Friday, September 28, 2018
Unsurprisingly,
in an unreported opinion, the Court has again refused to expand the duty owed
by a municipality to pedestrians exiting vehicles, specifically taxis. Decker v. City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) 171066- U
Decker claims he was injured when he exited a legally stopped taxi and stepped onto a crumbling
and eroding curb and sued the City of Chicago. The City filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the curb
where Decker fell was located outside of the sidewalk, so Decker was
not an intended user of the curb. The Court agreed with the City, and dismissed the case and Decker appealed.
As
background, Section 3-102 (a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental
Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Tort Immunity Act”) imposes a duty on
municipalities only where the person injured is an intended and permitted
user of the property controlled by the municipality. The general rule in
Illinois is that a municipality does not owe a duty to pedestrians who walks or
crosses in a public roadway outside of a crosswalk. The reasoning is that
streets are intended for cars and not for pedestrians. The Supreme Court has,
however, recognized a very narrow exception which concerns only the permitted
and intended use of the street immediately around a legally parked
vehicle by its exiting and entering vehicle operators and passengers.
Decker argues that the taxi stopping to drop him off was essentially a legal
stopped vehicle, meaning he fell within this narrow exception and the City was
liable for his injuries. The Court disagreed.
The
following factors are considered in determining whether a duty is owed by a
municipality: (1) the foreseeability that the municipality’s conduct will
result in injury; (2) likelihood of injury; (3) magnitude of guarding against
it; and, (4) the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant. The
Court here ultimately concluded that while it was entirely possible that an
injury like Decker’s would occur to people getting into or getting out of a
taxi, the burden of requiring municipalities to maintain the areas surrounding
a legally stopped taxi would be unduly expensive and burdensome. Plus, taxis
can stop anywhere and by expanding the duty to any location a taxi decides to
stop would swallow the intended user rule of Section 3-102(a) because it would
allow taxi cab drivers to create a municipal duty of care where one does not
exist every single time they drop off a passenger.
Decker
v. City of Chicago
is not the first, nor will it be the last case to try and convince the Court to
expand the narrow rule involving the duty owed to a person exiting and/or
entering a vehicle. Stay tuned…
Post Authored by Christy Michaelson, Ancel Glink
Thursday, September 27, 2018
New Quorum Forum Podcast on Elections Just Released
Thursday, September 27, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
It’s time for a new Quorum Forum podcast episode - Election Special! Local Election Officials
In this "special meeting" episode, we discuss how local election officials can prepare for the 2019 local government election cycle. In addition to sharing our top election tips, we have also provided a useful “Receipt for Filing Nominating Papers” form, available on the episode page at quorumforum.ancelglink.com.
Wednesday, September 26, 2018
Ordinance Prohibiting Homeless from Sleeping in Public Places is Unconstitutional
Wednesday, September 26, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
A federal court of appeals recently found a City ordinance that made it a crime to camp on public and private property to be in
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Martin v. City of Boise, No.15-35845 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2018).
A Boise, Idaho ordinance outlawed the use of any streets,
sidewalks, parks, or public places for camping as well as occupying, lodging or
sleeping in any private or public building without the permission of the
owner. It was later amended to apply only on nights when there were no available
beds in local shelters. After plaintiffs were arrested under the ordinance, all of
whom were homeless at the time, they filed a lawsuit claiming that the law was unconstitutional because it
criminalized the mere conduct of sitting, lying and sleeping in public.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding such conduct
to be a universal condition of being human and an unavoidable consequence of
being homeless. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Robinson v. California which declared unconstitutional
a state statute making it a crime to be addicted to narcotics because it
criminalized the status of being an addict, rather than the conduct emanating
from the addiction. Similarly, the Boise ordinance punished individuals
for engaging in activities that were unavoidable on nights when there were no
other available alternatives due solely to their status as homeless
persons.
While this decision applies only in the Ninth Circuit, it
mirrors decisions in other federal district courts and may be instructive as to
how the Seventh Circuit might treat challenges to similar municipal ordinances
in Illinois, including cases brought under the State’s Bill of Rights for the
Homeless Act.
Post Authored by David Warner, Ancel Glink
Monday, September 24, 2018
Cook County $750 Political Contribution Limit Upheld
Monday, September 24, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
Cook County has enacted an ethics ordinance governing various activities involving Cook County elected and appointed officials and employees. That ordinance also places a $750 cap on political contributions by individuals and companies that do business with Cook County. After being fined by the Cook County Ethics Commission for receiving political contributions in excess of the ethics ordinance, Cook County Assessor John Berrios filed a lawsuit to challenge the ordinance, claiming that the ordinance exceeded the County's home rule powers, infringed on First Amendment protected speech, denied candidates due process, and violated public policy, among other allegations.
The circuit court ruled in favor of the County, rejecting Berrios challenges to the ethics ordinance. Berrios appealed, and the appellate court also upheld the ordinance. Berrios v. Cook County Board of Commissioners, 2018 IL (1st) 180654. The appellate court found the ordinance did not violate or impinge on any First Amendment protected rights. The court also found the County was not preempted by state election law in enacting its own stricter political contribution limits. Finally, the court determined that the ordinance did not violate Berrios' due process rights, rejecting his "selective enforcement" argument.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Wednesday, September 19, 2018
Reminder of Deadline to Modify Elected Official Compensation
Wednesday, September 19, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
We have reported on this issue in the past, but wanted to send another reminder this year since we are approaching the deadline to change your elected official's compensation in time for next spring's election.
Section 2 of the Local Government Officer Compensation Act states that the compensation of elected officers “shall be fixed at least 180 days before the beginning of the terms of the officers whose compensation is to be fixed.” 50 ILCS 145/2. While the 180 day calculation seems simple, the actual date will differ depending on the type of government unit.
For example, for townships, it is easy to calculate the 180 days, because all township officials, except assessors, take office on the third Monday in May (May 20, 2019), so the deadline to set compensation for elected township officials is November 21, 2018. 60 ILCS 1/50-15.
For example, for townships, it is easy to calculate the 180 days, because all township officials, except assessors, take office on the third Monday in May (May 20, 2019), so the deadline to set compensation for elected township officials is November 21, 2018. 60 ILCS 1/50-15.
The deadline for setting compensation is more complicated with other local governments that do not have fixed dates for their officers taking office.
For municipalities, the Illinois Municipal Code states that terms for municipal elected officials commence “at the first regular or special meeting of the corporate authorities after receipt of the official election results from the county clerk…unless as otherwise provided by ordinance,” but then that ordinance cannot fix the date later than the first regular or special meeting in the month of June after the election. 65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-15. So, the date on which new municipal officers will take office will vary from municipality to municipality, depending on local ordinances, meeting dates, and other factors. As a result, a municipality might want to act soon if it wants to change the compensation for its elected officials to ensure that the action takes place at least 180 days prior to the new officers taking office, which could be in April, May, or June.
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Post Authored by Julie Tappendorf
Tuesday, September 18, 2018
FCC Releases Small Wireless Facilities Draft Order
Tuesday, September 18, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
On
September 5, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a draft Declaratory
Ruling and Third Report and Order, focusing on state and local management
of small wireless facilities infrastructure deployment. The draft order is scheduled for the FCC’s September 26 open meeting, and if approved would enact substantial new limits on local wireless siting review.
You can read more about the draft order on the Illinois Municipal League's website here.
Monday, September 17, 2018
A New Take on Takings?
Monday, September 17, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
Rose Mary Knick was not happy
with her local township. The township passed an ordinance requiring the owners
of private cemeteries to open them to the public. A township official inspected
Knick’s property, determined that certain stones were grave markers, and issued
a violation for failing to hold open the cemetery to the public. Knick disputed
that a cemetery existed on her property, and filed suit alleging that the
ordinance was an unconstitutional taking of private property. However, Knick’s
federal lawsuit was dismissed on longstanding Supreme Court precedent, as she
had not yet sought “just compensation” under state law.
Under the Fifth Amendment,
governments are prohibited from taking private property for public uses
“without just compensation.” Takings under the Fifth Amendment are a concern
whenever local governments physically occupy private property or enact laws
that restrict how private property can be used.
The Supreme Court case of Williamson County v. Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985) has long governed Fifth Amendment
takings claims. In Williamson County,
The Supreme Court held that a property owner has not been denied “just
compensation” for its property unless they have exhausted their state law
remedies to obtain compensation. Now, Knick’s case may upend over 30 years of
Supreme Court precedent.
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Knick
argued that her facial takings claim was exempt from the exhaustion
requirement, and, even if it wasn’t, the court should overlook Williamson County. The Third Circuit disagreed, finding that her
takings claim was not an underlying challenge to the validity of the township’s
ordinance, but only a claim for just compensation. Knick did not allege that that the taking by
the township was invalid (i.e, for lack of a public purpose). If she had, her
takings claim would be exempt from the state law exhaustion requirement and she
could file directly in federal court. The Court held that state law inverse-condemnation
mechanisms are better equipped to value what compensation Knick was owed, and
that she needed to exhaust those remedies first.
Knick has now brought her dispute
with her township to the highest court in the land, and oral arguments are set
for October. While Knick’s case turns on seemingly mundane procedural issues,
the outcome could have a significant impact on local governments. If the
Supreme Court sides with Knick, it will become much easier for property owners
to challenge land use regulations as takings. A property owner could file suit
directly in federal court, even when the government has not yet refused to pay
just compensation. State law remedies (eminent domain/inverse-condemnation
proceedings), already exist to ensure just compensation is paid. Allowing these
claims to proceed in a second forum may result in a proliferation of takings lawsuits.
It will all turn on Knick and her
supposed cemetery.
Post Authored by Kurt Asprooth, Ancel Glink
Thursday, September 13, 2018
FOIA Denial Letters: Don’t Forget to Include Citations and Reasons for Denial!
Thursday, September 13, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
In Blanco
v. Joliet Police Department, after Blanco was arrested by the Joliet Police
Department, he sent a FOIA
request to the PD asking for any documents and recordings related to his
arrest. The PD denied his request under the Juvenile Court
Act, and Blanco sued.
Blanco claimed that the PD failed to cite a FOIA exemption and did not prove that the requested records
were exempt. He sought the release of the records and a civil
penalty of up to $5,000. In response, the PD argued that the Juvenile Court Act applied because Blanco was with two minors at the time of his
arrest. The PD also stated that the records contained exempt
personal information under 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA. The PD further cited 7(1)(a) which prevents disclosure of information prohibited by
law and 7(1)(bb), which prevents disclosure of information prohibited by the
Juvenile Court Act. The Circuit Court agreed with the PD and
dismissed the case.
Blanco appealed, arguing: 1)
the PD failed to comply with FOIA’s requirement that the denial letter
include a specific exemption claimed and a detailed factual basis and citation,
2) the PD should have been fined a civil penalty for failing to
disclose the requested documents, and 3) the Juvenile Court Act does not
prohibit the disclosure of these documents.
The Court acknowledged that the PD’s denial letter
raised questions of whether it complied with FOIA by specifying the exemption
and specific reason for the denial. However, the Court noted that even
assuming that the denial letter did not comply with FOIA, it is not automatic
that the requester would be entitled to have the documents released to
him. The Court found that without the record or transcripts on
appeal (Blanco failed to provide those to the Appellate Court), it had no way of knowing what happened in the circuit court, so it upheld the Circuit Court's ruling in favor of the PD.
While the PD was able to get out of possible
penalties because of Blanco's procedural deficiencies, this case is a reminder to public bodies of the importance of
including the citation for the applicable exemption and detailed factual reasons why it denied the request (whether in whole or in part) when it issues the written denial letter.
Post Authored by Erin Pell, Ancel Glink
Tuesday, September 11, 2018
PAC Issues Binding Opinion on Failure to Respond to FOIA Request
Tuesday, September 11, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
In its 11th binding opinion of 2018, the PAC found a public body in violation of FOIA for failing to respond to a FOIA request, and failing to respond to the PAC's request for review. This opinion doesn't offer any new guidance to public bodies beyond what we've reported on in the past in summarizing similar binding opinions issued by the PAC. PAC Op. 18-011.
Monday, September 10, 2018
Drone On! New Quorum Forum Podcast Episode Released
Monday, September 10, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
Whether you think drones are pretty cool, or really creepy, they are increasingly used in commerce and recreation. In our latest podcast episode of Quorum Forum, we discuss how local governments can regulate drones, and appropriately use drones. We also review new laws affecting local government employers and more.
Tune into this latest podcast episode at Drone on!
If you have ideas for future podcast topics, email us at podcast@ancelglink.com.
Friday, September 7, 2018
New State Law Preempts Local Government Regulation of Drones
Friday, September 07, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
Just last month, the Illinois General Assembly passed a law preempting local government regulation of unmanned aircraft systems (commonly referred to as drones).
In P.A. 100-735, the state declared that the regulation of drones is an "exclusive power and function of the State." The new law prohibits any unit of local government, including home rule units (except Chicago), from enacting any ordinance or resolution that regulates unmanned aircraft systems. The law became effective August 3, 2018.
So, what does this mean for Illinois local governments? The law does not seem to prohibit units of local government from controlling or regulating drones that fly over their own government-owned property, which would be more of an "ownership" exercise of authority rather than "regulatory" exercise. But, the law does appear to hinder a local government from regulating drones through its exercise of zoning or other powers over private property.
It will be interesting to see how the FAA will react to this state law given that the FAA has enacted a substantial number of regulations on unmanned aircraft systems.
For more information about this new law and how it affects local government regulation and control of drones, stay tuned for an upcoming episode of our podcast Quorum Forum, titled Drone On. We will update you as soon as that episode is released.
Tuesday, September 4, 2018
7 Years of Municipal Minute!
Tuesday, September 04, 2018 Julie Tappendorf
7 years ago, on September 3, 2011, Municipal Minute went live with its first post: "Tweeting into Trouble." More than 1,400 posts later, and we are still reporting on new cases, legislation, and issues of interest to local government officials and employees.
We welcome suggestions from our readers on future topics, and particularly appreciate it when readers alert us to PAC opinions or cases they find interesting and relevant to Municipal Minute.
Thanks for continuing to check in with us at Municipal Minute - we look forward to at least another 7 years of reporting on local government news.
Thanks again!
Julie Tappendorf
Ancel Glink
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