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Thursday, August 14, 2025

Teacher's Case Against School District's Naming Policy Moves Forward


An Indiana High School adopted a policy that required teachers to call students by their first names as they appeared in the school's database. For transgender students who had changed their first names, the database listed their new names. A teacher in the school objected to the school's name policy on religious grounds and requested an accommodation, which the school initially granted, which allowed him to call students by their last names. After a year, some students and teachers complained about the teacher's practice, and the school rescinded the accommodation, informing the teacher that he would face termination if he didn't call students by their first names. The teacher sued the school, claiming it failed to accommodate his religion. The district court ruled in the school's favor, and the teacher appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of the employee's religious practices or beliefs unless the employer can establish that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious practices or believes without undue hardship on the employer's business. To establish a Title VII case, the employee has to establish that his religious belief is "sincerely held." Then, the burden shifts to the employer to show that any reasonable accommodation would result in undue hardship. The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered that second part of the analysis (undue hardship) and held that the employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in "substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business." This new Supreme Court standard is more "rigorous" than the previous standard that defined "undue hardship" as anything that required an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee.

Applying the Supreme Court's new "undue burden" test to the school district, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, finding that the school district failed to introduce evidence that an accommodation to allow a teacher to call students by their last name resulted in the type of objective harm necessary to establish an "undue burden." The Court also rejected the school's argument that the accommodation caused a serious disruption to the learning environment. In short, the Court determined that there was a material factual dispute as to whether an accommodation would result in an undue hardship to the school, and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation.

The dissenting opinion would have upheld the district court's ruling in favor of the student. The dissent noted that the school had initially accommodated the teacher, but after a year, determined that the accommodation had failed in practice, and the school had an obligation to the transgender students harmed by the accommodation. The dissent argued that the school did not discriminate against the teacher based on his religion, and had reasonably concluded that its initial accommodation was not justifiable. 

Wednesday, August 13, 2025

Court Stops Enforcement of Indiana's Buffer Law


Indiana adopted a "buffer law" that makes it illegal for a person to to "knowingly or intentionally" approach within 25 feet of a police officer who is lawfully engaged in the execution of the law after the officer ordered the person to stop approaching. A group of media organizations filed a lawsuit to challenge the law, arguing it was unconstitutionally vague and a violation of due process rights. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction blocking the state from enforcing the law. 

The state appealed that ruling to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the injunction. The Seventh Circuit first rejected the state's argument that the case was moot because the state had amended the buffer law, noting that the state acknowledged that both laws were still in effect. Second, the Seventh Circuit held that the media organization plaintiffs had standing to challenge the law. As to the substance of the challenge, the Court determined that the buffer law was "susceptible to arbitrary enforcement" and was, therefore, unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit noted that the law provides no guidance to the officer in determining whether a "do not approach" order should be issued in the first place, making the law subject to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. As a result, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's issuance of an injunction prohibiting the state from enforcing the buffer law. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. v. Rokita, et al

Tuesday, August 12, 2025

No Standing to Challenge County Approval of Rodeos


A county was sued by an individual and two animal rights groups challenging the county's approval of temporary use permits for rodeos. Specifically, the plaintiffs had filed appeals with the county zoning board of appeals which they argued the county did not allow to proceed or canceled as moot. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved" by the county's approval of the temporary use permits for the rodeos in order to satisfy the standing requirement to appeal the county's decisions. 

The case was appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal. Specifically, the court held that to be "aggrieved" to appeal the county's decision, a plaintiff needed to be more than curious or concerned about the outcome and instead needed to possess a personal claim, status, or right and a distinct injury that can be fairly traced to the defendant's conduct. In this case, the Court rejected the individual plaintiff's argument that he had standing because he suffered an "aesthetic injury," finding that an aesthetic injury alone is not sufficient to satisfy standing. The Court also rejected the organizations' argument that they had associational standing for the same reason. Finally, the Court rejected organizational standing because plaintiffs did not establish that the county impaired the organizations' services or daily operations. 

Because none of the plaintiffs could establish they were "aggrieved" by the county's approval of the temporary use permits for the rodeos, they did not have standing and the Appellate Court held that the case was properly dismissed. Humane Farming Ass'n et al., v. Boone County Board, et al.

Monday, August 11, 2025

Seventh Circuit Dismisses ADA Challenge to Local Zoning Regulations


The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a lawsuit brought against a municipality that sought to compel the municipality to issue a letter of zoning compliance for an addiction treatment center. Chosen Consulting, LLC v. Town Council of Highland.

After a change in ownership, a healthcare facility sought approvals to operate a treatment facility for patients suffering from addiction-related disorders. As part of the state licensing process, the facility was required to obtain a letter of zoning compliance from the town before it could receive a state license required to operate. Town officials informed the facility it would need a zoning variance to operate the facility. The facility never applied for the required variance, and town officials refused to issue the letter of zoning compliance requested by the facility. The facility sued the town claiming the town’s zoning regulations discriminated against disabled individuals. In its lawsuit, the facility sought an injunction from the court to order the town to stop obstructing the facility from treating addiction patients and compel the town to issue a letter of zoning compliance.

The district court ruled for the town and dismissed the facility’s lawsuit. Because the facility failed to apply for the required zoning variance, the court ruled the facility could not bring a lawsuit in federal court until it obtained a final zoning decision from the town on the desired change in use to operate the treatment facility.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit held that a lawsuit challenging a local zoning decision and seeking equitable relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act cannot be brought in federal court until a municipality has made a final, conclusive decision on an application for zoning relief. Since the facility never applied for a variance under the town’s zoning regulations, the court ruled the facility could not bring a lawsuit in federal court because there had been no final decision on the proposed change in use.

Post Authored by Tyler Smith & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink 

Friday, August 8, 2025

Quorum Forum Podcast Re-Release: Tips for Newly Elected Officials


To celebrate the release of Ancel Glink's 2025 Newly Elected Officials Guide, we are re-releasing one of our most popular podcast episodes: Tips for Newly Elected Officials!

The Quorum Forum hotline is open and Ancel Glink attorneys called with their tips and congratulations for newly and not-so-newly elected local government officials in Illinois. Adam SimonErin MonfortiDerke PriceJulie Tappendorf, and Dan Bolin shared helpful tips on local government meetings, public comment, working with staff, and more! 

Thursday, August 7, 2025

Appellate Court Rules in Favor of Wind Farm Developer


An Illinois municipality enacted a zoning regulation that restricted the generating power of wind energy conversion systems. A wind farm developer that sought to construct a wind farm on land outside the municipality but within 1.5 miles of its limits sued the municipality, claiming the zoning regulation was constitutionally invalid and outside the scope of the municipality's authority. The trial court ruled in favor of the municipality, but the Appellate Court reversed in Hickory Wind, LLC v. Village of Cedar Point.

After a municipality adopted a zoning regulation that prohibited any wind energy conversion structure or wind turbine designed to generate more than 120% of the electricity demand for the parcel on which it is located in the municipality and in the area within 1.5 miles of the municipality, a wind farm developer (Hickory Wind, LLC) filed a lawsuit challenging the regulation. The trial court found in favor of the municipality, holding that Hickory Wind failed to offer evidence that the zoning regulation exceeded the municipality's authority or was constituted impermissible exclusionary zoning, and that any "as-applied" challenge was not yet ripe. That ruling was appealed.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the ruling in favor of the municipality and ruled in favor of Hickory Wind on its "exclusionary zoning" claim. The Appellate Court noted that a zoning ordinance is "impermissibly exclusionary if the affected activity is effectively prohibited anywhere within the municipal limits." In this case, the Appellate Court determined that the zoning regulation on wind farms was not a "mere limitation" or restriction, but an outright ban. The Court acknowledged that municipalities have the authority to place reasonable limitations on things like height, blade length, tower density, and the like but that a regulation that restricts energy generation in such a way that it renders commercial wind power economically impossible is "both a violation of public policy and is also, in effect, an unauthorized ban." Because the municipality was non-home rule, it had to rely on statutory authority to regulate and the Court held that state law permitted regulation, but did not expressly authorize municipalities to ban commercial windmills. The Court declined to address the constitutional arguments since it resolved the case on non-constitutional grounds. 

There was a dissenting opinion in the case that would have deferred to the municipality on its own zoning regulations because state law specifically permits regulations of wind farms and no regulatory scheme preempts the municipality's zoning ordinance. The dissent also would have acknowledged the "potential impact that proposed 17 650-feet-tall windmills (taller than the St. Louis Arch) will necessarily have on the value of nearby homes and the possible chill they may place on subsequent residential and commercial development."




Wednesday, August 6, 2025

Illinois Governor Signed a Number of Bills on August 1st


The Illinois Governor signed a number of bills into law on Friday, August 1st, including the following that affect local governments:

HB 42 - Authorizes library boards to charge nonresident library fees on a quarterly or biannual basis, rather than in one lump sum.

HB 1910 - Requires libraries to maintain a supply of opioid antagonists and have at least one employee trained to identify the signs of opioid overdose present at the library during operating hours to administer an antagonist. Effective January 1, 2026. As we have reported previously, this bill only amends the Local Library Act and does not amend the Library District Act.

HB 2336 - Amends the Fire Protection District Act and the Illinois Municipal Code to authorize fire districts and municipalities to charge reasonable fees from assisted living or nursing home facilities for lift-assist services. Those fees cannot exceed the actual personnel and equipment costs for all services rendered in connection with the lift-assist service. Effective January 1, 2026.

SB 1701 - Modifies the definition of "supervisor" for police officers. Effective July 1, 2026.

SB 1195 - Amends the Illinois Police Training Act to require instruction for probationary law enforcement officers on trauma-informed programs, procedures, and practices. Effective January 1, 2026.

HB 32 - Amends the Township Code to permit a temporary deputy township supervisor to administer a township's general assistance program and allows township parks and recreation departments to employ minors for youth sports activities.

HB 1367 - Amends provisions of the Township Code to modify a township's use and disposition of open spaces. Effective January 1, 2026.

SB 1612 - Raises the competitive bid threshold to $60,000 for the purchase of supplies or materials for park districts, conservation districts, and forest preserve districts (competitive bids for "work," as defined by the statute, remains at $30,000).SB 1380 - Authorizes counties and municipalities to use a state or locally-owned utility pole and public right of way for public safety purposes. Effective January 1, 2026.

SB 2285 - Amends the Vehicle Code to update the definition of bicycle to include low-speed electric bikes. Effective January 1, 2026. 

Tuesday, August 5, 2025

Seventh Circuit Finds University's Social Media Page to be a Public Forum and its "Off Topic" Comment Rule Unconstitutional


We reported previously about a Wisconsin federal district court case that determined that a University social media page was a non-public forum, and ruled against a former student who challenged the University's deletion of her comments from the University's accounts. That 2022 ruling had been appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which just recently issued an opinion reversing the district court and finding that the University's social media page was a limited public forum, and the University's actions violated the former student's free speech rights. Krasno v. Mnookin (7th Cir. August 1, 2025). 

The University of Wisconsin-Madison operates Facebook and Instagram pages where it communicates with students, faculty, and the general public. The University moderates its social media accounts in several ways, including hiding or deleting comments the University finds to be "off-topic," and using a "keyword filter" that hides comments that include words or phrases the University includes in the filter, such as "lab," "animal testing," "kill animals," and others. The University also turns off comments on certain posts to prevent users from commenting. A former student who worked in the primate testing center of the University sued the University after she claims her comments were automatically hidden or deleted by the University in violation of her First Amendment rights. In 2022, a federal district court ruled that the University's social media pages were "nonpublic forums" because the University had, by policy or practice, restricted comments by banning "off topic" comments, so the University's actions did not violate the former student's free speech rights.

The former student appealed, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court's ruling that the University's social media pages were non-public forums. Instead, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the former student on several grounds, holding that the interactive spaces on the University's social media pages (i.e., the comment section) were limited public forums and the University's "off topic" comment rule as applied to the former student was unconstitutional. 

The Seventh Circuit determined that the interactive space on the University's social media pages (i.e., the space where private users can post comments) was not government speech nor a traditional public forum, nor a nonpublic forum. Instead, the Seventh Circuit held that the interactive space on the University's social media pages was a "limited public forum" because it was opened up for the purpose of allowing the discussion of certain topics. The Seventh Circuit likened the University's social media page to the City of Boston's flag pole which the U.S. Supreme Court had found to be a public forum because Boston had opened its pole up to private groups to display their flags. Here, the Seventh Circuit found that the University opened its comment section on its social media pages to speech by private users.  

In a limited public forum, governments can establish restrictions, but those restrictions must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The Seventh Circuit applied that test to the University's "off topic" comment rule and found it to be unconstitutional because the University's use of a filtering program to hide comments that included certain words and phrases relating to animal testing was unreasonable and constituted viewpoint discrimination against the former student's anti-animal testing and pro-animal rights viewpoint. The Seventh Circuit also found the University's "off topic" social media statement to be too open-ended, inflexible, and vague, and the University's enforcement to be too discretionary to survive a First Amendment analysis. As a result, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling in favor of the University, and ordered the district court to enter judgment in favor of the former student on her First Amendment claims.

There was a dissenting opinion that would have found the University's social media pages to be a nonpublic forum, similar to the National Portrait Gallery or the letters section of the University's "On Wisconsin" magazine. 

The Seventh Circuit's ruling that the University's social media pages are public forums is consistent with other federal courts of appeals that have analyzed similar challenges. We noted in our post about the district court ruling that we thought the district court's finding that the University's social media accounts were nonpublic forums was an outlier, and it is not surprising that the Seventh Circuit ruling last week was more inline with those other rulings. Governments who enforce an "off topic" comment rule may want to consult with their legal counsel to advise them whether this ruling might have an impact on their own social media moderation activities.

Monday, August 4, 2025

Appellate Court Upholds Dismissal of Residents' Case Against Village for Flooding


Homeowners sued a municipality, claiming that the municipality was responsible for recurrent, temporary flooding in their basements over the course of several years. Specifically, they claimed that the flooding violated the "takings clause" of the U.S. Constitution and constituted a nuisance and trespass to their properties, and that the municipality should be held liable because the municipality approved the development in a flood zone. The municipality filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that their claims were not timely brought and did not state a valid cause of action. The trial court agreed, and dismissed the case.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the homeowners' case against the municipality. First, the Court determined that the complaint did not include any allegations establishing that the municipality caused the recurrent, temporary flooding of the homeowners' basements. The Court noted that the homeowners did not claim the municipality constructed a structure that altered the flow of the river or caused the properties to be flooded, nor did the municipality create the rain, river, or floodplain. Instead, the Court found that the municipality did nothing more than allow the homeowners and their predecessors to "act upon their own choices" in purchasing a home in this development. As a result, the "takings" claim was properly dismissed by the trial court.

Second, the Court determined that the homeowners did not allege that their flooded basements resulted from the municipality's use of its own property, so the nuisance claim was also properly dismissed.

Third, the Court held that the flooding of the homes was caused not by the municipality's approval of construction plans, but by natural processes such as substantial rainfall, porous soil, and a shallow water table. As a result, the homeowners' trespass claim was also properly dismissed.

In sum, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court properly dismissed the homeowners' lawsuit because it did not state a valid cause of action against the municipality. Billie v. Village of Channahon.

Thursday, July 31, 2025

Residents of Mobile Home Park Entitled to Injunctive Relief for Water Shut Off


An Illinois Appellate Court recently ordered a city to restore water service to a customer whose water had been shut off for nonpayment. Holmberg v. Kewanee Partners.

Residents in a mobile home park pay a monthly fee to the mobile home park owner for their water service, along with their rent payments. The owner of the mobile home park was then responsible for paying the water bill to the city for the entirety of the mobile home park's water service, which was served by a consolidated water service line. The mobile home park became the subject of a foreclosure action, and the park was placed in receivership. While in receivership, the city issued a water bill to the mobile home park for $500,000, reflecting delinquent payments for water service to the mobile home park and other properties. The city's notice stated that water service would be shut off to individual mobile homes in eh park if payment was not received by June 3rd. A few days prior to that deadline, one of the residents of the mobile home park filed a lawsuit against the city, claiming that terminating her water service would violate her constitutional rights. She also filed a request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop the city from shutting off water to her mobile home. Other residents joined the lawsuit.

The trial court granted the original plaintiff's TRO, stopping the city from shutting off water to the residents' mobile homes. However, the trial court denied relief to some of the other plaintiff-residents in the mobile home park, and one of those residents appealed to the Appellate Court.

The Illinois Appellate Court determined that the trial court should have granted injunctive relief to other plaintiff-residents whose water service was disconnected. In this situation, the court determined that the mobile home park owner was the party responsible to pay for water service, and the residents who filed a lawsuit against the city had the right to receive water from the city while the lawsuit proceeded. The court rejected the city's argument that the residents whose water was already disconnected were not entitled to relief. The court also noted that the residents had established that they were making payments for water service to the receiver. 


Monday, July 28, 2025

Courts Decide Firefighter Pension Cases


Two on-duty disability pension cases were decided by the Illinois Appellate Courts recently, with one court finding in favor of the firefighter-applicant and the other for the Pension Board.

In Boyles v. Bolingbrook Firefighters Pension Fund, a firefighter filed an application for on-duty disability benefits relating to a back injury. The firefighter claimed he injured his lower back while helping to lift an injured person on a stretcher. The Pension Board determined that the firefighter was disabled, but did not qualify for a line-of-duty disability pension. On appeal, the trial court upheld the Pension Board's decision but the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and sent the case back to the Pension Board to award the firefighter a line-of-duty disability pension. The Appellate Court found the testimony of certain medical professionals that determined that the injury was caused by the performance of his firefighter duties to be more persuasive than the testimony of those medical professionals that found otherwise.

In Witteman v. Brookfield Firefighters Pension Fund, a firefighter filed an application for on-duty disability benefits relating to a back injury. He claimed he injured his back while helping lift an overweight patient. After conducting a hearing, the Pension Board denied the on-duty disability pension, citing to various inconsistencies in the firefighter-applicant's testimony about the incident, including that he changed his story as to how the injury occurred, his failure to report the injury to coworkers, and his evasive demeanor at the Pension Board hearing. The Pension Board also found testimony of his coworkers to be credible to support a finding that the firefighter's injury did not occur as he claimed. On appeal, both the trial court and Appellate Court upheld the Pension Board's denial of the line-of-duty pension. While the Appellate Court acknowledged that there was some inconsistency in coworkers testimony, they noted that all of his coworkers testified that the firefighter-applicant did not take part in lifting the patient onto a stretcher to transport him to the ambulance as he claimed.


Wednesday, July 23, 2025

Appellate Court Reverses Dismissal of Challenge to Rental Inspection Ordinance


A municipality adopted a rental ordinance that requires annual inspections of rental properties. The ordinance requires landlords to conduct background checks for any new adult tenant and provide proof of that at each inspection. It also requires landlords to incorporate a "crime free agreement" as an addendum to each lease. A landlord of a rental property with 21 units, as well as a tenant in that property, filed a lawsuit against the municipality to challenge the ordinance. Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that the annual inspections were an unconstitutional warrantless and unreasonable search and that the background check requirement violated rights to privacy and equal protection, among other claims.

The municipality filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, which the trial court granted. The trial court found that the defendants' facial challenge to the ordinance failed because they did not adequately allege that warrantless searches took place. The trial court also determined that the municipality had a legitimate interest in ensuring crime-free neighborhoods and that all landlords and tenants were treated the same, so there was no equal protection violation.

The defendants appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court agreed with the trial court, in part, and upheld the dismissal of the defendants' "facial" challenge to the ordinance. The Court also upheld the dismissal of the defendants' right to privacy challenge to the background check requirement. However, the Appellate Court did not agree with the dismissal of the defendants' "as applied" challenge to the ordinance, and remanded those claims back to the trial court for further proceedings. The Appellate Court determined that the defendants' raised a viable argument that the ordinance, as enforced, may have violated the defendants' constitutional rights because the municipality imposed fines when an inspection was not allowed, raising potential questions of whether the ordinance enforcement violated constitutional rights against warrantless searches. The Appellate Court did, however note that the defendants would not be entitled to damages under the Tort Immunity Act and any relief they might obtain is limited to declaratory or injunctive relief.

DPH Aurora Properties LLC v. City of Aurora