PAC Finds Village Board's Closed Session Violated OMA

PAC Finds Village Board's Closed Session Violated OMA

  Thursday, April 23, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Illinois Attorney General's Public Access Counselor (PAC) issued its third binding opinion for 2026 finding a village board in violation of the Open Meetings Act relating to a closed session. PAC Op. 26-003.

A sitting trustee on a village board submitted a complaint to the PAC claiming that the village board went into closed session to discuss "personnel issues" but instead discussed outstanding TIF loans. The village filed a response arguing that the board's closed session discussion fell under the "litigation exception" to the OMA, and that the mayor had mispoke in citing the personnel exception. 

The PAC reviewed the village's response, the meeting minutes, and the recording of the closed session. First, the PAC noted that the closed session discussion did not pertain to personnel issues. Further, the PAC stated that even if the board had discussed personnel issues in closed session, a generic reference to "personnel" is not adequate to identify a specific OMA exception. The PAC also found that the board failed to record the board's public vote on the motion in the meeting minutes. As a result, the PAC determined that the village board violated the OMA by not publicly disclosing and recording into the minutes the specific exception authorizing the closed session.

The PAC also rejected the village's argument that the litigation exception applied because litigation was an option for the village in dealing with the oustanding TIF loans. First, the PAC found that the board did not cite to that exception in open session or make the necessary finding in closed session as to why litigation was probable or imminent. Second, the PAC noted that litigation was "merely a distant possibility," which was not sufficient to fall under the probable or imminent litigation exception to the OMA.

The PAC ordered the village board to publicly release its verbatim recording of the meeting as a remedy to the OMA violation.

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Illinois Bill Proposes Regulations for E-Bikes, E-Scooters, and Similar Devices

Illinois Bill Proposes Regulations for E-Bikes, E-Scooters, and Similar Devices

  Wednesday, April 22, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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After Public Act 103-899 was signed into law in August 2024 (regulating low-speed electric bikes), some Illinois local governments adopted a patchwork of regulations governing the operation of low-speed electric bicycles and low-speed electric scooters in their communities. In an effort to promote statewide uniformity, the Illinois General Assembly is considering Senate Bill 3336, which, if passed in both houses, would enact sweeping changes to the authority and scope of local government regulations for these and other devices and vehicles. 

This post analyzes some of most important changes proposed by the bill.

Electric Micromobility Devices (EMDs)

First, SB 3336 would repeal Section 11-1518 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code), and replace it with a new section regulating “electric micromobility devices.” The bill broadly defines an electric micromobility device (EMD) to mean a light-weight, low-speed, electric-powered device primarily used for personal transportation and operated at speeds up to 28 miles per hour (including low and high-speed electric scooters, electric skateboards, and electric unicycles). 

If passed, SB 3336 would generally permit people at least 16 years of age to operate an EMD on any highway, roadway, or bicycle lane/path in Illinois in a manner that does not impede vehicular traffic—but would prohibit their operation on sidewalks, interstate highways, or on highways with a posted speed limit exceeding 35 mph (unless it has a designated bike lane). For EMD’s operating in excess of 28 miles per hour, SB 3336 would prohibit their operation on any public highway, bike path, or bike lane, regardless of speed limit. The bill expressly exempts operators of EMD’s from obtaining a drivers license (or permit), registration, certificate of title, or liability insurance. SB 3336 would also authorize local law enforcement agencies to confiscate and impound an EMD operated in violation of the Code, and release the EMD upon payment of a reasonable administrative fee related to its confiscation and impoundment. If passed, SB 3336 would expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating EMDs in a manner inconsistent with the Code.

Motor Driven Cycles

Second, SB 3336 creates a new section regulating the operation of “motor driven cycles,” which are broadly defined to include (1) every motorcycle, moped, and every motor scooter with an internal combustion engine of less than 150 cubic centimeter piston displacement, (2) an electric motor with a nominal power rating of greater than 750 watts but less than or equal to 8,000 watts, (3) or motorized pedalcycles and every electric bicycle or gas-powered bicycle that is not a low-speed electric bicycle or low-speed gas bicycle. 

If passed, SB 3336 would generally allow people possessing a drivers license (or an instruction permit in certain circumstances) to operate a motor driven cycle on public highways, streets, and roadways—but would prohibit their operation on sidewalks, bike paths, bike lanes, shared-use paths, off-road bike trails, natural surface trails designated for bike use, or any other bike-specific facility established by State or local law. In contrast to EMD’s, operators of motor driven cycles must have a drivers license (or permit), liability insurance, and must generally acquire a certificate of title. Similar to EMD restrictions, SB 3336 also authorizes local law enforcement agencies to confiscate and impound motor driven cycles operated in violation of the Code, and release them upon payment of a reasonable administrative fee related to its confiscation and impounding. If passed, SB 3336 would expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating motor driven cycles in a manner inconsistent with the Code. 

Low-Speed Electric Bicycles (E-Bikes and Gas-Bikes)

SB 3336 also proposes various changes to the Code provisions regarding low-speed electric bicycle (e-bikes) and low-speed gas bicycle regulations (gas-bikes). Currently, the Code has no minimum age requirement to operate Class 1 and 2 e-bikes. SB 3336, if passed, would require operators of Class 1 and 2 e-bikes to be at least 15 years old. Currently, the Code authorizes local governments to prohibit the operation of e-bikes on designated bike paths. SB 3336, if passed, would take that power away from local governments, and instead authorize the operation of e-bikes on any bike path unless “the State agency with jurisdiction” prohibits using e-bikes, or a specific class of e-bike, on designated bike paths. SB 3336, if passed, would also expressly preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating e-bikes or gas bikes in a manner inconsistent with the Code.

Toy Vehicles

SB 3336 also proposes a new definition for “toy vehicle,” which includes any battery powered ride-on toy that (i) is designed to not exceed 10 miles per hour, (ii) includes any number of wheels or handlebars or a steering wheel, and a seat or platform, and (iii) is designed for children under 8 years of age, including products like "Razor," "Power Wheels," and similar products. 

If passed, SB 3336 would authorize the operation of toy vehicles on local government property, unless the local government adopts an ordinance or resolution specifically prohibiting their use. Toy vehicles would also be prohibited from operating on sidewalks and paths designated for bicycles. The bill, if passed, would preempt local governments (including home rule units) from regulating toy vehicles in a manner less restrictive than the Code. 

Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink

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DOJ Extends Title II ADA Web Content Accessibility Compliance Deadlines

DOJ Extends Title II ADA Web Content Accessibility Compliance Deadlines

  Tuesday, April 21, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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On April 20, 2026, the DOJ published an interim final rule (link here) to extend the compliance deadlines under the new Title II Americans with Disabilities Act Rule that set technical standards requiring state and local government web content and mobile apps to meet the technical standards of Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Version 2.1, Level AA.

The Rule previously required state and local governments with a population of 50,000 or more to comply with the accessibility guidelines by April 24, 2026. State and local governments with a population of less than 50,000, and any special district governments, were required to comply by April 26, 2027.

The DOJ’s new interim final rule extends the deadline for state and local governments to comply with the new Rule by at least a year, as follows:

State and Local Government Size	New Compliance Date
0 to 49,999 persons	April 26, 2028
Special district governments	April 26, 2028
50,000 or more persons	April 26, 2027

Post Authored by Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

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Supreme Court Declines to Hear AI Copyright Case

Supreme Court Declines to Hear AI Copyright Case

  Monday, April 20, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal in an Artificial Intelligence (AI)/copyright case. Thaler v. Perlmutter. You can read the court of appeals decision here.

A Missouri artist had applied for a copyright registration for visual art he created through the use of AI technology. The U.S. Copyright Office rejected his application because the work was not created by "human authorship" as required to register a copyright. He sued, and both the district court and court of appeals upheld the Copyright Office's denial of his application. He then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which declined to hear his appeal, meaning that the Copyright Office's rejection of his application for a copyright for the AI work stands.

This wasn't the first time the Copyright Office rejected registration applications by artists for work generated by AI based on the lack of "human authorship" in the work. This case had been followed by artists, musicians, photographers, and other creators who have used AI in their creative works and were hoping for a different outcome in court. For now, at least, work created by AI is not copyright eligible.

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Federal Appeals Court Upholds Injunction Preventing Enforcement of Law That Limits “Drag Story Hour” and Similar Events

Federal Appeals Court Upholds Injunction Preventing Enforcement of Law That Limits “Drag Story Hour” and Similar Events

  Wednesday, April 15, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In 2023, the Montana state legislature passed a bill (Bill) prohibiting any school or library that receives state funding from allowing any “sexually oriented performance or drag story hour” on their property. The Bill includes significant criminal and civil penalties for both performers and institutions hosting these events. Just months after the Bill passed, a group of individuals, organizations, and businesses (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit claiming the Bill violates the First Amendment by restricting protected speech based on content. The federal district court issued a preliminary injunction limiting the state's enforcement of the Bill during the lawsuit. The state appealed the court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Imperial Sovereign Court of the State of Montana, et al. v. Knudsen, et al.

After determining that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Bill, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the constitutional claims raised in the case. In order to determine the proper framework to evaluate the First Amendment claims, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Bill “regulates purely expressive activity or expressive conduct,” and whether the regulations are content-based or content-neutral.

To start, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Bill was not passed to regulate “obscenity,” which is a narrow category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the Bill was purportedly enacted to limit children’s exposure to “indecent speech.” The Ninth Circuit noted that state legislative authority to regulate for the protection of minors must be considered against the long history of the First Amendment, which applies to protect “sexual expression that is indecent but not obscene.” 

Drag Story Hour 

The Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs were likely to establish that the Bill’s restriction on drag storytelling events is subject to strict scrutiny, because the restriction impacts purely expressive activity and regulates based on content. First, the Court noted that these performances (involving reading out loud while performing a drag persona) constitute expressive activity, likening drag story hours to theatrical plays. Second, the Court asserted three reasons to support their determination that the restriction was content-based: the Bill’s restriction (1) applies only to people reading a particular type of content, (2) prohibits only certain speakers from reading the book out loud or conveying a message, and (3) draws a line between prohibited and permitted speakers based on the content of their expression. The Court determined that these elements of the Bill were a content-based restriction on speech subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.  

Using the strict scrutiny framework, the Court next determined that the restriction on drag story hour events was not narrowly tailored to address the State’s expressed interest in preventing the exposure of minors to “indecent speech.” The Court found that the plain language of the Bill would impact speech activity widely accepted as appropriate under historic and contemporary standards. The Court noted that the Bill’s definition of “drag queen” and “drag king,” which includes the adoption of a “flamboyant or parodic male and female personas” using costumes and makeup, could be applied to include popular, well-received characters from G-rated children’s movies. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that the Bill was not tailored to limit children’s exposure to sexualized content and was overinclusive in the content it purports to regulate. The Court also determined that the provision was not narrowly tailored because it disregards minors’ own speech rights and completely overrides parental authority to determine appropriate content for their children. Thus, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction award, finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the restriction on drag story hours violated the First Amendment.  

Sexually Oriented Performances 

In addressing the Bill’s prohibition on “sexually oriented performances” in schools and libraries, the Ninth Circuit again evaluated whether the restriction limits purely expressive activity based on content. The Court found that the performances are purely expressive and, when viewed as a whole, constitute protected speech. The Court noted that, in the case of the statutory restriction on “sexually oriented performances,” the legislature limited speech based on its effect on young viewers. The Court characterized this limitation as “the essence of a content-based speech restriction.”  

After determining that the restriction on sexually oriented performances was content-based, the Ninth Circuit found that it was not narrowly tailored to meet the State’s interest in protecting minors. The Court noted that the legislature’s use of the phrase "sexually oriented” was vague and ambiguous, leaving schools and libraries to guess which performances and events would be subject to the Bill’s prohibitions. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the restriction on speech was not plausibly linked to its impact on children, given that several of the Bill’s restrictions would apply to limit performances in schools and libraries even when children are not present. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction that limited state enforcement of the Bill while the case proceeded in court.

Post Authored by Natalie Cheung and Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink 

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Appellate Court Upholds Conviction of Disorderly Conduct Ordinance Violation

Appellate Court Upholds Conviction of Disorderly Conduct Ordinance Violation

  Tuesday, April 14, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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A parent was arrested for violation of a disorderly conduct ordinance, and was later convicted at trial. According to the court opinion, the arrest related to conduct of the parent towards a teacher at his child's school where he clenched his fists and cursed. He appealed his conviction on several grounds, including that his First Amendment rights were violated, that the city violated court discovery rules, and that the sentence was outside the city's authority.

The Appellate Court upheld his conviction in City of Naperville v. Penick. First, the Court rejected his First Amendment argument, finding that he engaged in more than speech during the incident. Second, the Court found his sentence (supervision and no contact/no entry order) to be within a home rule municipality's authority to set an appropriate penalty for violation of a disorderly conduct ordinance. Third, the Court rejected his argument that the city engaged in discovery violations, finding that a defendant is required to (but did not, in this case) obtain leave of court to engage in discovery in an ordinance violation proceeding. In short, the Court upheld his conviction.

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Tree Trimming Incident Leads to Multiple Lawsuits

Tree Trimming Incident Leads to Multiple Lawsuits

  Monday, April 13, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court ruled in favor of a county in a lawsuit involving the county's actions in regards to a tree trimming incident involving neighbors in Lugo v. Woodford County. 

Two neighboring property owners had ongoing issues with each other which were serious enough to cause one neighbor to seek a no-stalking, no contact order from the other neighbor. While his petition for a protective order was pending, the petitioning neighbor hired a tree trimmer to trim branches of a tree on his neighbor's property that were overhanging onto his property. Because of the ongoing neighbor problems, the tree trimmer called the county sheriff to have a deputy present while the work was being done. The deputy informed the tree-owning neighbor that he could view and film the work from his own property, but could not trespass onto the petitioning neighbor's property or stage himself in front of the property while the work was proceeding. 

The tree-owning neighbor filed a lawsuit in federal court claiming the deputy and county violated his civil rights in restricting his activities and location while the tree was being trimmed. The district court ruled in favor of the county, and the court of appeals upheld that ruling. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to take on his appeal. 

After he lost his federal lawsuit, he filed a lawsuit in state court raising many of the same claims, as well as arguing that the county was continuing to violate constitutional rights based on race and ethnicity. The circuit court dismissed his case, finding that it was barred by "res judicata" which prohibits someone from filing a second lawsuit about issues that were already litigated in court. He appealed.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that the tree-owning neighbor's state court case was barred because of the final ruling in the federal court. At the end of the opinion, the Appellate Court provides its opinion on the neighbor's multiple lawsuits and appeals regarding a tree-trimming incident, as follows:

During his address at the Virginia Bar Association’s Law Day celebration in 1962, then-attorney general Robert F. Kennedy said, “The glory of justice and the majesty of law are created not just by the Constitution—nor by the courts—nor by the officers of the law—nor by the lawyers—but by the men and women who constitute our society—who are the protectors of the law as they are themselves protected by the law.” A civil suit in federal district court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. A civil suit in the state circuit court, this appeal to the Fourth District, and probably further. All because some tree branches needed trimming. It is doubtful this is what Kennedy had in mind. 

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Supreme Court Finds Qualified Immunity for Police Officer Sued for Excessive Force by Protester

Supreme Court Finds Qualified Immunity for Police Officer Sued for Excessive Force by Protester

  Wednesday, April 08, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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The Supreme Court recently weighed in on the issue of qualified immunity for a police officer who was sued under the civil rights statute for allegedly using excessive force in removing a person from a protest. Zorn v. Linton. 

Protestors staged a sit-in at the state capitol on the day of the Vermont Governor's inauguration. When the capitol closed for the day, police officers informed the protesters that they needed to leave or would be arrested for trespassing. When they refused to leave, officers removed them one-by-one. When one of the protesters refused to stand up, a police officer took her arm, put it behind her back, placed pressure on her wrist, and lifted her to her feet. The protester sued the police officer for using excessive force, claiming the use of a "rear wristlock" during the arrest injured her arm and caused psychological disorders. The district court held in favor of the officer, finding he had qualified immunity for his actions. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the "gratuitous" use of a rear wristlock on a protester who was passively resisting arrest constituted excessive force, so the police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The officer appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court

The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and held that the police officer did have qualified immunity. The Court noted that government officials have qualified immunity from suit under the civil rights statute (1983) unless their conduct violates clearly established law. Because the court of appeals failed to identify any case in the circuit where an officer taking similar action (rear wristlock) in a similar circumstance (removing a protester for trespass after repeated warnings), the Supreme Court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

Three Justices filed a dissenting opinion, finding that the officer should not be entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim because prior case law had established that using a rear wristlock as a "pain compliance technique" against a nonviolent protester would violate the protester's constitutional rights.

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Supreme Court Allows Civil Rights Challenge to City's Protest Ordinance to Move Forward

Supreme Court Allows Civil Rights Challenge to City's Protest Ordinance to Move Forward

  Tuesday, April 07, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion relating to a challenge to a City ordinance that required individuals participating in protests to stay within a "designated protest area" in Olivier v. City of Brandon.

Olivier was a street preacher in Mississippi who often shared his religious views on City sidewalks. In 2019, the City adopted an ordinance requiring anyone participating in protests or demonstrations to stay within a designated protest area. Olivier was arrested for violating the ordinance and pled no contest and was fined, given one year of probation, and a suspended 10 day prison sentence that would be served only if he violated the ordinance during his probation period. Although he did not appeal the fine or sentence, he did file a section 1983 civil rights lawsuit against the City to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. Specifically, he argued that the ordinance violated the First Amendment's free speech clause because it confined speakers to a designated protest area, and he sought an injunction prohibiting the City from enforcing the ordinance against him in the future. The district court and court of appeals dismissed his case based on an earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision that prohibits the use of the section 1983 to challenge the validity of a prior conviction or sentence. 

The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, and reversed their decision, allowing Olivier's lawsuit to move forward. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that Olivier was not challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence. Instead, he was seeking relief from future prosecutions for violations of the ordinance, so its prior decision barring 1983 relief did not apply. The Court did not weigh in on the question of whether the ordinance was constitutional or not, remanding it back to the district court to make that determination.

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Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 104: Not in My Park!

Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 104: Not in My Park!

  Monday, April 06, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 104: Not in My Park! Regulating Controversial Park Activities, Ancel Glink’s Tyler Smith, Eugene Bolotnikov, and Katie Nagy take the stage at the 2026 IAPD/IPRA Soaring to New Heights Conference. The Ancel Glink "Not In My Park" team discusses the legal complexities of managing potentially controversial activities in public spaces, ranging from the rapid rise of e-bikes and e-scooters to the evolving landscape of public camping regulations and the "noise" issues surrounding pickleball courts. This episode features live audio from their conference session, providing practical strategies for park districts and municipalities to regulate these activities while balancing individual rights and public safety.

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Another AI Hallucination Case

Another AI Hallucination Case

  Tuesday, March 31, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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Although today's case summary isn't related to local government issues, it is an important reminder to be careful in relying on AI (artificial intelligence) for legal work, particularly in filings with the court.

In Dec v. Markwayne Mullin, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a challenge by a Polish citizen who was denied a waiver of the waiting period for a family-based visa that requires a person to leave the country and remain abroad for ten years. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denied her waiver request and she sued. The district court dismissed her lawsuit, holding that the applicable federal law precludes judicial review of agency decisions on waiver requests. She then appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the dismissal of her case.

In addition to upholding the dismissal of her case, the Seventh Circuit also addressed deficiencies in the appellate brief filed on her behalf by her attorney. The Court noted that her brief cited two cases that do not exist and included an imaginary quotation, which the Court noted had "tell-tale signs of AI hallucinations" (although the plaintiff's attorney argued she did not use AI in her brief). The Court acknowledged that courts have been grappling with the use of generative AI in briefs filed with the court, particularly when it produces AI hallucinations and non-existent case citations. The Court expressed its concerns, particularly that trained lawyers are failing to check the accuracy of legal citations and quotations in their filings with the court. The Court was not only concerned about the plaintiffs' counsel inclusion of these hallucinated cases, but also the fact that opposing counsel in the case (DHS attorneys) failed to catch these errors and bring them to the attention of the court. 

The Court's discussion is a reminder to all lawyers and parties to litigation that they exercise caution in their use of AI in drafting briefs filed with the court and to double-check their legal arguments and any supporting citations. That cautionary reminder is not restricted to the attorneys filing with the court, but also to opposing counsel who fail to catch these errors.

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Reminder of Updated Web Accessibility Requirements

Reminder of Updated Web Accessibility Requirements

  Thursday, March 26, 2026    Julie Tappendorf

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In April 2024, the Department of Justice issued a final rule updating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) regulations to ensure that state and local governments’ web content is accessible to persons with disabilities.

Under the new rule, local governments must ensure their websites and mobile applications meet the technical standards of the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1, Level AA. An ADA fact sheet on the rule is available here.

The deadline to comply with the rule depends on the population reported for the local government in the 2020 U.S. Census Bureau data:

State and local government size	Compliance date
0 to 49,999 persons	April 26, 2027
Special district governments	April 26, 2027
50,000 or more persons	April 24, 2026

Local governments should reach out to their legal counsel if they have questions about compliance with these new regulations.

Post Authored by Katie Nagy, Ancel Glink

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