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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Wednesday, June 18, 2025

Ancel Glink Relaunches "The Workplace Report" Blog


We’re excited to share that Ancel Glink has officially relaunched its labor and employment law blog, The Workplace Report! Designed for public sector employers, HR professionals, and attorneys, the blog delivers timely insights on workplace policy developments, legal trends, and key court decisions affecting employers in Illinois and beyond.

Whether you’re navigating complex personnel issues or staying ahead of legislative changes, The Workplace Report is a valuable resource for practical guidance and legal perspective.

Check out the relaunch and subscribe to receive the latest posts directly in your inbox.

Friday, June 13, 2025

PAC Issues Binding Opinion Finding Public Body Failed to Respond to FOIA Request


The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its 5th binding opinion for 2025, finding a public body in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to a FOIA request. PAC Op. 25-005. The requester had filed a multi-part FOIA request asking for all emails and texts for a 4 year period between various village officials and employees, payroll records, meeting minutes and ordinances, and resident communications regarding the mayor's salary and for a four year period. When the village failed to respond to the request, the requester filed a "request for review" with the PAC office. The PAC reached out to the village, but according to the opinion, the village did not respond, and the PAC issued this binding opinion finding the village in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to the FOIA request. Nothing new in this opinion besides a reminder that public bodies have an obligation to respond to FOIA requests.

Thursday, June 12, 2025

Ordinance Prohibiting Yoga Instruction in City Parks Struck Down


In an interesting twist (pun intended), a federal court of appeals determined that yoga is a protected free speech activity under the First Amendment in a challenge to a municipality's ordinance that prohibited teaching yoga to four or more persons at City parks and beaches. Hubbard v. City of San Diego, (9th Cir. June 4, 2025)

The City had enacted an ordinance restricting the teaching of yoga on City parks and beaches. After two yoga instructors were informed by park rangers that they could no longer each yoga at City parks, they filed a lawsuit, challenging the ordinance as unconstitutional. The district court ruled in favor of the City, and the yoga instructors appealed.

On appeal, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that yoga is protected by the First Amendment because yoga teachers communicate and disseminate information about yoga’s philosophy and practice through speech and expressive movements. Second, the Court held that the City’s shoreline parks are traditional public forums. Third, the Court determiend that the City’s prohibition on teaching yoga at those parks was content-based, and, therefore, did not qualify as a valid time, place, and manner regulation. As a result, the ordinance was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the First Amendment and, since the City could not demonstrate any plausible connection between the instructors teaching yoga and any threat to public safety and enjoyment in the City’s shoreline parks, the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 

Note that this decision was decided in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, so it is not binding on Illinois, which is in the Seventh Circuit.

Wednesday, June 11, 2025

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 94: Discussing Supreme Court Decisions at the APA-ISS Conference


Ancel Glink just released its 94th episode of its Quorum Forum Podcast - Episode 94: Recent Supreme Court Decisions. Information about this episode is below.

How can decisions issued by the nation’s highest court impact community development at the local level? Find out as Megan Mack and Erin Monforti join the APA-ISS Spring Planning Conference to discuss two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, City of Grants Pass v. Johnson and Sheetz v. County of El Dorado. 


Tuesday, June 10, 2025

Court Dismisses Lawsuit by Former Fire Captain Terminated for Social Media Posts


A federal court of appeals recently upheld a municipality's decision to terminate a fire captain for posting content on social media that his employer (the City) found to be offensive attacks on transgender persons. Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg (4th Cir., June 5, 2025).

While employed as a fire captain, Misjuns maintained two Facebook pages - one was a personal page and the other was a public figure page. According to the Court of Appeals opinion, in 2021, Misjuns posted four cartoons on his public figure Facebook page that depicted offensive stereotypes of transgender women in bathrooms and participating in sports. Although Misjuns didn't identify himself as a City employee on his Facebook page, City residents who saw the posts identified him as a City employee, and subsequently filed complaints with the City about the posts.

After Misjuns became aware of the resident complaints, he posted a meme on his Facebook page that stated the following: “In the beginning, God created Adam & Eve. Adam could never be a Madam. Eve could never become Steve. Anyone who tells you otherwise defies the one true God. Threatening anyone for believing & saying this is most likely a hate crime.” 

Following an investigation by the City, Misjuns was terminated, and he filed a lawsuit against the City, claiming the termination constituted a breach of contract, and violated his equal protection rights, as well as his free speech and religion rights under the First Amendment, among other claims. The district court dismissed his claims, and he appealed to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.

First, the Court of Appeals determined that Misjuns failed to adequately plead his First Amendment (free speech and religion) and equal protection claims against the City. To hold a municipality liable for a constitutional civil rights violation, a plaintiff must show that the execution of a policy or custom of the municipality caused the violation, commonly referred to as Monell liability. Here, the Court determined that Misjuns failed to plead Monell liability. 

Second, the Court rejected his claim that the City's employee handbook constituted a binding contract between the City and its employees, so his breach of contract claim also failed.

Finally, the Court rejected his wrongful termination and conspiracy claims since those claims were solely brought against the individual defendants (and not the City), and those defendants had been previously dismissed from the lawsuit. 

Monday, June 9, 2025

Court Upholds Late Fee for Vehicle Sticker Tax


 An Appellate Court upheld Chicago's city sticker tax (wheel tax) in Zibrat v. City of Chicago.  

The City adopted a "wheel tax license fee" in 2011, and vehicle owners who failed to purchase the city sticker were assessed a late fee. After a vehicle owner purchased the city sticker after the deadline and was assessed a late fee, she filed a lawsuit claiming the late fee was an unconstitutional tax or impermissible fee. The circuit court dismissed the case, finding that although the late fee was a tax, it was not unconstitutional. She appealed, and the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal, finding that whether the late fee was considered a fee, penalty, or tax, it was permissible.




Friday, June 6, 2025

Court Upholds Denial of FOIA Request Based on Ongoing Law Enforcement Investigation Exemption


In response to separate FOIA requests submitted to a city’s police department and its office of emergency management seeking records regarding a 2021 fatal crash, both public bodies denied the requests because disclosing its responsive records would interfere with a pending or anticipated law enforcement proceeding. After the requester sued both public bodies seeking to compel disclosure of the withheld records, the circuit court ruled in favor of the public bodies, finding that disclosing the withheld records would interfere with an ongoing police investigation concerning a fatal collision, and that the requested body camera (BWC) footage was exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The requester appealed.

On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in favor of the public bodies. NBC Subsidiary (WMAQ-TV), LLC v. Chi. Police Dep't & Off. of Emergency Mgmt

First, the Appellate Court determined that the affidavit submitted by the police department provided case-specific details demonstrating why and how disclosing its withheld records would interfere with an ongoing police investigation (e.g., disclosing footage could expose witnesses to risk of harm or retaliation because of the primary suspect’s criminal history, alter witness memories and undermine the value of subsequent interviews, alert the suspect that they were being investigation and allow them to evade capture, or give the suspect time to create an alibi or fabricate evidence).

Second, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that he was entitled to receive redacted versions of the withheld records, because the public bodies demonstrated that its responsive records were entirely exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA’s pending or contemplated law enforcement exemption, because the court held that this particular FOIA exemption broadly protects entire records, in contrast to other FOIA exemptions which generally authorize redacting only discrete exempt information contained in records.

Third, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the police department’s prior disclosure of information concerning the accident undermined its argument that disclosing the withheld records at issue would interfere with an ongoing police investigation. The Appellate Court explained that the police department’s prior, more limited disclosure of information about the accident in a crash report and a community alert did not eliminate the risk of interference to the police department’s pending investigation if the department were forced to disclose the more detailed records at issue.

Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the requester’s argument that the body camera recordings capturing witness statements should have been disclosed, because the witnesses made their statements to police officers on a public street and allegedly did not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their statements. The Appellate Court explained that reasonable people in the position of the witnesses would reasonably expect that their statements would not be publicly disclosed, because disclosure could expose them to acts of retaliation and otherwise depict the witnesses in a vulnerable state after witnessing a traumatic accident. Therefore, because the witnesses captured in the withheld BWC recordings had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the recordings, and the witnesses did not provide their written consent to disclose the recordings, the public bodies properly withheld the BWC recordings from disclosure.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Thursday, June 5, 2025

Bill Requiring Local Libraries to Stock “Opioid Antagonists” Passes Both Houses of General Assembly


The spring 2025 legislative session of the Illinois General Assembly has come to an end after months of debate on a wide variety of proposed legislation. One update that caught our attention is the unanimous approval of House Bill 1910 (Bill) by both chambers. If signed by the Governor, this Bill would amend the Local Library Act to require all "libraries open to the public" to maintain a supply of approved “opioid antagonists,” such as Naloxone (Narcan), for use in assisting individuals experiencing an opioid overdose.

The Bill requires libraries to take all reasonable steps to make sure that, during operating hours, there is at least one person present in the library trained to (1) recognize and respond to an opioid overdose and (2) administer the opioid antagonist to reverse the effects of the overdose. Library personnel may administer an opioid antagonist to any person who they believe is experiencing an overdose on library property or at a library-sponsored event. The Bill provides immunity for libraries and their personnel related to the administration of an opioid antagonist, except in situations where they engage in willful or wanton misconduct.

After reviewing the Bill, we want to flag two items of interest for our readers. 

First, the Bill only amends the Local Library Act, and there appears to be no corresponding legislation to amend the Public Library District Act. While the Bill states that these new requirements apply to "[a]ll libraries open to the general public" in Illinois, the Local Library Act (the only statute this Bill amends) only covers public libraries established under the Local Library Act and not library districts. This raises a question as to the scope of the Bill's application, given the inconsistency of language used in the Bill (applies to all public libraries) and the only statute the Bill proposes to amend (the Local Library Act).

Additionally, the Bill provides that libraries may obtain an approved opioid antagonist from “any lawful source,” but does not reference funding to cover the cost of the medication or training for library personnel. Absent further legislation, grants, or other opportunities for funding, libraries may need to be prepared to cover the costs associated with compliance.

The Bill has been sent to Governor Pritzker for consideration. If the Bill is signed into law, Illinois libraries (at the very least, those libraries established under the Local Library Act) will need to stock a supply of opioid antagonists, work with staff to complete the required training, and otherwise ensure compliance with the requirements of the new law. 

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Wednesday, June 4, 2025

Seventh Circuit Upholds Constitutionality of Indiana’s Buffer Law


The State of Indiana has a "buffer law" that makes it a crime for a person to knowingly or intentionally approach an officer who is “lawfully engaged in the execution of the law enforcement officer’s duties after the law enforcement officer has ordered the person to stop approaching.” A citizen journalist who maintains a YouTube channel with over 23,000 subscribers, records and livestreams police conduct in the City, was told by City police officers to move backwards while he was recording the police after shots were fired, invoking the buffer law. The citizen journalist filed a lawsuit against the City, bringing a "facial challenge" to the buffer law, meaning he challenged its constitutionality "on its face” rather than as it was applied to him specifically. The district court ruled in favor of the City, finding the buffer law to be constitutional because it only had an “incidental effect” on the public’s First Amendment right to record and scrutinize police activity. He appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the ruling in favor of the City. First, the Seventh Circuit determined that the buffer law was content-neutral, because it regulates all forms of speech equally. 

Next, the Seventh Circuit determined that the law was narrowly tailored because it does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s interests in passing the law. The Court found that the buffer law reasonably served the government’s interest in maintaining police, citizen, and onlooker safety and protecting the integrity of police investigation. Because the law still allows those who are already present and recording to continue doing so beyond the buffer area, the Court held that the law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary.

Finally, the Court determined there were adequate open alternative channels of communication because under the buffer law, an onlooker could stay in place and record, or move to a different location to record, as long as they were not approaching an officer after being told to stop. As a result, the Seventh Circuit upheld the state's buffer law finding it to be a reasonable "time, place, and manner" restriction within the bounds of the First Amendment. Nicodemus v. City of South Bend, Indiana, No. 24-1099 (7th Cir. 2025)

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, June 3, 2025

School Board Member's Blocking of Users on Social Media Violated First Amendment


Last March, we reported on two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court addressing challenges to government officials' deletion of comments and blocking of users from their personal social media pages. (Lindke v. Freed and Garnier v. O'Connor-Ratcliff). The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a new two-part test for when a government official's social media activities on their personal accounts might tigger the First Amendment. The Court held that a government official can be liable under the First Amendment for actions taken on their personal social media accounts if (1) the official had the authority to speak on behalf of the government and (2) the official exercises that authority. The Supreme Court then remanded the two cases back to the lower courts to apply the new test.

Last month, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in the Garnier v. O'Connor-Ratcliff case. That case involved a challenge to two school board members who had blocked parents from their personal social media pages. The Ninth Circuit applied the U.S. Supreme Court's new two-part test. First, the Ninth Circuit held that one of the board members (the school board president) had actual authority to speak on the school district's behalf through California state statute and the school district's bylaws that encouraged electronic communication of school business and delegated communication authority to the board president. Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the board president was purporting to exercise that official authority on the president's social media accounts when she regularly communicated about district business, and had no disclaimer that her views were personal rather than official. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the board president's social media activities constituted "state action" under the civil rights statute and, as a result, the First Amendment limited her abilities to delete comments or block users if those actions would violate users' free speech rights. The Ninth Circuit found the case against the other board member was moot because he was no longer on the school board.

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that public officials can limit the risk of liability as the U.S. Supreme Court advised last year, stating as follows:

We emphasize that public officials assuredly do have the right to speak on public affairs, including issues related to their official duties, in their personal capacity. As the Supreme Court advised in Lindke, public officials can limit the risk of liability for personal speech on social media by, for instance, “keep[ing] personal posts in a clearly designated personal account,” including a disclaimer, or refraining from labelling their personal pages as official means of communication. (cite omitted)


Monday, June 2, 2025

Illinois Supreme Court Upholds Village's Prosecution of Cannabis DUI For Driver’s Education Student


In Village of Lincolnshire v. Olvera the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a 16-year-old high school student for driving under the influence (DUI) during a driver’s education class. 

The Village brought state DUI charges against the student, who was later found guilty in a bench trial. The student appealed and his case made its way to the Illinois Supreme Court, where he argued that (i) the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI and (ii) there was insufficient evidence to prove he was under the influence of cannabis.

The student claimed that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI because it failed to present written permission from the State to prosecute the case under state statute. He argued that the Village was required to submit evidence of its written permission into the record during trial. Both the Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that the statute does not require the Village to submit written authority into the record at trial.

The student also argued that the Village failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of cannabis, and that it was to a degree that “rendered him incapable of safely driving.” The Illinois Supreme Court noted that at trial, the Village presented testimony from the driving instructor, who observed the defendant’s erratic driving, head slumping, nervousness, and failure to stop the vehicle, which required the instructor to manually intervene several times by grabbing the wheel or applying the instructor-side brake. The instructor testified that by itself this behavior is often observed in any nervous inexperienced driver, however additional evidence supported the DUI charge, including the student's failure of multiple field sobriety tests administered by the school resource officer. Although, the student did not exhibit the smell of burnt cannabis, a student safety search revealed a “joint” in his wallet. Also, the student acknowledged possession of marijuana and admitted to the Dean of Students that he had used marijuana the night before. Surveillance footage from the high school was admitted into evidence showing the student stumbling through the school hallways before exiting to the driver’s education vehicle.

When viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the student was under influence of cannabis and was incapable of safely driving, upholding his conviction.

Post Authored by Glen Batista and Megan Mack, Ancel Glink

Friday, May 30, 2025

In the Zone: Court Upholds Zoning Board's Denial of Variance for Accessory Structure


In 2022, building plans were submitted to the County for approval of a proposed reconstruction of a boathouse. According to the relevant County ordinances, in order for a structure to qualify as a boathouse, it must be used to store boats, may not contain other rooms, must be built over an earthen floor or water slip, and may not be used for human habitation. If a structure does not qualify as a boathouse under the regulations, it must be built at least 30 feet from the shoreline, unless it is granted a variance.

The building plans that were submitted to the County depicted a structure with two stories, an enclosed wooden floor that was heated, windows, recessed lighting, cabinetry, sky lights, ceiling fans, and a door – all of which indicated atypical features and activities for boathouses. The building plans also depicted people congregating inside the structure, indicating that it was intended to be used for human habitation. For these reasons, the County Zoning Board decided that the structure was not a boathouse under the County’s regulations and was, therefore, subject to the 30-foot setback requirement.

The builders also sought a variance for their structure to avoid the 30-foot setback requirement. The builders argued that because the area 30 feet from the shoreline was particularly steep, exceptional circumstances and practical difficulties existed in adhering to the setback requirement to justify a variance. The builders also argued that their plan was harmonious with the purpose of the regulations because the structure would not be used for habitation and because the large floor plan was justified by their extensive storage needs.

The Zoning Board denied the variance, finding that there was nothing so unique about the builders’ property that would not allow them to either build the structure 30 feet from the shoreline or modify their plans so that the structure would qualify as a boathouse. On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the Zoning Board's decision, finding, among other things, that a builder's dissatisfaction with the County's zoning regulations and personal preferences do not “manufacture a practical hardship justifying a variance.” Atwater v. Lake Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2025 IL App (2d) 240276-U.

Post Authored by Rachel Defries & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink