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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Thursday, May 29, 2025

Seventh Circuit Rules in Favor of Federal Agency in Federal FOIA Dispute


After a federal law enforcement agency did not respond to a FOIA request seeking records relating to a named person and his application for legal permanent residency, the requester filed a lawsuit claiming the agency violated the federal FOIA statute. During the litigation, the agency disclosed several responsive records, but withheld others citing a federal FOIA exemption that protects certain law enforcement records related to ongoing enforcement proceedings. The district court ruled that (1) the requester was not entitled to a declaratory judgement that ICE violated FOIA solely because ICE did not timely respond to his FOIA request, (2) that ICE properly withheld certain records under the federal FOIA statute, but needed to disclose certain personal information about the requester within the records, and (3) that the FOIA statute provides an adequate remedy for delayed disclosures, which precluded the requester’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act.

After the requester appealed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s rulings. Libarov v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf't. First, the Seventh Circuit rejected the requester’s argument that he was entitled to relief because the request became moot once the agency disclosed its responsive records, and there was no “case or controversy” regarding the adequacy of the records disclosed, so the requestor could not seek a declaratory judgment resulting solely from a delayed response. 

Second, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the agency properly withheld some records under the law enforcement exemption because the district court had reviewed the record in camera, and had an adequate factual basis to determine that (1) the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes and (2) disclosing parts of the records could reasonably be expected to interfere with the agency’s enforcement proceedings.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the requestor could not seek relief under the Administrative Procedure Act for a violation of FOIA, because the FOIA statute provided an adequate remedy to a requester seeking the disclosure of documents, namely a court order requiring compliance with FOIA.

Although this case interprets the federal FOIA statute, the Illinois FOIA statute is patterned after the federal statute, so decisions interpreting federal FOIA are sometimes relevant to construing similar provisions in the Illinois law.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, May 28, 2025

Fifth Circuit Dismisses Patron Free Speech Challenge to Library Book Removal Decision


A federal court of appeals issued a ruling last week dismissing a First Amendment lawsuit brought by library patrons to challenge the removal of certain books from a public library in Texas on free speech grounds. Little, et al. v. Llano County, et al.

Library patrons sued the librarian and board members of a county public library after the library officials removed 17 books because of their treatment of racial and sexual themes. The patrons claimed that the removal of these books violated their right to receive information under the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The federal district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction against the library. 

Last year, a panel of the Fifth Circuit upheld the federal court's injunction. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted an "en banc" rehearing of the appeal, and last week issued a lengthy ruling holding that the "right of information" does not apply to a public library's decision to remove books. Instead, the court of appeals determined that the library's collection decisions are government speech and, therefore, not subject to free speech protections under the First Amendment. 

The court of appeals also rejected the patrons claims that the library's actions were in the nature of book banning, holding that patrons could still purchase the removed books from a bookstore or online. 

The court of appeals also determined that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico (a school book removal case) carries "no precedential weight" in the Fifth Circuit. The court of appeals also overruled a 30 year old decision in their own circuit court (Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School) that found unconstitutional a school's book removal decision, finding that this case created confusion because libraries are not able to determine whether a book removal violates the First Amendment.

There were a number of justices who joined in a dissenting opinion that disagreed with the majority's ruling. The dissenting justices would apply the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Pico and find that the book removal decision of the county library was based on discriminatory intent rather than simply "weeding" books from the library's collections. The dissenting justices would also have left in place the 30 year old Fifth Circuit decision in Campbell that the majority overruled.

This decision is limited to the Fifth Circuit and the three states within its jurisdiction (Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana), and does not apply in Illinois. However, because the decision appears to limit the Pico decision on book removals that was previous issued by the U.S. Supreme Court, this case might make its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which could have an impact on Illinois libraries.


Friday, May 23, 2025

Court Upholds Denial of Police Officer’s Line-of-Duty Disability Benefits


A police officer filed an application for line-of-duty disability benefits after being injured during mandatory “wellness and resiliency” training, which involved classroom instruction and stretching, yoga, and other physical movements. During the stretches, the officer experienced back pain and was later diagnosed with various spinal conditions, undergoing two unsuccessful surgeries. Despite receiving treatment, the officer was unable to return to work with the police department.

The Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (Pension Board) found that the officer was entitled to ordinary disability benefits, but denied her duty disability benefits because her injury did not result from an “act of police duty inherently involving special risk,” as required by the Illinois Pension Code. Ordinary disability benefits are 50% of the officer’s salary, as opposed to 75% for duty disability benefits.

On appeal, both the circuit court and the appellate court affirmed the Pension Board’s denial of the officer’s duty benefits. To determine if an officer is injured “in the performance of an act of duty” to be eligible for duty disability benefits, courts look at the capacity in which the officer was acting when injured, rather than the precise physical act that caused the injury. Here, the courts found that the officer was stretching and performing breathing exercises while dressed in plain clothes, for the purpose of relaxing and living a healthier lifestyle. As a result, the courts found that the officer was injured in the capacity of an individual seeking to calm herself and live a healthier lifestyle, as any regular civilian might do – but not in a police officer capacity. Additionally, although the training was mandatory, an activity being mandatory does not automatically make it an “act of duty” when the activity has a clear counterpart in civilian life. Gonzales v. Retirement Bd. of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 2025 IL App (1st) 242166-U.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Thursday, May 22, 2025

PAC Finds Police Department in Violation of FOIA for Withholding Arrest Video


A municipal police department denied a FOIA request seeking a video recording of a former deputy chief's DUI arrest citing Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA, which exempts records relating to a public body's adjudication of employee grievances or disciplinary cases. After the requester submitted a request for review with the Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) challenging the denial, the PAC issued its fourth binding opinion of 2025 concluding that the Village improperly withheld the video recording. PAC Op. 25-004.

The Village argued that because the video recording was used as evidence in an adjudicatory proceeding to determine the appropriate disciplinary measures to impose against the former deputy chief, that the recording was therefore “related to” an adjudicatory proceeding of an employee disciplinary matter. However, the PAC disagreed that the video was “related to” the adjudicatory proceeding, because it was created before any disciplinary proceeding took place and existed independently on the subsequent adjudication. Instead, the PAC determined that records can only "relate to" an adjudication within the meaning of the FOIA exemption contained in Section 7(l)(n) if they are created in the process of conducting the adjudication itself.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, May 14, 2025

Court Upholds Dismissal of FOIA Lawsuit Against Sheriff's Office


 An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit challenging a sheriff's department's response to a FOIA request in Tynis v. McHenry County Sheriff's Department

An inmate in county jail filed a FOIA request with a county sheriff's department seeking certain electronic communications and other records relating to a specific police report. The sheriff responded that (1) it had no text messages responsive to the request, (2) it released a copy of certain redacted emails; and (3) it withheld certain records because they contained confidential witness and juvenile information, LEADS records protected by state law, among other exempt information under FOIA and other laws. 

The inmate filed a lawsuit against the sheriff's office asking the court to order the release of the requested records and to award him fees and costs. The sheriff's office filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. While that motion was pending, the court reviewed the unredacted records "in camera" (a confidential review outside of public view) and found the sheriff's office in compliance with FOIA when it redacted and/or withheld information that was exempt under FOIA and other applicable laws. As a result, the court dismissed the FOIA complaint, and the inmate appealed.

On appeal, the Appellate Court determined that the sheriff's redaction of email addresses, the address and phone number of the victim, and certain investigatory information from the responsive records was proper, as this information was exempt from FOIA. The Appellate Court also upheld the sheriff's decision to withhold LEADS information as that information is prohibited from release under state law. Finally, the Court determined that an award of fees and costs was not appropriate as the inmate did not prevail in the proceeding since the trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit was proper. 

Monday, May 5, 2025

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep 93: APA-CMS Bar Exam


 Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast just released Episode 93: 2025 APA-CMS Bar Exam.

The American Planning Association Chicago Metro Section recently teamed up with Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast for the 10th annual “Bar Exam” planning law session. This event is a realistic simulated law school experience testing planners and land use professionals on important planning law cases on group housing, short-term rentals, and more! The 2025 session featured in this episode was recorded live at One Lake Brewing in Oak Park. As is tradition, everyone literally "passed the bar" after attending this session. This episode also marks seven years of Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum podcast! 

Thursday, May 1, 2025

PAC Finds Public Body in Violation of FOIA For Not Responding


A requester filed a FOIA request with a transit authority asking for certain records relating to the authority's use of security K-9 animals. The requester filed a request for review with the PAC claiming the transit authority violated FOIA by failing to respond to the FOIA request. In the PAC’s third binding opinion of 2025, the PAC concluded that the transit authority violated FOIA by not timely complying with or denying the FOIA request. PAC Op. 25-003

While this opinion does not provide any new guidance to public bodies in complying with FOIA that hasn't already been said through other binding opinions, it is a reminder to public bodies that they are obligated to respond to FOIA requests in a timely manner or utilize the various extension or other provisions of FOIA to provide additional time for response. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, April 29, 2025

In the Zone: Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Village’s Claims Related to Annexation Agreements


An Illinois Appellate Court dismissed a lawsuit filed by a municipality asking the court to enforce terms in annexation agreements relating to a land donation from a developer and university foundation. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Northern Illinois University Foundation.

In 1999, the Village and Northern Illinois University Foundation (Foundation) entered into an annexation agreement to construct a Northern Illinois University (NIU) branch in exchange for annexing 342 acres into the Village. The agreement stated if a certain 20-acre parcel (the old parcel) was not developed as a NIU branch within ten years, the parcel would be donated to the Village. In 2005, the Village, Foundation, and a developer entered into a second agreement. This agreement amended certain provisions of the 1999 agreement including a provision that the Foundation would exchange the old parcel to the developer in exchange for the developer deeding a different parcel to NIU (the new parcel).

In 2021, after NIU failed to build a branch on the new parcel, the Village sued to demand the Foundation donate the new parcel to the Village. The trial court dismissed the Village’s lawsuit, finding that the 2005 agreement was an amendment to the 1999 agreement that continued its terms except for the provisions related to donations, and the 2005 agreement did not obligate the Foundation to donate any parcel to the Village. The trial court also dismissed the Village’s claim for unjust enrichment because the statute of limitations had passed.

On appeal, the Appellate Court found the two agreements clear and unambiguous. The Appellate Court found that the 2005 Agreement had express provisions that stated it was the complete agreement of the parties, and because the 2005 Agreement had no requirement for the Foundation to donate the new parcel to the Village, there was no basis for the Village to receive a land donation. Further, the Appellate Court rejected the Village’s claim that the developer was bound to the land donation terms of the 1999 agreement because the Village admitted in a court filing that the 2005 agreement superseded the prior terms. Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the Village’s argument that the Court’s decision violated the public interest element of annexation agreements because the Village did not previously raise that issue before the trial court.  

Post Authored by Daniel Lev, Ancel Glink

Monday, April 28, 2025

Appellate Court Upholds Demolition Order for Hotel in Violation of City Codes


An Illinois Appellate Court upheld a trial court's demolition order against a hotel cited for numerous unabated municipal code violations. City of South Beloit v. New Charter Group, Inc.

City code enforcement officers inspected the hotel several times in 2019 and issued numerous citations to the hotel owner for violations of the City’s property maintenance and building codes. The hotel was ultimately condemned and declared unfit for occupancy until the hotel owner made repairs and corrected the code violations. In 2021, the City engineer inspected the hotel and prepared a report estimating the repair costs to correct the City code violations would cost approximately $7 million. The hotel’s assessed property value in 2023 was $499,836.

The City filed a lawsuit seeking a demolition order from the court and assessment of fines against the hotel owner for past and continued code violations. Based on testimony from the City’s code official and engineer, the trial court found the hotel was dangerous, unsafe beyond reasonable repair, and that the repair costs far exceeded the hotel’s current value. As a result, the court granted the City’s demolition order and awarded the City fines exceeding $8 million for the code violations.

On appeal, the hotel owner argued the City failed to prove the repair costs exceeded the hotel’s value, that the City assumed control of the hotel and blocked repairs from being made, and that the City failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. 

The Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision and upheld the City’s demolition order.

First, the Appellate Court rejected the hotel owner’s argument that the City failed to prove repair costs exceeded the hotel’s value, finding that the trial court reasonably relied on the City engineer’s estimate of repair costs as he testified that he was familiar with local construction costs. 

Second, the Appellate Court held that the City only prohibited occupancy of the hotel by guests and did not prohibit the hotel owner from accessing the hotel to make repairs and remedy the code violations at the property. Additionally, the Court ruled the hotel owner failed to show the asserted defense of “unclean hands” applied to a demolition order and assessment of fines for code violations. The Appellate Court also found that the City provided adequate notice of the code violations at the hotel by citing the specific municipal code sections the hotel owner allegedly violated in the citation notices. 

Finally, the Appellate Court ruled the City was not required to exhaust administrative remedies as state law permits municipalities to also enforce local ordinance violations through lawsuits filed in a circuit court.

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

Thursday, April 24, 2025

Federal District Court Allows Public Employee’s First Amendment Claim to Proceed to Trial


Recently, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (District Court) issued an opinion allowing a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed to trial. Caparelli-Ruff v. Bd. of Educ. of East Aurora Sch. Dist. 131.

The Executive Director of Student Services (Director) of a school district (School District) was employed by the School District under a one-year contract for the 2021-2022 school year. In the spring of 2022, the Director began her campaign for County Regional Superintendent of Schools—a position unrelated to her employment with the School District.

To raise campaign contributions, the Director held a gun raffle, which she advertised on her personal Facebook page. Within weeks of posting the advertisement, the Director was placed on paid administrative leave for the remaining term of her employment contract with the School District. The Director filed a lawsuit against the School District, claiming she was terminated (and her contract was not renewed) in retaliation for her post about the gun raffle. The Director argued that the School District’s actions violated her First Amendment right to free speech and constituted a breach of her employment contract. The School District defended its decision to place the Director on leave and not rehire her for the following school year because of her poor performance (and not her speech activity). 

The District Court ruled in favor of the School District on the breach of contract claims, finding that the Director’s contract did not entitle her to automatic renewal of her employment for the following school year. Because the Director could not establish that her employment contract was breached, or that the School District had agreed to retain her for the following school year, her contract claims were dismissed. 

On the Director’s First Amendment retaliation claim, however, the District Court denied the School District's motion for summary judgment and allowed that claim to move forward to trial. The Court undertook a balancing test to evaluate whether the Director’s interest in speaking as a private citizen outweighed the School District’s interest in maintaining orderly operations. 

First, the Court found that the raffle advertisement was clearly posted in the Director’s personal capacity, since it related to her campaign for public office that was separate from her employment.

Second, in evaluating whether the Director’s post interfered with the School District’s operations, the District Court considered the actual impact of her post on the school community based on several factors, including (1) whether the post disrupted harmony among co-workers, (2) whether the post interfered with the Director’s job duties, and (3) the context of the post, among others.

The School District argued that the advertisement was very disruptive, since it was posted around the same time of the school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, in May 2022 and staff had raised concerns about the Director’s judgment in advertising a gun raffle at that time. The Director argued that the School District had taken the post out of context: the post was made to her personal Facebook page, and she had not discussed the raffle while at work. Furthermore, her campaign did not impact her ability to do her job as Director. Taking all of these factors into consideration, the District Court found that the School District was unable to demonstrate that the post unduly interfered with its operations or the Director’s performance of her duties. Because the School District had not shown that its interests outweighed those of the Director in speaking freely, it did not meet its burden for summary judgment.

For these reasons, the District Court determined that the Director’s First Amendment retaliation claim could move forward to trial.

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, April 22, 2025

In the Zone: Appellate Court Overturns ZBA’s Decision Concerning Special Use Permit for Clinic


An Illinois Appellate Court recently overturned a municipality's zoning determination that a property owner complied with the terms of a preexisting special use permit for the property. Rylatt v. Christensen

A doctor purchased a home that was subject to a preexisting special use permit (SUP) to allow a medical clinic (chiropractor) to operate as a home occupation, which included a variance to permit one nonresident of the home to work in the clinic. The doctor who purchased the property planned to operate a family planning clinic on the property. Initially, the city zoning official determined that the proposed business did not comply with the SUP because no employee would reside at the home so it could not qualify as a home occupation. After several discussions, the doctor stated that one of the clinic employees would reside at the property, and the City found the proposed use would comply with the SUP’s requirements.

A group of plaintiffs appealed the zoning official’s determination, arguing the proposed clinic would negatively impact neighboring properties, and the City's ZBA held a hearing on that appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ZBA upheld the determination that the clinic conformed with the SUP and found that none of plaintiffs had standing to challenge the determination.

Plaintiffs then filed a lawsuit to challenge the ZBA's rulings. The trial court dismissed the case and upheld the ZBA's decision that plaintiffs had no standing and dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining claim that the ZBA violated state law. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court found that the plaintiffs who resided within 550 feet of the clinic raised sufficient arguments about the potential impact of the clinic on his home to have standing to challenge the City's determination before the ZBA. However, the Appellate Court upheld the ZBA's finding that the other plaintiffs had no standing.  The Appellate Court provided a detailed discussion of the factors used in determining standing in these type of cases, with a thorough analysis of the standing cases.

The Appellate Court also held that the ZBA erred in affirming the zoning determination that the clinic was consistent with the SUP’s terms. The Court expressed concerns that the original SUP was never produced, making it difficult to justify the City's detemination that its terms were complied with. Also, the Court determined that there was no evidence the doctor would work or live on property, unlike the previous property owner. The Court noted that there was a lot of information lacking with regard to the SUP and the proposed use, and the Court was skeptical about the City official's testimony about his interpretation of the City's code in making the determination.

As a result, the Appellate Court overturned the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal of the ZBA's determination and sent the case back to the trial court.

Post Authored by Dan Lev & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Thursday, April 17, 2025

Court Interprets Procedural Requirements in Civil Forfeiture Statute


Last January, police arrested a driver for driving under the influence. The driver was charged with aggravated DUI because he was driving with a suspended license from a prior DUI offense, and his truck was not insured at the time of the arrest. The police also seized the truck the Defendant was driving pursuant to state civil forfeiture of vehicle laws. 720 ILCS 5/36-1.5(a)

A month after the arrest, the State filed notice and a petition for preliminary determination of probable cause at the court’s next available hearing, which was 18 days after police seized the driver's truck. State law required the State to “seek” a preliminary determination over whether the police had probable cause to seize property within 14 days of taking it. 

At the hearing, the driver asked the court to dismiss the action, arguing that because more than 14 days had passed since police seized his truck, it did not comply with state law. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the petition was filed on time, and that probable cause existed for the police to seize the vehicle. 

On appeal, the main question was whether the State was required to obtain a preliminary determination of probable cause within 14 days of seizing the truck, or if requesting a hearing within that time frame was enough to satisfy the statutory requirement. This question turned on the meaning of the word “seek” in the statute. The driver argued that “seek” meant the State had to obtain a court ruling on probable cause to satisfy the requirement. However, the Appellate Court determined that the word “seek” only required the State to “request or try to acquire” a preliminary determination on probable cause within the 14-day time frame. As a result, the Appellate Court held that the State satisfied the statutory requirement by requesting a hearing within the 14-day period. Illinois v. 2008 Ford F-250 Super Duty, 2025 IL App 3d 240194.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink