Tuesday, July 15, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
After the Illinois General Assembly concluded its spring session, Ancel Glink’s Eugene Bolotnikov joined the Quorum Forum Podcast to talk about recent legislation local government should know, including updates on veteran housing, grant opportunities for libraries, law enforcement hiring practices and more. You can listen here: Episode 95: Legislative Update
Monday, July 14, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
An Illinois Appellate Court issued an opinion in favor of a government body after a media outlet filed a lawsuit challenging its response to the media's FOIA request for records pertaining to a fatal accident. NBC Subsidiary v. Chicago Police Department.
An investigative television producer submitted a FOIA request to a municipal police deparrment (CPD) and the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) requesting various records relating to a fatal hit and run accident. CPD denied the request, citing various exemptions including that state law prohibited release of the officer body worn camera recordings, and that release of other records would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings or would obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation. The OEMC also denied the request submitted to it for police observation or surveillance camera recordings on the basis that release would impede CPD's open investigation
The requester filed a lawsuit against CPD and OEMC, and the trial court ruled against the requester, finding that the denials were proper under FOIA. The trial court found persuasive an affidavit of a CPD officer that detailed how release of the requested records would compromise the current investigation because the perpetrator was still at large and release of the requested records could negatively affect the CPD's ability to obtain witness cooperation, among other things.
The requester appealed, arguing that the officer's affidavit was insufficient to satisfy CPD's and OEMC's obligations under FOIA to prove by clear and convincing evidence that release of the withheld records would interfere with pending or reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings. The Appellate Court disagreed, finding that the officer's affidavit contained sufficient details to meet the statutory burden, and that the affidavit was not simply a conclusory or generic statement as the requester claimed.
The Appellate Court also held that the requester was not entitled to redacted versions of the law enforcement records at issue, finding that the case involved a small number of records, and there was nothing to suggest that the records contained information that was not exempt. So, the Court held that the records were properly withheld in their entirety in this case.
The Appellate Court also found no merit in the requester's argument that the voluntary disclosure of certain information in the traffic crash report undermined a denial of other records.
Finally, the Court rejected the requester's argument that the body worn camera recordings should be released because the witnesses and victim did not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the Body Camera Act because their encounter with officers was in a public place. The Court noted that the phrase "reasonable exeptation of privacy" in the Body Camera Act was dependent on the context of the law enforcement encounter and the potential distribution of the recording, so that a reasonable person engaging with law enforcement would expect that a recording would not be publicly disseminated to the news media or public at large, even where the encounter is on a public street. The Court also acknowledged that individuals who have just witnessed a traumatic incident such as a fatal car accident would not reasonably expect the police to release video to the public of their vulnerable state or that a person receiving treatment in an ambulance would not reasonably expect the police to release video footage of their treatment.
In sum, the Court upheld the CPD and OEMC's denials of the requester records in their entirety.
Wednesday, July 09, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently allowed a lawsuit filed by a deputy sheriff of a county sheriff's department who claimed he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights to move forward. Reilly v. Will County Sheriff's Office.
In 2017, a deputy sheriff in a county sheriff's department announced he was running a campaign for county sheriff against his boss. During his campaign, the deputy publicly criticized his boss. While the campaign was ongoing and prior to the election, the deputy took a promotional examination and was placed first on the sergeant promotional list. The sheriff had the ultimate decision on the sergeant promotion, and between 2018 and 2019, the sheriff selected five other candidates on the promotional list to be promoted to sergeant. Ultimately, the deputy lost the election, and his boss was relected as sheriff.
The deputy filed a lawsuit against the sheriff's office and the sheriff, claiming they retaliated against him because of his criticism of the sheriff during the 2017 campaign. The deputy claimed the sheriff admitted publicly that he passed the deputy over for promotion because of his criticism during the 2017 campaign. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing the deputy's complaint did not state a valid claim and that it was untimely because it was filed more than 2 years after the promotional list expired. The district court agreed with the defendants, and dismissed the case and did not allow the deputy to file an amended complaint.
The deputy appealed the dismissal of his case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the dismissal, finding that the complaint stated a plausible claim for First Amendment retaliation, and that the district court applied too high of a standard in not allowing the deputy to file an amended complaint.
Wednesday, July 02, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
A Wisconsin school district terminated a school counselor after she delivered a profanity-laden speech denouncing gender ideology and transgenderism and their impact on children at a rally at the state capitol. The guidance counselor filed a civil rights lawsuit against the school board and three school officials claiming she was unlawfully fired in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court denied her request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed her First Amendment claim, finding that the school district's interests as a public employer outweighed her speech rights under these circumstances. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal in Darlingh v. Maddaleni (7th Cir. July 2, 2025).
After video of her speech at the rally appeared on YouTube, the school opened an investigation, ultimately firing her for violating school policies that prohibited abusive and intimidating language and bullying. The school also explained that her speech at the rally impaired her ability to perform as a guidance counselor, damaged the school's reputation, and undermined its mission to provide an equitable and supportive learning environment for all students.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the U.S. Supreme Court's Pickering balancing test to the counselor's First Amendment claim. That test requires a court to determine whether the public employer's interests outweigh the employee's free speech rights. In applying that test, the Seventh Circuit examined whether the counselor's speech was constitutionally protected - i.e., was she speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern? The Seventh Circuit determined that while the counselor's speech interests were strong, and the topic she spoke on was a matter of intense public concern, the context of her speech and her role as a school guidance counselor was important in the analysis. In balancing the school district's interest that guidance counselors have an "inordinate amount of trust and authority," against the guidance counselor's speech at the rally which the court found to be "a harsh, angry, and profanity-filled public pledge...that was hardly compatible with her obligation to build student and parental trust," the Seventh Circuit concluded that the school district's interests outweighed the guidance counselor's free speech rights in these circumstances. As a result, the guidance counselor's speech fell outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection as applied to public employment.
Monday, June 30, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
After an inmate submitted several FOIA requests to a state’s attorney’s office (SAO) seeking records regarding his pending post conviction proceeding, the SAO denied the request in its entirety based on the FOIA exemption that protects from release records that would interfere with a pending law enforcement proceeding. The SAO argued that disclosing the records would interfere with a pending law enforcement proceeding because the requester’s civil postconviction proceeding was still pending at the time of receiving the FOIA requests. The requester filed a lawsuit against the SAO alleging they improperly denied his FOIA requests, and the circuit court ruled in favor of the SAO, finding that disclosing the requested records to the requester would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings.
On appeal, the First District Appellate Court reversed the circuit court, finding that the SAO did not prove that all of its responsive records were exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Taylor v. Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office.
First, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the circuit court incorrectly treated his civil postconviction proceeding as a law enforcement proceeding, finding that civil postconviction proceedings do fall within the scope of Section 7(1)(d)(i) of FOIA (the pending law enforcement proceedings exemption).
Nevertheless, the Appellate Court determined that the SAO improperly withheld the responsive records under that exemption. Although an affidavit from the SAO’s FOIA officer stated that its responsive records were entirely exempt because disclosure would interfere with a pending postconviction proceeding, the Appellate Court determined that the affidavit was insufficient because it was conclusory and did not specifically explain which records were exempt from disclosure, and why the records were categorically exempt from disclosure. It is important to note that the Appellate Court held that the pendency of a postconviction petition, in and of itself, was not sufficient to entirely exempt records under the cited exemption.
The Appellate Court ordered the SAO to either disclose the responsive records or justify withholding its responsive records by preparing an index and a detailed affidavit explaining why disclosing each document would interfere with or harm pending or prospective law enforcement proceedings
Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink
Thursday, June 26, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
A member of the public submitted a "request for review" to the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor's office (PAC) claiming that a City pool committee (Committee) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by holding meetings closed to the public regarding building a new pool in the City. After analyzing a four-factor test established by the Illinois Supreme Court to determine whether the Committee would constitute a “subsidiary body” subject to OMA requirements, the PAC concluded that the Committee is a subsidiary body of the City subject to the requirements of OMA. PAC Op. 25-007.
First, the PAC determined that the Committee did not legally exist independently of the City, because the City created the Committee as part of the City’s planning process to construct a new pool in the City. Although the City argued the Committee was an informal advisory committee, the PAC stated that labelling the Committee or its gatherings as “informal” does not shield its gatherings or discussions about public business from OMA requirements.
Second, the PAC determined that the City exerts a significant amount of government control over the Committee, because the Mayor appoints the members of the Committee, the Committee’s recommendations are subject to City Council approval, and the City has been directly involved in and controlled multiple facets of Committee activities relating to building a pool in the City, including providing assistance related to finance, engineering and zoning, and parks and recreations matters.
Third, although the PAC noted that it was unclear whether the Committee uses any public resources for its activities (e.g., holding meetings on city property), and the City noted that Committee members are unpaid volunteers, the PAC asserted that the Committee receives at least some indirect public funding by virtue of being part of the City, and City officials and employees devote their time to supporting the Committee’s activities.
Lastly, the PAC determined that the City utilizes the Committee to perform governmental functions, because the Committee is tasked with assessing the potential designs, costs, and locations for a new City pool, and reporting its findings to the City, which the PAC argued are roles typically performed by a municipal committee.
Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink
Tuesday, June 24, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
A city received a FOIA request seeking copies of the
department’s settlement records concerning a class action lawsuit against a
named alderperson. In response to the request, the city disclosed certain
responsive records, but withheld a record concerning the settlement that was
signed by the alderperson and a city attorney pursuant Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA,
which exempts from disclosure privileged attorney-client communications between
a public body and its attorneys.
After the requester submitted a request for review, the PAC issued its sixth binding opinion of 2025, concluding that the department improperly withheld the responsive record pursuant to Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA. PAC Op. 25-006. In connection with the withheld record at issue, the PAC determined that because the alderperson was represented by a private attorney, while the city was represented by attorneys from its law department, the parties had separate interests in the subject matter of the withheld record. Because (1) no legal advice pertaining to the litigation or the settlement was sought from or provided to the alderperson from the city attorney who signed the record, and (2) there was no indication the city attorney was acting as the alderperson’s attorney in connection with the settlement, the PAC determined that the withheld record was not a privileged attorney-client communication under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA.
Additionally, because the withheld record was not a communication protected by the attorney-client privilege, and related to the obligation, receipt, or use of city funds regarding the settlement, the PAC determined that the public had a right to know the purposes for which public funds were expended in connection with the settlement.
Post Authored by Eugene Boltnikov, Ancel Glink
Monday, June 23, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a district court's preliminary order prohibiting a school district (District) from enforcing its policy that requires transgender students to use restrooms that are gender-neutral or correspond to their sex assigned at birth. D.P. v. Mukwonago Area School District, et al.
The District enacted a policy requiring all students to use restrooms and locker room facilities according to their sex assigned at birth, or otherwise use gender-neutral alternatives. The policy included procedures allowing students to request an exception, which would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with the student and their parents. Prior to adoption of the policy, a transgender middle-school student (Student) regularly used the girls’ bathroom. Following adoption of the policy, the Student and her mother sent a letter to the District demanding that the policy be rescinded. The District responded, offering to go through the evaluation process for an exception under its policy. Shortly thereafter, the Student filed a federal lawsuit claiming violations of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the time she filed her lawsuit, the Student also submitted a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to prevent the District from enforcing the policy while the case was ongoing. The District opposed the request for temporary relief but did not request an evidentiary hearing or submit any additional evidence. The district court granted the Student’s request for a TRO and—five days later—converted it to a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the District’s policy until the case was fully resolved. The District appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that (1) the judge erred by not holding a hearing prior to granting the preliminary injunction, and (2) the preliminary injunction should be voided because the Student was not likely to succeed on the merits of her claims.
The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Student and upheld the preliminary injunction entered by the district court. The Seventh Circuit noted that an evidentiary hearing is only required when an opposing party raises genuine issues of fact in response to a motion for preliminary injunction but because the District did not dispute the factual record established by the Student, and failed to request a hearing, the Court found no error in granting the preliminary injunction based solely on the written submissions of the parties.
The Seventh Circuit also determined that the preliminary injunction was properly entered because the Student demonstrated she was likely to succeed in the case and would suffer irreparable harm if she were made to comply with the District’s policy during litigation. The Court cited several key cases addressing the issue of transgender students’ use of restrooms and noted that the District’s policy would likely be ruled unlawful discrimination based on sex under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.
Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink
Friday, June 20, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion setting forth the standard that must be applied by courts in cases involving alleged failures to accommodate students with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act). A.J.T., et al. v. Osseo Area Schools, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, et al.
In this case, a student with a rare form of epilepsy filed several claims under various federal statutes alleging that her school district failed to accommodate her when it refused to provide certain services to her, which she claimed resulted in her receiving fewer instructional hours than her peers without disabilities. The student’s disorder caused her to have frequent seizures, particularly in the mornings, which she claims prevented her from attending school before noon. For the first few years she attended school, the student was granted various accommodations, including at-home evening instruction to supplement the hours she was otherwise unable to attend school.
In 2015, the student and her family moved to a different state, and the student’s new school district (District) denied her parents’ request to include evening instruction in her individualized education program (IEP), resulting in her receiving just over 4 hours of schooling every day (significantly less time than the typical school day for her peers). In 2018, the student’s schedule was reduced even further, and the family’s requests for accommodation were continually denied by the District.
The student first filed a claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), alleging that the failure to accommodate her requests for evening instruction deprived her of a “free appropriate public education” as required under IDEA. Both the state board of education and a federal trial court ruled in favor of the student and ordered the District to provide her with at-home instruction on school nights.
After succeeding on her IDEA claim, the student sued the District in federal court, claiming violations of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Both of these federal laws were enacted to ensure that people with disabilities have an equal opportunity to benefit from government services, including public education. The District argued the case should be dismissed because the student failed to meet the standard for a successful claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. The district court and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the District, finding that the student failed to show that the District acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment when it denied her accommodations requests. The Eighth Circuit determined that a school district’s “simple failure” to provide a reasonable accommodation is not enough to trigger liability under either statute.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the student did not need to show bad faith or gross misjudgment by the District to move forward with her claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Instead, the student need only show that the District acted with “deliberate indifference” when it denied her reasonable accommodation requests—an easier standard to meet. The opinion of the Court (authored by Chief Justice Roberts) noted that the standard that had been advocated by the District was uniquely difficult to satisfy. Outside of the context of elementary and secondary education, claims of disability discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not require a showing of an intent to discriminate, or animus against individuals with disabilities. The Supreme Court found there was no evidence in the statutory language or legislative history that supported imposing such a high burden on students when other groups with disabilities would not be required to show bad faith or gross misjudgment to bring a discrimination claim. As a result, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the student and determined that students with disabilities filing claims under these statutes are held to the same standard as other individuals alleging disability discrimination in different contexts.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act were enacted with an awareness that discrimination against individuals with disabilities is often the product of neglect and thoughtlessness, rather than deliberate hostility.
Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink
Wednesday, June 18, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
We’re excited to share that Ancel Glink has officially relaunched its labor and employment law blog, The Workplace Report! Designed for public sector employers, HR professionals, and attorneys, the blog delivers timely insights on workplace policy developments, legal trends, and key court decisions affecting employers in Illinois and beyond.
Whether you’re navigating complex personnel issues or staying ahead of legislative changes, The Workplace Report is a valuable resource for practical guidance and legal perspective.
Check out the relaunch and subscribe to receive the latest posts directly in your inbox.
Friday, June 13, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 5th binding opinion for 2025, finding a public body in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 25-005. The requester had filed a multi-part FOIA request asking for all emails and texts for a 4 year period between various village officials and employees, payroll records, meeting minutes and ordinances, and resident communications regarding the mayor's salary and for a four year period. When the village failed to respond to the request, the requester filed a "request for review" with the PAC office. The PAC reached out to the village, but according to the opinion, the village did not respond, and the PAC issued this binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA request. Nothing new in this opinion besides a reminder that public bodies have an obligation to respond to FOIA requests.
Thursday, June 12, 2025 Julie Tappendorf
In an interesting twist (pun intended), a federal court of appeals determined that yoga is a protected free speech activity under the First Amendment in a challenge to a municipality's ordinance that prohibited teaching yoga to four or more persons at City parks and beaches. Hubbard v. City of San Diego, (9th Cir. June 4, 2025)
The City had enacted an ordinance restricting the teaching of yoga on City parks and beaches. After two yoga instructors were informed by park rangers that they could no longer each yoga at City parks, they filed a lawsuit, challenging the ordinance as unconstitutional. The district court ruled in favor of the City, and the yoga instructors appealed.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that yoga is protected by the First Amendment because yoga teachers communicate and disseminate information about yoga’s philosophy and practice through speech and expressive movements. Second, the Court held that the City’s shoreline parks are traditional public forums. Third, the Court determiend that the City’s prohibition on teaching yoga at those parks was content-based, and, therefore, did not qualify as a valid time, place, and manner regulation. As a result, the ordinance was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the First Amendment and, since the City could not demonstrate any plausible connection between the instructors teaching yoga and any threat to public safety and enjoyment in the City’s shoreline parks, the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on speech.
Note that this decision was decided in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, so it is not binding on Illinois, which is in the Seventh Circuit.
