When Tied To Personal Information
Thursday, January 09, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
An Illinois Appellate Court recently held in favor of a public body in a FOIA challenge after the public body denied a request for the names of students who received MAP grants. Timpone v. Illinois Student Assistance Commission.
Timpone filed a FOIA request with the Illinois Student Assistance Commission requesting the names of all students who received a State of Illinois Monetary Award Program (MAP) grant in 2015. ISAC provided a spreadsheet aggregating 2015 MAP grants by city and the dollar amounts and number of recipients but denied Timpone's request for the students' names, citing personal privacy protections under 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b) of FOIA. Timpone then sued, and the circuit court ruled in his favor and ordered ISAC to release the names.
ISAC appealed to the appellate court which reversed the circuit court's ruling in Timpone's favor. First, the appellate court agreed with ISAC that the names of the students who received grants qualified as "personally identifiable information" that was protected under state regulations pertaining to the confidentiality of grant applicants and participants. Second, the appellate court also agreed that the names of students were protected under the "private information" FOIA exception in 7(1)(b) because personal financial information is "universally presumed to be private, not public." The court rejected Timpone's argument that "names, by themselves are not private" finding that the students' names were tied to grant amounts (i.e., personal financial information) that, if released, would invade the students' privacy rights.
In short, the appellate court determined that ISAC did not violate FOIA in denying a request for release of the names of students who received MAP grants since release of that information was confidential and exempt from release.
Wednesday, January 8, 2020
Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Homeless Sanctions Case
Wednesday, January 08, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from a Ninth
Circuit ruling that prohibited local governments from imposing criminal
sanctions against homeless individuals for sleeping outdoors on public
property when no alternative shelter is available to them.
The
Supreme Court’s decision to let the Ninth Circuit ruling stand came without
comment or noted dissent from the justices and is the latest development in a
case that has been ongoing for nearly a decade. The case, Martin v. Boise,
originates from a constitutional challenge to ordinances enacted by the City of
Boise which make it a crime for individuals to sit, sleep, or lay on public
sidewalks. In its defense of the ordinances, the City of Boise contended that
the ordinances were essential in curbing crime, violence, disease, and other
environmental hazards which stem from individuals living on the streets and the
public at large.
The
Ninth Circuit rejected the City of Boise’s argument and held that the Eighth
Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishments “prohibits the imposition
of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping or lying outside on public property
for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” In its reasoning, the
Court noted that the state may not criminalize involuntary conduct that is an
unavoidable consequence of homelessness, and as such local governments may not prosecute
homeless people for sleeping outdoors on the “false premise” they had a choice
in the matter to begin with. Further, the Court stated that its holding is a
narrow one, and that the decision only applies in circumstances in which the
number of homeless individuals within City limits is greater than the number of
available beds in shelters.
Although
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is not binding in Illinois, the Supreme Court’s
decision not to hear the case has widespread implications on the homeless
epidemic from Alaska to Arizona that local governments should be careful not to "punish" homeless people for sleeping in public when there are
no available shelter alternatives.
Post Authored by Rain Montero & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
Tuesday, January 7, 2020
PAC Wades into Records Retention Territory in 13th Binding Opinion of 2019
Tuesday, January 07, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
On the last day of 2019, the Illinois Public Access Counselor (PAC) office issued its 13th binding opinion for 2019. Unfortunately, the opinion was uploaded to the Attorney General's website after we posted our summary of 2019 FOIA opinions was published, so we are summarizing it separately.
In PAC Op. 19-013, the PAC found a public body in violation of FOIA for not providing a tape of a gathering of public officials. The public body denied the request based on its opinion that because there had been no quorum of the public body at the gathering, there was no meeting so the tape was not a public record subject to FOIA and did not need to be released. The public body had also apparently erased the tape. The requester filed an appeal with the PAC, and the PAC determined the tape was a public record under FOIA because the public body members discussed public business at a "gathering" of 3 members of the 7 member body. As a result, the PAC stated the tape should have been released upon request.
The PAC also found the public body in violation of FOIA because it had erased the tape after a FOIA request was received. This appears to be the first time the PAC has interpreted FOIA to incorporate a records retention obligation (which is expressly a part of the Local Records Act). This is a significant development in the interpretation and application of the FOIA statute and appears to stretch FOIA (and, therefore, the PAC's jurisdiction and authority) beyond records release and fully into records retention territory. The PAC supported its newly granted authority by citing cases from other states. The one Illinois case the PAC did cite actually referred to the retention provisions of the Local Records Act and State Records Act to supports the court's discussion of a public body's obligation to retain public records. In my opinion, it seems inappropriate for the PAC (rather than a court) to interpret FOIA in a manner that appears to expand its jurisdiction beyond what the General Assembly intended.
Monday, January 6, 2020
Ring in the New Year Quorum Forum Podcast 33
Monday, January 06, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
Happy New Year from Municipal Minute! And to welcome you to 2020, we've put together a brand new Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 33: Ring in the New Year,
In this episode, Quorum Forum podcast welcomes Ancel Glink’s Adam Simon to celebrate the new year and Ancel Glink's recent appellate court victory helping municipalities correctly collect cable franchise fees. Then, we ring in 2020 by taking calls and answering questions about public employees, public comment, cannabis, and more.
What questions are you facing in the new year? Leave us a voicemail at 312.604.9178, or email us at podcast@ancelglink.com!
Friday, January 3, 2020
Summary of PAC Binding Opinions of 2019 (FOIA opinions)
Friday, January 03, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
Today, we summarize the 2019 Public Access Counselor binding opinions relating to FOIA complaints.
PAC Op. 19-001 (body camera recordings must be released)
In PAC Op. 19-001, the PAC found the Chicago Police Department in violation of FOIA for denying a request for body camera recordings. The PAC rejected the CPD’s argment that the Body Camera Act prohibited release of body camera recordings unless the recording had been previously "flagged." Specifically, the PAC noted that the Body Camera Act allows disclosure of recordings under FOIA in certain limited circumstances. First, a recording can be released if it is "flagged" because of a complaint, discharge of a firearm, use of force, arrest or detention, or resulting death or body harm. Second, a recording can be released to the subject, the subject's attorney, the officer, or the officer's representative. The PAC rejected CPD's argument that the latter exception also required prior "flagging," finding that the statute did not include that language when allowing release to certain individuals.
PAC Op. 19-003 (failure to respond)
In PAC Op. 19-003, the PAC found a public body in violation for FOIA for failing to respond to a FOIA request. As we have learned from a number of similar binding opinions, it is a violation of FOIA to not respond to a FOIA request within the statutory time-frame (5 business days unless the request is for commercial purposes).
PAC Op. 19-005 (calendars)
In PAC Op. 19-005, the PAC found a Police Department in violation of FOIA for denying a request for release of "extradition calendars." CPD personnel who work in the field services section on prisoner extradition matters put together a working schedule calendar containing various assignments to assist the officers and their supervisors in keeping track of court dates and related activities in the department. In response to a FOIA request for a copy of the calendar, the CPD denied the request, citing 7(1)(f), which exempts draft or predecisional documents from release. The CPD argued that the calendar was created by the officers, not the CPD itself, and that the calendar was constantly updated based on evolving schedules. The requester filed an appeal with the PAC, which rejected the CPD's basis for denial, finding the extradition calendar to be releasable under FOIA. Specifically, the PAC stated that because the calendar was purely factual in nature, it did not fall under the "deliberative process" exemption under 7(1)(f).
PAC Op. 19-006 (failure to respond)
In PAC Op. 19-006, the PAC issued an opinion finding a municipality in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to a union's FOIA request for various records pertaining to a bargaining unit and finances of the municipality. Not only did the municipality fail to respond to the FOIA request, it also did not respond to the PAC's request for review.
PAC Op. 19-007 (proprietary business records)
In PAC Opinion 19-007, the PAC found a public body in violation of FOIA when it refused to hand over manganese reports of a business entity in response to a FOIA request. The city had denied the request, claiming that the reports contain sensitive business information that fell under section 7(1)(g) of FOIA’s exemption for proprietary commercial information. The PAC rejected the city’s argument arguing that the city failed to provide any evidence that the disclosure of the information would cause competitive harm to the private business entity. The PAC reasoned that no substantive business insights would result from the disclosure of the reports, which contain, among other things, how the materials are transported in and out of the facility, its density and percentage of manganese, and the amounts shipped, received, and stored. Because the city failed to articulate specific facts demonstrating the competitive harm to the private entity that would result from disclosing the limited information reports, the PAC ordered the city to comply immediately with the FOIA request for the manganese reports.
PAC Op. 19-08 (police reports)
In PAC Op. 19-008, the PAC found a police department in violation of FOIA when it redacted portions of its police reports. A news reporter submitted a FOIA request to a city police department (“PD”) seeking police reports concerning the arrests of two individuals. The PD subsequently provided him copies of the records, but redacted certain information from those records pursuant to Sections 7(1)(b) (private information), 7(1)(c) (unwarranted invasion of personal privacy), 7(1)(d)(iii) (deprivation of fair trial or impartial hearing), and 7(1)(d)(iv) (disclosure of confidential sources or witnesses) under FOIA. The PAC rejected the PD’s arguments, finding it did not meet its burden to justify use of these exemptions.
PAC Op. 19-010 (body camera recordings)
In PAC Op. 19-010, the PAC found a city in violation of FOIA for denying a request for body camera recordings. relating to an attempted arrest. The city cited the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Although the city and states attorney provided detailed reasons why release of the recordings would interfere in the ongoing criminal investigation, the PAC determined that the city's burden to justify withholding the records was not satisfied. The PAC also rejected the city's reliance on the exemption set forth in the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act and ordered release of the recording.
PAC Op. 19-011 (failure to respond)
In PAC Op. 19-011, the PAC found a county assessor's office in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to a FOIA request for permit applications relating to five properties. The county failed to respond to the request or to the PAC's request for review.
Thursday, January 2, 2020
Summary of PAC Binding Opinions of 2019 (OMA opinions)
Thursday, January 02, 2020 Julie Tappendorf
As we do every year, we are summarizing the Public Access Counselor binding opinions for 2019. Today's post will summarize the opinions that relate to Open Meetings Act complaints and tomorrow we will summarize the FOIA-related opinions.
PAC Op. 19-002 (public
comment period restriction without rules)
In PAC 19-002, the PAC found a school
district in violation of the Open Meetings Act when it restricted the public
comment period at a school board meeting to 15 minutes without having an
established and recorded public comment rule to that effect. The PAC reviewed
the District's "Board Policy Manual" which did include a limit on
public comment at meetings of 3 minutes per person. However, the PAC noted in
its opinion that the school board's manual did not include a reference to a 15
minute total cap on public comment. PAC rejected board’s argument that past
practice authorized the restriction.
PAC Op.
19-004 (public recital)
In PAC Op.
19-004, the PAC found a public body in violation of the Open Meetings Act
for failure to provide an adequate public recital of the business being
conducted before taking final action on a resolution. A school district board
voted on "Resolution 2019-1 authorizing a Notice to Remedy." Shortly
thereafter, a newspaper reporter filed a complaint with the PAC arguing that
the board did not give any public details about the resolution prior to voting
on it. The PAC contacted the school board for a response, and the school board
provided copies of the agenda, minutes, closed session recording, resolution,
and the "Notice to Remedy." The school board attorney explained to
the PAC that the resolution number and title were read aloud prior to the board
voting on the resolution, as reflected in the minutes of the
meeting. Nevertheless, the PAC found that in this case, the school board
violated the OMA because it failed to disclose enough detail about the
resolution prior to voting on it, including disclosing the name of the teacher
being served with the Notice to Remedy).
PAC Op. 19-009
(resident only restriction during public comment)
In PAC Op.
19-009, the PAC found a city in violation of the Open Meetings Act for
prohibiting a member of the public from addressing the city council at a
council meeting because she was not a city resident. The PAC first noted
that the city council had not adopted public comment rules so the council could
not impose a restriction on public comment. The PAC rejected the city's
reliance on Roberts Rules of Order as its public comment rules since the city
could not identify specific rules addressing public comment at meetings. Since
it had no rules in place, the city council could not impose a "resident only"
restriction. But, even if the city council had adopted a "resident
only" rule for public comment, the PAC stated that such a rule would
violate the OMA because the public comment requirement of the OMA allows
"any person" to address the public body, whether they are a resident
or not.
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