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Blog comments do not reflect the views or opinions of the Author or Ancel Glink. Some of the content may be considered attorney advertising material under the applicable rules of certain states. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Please read our full disclaimer

Thursday, January 30, 2025

Illinois Supreme Court Dismisses Election Contest Challenge


The Illinois Supreme Court recently issued a new opinion addressing limits on the authority of circuit courts to hear election contest challenges. Ontiveroz v. Khokhar.

After the 2021 election, a candidate for the office of village president challenged the election results after losing the election by two votes. In his petition, the candidate claimed that a disqualified candidate had misled voters about write-in ballots and that several ballots should not have been counted because they did not comply with the Illinois Election Code. 

The circuit court dismissed the candidate's case after finding it lacked jurisdiction to hear the challenge because the candidate did not timely file a verified petition as required by the Election Code for contesting election results. On appeal, an Illinois Appellate Court reversed the dismissal, finding that the Election Code allows subsequent verification of an election contest petition if the petition is initially timely filed, and sent the case back to the circuit court to consider additional jurisdictional issues.

The Appellate Court's ruling was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which upheld the circuit court’s dismissal of the case. The Supreme Court held that circuit courts can only hear election contest cases as permitted by state law, and if a party violates a statute’s filing timelines or substantive requirements, then a court has no authority to hear the case. Since the candidate did not comply with the Election Code provision authorizing judicial review of election contests, the Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the case.

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

Thursday, January 16, 2025

Guidance on New Rental Use Tax Amendment


A new law went into effect on January 1, 2025, that amended the state's Use Tax Act (Act) regarding taxation of leases of personal property. This post explains how this Act may affect units of local government.

The major change to the Act is a new provision that requires the taxation of leases between a retailer and consumer. "Lease" is now defined in the Act as:

a transfer of the possession or control of, the right to possess or control, or a license to use, but not title to, tangible personal property for a fixed or indeterminate term for consideration, regardless of the name by which the transaction is called.

Prior to this legislative change, Illinois did not impose a tax on leases of personal property. Instead, the State would tax the retailer for their initial purchase of tangible personal property (TPP), and then the retailer could lease the TPP tax-free. The amendment to the Act flips this scenario. Now, a retailer does not need to pay tax on the initial purchase of TPP but will have to pay use tax on the lease of that TPP.

For example, it used to be that a retailer would purchase a set of golf clubs and pay sales tax on that purchase. Then, when the retailer rented those golf clubs out to consumers, that rental transaction was not taxed. As of January 1st, that same retailer will not pay sales tax on the purchase of those golf clubs they intend to lease but will pay a use tax each time they lease those clubs.

The amendments to the Act have raised some questions which are addressed below:

Are units of local government subject to the Act?

Yes. The Act applies to all persons (including public corporations) who engage in the business of retail leases, and that would include units of local government that lease out personal property to others.

What is TPP?

TPP is not explicitly defined by the Act. However, Illinois courts have defined TPP to mean things that are seen, weighed, measured, and that are capable of being possessed. Examples of TPP include objects that consumers possess and/or use such as paddle boards, rackets, balls, shovels, lawnmowers, chairs, bicycles, scooters, iPads, and other physical items. The Department of Revenue has also provided some examples on its website here.

Does the Act apply to leases of real estate?

No, the Act applies to leases of personal property, not real property or real estate. The Illinois Department of Revenue has published guidance stating that real estate is not TPP for the purpose of the Retailers Occupation Tax. Also see DOR websiteBased on how courts have interpreted TPP in applying similar taxes, the use tax would not apply to real estate, only personal property. Therefore, the rental of a pool, cabin, cabana, course, court, banquet space, office, meeting room, or other physical space should not be subject to the Act. The Department of Revenue may issue guidance to clarify this issue as this has been a frequent question since the Act took effect.

Are there other exceptions to what is considered TPP?

Yes. The definition of TPP under the Act expressly exempts motor vehicles and watercraft. For the purposes of the Act, motor vehicles and watercrafts mean a machine that is required to be registered with an agency of Illinois. 

You can read the Department of Revenue's bulletin on this new law here. If the Department of Revenue does issue additional guidance on this legislative amendment, we will update Municipal Minute. 

Post Authored by Daniel Lev & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

Tuesday, January 14, 2025

Join Ancel Glink at the IAPD/IPRA Conference Jan 23-25, 2025


It's almost time for the IAPD/IPRA annual conference which takes place January 23 - 25, 2025, at the Hyatt Regency, Chicago. Ancel Glink attorneys will be speaking at 13 sessions this year, so if you are attending the conference, please come find us!

Date

Time

Session

Speakers

Thursday, 1/23/2025

10AM – 11AM

Session 112

Real Estate 101: What You Need to Know About Acquiring, Selling and Using Property

Scott Puma and David Silverman, FAICP (Ancel Glink)

 

Thursday, 1/23/2025

1:30PM – 2:30PM

Session 120

Can We and Should We Have Video Surveillance in Parks and Facilities?

Megan Mack and Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink)

Thursday, 1/23/2025

3PM-4PM

Session 133

Large Event, Festival and Parade Security

Derke Price (Ancel Glink) and Chief Steven Schindlbeck (Naperville Park District)

 

Thursday, 1/23/2025

3PM-4PM

Session 116

Social Media & The Law: Facebook? Instagram? X?

Julie Tappendorf (Ancel Glink)

 

Friday, 1/24/2025

8:30AM-9:30AM

Session 110

Legal/Legislative  I

Derke Price (Ancel Glink) and Jason Anselment (IAPD)

 

Friday, 1/24/2025

10AM – 11AM

Session 123

Direct & Deliberate: How to Successfully PASS a Referendum

Keri-Lyn Krafthefer (Ancel Glink), Lauren Raspanti (Lemont Park District), Louise Egofske (Lemont Park District) and Paul Hanley (Beyond Your Base)

Friday, 1/24/2025

3:30PM-4:30PM

Session 119

Regulating Controversial Park Activities

Megan Mack, Erin Monforti and Tyler Smith (Ancel Glink)


Saturday, 1/25/2025

10:30AM-11:30AM

Session 117

Having a Healthy and Prosperous Relationship with your Executive Director

Derke Price (Ancel Glink)

Saturday, 1/25/2025

10:30AM-11:30AM

Session 134

So You're Thinking About Going Solar

Adam Simon (Ancel Glink), Karen Larson (Park Ridge Park District) and Shawn Ajazi (Progressive Business Solutions)

Saturday, 1/25/2025

12:30PM-1:30PM

Session 122

Affiliates: A Blessing or a Curse?

Derke Price (Ancel Glink) 

Saturday, 1/25/2025

12:30PM-1:30PM

Session 118

Park District Finance - It's Not Intuitive

Adam Simon (Ancel Glink) and Mari-Lynn Peters (Park District of Highland Park)

Saturday, 1/25/2025

12:30PM-1:30PM

Session 135

Crossing the Line:  What Park Districts Need to Know about the Migrant Crisis

Keri-Lyn Krafthefer (Ancel Glink)

Saturday, 1/25/2025

2PM-3PM

Session 140

Board Policy Manuals: Why They Are Essential For Your Agency

Scott Puma and Erin Monforti (Ancel Glink)


Friday, January 3, 2025

PAC Finds Public Body Violated FOIA in Denying Request for Public Record


In its last binding opinion of 2024, the Public Access Counselor of the Illinois Attorney General's Office (PAC) found a public body in violation of FOIA, rejecting all of the exemptions relied upon by the public body in denying the request. PAC Binding Op. 24-016

A requestor submitted a FOIA request to a City Community Commission for Public Safety and Accountability (Commission) seeking a copy of a letter sent to the Commission by former and current Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) employees requesting the Commission to investigate a COPA administrator. The Commission denied the request in its entirety, citing several FOIA exemptions. After the requestor filed a request for review with the PAC challenging the denial, the PAC issued a binding opinion finding that the Commission improperly denied the FOIA request.

First, the PAC rejected the Commission's reliance on the "invasion of personal privacy exemption" of Section 7(1)(c) of FOIA. The PAC determined that the public's considerable interest in disclosure of the requested record (which involved allegations of impropriety by a COPA administrator in performing their public duties and the abilities of other public employees to perform their public duties) outweighed any privacy interests involved in the letter because the letter did not contain any highly personal details about private affairs. 

Next, the PAC rejected the Commission's reliance on the "ongoing law enforcement investigation" exemption of Section 7(1)(d)(iv) of FOIA, finding that the Commission is not a law enforcement agency, and that the Commission did not possess the letter as part of its participation in a law enforcement investigation or proceeding.

The PAC also concluded that the letter was not exempt under Section 7(1)(d)(vi) of FOIA, because the Commission did not demonstrate how disclosing the letter would endanger anyone’s life or physical safety.

The PAC further found that the Commission did not demonstrate that the letter fell under the "deliberative privilege" exemption of Section 7(1)(f) of FOIA. The PAC noted that the letter was an unsolicited communication prepared by employees of a separate public body and third-party former employees who were not involved in a joint decision-making process with the Commission and, therefore, it was not issued as part of the Commission’s predecisional intra- or inter-agency deliberative process, so disclosing the letter would not expose the contents of any Commission deliberations.

The PAC also rejected the Commission’s argument that the letter was prepared and compiled with respect to an internal audit that would be exempt under Section 7(1)(m) of FOIA, noting that the letter was issued by third-parties independent of any Commission audit, and the Commission could not transform a letter created outside the context of an audit into exempt audit material just because the Commission might consider the letter when potentially auditing COPA.

Finally, the PAC rejected the Commission’s argument that the letter was protected under the employee grievance adjudication process protected by Section 7(1)(n) of FOIA, finding that the Commission did not demonstrate that the subject of the letter was being adjudicated as an employee grievance and, in any event, records created well before any adjudication takes places are not exempt under Section 7(1)(n). 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

Thursday, January 2, 2025