Regulating Election and Campaign Signs

Regulating Election and Campaign Signs

  Thursday, August 29, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Every election cycle presents unique challenges for public bodies. To stay ahead of these possible issues, one thing to add to your checklist is the review of your sign ordinance to make sure you are prepared to address any issues that arise related to the regulation of election and campaign signs. 

First, you should confirm your sign ordinances does not single out political signs. Municipal officials should be aware of restrictions on their authority to regulate temporary election and campaign signs on private property. Illinois law prevents municipalities from prohibiting the display of temporary outdoor political campaign signs on private residential properties. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1(12). Municipal sign codes also cannot impose stricter time restrictions on the display of temporary election and campaign signs than other signs (such as “for sale” signs or holiday decorations). Placing stricter time display requirements only on temporary political signs is a content-based regulation and could result in First Amendment lawsuits against a municipality. Your ordinance cannot, for example, permit real estate signs all year round, but only permit political signs for a certain time period. Your sign regulations must be content neutral.

Second, while your public body can prohibit campaign signs from being placed on government property (public rights of way, for example), it is important to know that candidates or their supporters are allowed to place temporary election and campaign signs on public property outside the designated campaign-free zone during the time period that polls are open for voting on primary and general election days. Special rules apply to political and campaign signs on public property during an election day, and an “election day” is considered any day that early voting may be occurring on your property - it is not just the official day of the election. If your governmental property is a polling place, Illinois law prohibits any electioneering activities within a polling place where voters cast ballots and within 100 feet of a polling place. 10 ILCS 5/17-29. As such, on an “election day,” no election or campaign signs may be placed within this 100-foot designated campaign-free zone, but congregating and engaging in electioneering activities (such as placing election and campaign signs) are permitted on public property outside the designated campaign-free zone. There are special rules for the location of the designated campaign-free zone depending on the unique characteristics of a polling place, which may result in you having to measure the distance from the polling place to see where the campaign-free zone ends. Depending on the measurements from your specific polling place location, you may actually have to permit electioneering within your public building outside of the 100 feet campaign-free zone.

Under section 17-29(c) of the Election Code, the regulation of electioneering on polling place property on election day, including the placement of temporary signs, is an exclusive power and function of the State, so this preempts home rule municipalities from adopting any laws inconsistent with this statute.

Post Authored by Keri-Lyn Krafthefer & Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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Special Considerations about Establishing Compensation of Elected Officials

Special Considerations about Establishing Compensation of Elected Officials

  Wednesday, August 28, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Note: this is part 2 in our 2-part series on elected officials compensation.

Our previous post discussed the time period by which public bodies must establish compensation for their officers to be elected in the April 2025 election. In this post, we address special factors to keep in mind when establishing compensation for elected officials.

First, section 3.1-30-5 of the Illinois Municipal Code requires municipalities to establish their compensation by ordinance – not by a resolution or motion. The salaries may be fixed in the annual appropriation or budget ordinance, provided that the salaries or compensation of an elected official may not take effect during the term of any officer holding an elective office and that they are adopted at least 180 days prior to the terms of office commencing. See 65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-10 and 3.1-50-5.

Second, the compensation of elected officials must specify whether the members of the corporate authorities are to be compensated at an annual rate or for each meeting for which a public notice of the meeting was given. 65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-15. Also, you might consider specifying whether this applies to both regular and special meetings, and whether an elected official will be paid for a meeting even if they fail to attend. 

Third, in addition to setting a salary or per meeting stipend, the compensation ordinance should specify whether the elected official’s compensation includes health insurance benefits or participation in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund. “Compensation” generally includes other benefits, like health insurance. See Ill. Attorney General Opinions 94-022  and 96-039.

Fourth, consider how to address expense reimbursement. If elected officials are submitting receipts and receiving reimbursement, that is permissible and not considered additional compensation under Section 3.1-50-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code. However, if an elected official is given a fixed lump sum expense allowance, that would be considered to be additional compensation. See DeSutter v. South Moline Township Board, 96 Ill.2d 372 (1983) and Hume v. Town of Blackberry, 131 Ill.App.3d 32 (1985). Also, if you provide a fix stipend amount for expenses, specify how that will comply with the requirements of the Local Government Travel Expense Control Act, 50 ILCS 150/1, et seq. Are travel expenses covered by the stipend or in addition to it?

Except for the clerk who can receive additional compensation for serving as collector (65 ILCS 5/3.1-50-25) and the mayor/village president who can receive additional compensation for serving as the local liquor control commissioner (235 ILCS 5/4-3), elected officials cannot receive additional compensation from the municipality, even for performing additional duties. See Ill. Attorney General Opinion 99-009. 

Finally, an ordinance that is adopted at least 180 days prior to the terms of office, can provide for a cost of living or other similar increase during the term of office according to the Illinois Attorney General, which has opined that such increases, during the term of office, do not violate the prohibitions against increasing salaries during a term of office because they are set 180 days in advance. See Illinois Attorney General Opinion S-1366. 

Post Authored by Keri-Lyn Krafthefer & Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

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It's Time to Establish Elected Officials' Compensation for Terms Starting in 2025

It's Time to Establish Elected Officials' Compensation for Terms Starting in 2025

  Tuesday, August 27, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Note: this is part 1 of a 2-part series on elected officials compensation. Stay tuned for part 2 tomorrow

Although the outcome of the November 2024 elections is still unresolved, it is time for Illinois local governments to start focusing on the 2025 elections. One important action step that needs to move to the top of your list is establishing compensation for the officers who will be elected in 2025. 

Section 2 of the Local Government Officer Compensation Act specifies that the compensation of elected officers “shall be fixed at least 180 days before the beginning of the terms of the officers whose compensation is to be fixed.” Section 3.1-50-10 of the Illinois Municipal Code contains the same requirement.  

For most units of local government that want to set the salaries of the officials who will be elected at the April 1, 2025 election, the precise calculations can be a little tricky, as discussed below, but most public bodies will meet this deadline if they take action before the end of October.  For townships, it is simple to calculate the 180-day deadline, because all township officials (except assessors and collectors) take office on the third Monday in May, which will be May 19, 2025. 60 ILCS 1/50-15. Township boards are also required to set the salary of the township assessor at the same time they set the compensation for the supervisor, so the same deadline applies, even though new assessors will not be seated until the following January 1st.  See 35 ILCS 200/2-70. For all townships, the latest date to set compensation of newly-elected officials is November 20, 2024.  

Similar to townships, the terms for public library district trustees begin on the third Monday in May or May 19, 2025. 75 ILCS 16/30-10. As a result, the latest date to set compensation of newly elected library trustees is November 20, 2024.

It is not as simple to calculate the deadline for other units of local government as there is no fixed date for elected officers to enter office. School boards generally seat new members at their organizational meetings, but dates for those meetings may vary. Park boards usually install officers at their first meetings after they receive their vote results. 

The Illinois Municipal Code specifies that terms for municipal elected officials commence “at the first regular or special meeting of the corporate authorities after receipt of the official election results from the county clerk…unless as otherwise provided by ordinance,” but that ordinance cannot provide for a date later than the first regular or special meeting in the month of June after the election. 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-15. The challenge with this requirement is the date that elected officials take office following the election varies depending on the form of government and, at times, upon the public body’s receipt of the election results. Therefore, a public body may not know precisely when 180 days in advance will be, because it cannot predict when it will receive the election results. It is possible, and likely, that one municipality will install officers on a different date than a neighboring municipality. The safest approach is to adopt any compensation ordinance well in advance of the deadline.

Any changes in compensation for people holding the same office (for example, village trustees) will only apply to the officials who are elected at the April 1, 2025 election, not those elected previously. Therefore, it is possible that trustees may be paid differently depending on when they were elected. 

Our next blog post will address special things to consider when establishing compensation of elected officials. 

Post Authored by Keri-Lyn Krafthefer & Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

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Appellate Court Reverses Ruling in PEDA Benefits Case

Appellate Court Reverses Ruling in PEDA Benefits Case

  Monday, August 26, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Former employees sued a City claiming it unlawfully withheld employment taxes and compensatory time from benefits they received pursuant to the Public Employee Disability Act (PEDA). PEDA provides benefits to certain eligible public employees who are injured in the line of duty for a period of up to a year. The trial court ruled in favor of the employees, but on appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. Bitner v. City of Pekin.

The employees claimed, among other things, that the City violated the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act when it withheld employment taxes from their PEDA benefits. On appeal, the Appellate Court determined that the City did not violate state law when it withheld employment taxes from benefits the employees received under PEDA. The Court referred to express language in PEDA that provides that an employee receiving PEDA benefits is to be paid on the same basis as the employee was paid before the injury (see below):

Whenever an eligible employee suffers any injury in the line of duty which causes him to be unable to perform his duties, he shall continue to be paid by the employing public entity on the same basis as he was paid before the injury, with no deduction from his sick leave credits, compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a public employee pension fund during the time he is unable to perform his duties due to the result of the injury, but not longer than one year in relation to the same injury.

Based on the Court's interpretation of this language, the City was not prohibited from deducting employment taxes from the PEDA benefit payments because there was no express mention of employment taxes or tax withholdings in the list of prohibited deductions (which referenced compensatory time and service credits but not taxes). 

The Court did remand the case back to the trial court to look further into the employees' claims that the City wrongfully deducted compensatory time from the PEDA benefit payments.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Seventh Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Church Zoning Dispute

In the Zone: Seventh Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Church Zoning Dispute

  Thursday, August 22, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ruling in favor of a municipality that its zoning code did not unlawfully discriminate against religious institutions where it only permitted religious institutions as special uses in certain zoning districts. Word Seed Church v. Village of Hazel Crest

A church was looking for a new permanent building for its 120-person congregation and wanted to buy property in a village. The village’s zoning code did not allow churches as permitted, by-right uses in any of its zoning districts, but some of the districts allowed churches as special uses. The church sued the village on multiple grounds claiming that the zoning code discriminated against religious assembly and forced religious institutions to go through the more onerous special use permit process. 

The district court ruled in favor of the village, rejecting the church's claims. First, the court held that RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) did not apply because the church never had a property interest in any real estate located in the village. Second, the court denied the church’s equal protection claim because: (1) the church’s decision not to seek a special use permit precluded any possibility of discrimination against it; (2) the church did not show that comparable secular organizations had been treated worse than churches; and (3) contrary to the church’s allegations, there was no property in the village that could accommodate the 120-member capacity the church said it needed. Finally, the district court rejected the church’s vagueness challenge, noting that the Seventh Circuit has upheld zoning ordinances with similar special use regulations. 

The church filed a request with the district court for it to reconsider its ruling, arguing that the court had applied the wrong version of the zoning code in ruling against the church. In 2008, the village had amended its zoning code to remove numerous businesses from its permitted and special use lists in the village's business zoning districts. The district court denied the church’s request to reconsider, and the church appealed.

The Seventh Circuit ruled against the church for three reasons. First, it found the district court would have ruled the same whether it used the pre-2008 or post-2008 version of the zoning code so its argument on reconsideration was irrelevant. Second, the 2008 zoning amendment removed secular businesses from the business zoning districts' list of permitted and special uses and had no bearing on religious assembly. Third, the Seventh Circuit held that the church waived its right to challenge amendments to the business district zoning district during the district court proceedings.

Post Authored by Daniel Lev, Ancel Glink

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DNC Safety Ordinance is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

DNC Safety Ordinance is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

  Wednesday, August 21, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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The Democratic National Convention is being held in Chicago from August 19-22, 2024. In preparation for the event, the Chicago Police Department and the Secret Service established security protocols for the areas surrounding the convention facilities. The City of Chicago also enacted an ordinance prohibiting items such as laptops, drones, pointed objects, and weapons inside the perimeters.

In Thayer v. City of Chicago, individuals who planned to protest at the DNC challenged the ordinance as unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, they challenged the prohibition of “pointed objects," arguing that this ban raised a question whether protesters could bring ballpoint pens or wear buttons secured with safety pins into the protected area.

The Illinois Appellate Court denied the protesters' request to temporarily suspend the safety ordinance and found that it was not unconstitutionally vague. While the ordinance does not provide a complete list of objects that are permitted or banned, the Appellate Court held that the ordinance has a core ascertainable meaning that was aimed at keeping people safe.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Seventh Circuit Keeps PFAS Lawsuit in State court

Seventh Circuit Keeps PFAS Lawsuit in State court

  Tuesday, August 20, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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The State of Illinois sued 3M alleging the company’s Cordova Facility caused PFAS contamination in the Mississippi River in violation of state environmental protection laws. 3M’s Cordova Facility is located along the Mississippi River’s banks and chemicals containing PFAS are manufactured at the facility. 

3M sought to remove the lawsuit to federal court, arguing the PFAS contamination in the Mississippi River could have come from the Army’s Rock Island facility (which is also located on the Mississippi River), and that it had immunity from any state law violations under the government contractor defense. The State argued the case should stay in state court because the lawsuit did not seek any relief from PFAS contamination linked to the Army’s Rock Island facility. 

The district court ruled in favor of the State and 3M appealed. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision to keep the lawsuit in state court, holding the government contractor defense was not available to 3M because the State’s lawsuit only sought relief for PFAS contamination derived solely from the Cordova Facility. As the State’s lawsuit sought no relief for PFAS contamination from the Amy’s facility, the Court ruled 3M could not raise a federal defense and remove the lawsuit to federal court. State of Illinois v. 3M Company. 

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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