A collection of local business and real estate organizations challenged the proposed ballot question, arguing the proposal violated state statute and the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiffs argued that state statute only allows the imposition of a new transfer tax or increase in the rate of taxation with approval by referendum, and that any other change (such as a tax decrease) has to be done without prior approval by referendum.
The trial court ruled in favor of the local businesses and prohibited the proposal from being on the ballot. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court in Building Owners and Managers Association v. Commission of the Board of Elections,
First, the Appellate Court noted that Illinois courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction over challenges to referenda that are part of the legislative process. The rationale is the separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislative branches of government, and that the judiciary can "neither dictate nor enjoin the passage of legislation." Here, the referendum was the first step in a process to authorize a municipality to adopt an ordinance implementing or modifying the tax, a legislative process that the AppellateCourt held that courts should not interfere with.
Second, the Appellate Court stated it would not issue an advisory opinion, and that courts should only decide the validity of legislation that has already been enacted.
The Appellate Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, finding that the trial court should not have exercised jurisdiction over the complaint.
Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
The first case involved a First Amendment lawsuit against a City Manager who had deleted critical comments and blocked the commenter from the City Manager's personal Facebook page. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled in favor of the City Manager, finding that his actions did not amount to "state action" under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which issued an opinion today. The Supreme Court held that a government official's speech on social media will only be attributable to the government if the official (1) possesses actual authority to speak on the government's behalf and (2) purported to exercise that authority when the official spoke on social media. The Court remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit to apply that test to the extent that it differed from the one the Sixth Circuit applied when it ruled in favor of the City Manager. Lindke v. Freed.
The second case also involved a First Amendment lawsuit, this time filed by parents against school board members who had deleted their comments and blocked them from the school board members' personal Facebook pages. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the parents, holding that the school board members violated the parents' First Amendment rights when they deleted comments and blocked them from their pages. That ruling was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated the Ninth Circuit's ruling and remanded the case with instructions that the Ninth Circuit apply the test the Supreme Court established in today's Lindke v. Freed case. O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier.
Stay tuned next week for a more detailed analysis of the Supreme Court's new test and how it might apply to both government officials' and employees' social media activities.
]]>In January 2016, a city clerk asked a junior clerk to
volunteer for two political campaigns, and the junior clerk declined. In February 2016, the city clerk fired the junior clerk, stating that the reason was the clerk's previous felony conviction for stealing public funds. The junior clerk then sued the city clerk claiming the
termination was retaliation against his refusal to volunteer for the political campaigns in violation of his First Amendment free speech rights. A jury ruled in favor
of the city clerk, and the junior clerk appealed.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit considered four issues:
1) whether the trial court improperly admitted expert
witness testimony;
2) whether the trial court improperly allowed an
allegedly biased juror to sit on the jury;
3) whether the trial court issued confusing and
misleading jury instructions and verdict forms; and
4) whether the jury’s completed verdict forms were
inconsistent.
Regarding the expert witness claim, the Seventh Circuit
determined the expert testimony was properly admitted because the trial court
used the correct framework to admit expert testimony, the testimony satisfied
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and it was relevant to case.
Regarding the biased juror claim, the Seventh Circuit
stated the standard for disqualifying a juror is whether the juror holds a
relevant prejudicial belief and whether they can suspend that prejudicial belief.
Although the juror stated a belief that was possibly prejudicial, since the
juror repeatedly stated they could suspend the belief, it was proper to let
the juror remain.
Regarding the jury instruction and forms claim, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned the jury instructions correctly laid out the elements
of a First Amendment challenge, and the verdict forms clearly indicated that
only one of the two forms applied depending on how the jury ruled.
Regarding the verdict form inconsistency claim, the Seventh Circuit held that because this claim was not raised at trial, it could not be raised on appeal.
Post Authored by Daniel Lev, Ancel Glink
]]>More recently, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the County claiming the tax was unconstitutional because it violates their Second Amendment rights, and seeking money damages for themselves and for other similarly situated individuals for having been forced to pay the allegedly unconstitutional tax. The County filed a motion to dismiss the class action lawsuit based on four arguments:
(1) the current case was controlled by the Illinois Supreme Court's previous decision in Guns Save Life v. Ali;
(2) the plaintiffs were seeking an improper advisory opinion;
(3) the plaintiffs were alleging insufficient facts to defeat the motion; and
(4) the ordinance’s tax does not exceed the U.S. Supreme Court decision that so long as fees are not exorbitant then they’re constitutional.
The trial court granted the County's motion to dismiss based on the first argument, holding that it was bound by the outcome of the Guns Save Life case because although the Illinois Supreme Court had relied only on the Uniformity Clause to find the tax unconstitutional, the Appellate Court had previously determined that the taxes did not infringe upon any protected Second Amendment right.
In Vandermyde v. Cook County, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the trial court's analysis, finding that nothing in the Appellate Court's previous decision in the Guns Save Life case retained precedential value as it related to the Second Amendment question, and so the trial court was entitled to review and decide the Second Amendment issues in the exercise of its own judgment. The Appellate Court also found the plaintiffs claims to be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and rejected the County's argument that the taxes were a fee, finding the taxes had no relation to the County's administrative costs in regulating the allegedly protected activity. As a result, the Appellate Court sent the class action case back to the trial court to review the plaintiffs' Second Amendment challenge.
Post Authored by Madeline Tankersley & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of a Village in excluding evidence regarding damages arising from a Village’s decision to deny a special use permit to operate a strip club. Chicago Joe’s Tea Room v. Village of Broadview
In 2006, the club owner (Owner) tried to open a strip club,
but the Village denied the Owner a special use permit. The Owner filed a lawsuit
in May 2007 alleging multiple issues that were resolved in complicated court
proceedings between 2008 and 2018. The only issue remaining was whether the
Owner was owed damages over the denial of the permit.
In August 2007, the State of Illinois amended laws governing
the location of where new adult businesses could open that restricted new adult entertainment businesses. From
2012 to 2014, the Owner offered its opinion on the
damages owed based on the club’s expected lost profits. The Village challenged the Owner’s opinion, and the Owner responded with a supplemental expert opinion.
In August 2022, the Village filed a motion to exclude
practically all the Owner’s evidence of damages and lost profits which was approved by the trial court. Ultimately, both parties agreed to a final judgement, and the
court awarded the Owner $15,111.
On appeal, the Owner asked the Seventh Circuit to consider
five issues:
1) the exclusion of the Owner’s opinion regarding damages
owed;
2) the exclusion of the Owner’s rebuttal expert witness;
3) the exclusion of the financial records of the strip club
where the Owner previously worked;
4) the exclusion of undisclosed total damages; and
5) the denial of the Owner’s 2018 motion to amend their
lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of the 2007 Illinois adult business law.
The Seventh Circuit held that determining profits for a business that never opened required specialized knowledge that the Owner, as a non-expert, could not provide. In addition, because the Owner’s testimony was based on a different strip club that he had not worked at for years prior, his personal knowledge was insufficient to provide relevant evidence.
On the rebuttal expert and the other strip club’s financial records claims, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the inclusion of this evidence, either directly or indirectly, was based on supporting the Owner’s testimony. Because the Owner's opinion testimony was properly excluded, tje rebuttal testimony was also properly excluded.
Regarding Owner's undisclosed damages claim, the Seventh Circuit held that the parties must disclose calculations for each category of damages claimed, and the trial court was correct to exclude evidence that should have been included in prior required disclosures.
Finally, on the Owner's challenge to the Illinois law claim, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s ruling that allowing the
amendment in 2018 would have caused undue delay to the trial when the Owner could have amended its lawsuit previously where the lawsuit was filed in 2007.
More information about the book can be found on the ABA's website here and a summary of the book is provided below:
Title: Development by Agreement: A Toolkit for Land Developers and Local Governments
Authors: Julie A. Tappendorf, Cecily Talbert Barclay, and Matthew S. Gray
Summary: Landowners and local governments often use agreements to increase public benefits and reduce uncertainty surrounding proposed developments. The second edition of this guide provides an overview of problems faced by land developers and local governments that can easily be solved by development and annexation agreements.
]]>Planning professionals may be interested in checking out an upcoming webinar on affordable housing and community land trusts hosted by the APA Planning & Law Division - details below:
Title: Community Land Trusts:
Affordable Housing Strategies for Racial and Economic Justice
Date & Time: Tuesday, March 12, 2024 from noon to 1:35 p.m. Central Time
Credit: 1.50 CM | 1 CM - Law | 1.5 CLE
(Illinois)
Registration here
Description: At a moment during which no state has an adequate supply of extremely low-income rental housing, innovative solutions in shared equity housing are helping to cultivate meaningful, lasting social change. As active practitioners in the world of Community Land Trusts, our three guest speakers’ unique experiences—derived from legal, administrative, and urban planning perspectives—are invaluable in guiding the work of housing attorneys, planners, and lay advocates alike. This webinar will cover tangible strategies for shared equity housing implementation, tools for effective participatory governance frameworks, and potential institutional or systemic barriers.
]]>Candidates for the office of Appellate Court Judge filed nomination papers to be included on the March 2024 primary election ballot. The nomination papers included affidavits certifying their petitions were signed during the required statutory period. Objectors claimed the candidates' affidavits did not comply with the Election Code (Code) because the date range deviated from the Code’s required language,and the candidates should not be on the ballot.
The affidavits contained statements that all signatures were provided during the period of “September 5, 2023 to December 4, 2023.” The Code requires that nomination petitions included a circulator's certification that the nomination papers were signed no more than 90 days before papers were due to be filed. The objectors argued that the affidavit language did not match the statutorily prescribed language.
The Electoral Board ruled in favor of the objectors and ordered the candidates’ names to be removed from the ballot, finding that strict compliance with the prescribed language of the Code was required. The candidates appealed, and the circuit court found the affidavits to be in substantial compliance and ordered the names to appear on the ballot.
On appeal, the Appellate Court agreed with the circuit court and held that the affidavits complied with the Code as this provision of the statute only required a showing of substantial compliance. The Court reasoned that since the affidavits contained an affirmative statement that complied with the purpose of the Code, the candidates were found to be in substantial compliance and the Court ordered their names to appear on the ballot.
Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
The Appellate Court upheld her conviction in Village of Glen Ellyn v. Podkul, rejecting the driver's arguments. First, the Appellate Court held that the driver's claim challenging the Village’s authority to prosecute was forfeited because the driver failed to make an objection during her trial or post-trial motions.
Second, the Appellate Court rejected the driver's claim that a conviction made without statutory authority is void and can be challenged at any time. The Appellate Court held that the trial court’s judgment would only be void if it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issue or lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Here, the Appellate Court held that the conviction would only be voidable, so could only be challenged at the appropriate time and through the proper process.
Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the driver's argument that the conviction could be reversed under the "plain error" rule. The Court held that the plain error rule only allows reversal if there is a structural error proven to have caused a severe threat to the fairness and reliability of the trial but the driver failed to demonstrate any error that would rise to the necessary level of severity to justify reversal of her conviction. Here, the driver was not prevented from mounting an adequate defense, putting on evidence, cross-examining the State’s witnesses, or presenting arguments during her trial. Instead, she merely argues that the Village lacked the statutory authority to prosecute her - i.e., that the prosecution was brought by the wrong party, not that the proceedings themselves were fundamentally unfair or unreliable.
Post Authored by Madeline Tankersley & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
The defendants argued they were entitled to discretionary immunity under the Local Governmental
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act). The Act protects municipalities from liability for an injury resulting from an act or
omission of its employee where the employee is not liable. The Act also protects a public employee from liability for an injury resulting
from an act or omission of the employee acting in the exercise of his or her discretion.
The trial court held that the
instructor was not entitled to protection under the discretionary immunity act
and awarded Chavez damages.
On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed, holding that the instructor was protected by immunity. The Court found that the taser class was the sole responsibility of the instructor and he was the only person capable of making determinations for the method of instruction for the training. The Court also found that the instructor’s decision not to place mats, the choice and placement of the alligator clips, and how many exposures to give and policy determinations were made (i.e., conducting the course at a fire department to ensure medical personnel were nearby), all weighed in favor of a determination that the instructor acted in the exercise of his discretion. As a result, the Appellate Court held that both the instructor and municipality had immunity under the Act. Chavez v. Village of Kirkland.
Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
]]>A month before the deputy fire chief retired, the mayor and village board increased the deputy chief's salary from approximately $125,000 to $150,000. When the deputy chief applied to the Pension Board to receive his pension, the Pension Board approved payouts based on the chief’s $125,000 salary. The deputy chief filed a request with the Pension Board to base the pension on his final $150k salary. The Pension Board reviewed the deputy chief's request at a Pension Board meeting, where the matter was included on the agenda and the deputy chief's attorney was permitted an opportunity to speak on the deputy chief’s behalf. The Pension Board ultimately denied the request, finding that basing the pension on an "unauthorized pension spike" would be against public policy and the regulations of the Illinois Department of Insurance, and would conflict with the Pension Board's fiduciary duties to the Fund and its members. The deputy chief then filed a lawsuit against the Pension Board, and the trial court ruled in the deputy chief’s favor and ordered the Pension Board to hold a new hearing on the matter. The Pension Board then appealed.
The Appellate Court determined that the trial court could only order a new hearing if the deputy chief’s due process rights were violated. Here, the Appellate Court noted that due process required the deputy chief to be provided notice of the Pension Board meeting and a meaningful opportunity to be heard at that meeting. The Appellate Court noted that the deputy chief had prior notice of the meeting because he discussed the matter with the Pension Board’s attorney, and it was a listed agenda item at the Pension Board meeting. Additionally, the Appellate Court found that the deputy chief’s attorney spoke on the deputy chief's behalf at the Pension Board meeting, providing the deputy chief with a sufficient opportunity to be heard. As a result, the Appellate Court determined that the deputy chief’s due process rights were not violated, and as a result, the trial court had no authority to order a new Pension Board hearing.
Post Authored by Daniel Lev, Ancel Glink
]]>On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the circuit court’s ruling in Shehadeh v. City of Taylorville.
First, the Appellate Court held that the requestor’s letter complaining about the conduct of the City's attorney was not a public record because it did not "pertain to the transaction of public business,” like business or community interests and instead pertained to the requestor’s private affairs.
Second, the Appellate Court ruled that the requestor’s letter addressed to the Mayor did not qualify as a public record under FOIA because it was not “received by, in the possession of, or under the control of a public body.” After analyzing FOIA’s definition of a “public body” and prior Illinois cases concluding that an individual alderperson was not a “public body” under FOIA, the Appellate Court concluded that the Mayor is not a “public body” under FOIA. The Court rejected the requestor’s argument that an individual Alderperson should be distinguished from a Mayor, noting that even though a Mayor (unlike an individual Alderperson) has legal authority to make certain unilateral decisions and actions, that distinction does not transform a Mayor into a "public body" under FOIA.
Finally, the Appellate Court determined that the requestor’s request asking for a copy of his own letter was inconsistent with FOIA’s legislative purpose of making public records open and accessible to the public, because requiring the City to provide the requestor with a copy of his own letter would do nothing to further this purpose.
Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov and Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
With so few binding opinions issued by the PAC each year (about 15 or so each year) and no website posting of the PAC's advisory opinions, there still isn't a lot of guidance for public bodies on the unique (or routine, for that matter) questions and issues that come up in their compliance with FOIA and OMA.
]]>The firefighter then sued claiming he was entitled to a pension because he should be allowed to combine his creditable service from his current and former employment for pension eligibility under section 4-109.3 of the Pension Code.
The court disagreed, finding that section only applies to a firefighter who begins employment with a new employer as a result of an IGA that eliminates the previous employer's fire department but does not apply to a firefighter who voluntarily left one job to start another one. The court also noted that the Pension Code makes it clear that only the last pension fund is responsible for a non-duty disability pension, and only if the firefighter has at least 7 years of creditable service with that last pension fund. The court also noted that had the legislature wanted to allow the type of "stacking" of creditable service proposed by the firefighter for non-duty disabilities, it would have included language to that effect but it did not. As a result, the court upheld the denial of a non-duty disability pension by his former employer's pension fund board. Wessel v. Wilmette Firefighters' Pension Fund
]]>
Park and recreation agencies manage many acres of public space where controversial activities sometimes take place. What authority does your organization have to address resident complaints over the location of pickleball recreational facilities, homeless individuals’ and migrant populations’ use of public parks, and protests in parks? Find out as Ancel Glink attorneys Tyler Smith, Katie Nagy, and host Erin Monforti take over Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast!
]]>First, to receive general assistance under the Code, recipients must either be United States citizens or in a category of eligible non-citizens. The Code provides definitions of those categories, but a township may need to consult with an immigration attorney or legal non-profit for guidance on application of this provision of the Code to the migrants within their jurisdiction.
Second, for migrants to receive general assistance, they must not be eligible under any other section of the Code. The Code allows the administration of funds for several programs that migrants may be eligible for depending on certain immigration classifications. Townships may need to seek expert guidance on the classification question as well.
Third, assuming those preliminary hurdles are cleared, townships have legal authority to administer general assistance to migrants. While general assistance is usually limited to residents of Illinois, an exception exists to provide non-state residents with general assistance for a temporary period when they will suffer “great hardship.” Migrants arriving in the Chicagoland area typically have no money, food, or shelter which would likely qualify as a great hardship under the Code.
General assistance is split into two categories: 1) transitional assistance; and 2) family and children assistance. The first category, transitional assistance, is for individuals 18 years or older who are “chronically needy” and townships have the power to expand categories of “chronically needy.” If a township wants to provide aid to migrants through transitional assistance, they have the power to do so. The second category, family and children assistance, is for families with children under 18 or pregnant women. There may also be other aid programs for needy families that migrants may be eligible for depending on immigration status.
Finally, nothing in the Code should be construed to mean that townships are required to provide general assistance to migrants in their communities, but only that they appear to have the authority to do so, subject to certain status or classification issues.
Post Authored by Daniel Lev, Ancel Glink
]]>In October 2020, a group sued a city and developer to prevent the annexation of over 1000 acres of unincorporated property for the purpose of developing an industrial business park for warehouses and truck terminals. The city and developer agreed to an annexation and development agreement and development approvals after conducting multiple public hearings. After amending the lawsuit several times, the trial court ultimately considered five claims:
1) whether the development would cause a private nuisance to individuals;
2) whether the development would cause a public nuisance to
the community at large;
3) whether the annexation agreement was void for being too
vague;
4) whether a November 2021 plan commission hearing about
the development was invalid due to inadequate notice; and
5) whether November and December 2021 plan commission’s
in-person hearings violated the Open Meetings Act for not following the
Governor’s mask mandate.
The trial court dismissed all five of the group’s issues, and the group appealed.
The Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the third, fourth, and fifth claims. On the vagueness claim, the court held that imperfect drafting did not make the annexation agreement illegal or unauthorized. On the notice claim, the court held that the group did not allege they suffered any harm from inadequate notice, so there was no prejudice to justify an improper notice claim. On the mask mandate claim, the court stated the statewide mask mandate was targeted towards individuals, not governments, and there was no legal basis to invalidate an ordinance or annexation agreement passed at a public hearing where face masks were not worn by attendees.
However, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the first and second claims. On the private nuisance claim, the court held that plaintiffs' allegations about the potential impact of air and noise pollution, vibrations, and safety concerns were immediate and specific enough for group members who lived closest to the development to meet the pleading requirements for that claim. On the public nuisance claim, the court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim for a common-law public nuisance in their allegations relating to a potential increase in truck traffic and the impacts on the community.
In sum, the Appellate Court held that the trial court should have let plaintiffs' private and public nuisance claims move forward to the next stage of litigation and remanded the case back to the trial court.
Post Authored by Daniel Lev, Ancel Glink
The City of Rock Falls had an ordinance in place that requires any property within city limits that is being serviced by a private sewage disposal system to be converted and redirected to the public sewage disposal system upon the sale of that property. Aims Industrial Services, LLC (Aims) purchased a commercial property located within Rock Falls that was being serviced by a private sewage disposal system. Despite being notified by the City that it needed to comply with the ordinance, Aims did not take action to connect its property to the public sewage disposal system. The City filed a lawsuit to enforce compliance with the ordinance.
The trial court found in favor of Aims and held there was no reason, outside of compliance with the ordinance, to force Aims to connect to the public sewage system. In ruling in favor of Aims, the court balanced the competing interests of the parties, and considered Aim's costs of compliance of approximately $150,000, and the fact that the private sewer system was not in disrepair nor a threat to public health.
The City appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have considered the interests of the parties and instead should have enforced the requirements in the ordinance. The Appellate Court agreed and reversed the ruling in favor of Aims. The Appellate Court stated that “where a governmental agency is expressly authorized by statute to seek injunctive relief, the traditional equitable elements necessary to obtain an injunction need not be satisfied.” Further, the Appellate Court explained that "because there is a presumption of harm to the public when an ordinance is violated, a governmental agency seeking an injunction need only show that the ordinance was violated and that the ordinance specifically provides for injunctive relief." The Appellate Court concluded that because the City only had to prove that Aims violated the Code and that the Code specifically authorized injunctive relief as a remedy, "the construction work and cost required to connect to the City’s sewage system, as well as the exemption granted to the other business, were irrelevant."
Aims appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which upheld the Appellate Court's ruling in favor of the City. The Illinois Supreme Court made it clear that a "court is not free to disregard or 'rebalance' the policy determinations made by a legislative body" and when a trial court is confronted “with a continuing violation of statutory law, it has no discretion or authority to balance the equities so as to permit that violation to continue.” The trial court should only have considered whether the City met its burden in establishing a violation of the ordinance had occurred.
Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink
The public body argued that because the agreement included a mutual non-disparagement clause in the agreement, release of the agreement could expose it to liability because disclosure might cause harm to the other contracting party, such as disparagement. The PAC rejected that argument, and also noted that even if the agreement contained a confidentiality provision prohibiting disclosure of the agreement, that provision would be unenforceable because section 2.20 of FOIA provides that settlement agreements are public records disclosable to the public, subject to redaction of exempt information.
Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink
]]>The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, rejecting plaintiffs' arguments. The case made its way to the Illinois Supreme Court which also ruled in favor of the defendants. Specifically, the Illinois Supreme Court found that plaintiffs had no constitutional right to how the local pension funds are invested (whether at the state or local level) or in the selection of investment managers. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional "takings" claim, holding that while participants have a right to receive their promised benefits, they do not have a private property right in the source of funding for those payments. Arlington Heights Police Pension Fund v. Pritzker, et al.
Various bills have been introduced over the past couple of years to expand the remote meeting provision in OMA beyond a public health disaster although none of those bills have been enacted. One of those bills is House Bill 1408, which would allow a public body to conduct a remote meeting if the chief elected or appointed official of the public body determines that an in-person meeting would pose a high risk to the health or safety of members of the public body or public and that a remote meeting is in the best interests of the public body. The bill would make a few other changes to the OMA regarding the opportunity for public comment and certain notice requirements for these expanded remote meetings.
The bill is still in committee so it is not clear whether it will have any movement this legislative session but we will monitor it and similar bills.
In 2011, a restaurant opened in the Village. The Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR) mistakenly located the restaurant in a neighboring City. As a result, the restaurant’s sales tax revenue that should have gone to the Village instead was allocated to the City. In March 2020, the Village discovered the error and alerted IDOR. Although the City had received over $1.1M dollars from the restaurant’s sales tax from 2011 to 2020, the Village was only reimbursed for $100K of that misallocated revenue based on the IDOR's claim that state law limited reimbursement of funds to only the prior six months since the error was discovered. When the City refused to return the remaining $1M in unfairly received sales tax revenue to the Village, the Village sued the City. The trial court dismissed the Village's lawsuit on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the tax case, and the Village appealed.
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court on three bases. First, the Appellate Court held that the trial court did, in fact, have jurisdiction to calculate the sales tax amount that should have been allocated to the Village. Second, the Appellate Court held that the City was obligated to monitor its tax rolls to discover the mistake within the initial six months of IDOR’s error, so allowing the City to keep the $1M in misallocated tax revenue would be an unfair windfall to the City. Third, the Court determined that the Village was not precluded from suing the City because the issue was not only about the IDOR's error, but also the return of the misallocated funds to the Village.
Post Authored by Dan Lev, Ancel Glink
]]>As of January 1st, all Illinois employers must report both newly hired employees and independent contractors that perform work for the employer under an IRS 1099 Form to IDES not later than 20 days after the date the newly hired employee or independent contractor operating under a 1099 form is employed or hired. Note that the new reporting obligation does not seem to extend to employees of vendors an employer contracts with for work performed by the vendor's own employees. Instead, the intent of the law is to capture those independent contractors who are not subject to reporting by their employers because they are self-employed and working under a 1099 form.
Each report should be made on an IRS Form W-4 or, at the option of the employer, an equivalent form, and transmitted by first class mail or electronically on the IDES website at this IDES link.
If an employer knowingly fails to report “newly hired employees,” including self-employed independent contractors, the Act imposes a civil penalty of $15 for each person that the employer failed to report. Also, the Act makes it a Class B misdemeanor and imposes a fine of $500 per employee for any person that knowingly conspires with a newly hired employee to cause an employer to fail to report or file a false or incomplete report regarding required newly hired employee information under the Act.
Post Authored by Eugene Bolotnikov, Ancel Glink
]]>House Bill 4401 was introduced on January 8th. If passed, the bill would amend the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Local Records Act (LRA) to add a definition for “junk mail” to each Act and provide that the term “public records” for purposes of complying with FOIA or the LRA does not include junk mail.
House Bill 4402 was introduced on January 8th. If passed, the bill would amend the Open Meeting Act (OMA) to replace one of the reasons authorizing a member of a public body to attend an in-person meeting remotely (“a family or other emergency”) with “exigent circumstances concerning a family member.” The bill would also add definitions for “bona fide emergency” and “exigent circumstances.”
Senate Bill 2665 was introduced on January 10th. If passed, the bill would amend the OMA to add a new reason authorizing a member of a public body to attend an in-person meeting remotely for "performance of active duty as a service member." The bill would also add a definition for "active military duty" and "service member."
House Bill 4325 was introduced on January 3rd. If passed, the bill would amend FOIA in a number of ways, including the following: