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Wednesday, August 27, 2025

Public High School Teacher's Termination for Social Media Posts Upheld by Court of Appeals


The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a school district's termination of a public high school teacher who had posted inflammatory comments on a Facebook page that was primarily followed by former students. Hedgepeth v. Britton,

A social studies teacher at an Illinois public high school for 20 years had been suspended twice by the school district for various actions, including swearing at students and profane outbursts in the classroom. In 2020, during the George Floyd protests, she made a series of posts to Facebook, including stating that protesters should be hosed down with high pressure water hoses. She also engaged with a former student on her Facebook page, stating that she found the term "white privilege" to be as racist as the "N" word. 

The day after the teacher made the posts, the school principal began receiving complaints from current high school students, alumni, another teacher, and a parent. The school district also received emails, calls, and media inquiries regarding the teacher's social media posts. After investigating the matter, the school district fired her, finding that she violated four school district policies, including one that governed teacher conduct on social media and the school's “just and courteous professional relationships” policy she had been disciplined for violating twice before. 

After she was terminated, she appealed her termination to the Illinois State Board of Education, which upheld the district's decision to terminate her. She also filed a lawsuit against the school district, claiming the termination violated her First Amendment rights. The district court also upheld the school's decision to terminate her and she appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that public employees do not relinquish their First Amendment rights as a condition of accepting government employment. Based on U.S. Supreme Court cases, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen on matters of "public concern." However, that right is not unlimited or unrestricted, and public employees are subject to certain limitations on their freedom, depending on the employee's role, particularly when they serve in a role of "trust." In order to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, the teacher had to prove three things: (1) that she engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) that she suffered a deprivation likely to deter that protected speech and (3) that the speech was a motivating factor in her termination.

The Seventh Circuit focused on the first prong of the test. That prong requires the employee to demonstrate that she was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern and, if so, the court will balance that interest against the government employer's interest in "promoting the efficiency of the public services." Even if an employee speaks on matters of public concern, they may not have First Amendment protections if the employer's interest outweighs their speech rights. This balancing test is known as the Pickering test that is derived from a U.S. Supreme Court case. 

In applying the test, the Seventh Circuit first found that the teacher was speaking on matters of public concern in the Facebook posts that were the subject of the lawsuit. However, the court determined that the school district's interests outweighed the teacher's speech rights for several reasons. First, the school had an interest in addressing actual disruptions to school operations where the district received over a hundred emails and numerous other complaints about the teacher's social media posts. Second, the school could reasonably look to the teacher's past conduct and disciplinary record in considering whether her speech could have a future impact to school operations. Third, the court rejected the teacher's argument that her posts were on her private social media account so should not be the basis for her termination, because the court found that her audience (i.e., her Facebook friends) primarily consisted of community members (80% were former students), which amplified her speech. The court also noted that public school teachers occupy a unique position of trust, which makes the government employer's interest even more compelling.

In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit found ample evidence of actual disruption to the school district from the teacher's social media conduct, and that the teacher's social media posts were not entitled to First Amendment protection.




Tuesday, August 26, 2025

Court Finds No First Amendment Violation in School's Restrictions on School Club Flyers


A high school student established a pro-life student club at her high school, which school administrators approved. She was allowed to have a table at the school's activities fair, where she displayed pro-life signs and recruited more than 30 members. However, when the student tried to post flyers with political slogans on school walls, she was told she had to revise them to comply with the school's neutral content rules for all student-club wall postings. She and her mother challenged the administrator's decision on the wall postings, and ultimately the club was suspended for the remainder of the semester but reinstated a couple of months later.

The student sued the school district claiming that the school's rejection of her flyers and suspension of the club violated her First Amendment rights. The district court disagreed, ruling in favor of the school district. That decision was appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. E.D. v. Noblesville School District.

The school defended its decision to reject the pro-life club's flyers because of their political content, arguing that it restricted all student club flyers to the club's name and the meeting time, date, and location. The school stated that the pro-life club's flyer included language such as "Defund Planned Parenthood" that went beyond what school club flyers were allowed to include. The school noted that once the students meet, they are free to talk about their common interests but that the flyers cannot contain content that is "political or that could disrupt the school environment." The school also defended its decision to suspend the club because the student's mother became involved in school club matters which were supposed to be student-led when she attempted to end run the process by lobbying another administrator to allow the flyers. 

The Seventh Circuit upheld the school's actions, finding that the flyers (and political content) could be perceived as having been endorsed by the school because they are posted on school walls. The court rejected the student's argument that this was a case about private student speech, instead finding it to be a case about whether the school must lend its resources (the school walls) to disseminate student speech. The court determined that it did not have to do so, noting that although the school walls were a limited public forum for student expression, the school can restrict the content in this manner to "create a stable, neutral educational environment." The court acknowledged that the school's flyer policy regulated content, but noted that it did not discriminate based on viewpoint since the school banned all political content from all school club flyers. As a result, the court found no constitutional violation in the school's actions regarding the club's flyers. The court also upheld the school's suspension of the school club, finding that it was not based on the club's viewpoint or message but instead because of the parent's involvement in the club that was inconsistent with the policy that school clubs be student-led.


Thursday, August 21, 2025

Court Upholds Village's Response to FOIA Request from Recurrent Requester


In Dyler v. Village of Arlington Heights, an Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a Village in five consolidated lawsuits challenging the Village's response to multiple FOIA requests.

A requester filed various FOIA requests asking the Village to provide copies of bonds for specific Village employees. The Village responded to each request that it searched for responsive records, but did not locate any. About a year later, the Village did locate a requested bond from its insurer and sent it to the requester. The requester subsequently filed five separate lawsuits against the Village, all claiming that the Village violated FOIA. The requester also filed appeals with the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC), which ruled in favor of the Village, finding that it properly responded to the request because no responsive records existed. 

The trial court consolidated all five lawsuits and ruled in favor of the Village, finding that it properly responded to the requester's FOIA requests. That decision was appealed to the Appellate Court, which also ruled in the Village's favor, finding support for the Village's response in an affidavit submitted by the Village that no records existed. The Appellate Court also rejected the requester's claim that the Village improperly designated him a "recurrent requester" under FOIA. The Court noted that FOIA authorizes a public body additional time to respond to FOIA requests from a "recurrent requester" (21 business days rather than 5 business days), and that his multiple requests to the Village were properly counted for purposes of determining that he was a recurrent requester. 

Wednesday, August 20, 2025

Board Violated OMA By Discussing Public Business at Private Energy Event


A member of the public submitted a request for review to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), claiming that a majority of a quorum of a county board held an improper “meeting” in violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) when it discussed public business at an informational event hosted by a private energy company. In its 11th binding opinion of 2025, the PAC concluded that a county board violated OMA by holding an improper private meeting in violation of Section 1.02 of the OMA. PAC Op. 25-011.

In this case, the board did not dispute that a majority of a quorum of the board attended the event. However, the board argued that the event was an informational presentation by a private energy company to discuss a proposed renewable energy project, and not a “meeting” where a majority of the quorum of the board discussed public business. The PAC disagreed, finding that board members engaged in a question and answer session with energy company’s representatives about their proposed operations in the county, which pertained to county business since the discussions centered around business or community interests impacting the county.

The board also argued that the event was not a meeting because there were no specific items concerning the energy company pending before the board. While the board did not reach an accord on any specific matter at the time of the event, the PAC determined that the event was nonetheless a meeting subject to OMA’s requirements, because a majority of a quorum of board members engaged in the collective inquiry phase of deliberations by gathering and exchanging information concerning the renewable energy project in anticipation of possibly taking future action.

This is a good reminder to members of public bodies that a meeting could be triggered even in informal settings where a majority of a quorum of the public body discusses public business.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, August 19, 2025

PAC Finds Separation Agreement Was Not Exempt in its Entirety From FOIA


In response to a FOIA request from a news agency seeking a named police officer’s resignation or termination records, a city’s office of public safety administration (OPSA) denied the request entirely citing the "private information" exemption in Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA, and the "personal privacy" exemption in Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. In its 10th binding opinion of 2025, the Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General’s office (PAC) concluded that OPSA improperly denied the request in its entirety. PAC Op. 25-010.

First, the PAC noted that the "personal privacy" exemption of Section 7(1)(c) provides an exemption for "the disclosure of information that is highly personal or objectionable to a reasonable person and in which the subject's right to privacy outweighs any legitimate public interest in obtaining the information." However, that same FOIA exemption also states that the "disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy." Here, the PAC determined that the records withheld by OPSA concerned a public employee’s separation from employment which "bears on the public duties" of a public employee." As a result, the records should not have been entirely withheld under the "personal privacy" exemption of Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. 

Second, the PAC acknowledged that Section 7(1)(b) of FOIA authorizes public bodies to discretely redact “private information” as that term is defined in FOIA. Because the responsive records to this request contained handwritten signatures and employee identification numbers (which fall within FOIA’s definition of private information), the PAC determined that this "private information" could have been properly redacted and the remainder of the record released to the requester. However, the PAC noted that this exemption would not justify withholding the records in their entirety.

Note that this opinion does not stand for the proposition that public bodies cannot redact personal privacy information contained in public records (e.g., separation records) so long as the public body demonstrates that disclosing that information would cause the subject a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink 

Monday, August 18, 2025

PAC Finds Violation of OMA Where Board Did Not Name Candidate for Appointment


The Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's office (PAC) issued three new binding opinions recently, which we will summarize over the next few days.

In PAC Op. 25-009, the PAC concluded that a village board violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) becaues it failed to provide an adequate public recital before the board voted on the appointment of a person to fill a vacancy on the village board.

The village board defended its actions by arguing that it did not take final action at the meeting because the board voted against approving a motion to appoint a person to fill a vacant village trustee position. The PAC disagreed, finding that decisions that bring matters to a resolution—regardless of the outcome of the vote—constitute "final action" under the OMA. Here, the board decided not to approve the appointment presented by the village president to fill the vacancy on the village board. 

Because the board’s vote on the motion constituted a final action under Section 2(e) of the OMA, the PAC determined that the board’s vote had to be preceded by a public recital that (1) announced the general nature of the matter being considered (2) with sufficient detail to inform the public about the particular transaction or issue. Although the board did announce the general nature of the matter being considered (motion to appoint a person to fill a trustee vacancy), the PAC determined that the board did not provide sufficient detail to inform the public about the matter being voted on because the board did not name or identify the person whose appointment the board considered prior to taking the vote.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink


Thursday, August 14, 2025

Teacher's Case Against School District's Naming Policy Moves Forward


An Indiana High School adopted a policy that required teachers to call students by their first names as they appeared in the school's database. For transgender students who had changed their first names, the database listed their new names. A teacher in the school objected to the school's name policy on religious grounds and requested an accommodation, which the school initially granted, which allowed him to call students by their last names. After a year, some students and teachers complained about the teacher's practice, and the school rescinded the accommodation, informing the teacher that he would face termination if he didn't call students by their first names. The teacher sued the school, claiming it failed to accommodate his religion. The district court ruled in the school's favor, and the teacher appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of the employee's religious practices or beliefs unless the employer can establish that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious practices or believes without undue hardship on the employer's business. To establish a Title VII case, the employee has to establish that his religious belief is "sincerely held." Then, the burden shifts to the employer to show that any reasonable accommodation would result in undue hardship. The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered that second part of the analysis (undue hardship) and held that the employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in "substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business." This new Supreme Court standard is more "rigorous" than the previous standard that defined "undue hardship" as anything that required an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee.

Applying the Supreme Court's new "undue burden" test to the school district, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, finding that the school district failed to introduce evidence that an accommodation to allow a teacher to call students by their last name resulted in the type of objective harm necessary to establish an "undue burden." The Court also rejected the school's argument that the accommodation caused a serious disruption to the learning environment. In short, the Court determined that there was a material factual dispute as to whether an accommodation would result in an undue hardship to the school, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation.

The dissenting opinion would have upheld the district court's ruling in favor of the student. The dissent noted that the school had initially accommodated the teacher, but after a year, determined that the accommodation had failed in practice, and the school had an obligation to the transgender students harmed by the accommodation. The dissent argued that the school did not discriminate against the teacher based on his religion, and had reasonably concluded that its initial accommodation was not justifiable. 

Wednesday, August 13, 2025

Court Stops Enforcement of Indiana's Buffer Law


Indiana adopted a "buffer law" that makes it illegal for a person to to "knowingly or intentionally" approach within 25 feet of a police officer who is lawfully engaged in the execution of the law after the officer ordered the person to stop approaching. A group of media organizations filed a lawsuit to challenge the law, arguing it was unconstitutionally vague and a violation of due process rights. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction blocking the state from enforcing the law. 

The state appealed that ruling to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the injunction. The Seventh Circuit first rejected the state's argument that the case was moot because the state had amended the buffer law, noting that the state acknowledged that both laws were still in effect. Second, the Seventh Circuit held that the media organization plaintiffs had standing to challenge the law. As to the substance of the challenge, the Court determined that the buffer law was "susceptible to arbitrary enforcement" and was, therefore, unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit noted that the law provides no guidance to the officer in determining whether a "do not approach" order should be issued in the first place, making the law subject to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. As a result, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's issuance of an injunction prohibiting the state from enforcing the buffer law. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. v. Rokita, et al

Tuesday, August 12, 2025

No Standing to Challenge County Approval of Rodeos


A county was sued by an individual and two animal rights groups challenging the county's approval of temporary use permits for rodeos. Specifically, the plaintiffs had filed appeals with the county zoning board of appeals which they argued the county did not allow to proceed or canceled as moot. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved" by the county's approval of the temporary use permits for the rodeos in order to satisfy the standing requirement to appeal the county's decisions. 

The case was appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal. Specifically, the court held that to be "aggrieved" to appeal the county's decision, a plaintiff needed to be more than curious or concerned about the outcome and instead needed to possess a personal claim, status, or right and a distinct injury that can be fairly traced to the defendant's conduct. In this case, the Court rejected the individual plaintiff's argument that he had standing because he suffered an "aesthetic injury," finding that an aesthetic injury alone is not sufficient to satisfy standing. The Court also rejected the organizations' argument that they had associational standing for the same reason. Finally, the Court rejected organizational standing because plaintiffs did not establish that the county impaired the organizations' services or daily operations. 

Because none of the plaintiffs could establish they were "aggrieved" by the county's approval of the temporary use permits for the rodeos, they did not have standing and the Appellate Court held that the case was properly dismissed. Humane Farming Ass'n et al., v. Boone County Board, et al.

Monday, August 11, 2025

Seventh Circuit Dismisses ADA Challenge to Local Zoning Regulations


The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a lawsuit brought against a municipality that sought to compel the municipality to issue a letter of zoning compliance for an addiction treatment center. Chosen Consulting, LLC v. Town Council of Highland.

After a change in ownership, a healthcare facility sought approvals to operate a treatment facility for patients suffering from addiction-related disorders. As part of the state licensing process, the facility was required to obtain a letter of zoning compliance from the town before it could receive a state license required to operate. Town officials informed the facility it would need a zoning variance to operate the facility. The facility never applied for the required variance, and town officials refused to issue the letter of zoning compliance requested by the facility. The facility sued the town claiming the town’s zoning regulations discriminated against disabled individuals. In its lawsuit, the facility sought an injunction from the court to order the town to stop obstructing the facility from treating addiction patients and compel the town to issue a letter of zoning compliance.

The district court ruled for the town and dismissed the facility’s lawsuit. Because the facility failed to apply for the required zoning variance, the court ruled the facility could not bring a lawsuit in federal court until it obtained a final zoning decision from the town on the desired change in use to operate the treatment facility.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit held that a lawsuit challenging a local zoning decision and seeking equitable relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act cannot be brought in federal court until a municipality has made a final, conclusive decision on an application for zoning relief. Since the facility never applied for a variance under the town’s zoning regulations, the court ruled the facility could not bring a lawsuit in federal court because there had been no final decision on the proposed change in use.

Post Authored by Tyler Smith & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink 

Friday, August 8, 2025

Quorum Forum Podcast Re-Release: Tips for Newly Elected Officials


To celebrate the release of Ancel Glink's 2025 Newly Elected Officials Guide, we are re-releasing one of our most popular podcast episodes: Tips for Newly Elected Officials!

The Quorum Forum hotline is open and Ancel Glink attorneys called with their tips and congratulations for newly and not-so-newly elected local government officials in Illinois. Adam SimonErin MonfortiDerke PriceJulie Tappendorf, and Dan Bolin shared helpful tips on local government meetings, public comment, working with staff, and more! 

Thursday, August 7, 2025

Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Wind Farm Developer


An Illinois municipality enacted a zoning regulation that restricted the generating power of wind energy conversion systems. A wind farm developer that sought to construct a wind farm on land outside the municipality but within 1.5 miles of its limits sued the municipality, claiming the zoning regulation was constitutionally invalid and outside the scope of the municipality's authority. The trial court ruled in favor of the municipality, but the Appellate Court reversed in Hickory Wind, LLC v. Village of Cedar Point.

After a municipality adopted a zoning regulation that prohibited any wind energy conversion structure or wind turbine designed to generate more than 120% of the electricity demand for the parcel on which it is located in the municipality and in the area within 1.5 miles of the municipality, a wind farm developer (Hickory Wind, LLC) filed a lawsuit challenging the regulation. The trial court found in favor of the municipality, holding that Hickory Wind failed to offer evidence that the zoning regulation exceeded the municipality's authority or was constituted impermissible exclusionary zoning, and that any "as-applied" challenge was not yet ripe. That ruling was appealed.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the ruling in favor of the municipality and ruled in favor of Hickory Wind on its "exclusionary zoning" claim. The Appellate Court noted that a zoning ordinance is "impermissibly exclusionary if the affected activity is effectively prohibited anywhere within the municipal limits." In this case, the Appellate Court determined that the zoning regulation on wind farms was not a "mere limitation" or restriction, but an outright ban. The Court acknowledged that municipalities have the authority to place reasonable limitations on things like height, blade length, tower density, and the like but that a regulation that restricts energy generation in such a way that it renders commercial wind power economically impossible is "both a violation of public policy and is also, in effect, an unauthorized ban." Because the municipality was non-home rule, it had to rely on statutory authority to regulate and the Court held that state law permitted regulation, but did not expressly authorize municipalities to ban commercial windmills. The Court declined to address the constitutional arguments since it resolved the case on non-constitutional grounds. 

There was a dissenting opinion in the case that would have deferred to the municipality on its own zoning regulations because state law specifically permits regulations of wind farms and no regulatory scheme preempts the municipality's zoning ordinance. The dissent also would have acknowledged the "potential impact that proposed 17 650-feet-tall windmills (taller than the St. Louis Arch) will necessarily have on the value of nearby homes and the possible chill they may place on subsequent residential and commercial development."