Annexation Agreement Binds Successor Owner of Part of Property

Annexation Agreement Binds Successor Owner of Part of Property

  Thursday, April 28, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois appellate court recently issued an opinion about enforcement of an annexation agreement against a successor owner that will be of interest to Illinois municipalities. Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co.

In 2003, the Village entered into an annexation agreement with the owner at the time of about 115 acres of land that was unincorporated. The agreement was for a 20 year term, and stated that it was binding on the "successor owners of record of the land which is the subject of the agreement." The agreement provided for the annexation of the property into the Village and future residential development. The agreement required the owner to construct certain public improvements on the property, including roadways, and to provide the Village with a letter of credit to secure construction of the public improvements. 

In 2011, the owner sold 41 of the 82 platted lots to Plank. In 2017, Plank sold 34 lots to KPHC (the defendant). In 2019, the Village sent letters to KPHC requesting that it deposit a letter of credit in an amount proportionate to the number of lots it owned in the development in order to secure the completion of the roadways. When KPHC did not provide the security, the Village sued, arguing that KPHC was in breach of the annexation agreement. KPHC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because it did not own the entirety of the property that was subject to the annexation agreement, it was not responsible for the obligations under that agreement. The trial court ruled in KPHC's favor and dismissed the Village's lawsuit, holding that the obligations did not "run" to a successor owner unless that successor owner purchased the entire subdivision. The trial court also awarded fees to KPHC under a fee-shifting provision in the annexation agreement.

The Village appealed, and the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the Village's case against KPHC. First, the appellate court noted that the agreement itself makes it clear that the agreement "runs with the land" and is binding on successor owners. The appellate court rejected KPHC's argument that because the agreement didn't specify that it was binding on subsequent owners who only purchase a portion of the property, that it didn't extend to KPHC. The court found the Village's use of a "proportionate responsibility" analysis for apportioning responsibility for construction of public improvements and the provision of security for those improvements to be a common and workable scenario and consistent with the language in the annexation agreement that contemplated phasing of the development. 

In sum, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the Village's case against KPHC and remanded it back for further proceedings. 

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Appellate Court Rules on Local Government COVID Workplace Policies

Appellate Court Rules on Local Government COVID Workplace Policies

  Wednesday, April 27, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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The Fourth District Court of Appeals recently issued two decisions upholding workplace policies requiring COVID-19 vaccination and/or testing for public employees.  

In Graham v. Pekin Fire Department, several current and former employees asked a Sangamon County court to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring various public employers, Governor Pritzker, and the Illinois Department of Public Health from enforcing a workplace policy requiring all employees either to be vaccinated against COVID-19 or, alternatively, to undergo regular testing for COVID-19. The employees maintained that the vaccination and testing policy was invalid because only the IDPH has the authority to quarantine people and require them to be vaccinated or tested for contagious diseases, and that the vaccination and testing policy was discriminatory under section 5 of the Right of Conscience Act. The circuit court denied the employees' TRO petition.

After the employees appealed, the appellate court upheld the denial of the employees request for a TRO. The appellate court noted that the Illinois General Assembly recently enacted a statute that made it clear that it was not a violation of the Conscience Act for an employer to take measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The court also concluded that employers had the power to enact workplace safety rules, including the vaccination and testing requirement.

In Allen v. North Mac School District 34, a school district announced a policy in October 2021, stating that employees who did not provide proof of COVID-19 vaccination or comply with required weekly COVID-19 testing could be deemed ineligible to work and placed on a nondisciplinary administrative leave until the teacher complied with the policy, or subject to disciplinary action if a teacher failed or refused to comply. In March 2022, educators in various school districts filed an emergency motion for a TRO against numerous school districts and various state agencies and officials, including Governor Pritzker. The educators argued that (1) school districts lacked authority to require teachers to get a COVID-19 vaccination or submit to testing and (2) educators could not be compelled to take a COVID-19 vaccine or be subjected to weekly testing without first being afforded their right to due process. In April 2022, the Sangamon County circuit court ruled in favor of the educators and issued a TRO to stop enforcement of the policies.

On appeal, the appellate court vacated the TRO issued by the circuit court for several reasons. Specifically, although Section 2 of the Public Health Act affords an individual the right to due process if he or she does not consent to an order from the IDPH or a certified local health department, the court clarified that this case does not involve a situation where the IDPH or a certified local health department has ordered the educators to do anything. The appellate court also noted that the Act does not require a public school district to obtain a court order before it can place a teacher on unpaid administrative leave for refusing to get vaccinated or tested on a weekly basis. Instead, the court held that the school districts adopted lawful and reasonable workplace policies designed to protect students and school employees, and nothing in these policies restricted the educators’ activities, movement, or interactions anywhere outside of the workplace.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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IL Supreme Court Narrows Absolute Immunity for Injuries Resulting from Escaping Prisoners

IL Supreme Court Narrows Absolute Immunity for Injuries Resulting from Escaping Prisoners

  Tuesday, April 26, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Supreme Court recently issued an opinion limiting the application of absolute immunity for local public entities and public employees under Section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act (Act) as it relates to prisoners in custody. Robinson v. Village of Sauk Village. 

Robinson filed a complaint against two municipalities and individual police officers (collectively, Defendants) to recover for injuries he suffered after he was hit by a vehicle that had been fleeing the Defendant police officers. Police had received a stolen vehicle report, located the vehicle in motion, and attempted to stop it with emergency lights. The vehicle fled at a high rate of speed through multiple jurisdictions, committed multiple traffic violations and crossed into Indiana before stopping in a parking lot. The lead officer positioned his squad car perpendicular to the vehicle’s driver door and exited drawing his firearm on the suspect. The lead officer approached the vehicle but remained approximately 10 feet away. The suspect remained in the closed vehicle and ignored orders to exit. Instead the suspect repeatedly shouted, “shoot me” and pointed a bottle and a small black object at the lead officer. Notably, the officers did not block the vehicle or otherwise directly limit or control the suspect’s movement. Unrestricted, the suspect drove away at a high rate of speed into Illinois with officers in pursuit. During the pursuit, the suspect struck and severely injured Robinson in an intersection cross walk. The suspect continued to flee to Indiana where he was fatally shot by Indiana police officers.

The circuit court ruled in favor of the Defendants in granting their motion for summary judgment, finding Defendants were immune from liability because the suspect was "in custody" for purposes of Section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act when officers pointed weapons at him in the parking lot and ordered him to show his hands. Section 4-106(b) of the Act provides, in part, “[n]either a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for *** [a]ny injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner.” The Act defines “prisoner” as a person held in custody. 

The appellate court disagreed with the circuit court, holding that the suspect was not an “escaped or escaping prisoner” as required for absolute immunity under the Act. The appellate court further noted custody is not defined by the Act but a mere show of authority by police officers is insufficient to establish physical custody. Because the suspect’s freedom of movement was not controlled by the officers, he was not in custody before he fled the parking lot. As such, the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.

On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, Defendants argued that the demonstration of authority by police officers when they drew their weapons and gave orders in the parking lot was sufficient to establish custody under the Act. Robinson countered by arguing that a show of authority does not establish custody under the Act and that previous Supreme Court case law defined custody as control over a suspect’s freedom of movement. Robinson further argued that if a mere show of authority is sufficient to establish custody under the Act, absolute immunity would be invoked every time a police officer tells a person to stop or activates emergency equipment.

The Court looked to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “custody” which could mean actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or physical, of imprisoning or taking manual possession. Without determining how broad the term custody may be, the Court concluded the act of directly controlling and limiting someone’s freedom of movement, i.e. being placed in a squad car, was custody within the meaning of the Act. Further, the Court concluded the phrase “held in custody” requires some direct restriction or control of a person’s freedom of movement to a particular place for at least a limited period of time. Moreover, the term prisoner refers to a person subject to some level of physical confinement.

Here, the suspect was partially surrounded by 6 officers with weapons drawn. However, the suspect remained in the vehicle with the engine running and ignored commands. The officers attempted to restrain and control the suspects movements but failed because they did not physically block his ability to move to a particular place. In conclusion, the Court agreed with the appellate court that a mere show of authority is insufficient to establish a person is “held in custody” under the Act. Particularly in this case, the failure of the police officers to block the suspect’s freedom of movement with their police vehicles or otherwise control his movement meant that the absolute immunity provision of the Act did not apply since the suspect was not an escaped or escaping prisoner. Until a person’s freedom of movement to a particular place is directly limited or controlled by law enforcement, they are not an “escaped or escaping prisoner” within the meaning of the Act to trigger absolute immunity. In short, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that summary judgment should not have been granted to Defendants, and the Court remanded the case back for further proceedings.

Post Authored by Bryan Strand, Ancel Glink

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Court Addresses Juvenile Records in FOIA Case

Court Addresses Juvenile Records in FOIA Case

  Monday, April 25, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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A requester submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Police Department (CPD) asking for records related to a 2019 officer-involved shooting of a juvenile. CPD denied the request, arguing that the juvenile law enforcement records were specifically prohibited from disclosure under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (JCA). The requestor subseuqently filed a lawsuit alleging that CPD had violated FOIA by failing to provide the responsive juvenile law enforcement records. The trial court ruled in favor of the requestor, finding that the JCA’s privacy protections for juvenile law enforcement records ended upon a minor’s death, meaning the requester was entitled to the disclosure of those records.

On appeal, the Appellate Court disagreed and reversed the trial court ruling, finding that the court's finding that the JCA’s privacy provisions do not apply to law enforcement records of a deceased minor was incorrect. Calloway v. Chicago Police Department. The appellate court noted that the JCA does not contain any language explicitly or implicitly limiting the scope of these protections to records involving a deceased minor. As a result, the appellate court held that these records cannot be disclosed to unauthorized parties without good cause and an order from the juvenile court.

The appellate court also held that the CPD failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the requested records fell with the scope of the asserted FOIA exemption, because the CPD’s affidavit in support of its claimed exemptions was brief and conclusory, and failed to provide the detailed justification required to show why the exemptions applied. The appellate court then remanded the case back to the trial court to determine what, if any, responsive records are exempt from disclosure under FOIA and which records are subject to disclosure.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Supreme Court Issues Decision in Challenge to Austin's Sign Regulations

Supreme Court Issues Decision in Challenge to Austin's Sign Regulations

  Thursday, April 21, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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The US Supreme Court just issued an opinion in a case challenging the City of Austin's sign regulations. This case overturns the Court of Appeals ruling finding the City's sign regulations to be unconstitutional and seems to offer welcome relief to municipalities struggling to regulate off-premise signs after the Court's 2015 ruling in Reed v. Gilbert. City of Austin v. Reagan. 

Like many other municipalities, the City of Austin, Texas has enacted sign regulations that restrict off-premises signs. Under the City's sign code, no new off-premises sign can be installed, and existing off-premises signs are "grandfathered," meaning they can remain in place but cannot be altered in a manner that would increase their nonconformity. Two billboard companies challenged the City's sign regulations, claiming that the City's distinction between off-premises signs and on-premises signs is unconstitutional under the First Amendment's free speech clause and the Supreme Court's ruling in Reed.

The District Court held that the City's sign regulations were content-neutral and the distinction between on-premise and off-premise signs satisfied the constitutional standard for content-neutral signs. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that the distinction was content-based because a government official would have to read a sign's message to decide whether a particular sign was off-premise or on-premise. The Court of Appeals then determined that the City's sign regulations did not satisfy the constitutional analysis that applies to content-based signs (strict scrutiny). 

The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court overturned the Court of Appeals ruling, rejecting the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Reed to mean that a sign regulation is "content-based" if an official has to read the sign to make a determination on whether a sign fell under the off-premise or on-premise regulation. The majority opinion found that interpretation of Reed to be "too extreme." The Court acknowledged that some evaluation of a sign's message may be necessary in applying sign regulations and that evaluation alone does not turn a content-neutral sign into a content-based sign that requires a stricter scrutiny for a constitutional analysis. 

The Supreme Court distinguished this challenge to the one at issue in Reed, finding that the challenged City of Austin sign regulations do not single out any topic or subject matter for differential treatment. Instead, the Court found that the challenged sign regulations distinguish based on location, which was more in the nature of a time, place, or manner restriction rather than a content or message restriction. The Court also acknowledged the Court's previous decisions that have upheld the distinction between on- and off-premise signs, including restrictions on billboards.

The Court did not make a determination as to whether the challenged sign regulations survive the "content-neutral" analysis and instead sent it back to the lower courts for application of the proper constitutional test for content-neutral sign challenges. 

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PAC Orders Release of Disciplinary Complaints in 5th Binding Opinion

PAC Orders Release of Disciplinary Complaints in 5th Binding Opinion

  Thursday, April 14, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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In November 2021, a reporter submitted a FOIA request to the City of Chicago Department of Human Resources (Department) seeking disciplinary records and complaints of racism, harassment, and discrimination filed against City employees. The Department released some redacted records, but withheld the remaining records citing the personal privacy and deliberative process exemptions. After the reporter appealed the partial denial to the PAC, the PAC issued its fifth binding opinion of the year concluding that the Department violated FOIA by improperly withholding responsive records. PAC Op. 22-005.

Specifically, the PAC found that disclosing most of the withheld complaints would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of any City employee's right to personal privacy because the public has a significant interest in obtaining information that sheds light on claims of misconduct by public employees. The PAC also noted that complaints alleging workplace misconduct by City employees, even if the complaints are later deemed unfounded, still pertain to the public duties of public employees and, as a result, disclosing these complaints would not result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to the City employees.

Additionally, the PAC determined that the Department failed to show how the complaints revealed the Department’s predecisional deliberative process. Although complaints may lead to deliberate discussions culminating in final actions, the PAC found that the complaints in this case were not part of a deliberative process because they preceded the decision-making process. The PAC also found that the complaints were factual in nature and purely factual information is not exempt from disclosure under exemption 7(1)(f).

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Appellate Court Directs Trial Court to Review Relocated Witness Records Requested by FOIA

Appellate Court Directs Trial Court to Review Relocated Witness Records Requested by FOIA

  Tuesday, April 05, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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In 2020, an individual submitted a FOIA request to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (SAO) seeking certain information related to victim/witness relocations. In response, the SAO provided certain non-exempt records, but withheld other records based on several asserted FOIA exemptions, including the personal privacy exemption as well as exemptions that apply to criminal and law enforcement records. The requestor sued the SAO claiming that the SAO violated FOIA by failing to prove that the withheld records were exempt from disclosure under the asserted exemptions. The trial court ruled in favor of the SAO, finding that the SAO sufficiently demonstrated that the withheld documents fell within the asserted FOIA exemptions.  

In Fields v. Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, although the appellate court acknowledged that the SAO’s affidavits emphasized the dangers of disclosing victim and witnesses identities, it held that the affidavits failed to demonstrate with reasonably specificity how or why disclosing certain records would lead to disclosing exempt information, (e.g., personally identifying information of witnesses and victims in the relocation program). As a result, the appellate court vacated the trial court's ruling in favor of the SAO and directed the trial court to conduct an "in camera" (private) inspection of the records to determine whether any records fall within the exemptions that were claimed by the SAO. The appellate court also invited the trial court to order the SAO to prepare an index of withheld information, which would assist and expedite the trial court’s review by: (1) detailing the nature or contents of withheld documents without disclosing the information deemed exempt by the SAO; and (2) containing a statement of claimed exemptions for each withheld document.

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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Governor Extends Disaster Declaration for Another 30 Days

Governor Extends Disaster Declaration for Another 30 Days

  Monday, April 04, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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Last Friday, the Governor extended the state disaster proclamation for another 30 days. You can access the updated disaster proclamation here. That means that public bodies can continue to conduct remote or hybrid meetings so long as they (1) make a local determination that a fully in-person meeting is not practical or prudent and (2) follow all of the other remote meeting requirements of section 7(e) of the Open Meetings Act for that meeting.

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Court Interprets Pension Code Provision on Survivor Benefits

Court Interprets Pension Code Provision on Survivor Benefits

  Monday, April 04, 2022    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois appellate court recently interpreted a provision in the Pension Code regarding the timing of receipt of surviving spouse benefits. Thornley v. Board of Trustees of River Forest Police Pension Fund.

A police offer retired in 2015, and then passed away three years later. His spouse applied for surviving benefits under the Pension Code. The Pension Board granted the application, but determined that the spouse was not entitled to benefits immediately because the deceased officer, had he lived, would not have been entitled to benefits until he reached age 60 (he was a deferred pensioner). The spouse sued, claiming that the statutory language stated that she was entitled to benefits "upon his death." The Pension Board argued that the surviving spouse benefits would commence on the date on which the officer would have been entitled to benefits under the Pension Code, which was when he turned 60 years old. Both the trial court and the appellate court agreed with the Pension Board, finding that she was entitled to the same benefits the officer would have been entitled to had he lived. In this case, pension benefits would commence when the officer would have turned 60 years old, and not immeidately upon his death.

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